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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the uses of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) and challenges faced in 
their implementation in the context of England’s National Programme for IT (NPfIT), the 
biggest civil IT programme in the world (Brennan, 2007).  Despite the huge investments 
and high visibility that characterised the NPfIT, its aim of national level EHRs was not 
achieved and the programme was dismantled after being in operation for nearly a 
decade. The concepts of ‘organising visions’ (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), ‘boundary 
objects’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989), ‘technology frames’ (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) and 
‘professional hybridisation’ (Noordegraaf, 2007) are employed to explain findings from 
this research. The study uses qualitative research methods, drawing on documentary 
sources and 51 semi-structured interviews.  
Responding to the limitations of using solely organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997), this thesis studies the NPfIT using a dual lens combining organising visions and 
boundary objects to understand the dynamics between stakeholders of the NPfIT 
organising vision. This thesis presents the EHR itself as a boundary object, and illustrates 
the knowledge sharing capacity of EHRs across clinical boundaries.  
A key emergent finding is the presence of clinician-IT hybrid professionals - a group that 
has neither been subject to empirical research nor been given sufficient attention in 
critical projects such as the NPfIT despite their unique position that bridges the clinical 
and IT domains. This study presents key findings discussing the factors that support and 
discourage the emergence of clinician-IT professional hybrids. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Overview 
‘The world's most spectacular purchase of “vapourware”1, perpetrated on behalf of the 
British taxpayer’ (Chelsom, 2011: 6). 
‘An expensive and problematic solution to a non-existent clinical problem’ (Robertson et 
al., 2010: 6). 
‘A dismal catalogue of naivety, ambition and spinelessness’ (The Times, 2011). 
‘A fiasco’ (Brooks, 2007: 7). 
These are not depictions of any ordinary project, but were labels attached to England’s 
National Programme for IT (NPfIT), the world’s biggest civil IT programme (Brennan, 
2007), also described as ‘the project that could make or break’ the English NHS (Craig and 
Brooks, 2006: 182). Launched in 2002 with an initial estimated cost of £6.2 billion 
(Connecting for Health, 2005b) that spiralled up to £9.8 billion (NAO, 2013), the NPfIT was 
the flagship programme for the modernisation agenda (Cabinet Office, 1999) within the 
English NHS. One of its key components, the NHS Care Record Service (NCRS), was 
intended to provide health professionals and patients easy access to their electronic 
health records (EHRs) from anywhere and at any time (Connecting for Health, 2005b). 
Despite the tremendous amount of political support available to the programme, it was 
subjected to significant criticism from the media and key stakeholders including clinicians 
(Sauer and Willcocks, 2007) and was finally dismantled in September 2011 (DH, 2011).  
The disparity between the NPfIT’s promised benefits and the actual outcomes prompts 
the need to investigate what went wrong, and how the derailment of the programme 
could have been averted. Nearly midway into the programme, Craig and Brooks (2006: 
                                                          
1
 Vapourware is a term used to refer to IT products that have been promised but do not actually materialise 
as they are neither delivered nor officially cancelled 
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184) had warned that if the NPfIT were to fail, it would cause ‘the largest haemorrhage of 
taxpayers’ money from essential front-line services into the pockets of management and 
IT systems consultants in British history’, exemplifying the magnitude of the stakes 
involved.  
This thesis investigates the dynamics between key stakeholder groups including clinicians, 
the Department of Health, information technology (IT) suppliers, NPfIT management and 
policymakers in the high profile NPfIT, and demonstrates how dissonance among these 
players was an impediment to the successful completion of the programme. The lack of 
clinical engagement was one of the main criticisms of the programme (Coiera, 2007; 
Cresswell et al., 2011; Hendy et al., 2005), resulting in an absence of efforts to understand 
the diverse needs of clinicians. This study employs empirical data to illustrate some of the 
(often conflicting) perspectives of multiple stakeholders regarding EHRs (McGinn et al., 
2011), given that the key component of the NPfIT envisioned EHRs at a national level. 
Prior to the NPfIT a significant level of computerisation had been reached among general 
practitioners (GPs) in the UK (Benson 2002a, 2002b). The success of computerisation in 
primary care was an opportunity for the national programme to employ lessons learned 
from local EHR implementations to inform policy and practice. However this was not the 
case, due to a lack of meaningful clinical engagement (Coiera, 2007; Cresswell et al., 
2011; Hendy et al., 2005). Much could have been learned from the experiences of primary 
care physicians who would have provided valuable inputs regarding clinical needs and 
requirements pertaining to EHRs. The leadership and initiatives taken by GPs who had an 
interest in computing was one of the reasons for the higher incidence of computerisation 
in primary care as opposed to secondary care (Benson, 2002a). This is an interesting 
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contrast to several studies that trumpet the techno-phobic and resistant nature of 
clinicians (Ford et al. 2009; Lapointe and Rivard, 2005; Timmons, 2003b). My empirical 
data points to the existence of a much overlooked clinical hybrid professional: the 
clinician-IT hybrid, and this thesis stresses the importance of this role in health IT 
initiatives such as the NPfIT. 
With this brief overview, I identify the importance of this research, and outline the key 
theoretical underpinnings that inform this study. This is followed by a section presenting 
my research objectives. The chapter concludes with an outline of the structure of this 
thesis. 
1.2  Why this research? 
Lessons learned from past IT projects – both, successes as well as failures (Parliamentary 
Public Accounts Committee, 2000) did not appear to be drawn on in the case of the NPfIT. 
Recently voiced hopes of a paperless NHS by 2018 (Whitfield, 2013) seem to indicate an 
insularity to past failures, resurrecting optimistic ambitions of policymakers who launched 
the NPfIT with a similar unfeasible timeline of under three years (Brooks, 2007; 
Greenhalgh and Keen, 2013). While this study does not aim to evaluate a particular 
aspect of the NPfIT, it illustrates the complex community dynamics which marked the 
programme using the concepts of organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) and 
boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989), providing useful insights for future 
research. 
In attempting to establish a national level EHR, the NPfIT did not engage with clinicians to 
understand how they perceived and used EHRs in their clinical practice. The increasingly 
specialist nature of healthcare implies that the interactions between different clinicians 
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4 
 
and EHRs vary. It is important to understand how EHRs interface between multiple users, 
and how their needs, knowledge and dependencies differ if they are to be deployed 
effectively. I analyse EHRs as boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989; Carlile 2002, 
2004) and highlight their multiple purposes as perceived by their users. 
Attempts were made to address the lack of clinical engagement toward the latter half of 
the national programme by a number of mechanisms including the establishment of 
National Clinical Leads (Cresswell et al., 2011). This process of involvement is an example 
of the absorption of clinical professionals into management/leadership and can be 
viewed as the formation of a distinct professional hybrid, the clinician-manager (Doolin, 
2002; Fitzgerald, 1994). The involvement of GPs in the computerisation of primary care in 
England draws attention to the unique role of clinicians who take an active interest in IT, 
and who could potentially be regarded as unique hybrid professionals bridging healthcare 
and technology. Given the potential link between high performing healthcare 
organisations and their preference for clinician-managers as opposed to managers 
without a clinical background (Goodall, 2011), there may be similar benefits offered by 
the increased recognition and involvement of clinician-IT hybrid professionals.  
1.3  Key theoretical underpinnings 
This section outlines the key theoretical concepts employed in this study. These concepts 
are revisited in Chapter 2 where I discuss them in further detail.  
This study draws on extant literature to understand the challenges, issues and nuances of 
EHR implementations, and uses this foundation to follow the progress of EHR 
development and implementation in the context of the NPfIT. Multiple voices, efforts and 
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ambitions served as inputs to the programme (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007), providing a 
chain of interwoven debates over the course of the NPfIT.  
I employ the concept of organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), to analyse the 
diffusion of IS innovations and the NPfIT. The consideration of ‘community discourse’ and 
the emergence and subsidence of ‘buzzwords’ or dominant rhetoric in organising visions 
help in understanding the dynamics between the many stakeholders involved in the NPfIT 
(see Chapters 3 and 5). I also use the concept of boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 
1989; Swan et al., 2007) when discussing the multiple perspectives that contributed to 
the NPfIT organising vision discourse. Described as ‘objects which inhabit multiple worlds 
simultaneously’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989: 408), boundary objects may be physical or 
abstract, and scholars have studied a range of boundary objects including technology (Gal 
Lyytinen and Yoo, 2008), texts (Oswick and Robertson, 2009) and timelines (Yakura, 
2002). 
When discussing clinicians’ multiple uses of EHRs, I again return to the concept of 
boundary objects, highlighting the different types of boundaries (Carlile 2002, 2004) 
where they may be positioned, to facilitate the flow of knowledge between different EHR 
users. The different interests of users may hinder effective knowledge flow, due to the 
challenge of knowledge ‘at stake’ (Carlile 2004). These tensions highlight the need to take 
into account users’ multiple perspectives and needs for successful EHR implementations.  
Underlying the theoretical discussions in Chapter 5 is the idea of technology frames which 
acknowledges differences in the ways distinct stakeholders perceive and use IT, 
influencing the way they interact with technology (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Davidson, 
2002; Davis and Hufnagel, 2007). Conflicts between users result in incongruent 
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technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994), and this variation in the interplay 
between stakeholder groups in different settings accounts for the context dependent 
nature of technology implementations (Davis and Hufnagel, 2007). Technologies that 
support multiple incongruent technology frames are likely to have a higher degree of 
‘interpretive flexibility’ (Pinch and Bijker 1984, 1987), defined as the ‘capacity of a specific 
technology (or other knowledge system) to sustain the divergent interpretations of 
multiple relevant groups’ (Sahay and Robey, 1996: 260). This holds true in the case of 
EHRs given their diverse range of users. 
 The latter part of this thesis focuses on the sociology of professions and professional 
hybrids. Freidson’s (1985) theory of restratification proposes that professionals adopt 
additional roles in response to external threats. This has significance to the emergence of 
clinical professional hybrids such as clinician-managers (Noordegraaf, 2007; Montgomery, 
2001; Ferlie et al., 2011), as they attempt to prevent non-professionals from pervading 
their jurisdiction (Dopson, 2009). Technology too may be regarded as a threat to clinician 
autonomy as its boundary spanning nature (McLaughlin and Webster, 1998; Tjora, 2000; 
Barrett et al., 2012) facilitates shifts in professional boundaries allowing an increased 
overlap between different clinical roles (Walter and Lopez, 2008). I draw on these strands 
of literature to analyse the infiltration of clinicians into the IT domain resulting in a niche 
group of clinician-IT hybrid professionals. 
With this brief overview of the key theoretical concepts which underpin this research, I 
now outline my research objectives and my anticipated theoretical contributions. 
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1.4  Research objectives 
This research investigates the significance of EHRs as boundary objects subject to multiple 
interpretations by a diverse range of users. The study is set in the context of England’s 
NPfIT, and studies the key boundary objects that marked the different phases of the 
national programme. My emergent findings pointed to the existence of a niche group of 
clinicians involved in IT development, implementation and policy making, and hence this 
research investigates reasons for the emergence of this new hybrid role and the specific 
challenges they have to contend with. 
This study began with the objective of addressing the following questions: 
1. How did the NPfIT organising vision develop under the influence of the 
discourse prevalent amongst stakeholders during the project?  
2. How do different users perceive EHRs, and how do professional roles influence 
how EHRs are used to mediate interactions and knowledge flow across 
boundaries? 
A key emergent finding from my empirical data was the presence of a significant number 
of clinicians who have ventured into IT roles. The identification of this often overlooked 
hybrid led to a subsequent research question: 
3. What triggers the formation of the clinician-IT hybrid, and how does this align 
with Freidson’s theory of restratification amongst medical professionals? 
With this overview of my research objectives, I now outline the anticipated theoretical 
contributions from this research. 
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1.5  Anticipated theoretical contributions 
This research offers three main contributions to academic literature, which I shall now 
detail. 
First, the limited success in national health IT systems implementations (Cresswell et al., 
2011) and the paucity of literature on large scale EHR initiatives (Takian et al., 2012) 
highlight the need for research into large scale national EHR initiatives such as the NPfIT’s 
Care Record Service. This study responds to this call, and investigates EHR adoption in the 
context of England’s NPfIT, thus serving as an empirical contribution to literature on large 
scale EHR projects. 
Secondly, scholars have identified the need for more research on the transformation of 
objects (Engeström and Blackler, 2005; McGivern and Dopson, 2010). During their 
lifetime, objects may go through phases in which varied levels of value are ascribed to 
them, and in the process they are transformed and reconceptualised (Engeström and 
Blackler, 2005). Studying the different phases or ‘buzzwords’ in the NPfIT organising vision 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) as abstract epistemic boundary objects, this research traces 
the development of some key boundary objects contained within the NPfIT. The 
longitudinal nature of the programme suggests the likelihood of changes in the nature of 
the programme’s boundary objects. By studying the lifetime of these objects in closer 
detail, this thesis offers insights into the transformation of objects in the context of the 
NPfIT. 
Thirdly, this research investigates the phenomenon of professional hybridisation which is 
a relatively recent and emerging area of research (Noordegraaf, 2007; Fitzgerald and 
Ferlie, 2000). Professional hybridisation is an important area of research as it bridges 
Chapter 1 
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different domains such as healthcare and management (Noordegraaf, 2007; 
Montgomery, 2001). This thesis contributes to literature on hybridisation by investigating 
a niche group of professional hybrids, namely clinician-IT hybrids, which has not seen 
significant empirical research. Building on empirical data gathered from a range of 
clinicians involved in IT either in advisory or hand-on development roles, this thesis 
addresses theoretical as well as empirical gaps in the literature by exploring how and why 
some clinicians adopt additional IT related roles. 
Having outlined my research objectives and anticipated contributions, I now present the 
structure of the thesis.  
1.6   Structure of the thesis 
This chapter introduces the reader to this study by presenting an overview of the key 
drivers and theoretical concepts that underpin this research. I explain the importance of 
this study, and the relevance of organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), 
boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989), technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 
1994) and professional hybridisation (Noordegraaf, 2007) to my research focus. I also 
outline the research objectives and anticipated contributions of this thesis.  
Chapter 2 provides a literature review that brings together work from the information 
systems (IS) field and the sociology of professions, as these strands of literature are 
particularly relevant to my research focus. Key theoretical concepts, including organising 
visions, boundary objects and technology frames, employed in the later chapters are 
elaborated in this literature review.  
Chapter 1 
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Chapter 3 provides an overview of ‘the NPfIT story’ using a combination of documentary 
sources and reviewed literature. This chapter serves to set the context for the findings 
and discussion chapters (Chapters 5 to 7) by discussing the key phases that marked the 
NPfIT during its operation from 2002 to 2011. 
In chapter 4 I discuss my research methods by outlining the research paradigm, sampling 
strategy, data collection phase and data analysis. I go on to consider the process of data 
gathering and highlight some of the challenges encountered. I also elaborate on the 
analytical process. The four chapters following this constitute my findings chapters.  
Chapter 5 analyses the NPfIT story presented in Chapter 3 using the concepts of 
organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) and boundary objects (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989; Swan et al. 2007). Different phases of the NPfIT such as contracting and 
the increased efforts toward clinical engagement are studied as abstract boundary 
objects within the programme. The chapter highlights the different and conflicting views 
of the stakeholders involved, and how these influenced the NPfIT organising vision. 
In chapter 6, the focus is narrowed down to EHRs in particular, using literature on 
boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989; Swan et al., 2007) to analyse my empirical 
data and explain how professionals and patients use EHRs to perform tasks and exchange 
knowledge between boundaries. I discuss the relevance of knowledge differences and 
dependencies (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) between EHR users to explain how the use of 
EHRs to mediate knowledge boundaries depends on the professional roles and 
knowledge capabilities of the users. 
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Chapter 7 shifts the focus to clinical professionals who have adopted additional IT related 
roles, and who may be categorised as clinician-IT hybrid professionals. This chapter 
presents empirical data to explain the reasons for the movement of clinicians into these 
hybrid roles, and highlights the challenges faced by them. I consider Freidson’s (1985) 
theory of restratification and analyse its relevance to the case of clinician-IT hybrids. 
Chapter 8 contains my discussion and conclusions. It brings together key points from my 
findings chapters, and provides an integrated discussion linking these findings, and their 
relevance to the NPfIT. I then conclude by summarising my key findings and 
contributions, and outlining the limitations of the study and scope for future research.  
With this overview of the thesis, I now proceed to present the key literature that informs 
this research.  
 
 
CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter elaborates on the key literature relevant to my research questions. This 
study’s focus on EHRs in the context of the NPfIT necessitates an understanding of the 
nuances of IS implementations in a large scale, national, health sector setting. For this 
reason, I draw on IS literature, steering the discussion toward the healthcare context 
specifically. Given the complexity of the healthcare setting, I emphasise the need for 
stakeholder involvement, and bring in the concepts of technology frames (Orlikowski and 
Gash, 1994), boundary objects (Carlile 2002, 2004) and organising visions (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997) when discussing the IS literature. These concepts acknowledge and accept 
the tensions and differences present amongst a diverse range of stakeholders and others 
involved in complex IS projects, but also highlight the need for increased cohesion, and 
the importance of the commonality between them.  
Given the general resistance on the part of clinicians when faced with new technology 
(Goldschmidt, 2005), it is essential to understand their innate tendency to retain control 
and independence in their work practices, evocative of the professional autonomy and 
dominance that they exercise (Freidson, 2007). This requires a comprehension of the 
sociology of professions (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1985), which will also be covered in this 
chapter.  
The next section discusses issues pertinent to IS implementations: challenges, large scale 
public sector IT, and the contextual nature of IS. This is followed by a discussion on 
technology frames, boundary objects and organising visions. I provide an overview of the 
increasing use of IT in the healthcare sector, with a focus on electronic health records 
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(EHRs). The increasing interest shown by national authorities in such initiatives is also 
briefly discussed. This discussion on healthcare IT also draws on literature on professional 
roles, to highlight the added complexity of IT in healthcare due to the independent and 
dominant nature of the medical profession (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 2007). With this 
background on IS implementations in the healthcare context, I highlight the link between 
professionalism and increased use of technology. The increasing dual roles adopted by 
health professionals will then be discussed; a phenomenon termed ‘professional 
hybridisation’ (Noordegraaf, 2007). I briefly elaborate the reason for such hybrid roles, 
and why they are crucial to the successful project implementations in the healthcare 
sector. This is followed by an overview of my research questions, where I reiterate my 
objectives on the basis of the reviewed literature. 
2.2  IT/IS implementations: Progress and challenges 
The field of IT has seen exponential growth in the last decade for a range of reasons 
including: decreasing technology cost, advances in technology, increasing need for faster 
communication across geographical locations, and increased investment in ICT (Nolan, 
1973). The increasing complexity of IT and its management is evident from Nolan’s (1973) 
four stages of data processing growth in organisations, namely, Initiation, Contagion, 
Control and Integration, that were later extended to six stages with the addition of Data 
Administration and Maturity (Nolan, 1979). As IT innovations are developed, the 
perceptions attached to them by people depends on the ‘talk’ or discourses surrounding 
them, causing some to suggest that they are discursive constructions (Ramiller, 2001a). 
The initial phases of Nolan’s (1979) six stage model were shaped by existing community 
discourses (Ramiller, 2006; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) that shaped how they evolved 
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over time. These discourses do not just differ with time, but between stakeholders, as at 
any given time conflicting discourses are likely to arise. For instance, IT has been 
recognised as having benefits as well as negative impacts simultaneously (Paré et al., 
2008), and this has sparked debates on whether technology does have the potential to 
improve work practices.  
The decision to adopt new technologies is often clouded by inadequate information and 
the lofty promises made by vendors (Ramiller 2001a, 2001b). In order to make informed 
decisions regarding technology adoption, the roles and authority of those advocating it 
need to be considered, i.e. whether it is authority by expertise, as in the case of IT 
developers, or authority by the ability to issue orders, as in the case of business 
executives (Ramiller, 2001b). These roles are of particular importance when discussing 
large scale IT projects which have a number of key stakeholders including the state, 
industry and professional groups. With this brief prelude on the evolutionary nature of IT 
innovations, I will now discuss the case of large scale IT projects which are rife with 
challenges, and even more so when placed in a public sector setting. 
2.2.1 Large scale public sector IT initiatives 
New and innovative information and communication technologies (ICT) would at first 
glance appear to be an unconventional area of interest for the public sector given public 
servants’ general aversion to risk (Ahmad and Broussine, 2003). In the case of health 
technologies such as EHRs, the challenges of IT implementations (Goldfinch, 2007) 
combined with the complexity of the healthcare sector (Goldschmidt, 2005) are 
exemplified when transferred to public sector settings which have their own set of 
challenges (Jones, 2008; Ahmad and Broussine, 2003).  Despite this, the transformational 
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capabilities of technology have been recognised and governments have seen renewed 
efforts to incorporate IT for better delivery of services to the public (Silcock, 2001; DH, 
2002a). These efforts have resulted in increased public sector investments in ICT, e-
government projects and large scale applications to improve efficiency of government 
procedures. 
Despite tremendous progress and increased investments in technology, IT projects are 
known to be prone to failure (Goldfinch, 2007) and the rate of project failures is reported 
to be increasing, based on comparative analysis of the 1980s and the 1990s (Ashurst et 
al., 2008). Large scale IT implementations are subject to even higher risks (Goldfinch, 
2007) and have had a track record of frequent failures due to challenges that include 
resistance, implications of potential power redistribution, evidence of return on 
investment, and difficulty integrating with already existing fragmented systems (Folkerd 
and Spinelli, 2008; Fukami and McCubbrey, 2011; Kim and Kankanhalli, 2009; Lapointe 
and Rivard, 2005). The problem of shifting and expanding project goals and 
functionalities, also known as ‘scope creep’ (Kreps and Richardson, 2007), is yet another 
challenge in large scale IT projects, and results in escalating costs. Public sector projects 
are no exception, and are known to have particularly low success rates in comparison to 
other sectors. Some suggest that given the rates of government project failures, public 
sector IS projects should steer clear of new (innovative) technologies, and be restricted to 
tried and tested systems (Goldfinch, 2007). 
Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl (2007:279) suggest that cost estimations for large scale projects 
must be regarded with caution as those who promote such projects may ‘strategically 
misrepresent’ costs and benefits. Such deliberate cost underestimations may be either to 
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promote the interests of stakeholders who would profit from the implementation of such 
projects, or to support the public interest as lower cost estimates provide an incentive to 
avoid wasting taxpayers’ money. Policymakers responsible for making decisions on the 
basis of forecasts and estimates are often unaware of the assumptions employed in 
making these calculations (Wachs, 1990a). Individuals may be under pressure during 
project planning meetings with superiors, resulting in them providing figures that others 
want to hear, rather than providing a realistic plan (Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl, 2007). This 
results in initial project estimates being utilised to merely justify the project rather than 
to genuinely evaluate it (Wachs, 1990b). Such ‘cooked’ forecasts (Wachs, 1990b: 144) are 
deceptive even if they are allegedly for altruistic purposes, and they may result in the 
rollout projects that are not economically viable in the long term (Flyvberg, Holm and 
Buhl, 2007). 
Hierarchies and bureaucracy may be present in many settings but are particularly 
pronounced in the public sector and government projects (Ahmad and Broussine, 2003; 
Bretschneider, 1990; Caudle, Gorr and Newcomer, 1991; Jones, 2008). Public sector IT 
projects have more inter-dependencies across organisational boundaries, more red tape 
compared to private sector projects, and are prone to discontinuities in political 
leadership (Bretschneider, 1990; Cats-Baril and Thompson, 1995).  
Public sector initiatives are extremely risk averse (Ahmad and Broussine, 2003) and a lack 
of political will is one of the reasons why many national public sector programmes fail 
(Jones, 2008). The other extreme is equally detrimental, where political will mutates into 
a political agenda that may conflict with the needs and demands of the public. When this 
occurs, the potential and aims of such initiatives are often tinged with false assumptions, 
Chapter 2 
17 
 
ulterior motives and ultimately, disillusionment (Ahmad and Broussine, 2003). The high 
visibility of public sector projects makes them subject to excessive media attention (Cats-
Baril and Thompson, 1995), and the drive to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the wider 
public (Moore and Hartley, 2005) is a possible reason for their risk aversive nature. This 
accountability to the public encourages transparency; on the other hand, it may also be 
the very reason for whitewashing the actual status of various issues. 
While some suggest that the very nature of innovative technology implies radical change 
rather than an incremental approach (Hartley, 2011), the large scale of these government 
projects, their frequent lack of regard for local standards and the associated difficulties in 
interoperability and integration call for a need to re-examine the centralised big bang 
approach adopted by several national authorities (Jensen and Aanestad, 2010). Examples 
in the UK include the cancellation of the Wessex Health Authority’s Regional Information 
Systems after an expenditure of over £43 million, the abandonment of a benefits 
payment scheme involving the British Post Office, the Department of Social Security and 
the computer company, ICL, at a cost of £300 million (Goldfinch, 2007), and more 
recently, the dismantling of England’s NPfIT (DH, 2011) which was the world’s largest civil 
IT project (Brennan, 2007). Britain’s 2011 ICT strategy refutes this however, suggesting 
that its IT failures were not exceptional, and that there is no credible reason to assume 
that government-led ICT projects are necessarily more prone to failure (Cabinet Office, 
2011a). The British government does acknowledge the dependence of IT project success 
on preparedness, change management and effective process reengineering, and the need 
to shift its style of ICT implementation away from its typical big bang approach (Cabinet 
Office, 2011b).  
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By the early 2000s, the UK public sector experienced a number of IT project failures as 
highlighted in a report by the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (2000). These 
projects spanned various departments including agriculture, health, the Inland Revenue, 
defence and education, and it was acknowledged that there was a need to learn from 
past mistakes. It was in this milieu that the NPfIT was conceived the year following the 
publication of this report.  
At this time there appeared to be a shift from traditional public sector management to 
new public management (NPM) (Crawford and Helm, 2009), and the NPfIT reflected this 
in its attempts to engage in consultations with people rather than limit the level of 
community involvement. While there was an effort to try and learn from successful 
projects in other countries such as the US (Stevens, 2004), the programme team did not 
seem to remember lessons from previous IS project implementations in the NHS (Currie, 
2008; Maguire, 2007) that were detailed by the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee 
(2000).  
Several studies of the NPfIT have investigated its challenges and underlying problems 
(Avison and Young, 2007; Brennan, 2007; Hendy et al., 2005; Robertson et al., 2010). 
Despite the dismantling of the project, it continues to ignite interest from academics as 
well as practitioners, as a classic case study which represents the challenges to strong 
governmental and political interest when faced with opposition and disengagement of 
end-users. 
Historically the UK public sector has had a focus on productivity and budgeting measures 
(Jones, 2008). This holds true in the case of the NHS as well, with its various reforms 
surrounding purchasing models, performance measures, reorganisation and emergence 
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of new bodies, fundholding and shifting agendas (Klein, 1995; Morrell, 2006). In the late 
1990s, the need for improved service delivery resulted in calls for modernisation, and this 
included the incorporation of information systems to facilitate this aim (Jones, 2008; NHS, 
2000; The NHS Confederation, 2003a). 
Given the range of settings and the varied scales in which technology can be 
implemented, it follows that each implementation scenario is unique and will not 
necessarily have the same outcomes as implementations in other contexts. This draws 
attention to the highly contextual nature of IS implementations, and the need to tailor 
systems to the need at hand.  
2.2.2 The contextual nature of IS 
Several IS implementations are launched in a bid to be at par with systems in other 
countries or organisational contexts (Avgerou, 2001; European Commission, 2009; 
Robertson et al., 2010). However, successful IS implementation in other regions, 
organisations or industries does not necessarily translate into similar outcomes in every 
case. These variations in IS project outcomes are due to reasons including the diverse 
stakeholder groups involved, different challenges and requirements of various sectors, 
and a possible underestimation of the complexity of IS projects in new settings (Avgerou, 
2001). There is clearly a need to contextualise and tailor systems to the context in which 
they are being implemented. 
Healthcare in particular has been recognised as a highly challenging environment for the 
introduction of new technology, given its complexity and institutionalised nature 
(Chiasson and Davidson, 2004; Fennel and Alexander, 1987). The mutual influence that 
technology and social context have on each other (Avgerou, 2001) may be seen in the 
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manner in which health IT introduces changes in clinical work practices, and also has to 
contend with the workarounds that clinicians attempt in their efforts to resist change 
(Alshawi et al., 2003; Goldschmidt, 2005). In order to better understand the interplay 
between technology and its social context, it is necessary to recognise the variations in 
the way different users perceive and use technology. I will discuss this further, employing 
literature on ‘technology frames’ (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) and ‘boundary objects’ 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989).  
2.3  Technology frames and boundary objects 
The presence of multiple stakeholder groups adds an additional dimension of complexity 
to the contextual nature of IS implementations, given the diverse perspectives and needs 
of each user group (Ramiller, 2001b). Orlikowski and Gash (1994) introduce the term 
‘technology frames’ to refer to the varied lenses through which different users perceive 
technology and its usage.  
Technology frames are structured in terms of the various knowledge domains, with the 
contents of the frame being the knowledge itself (Davidson, 2006). These frames are not 
rigid, and their structure as well as content may shift and vary with time and context 
(Davidson, 2006). Given the multiple stakeholders present in a typical IS project, conflicts 
result in incongruent technology frames. Attempts to resolve these incongruences may 
result in filtering, negotiation or shifting of technology frames (Ovaska, Rossi and 
Smolander, 2005). While cognitive diversity is beneficial in early phases of IT development 
and planning, the later implementation phases require more cohesive and integrated 
efforts to see fruition (Davidson, 2002). Hence, the tendency for frames to be negotiated 
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and shifted in order to resolve incongruences between stakeholders may be a step 
toward a more unified focus in IS implementation.  
Some typical technology frames which shape users’ understanding of technology include 
the nature of technology (its features and purpose), technology strategy (on the 
implementation approach), technology-in-use (ease of use, training, etc.), IT delivery 
strategies, IT design, the business value of technology, and IT-enabled work practices (on 
how technology changes or fits in with existing work practices) (Orlikowski and Gash, 
1994; Davidson, 2002). The reasons for incongruences in users’ technology frames include 
different requirements and needs of stakeholders. This may in turn be linked to the 
professional differences amongst various user groups as well, as professionals have 
specific and specialist requirements and practices which differ or conflict from that of 
their peers (Aydin and Rice, 1991).  
There may be variations in responses to technology even amongst members of a 
professional group, depending on their departmental or organisational affiliations (Aydin 
and Rice, 1991). With clinicians often belonging to a combination of organisations and 
professional bodies, it may be the case that they have to contend with conflicting 
requirements and expectations from their multiple affiliations.  
Technology also has the capacity to change boundary practices, i.e., the way elements on 
either side of these boundaries interact with each other (Gal, Lyytinen and Yoo, 2008). 
Technology’s boundary spanning capabilities facilitate an increasing overlap of roles and 
responsibilities (Barrett et al., 2012; McLaughlin and Webster, 1998; Tjora, 2000), also 
called ‘task drift’ (Bossen, Jensen and Witt, 2012). This has particular significance to the 
role of health professionals, as clinicians are gradually able to take on tasks which were 
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previously outside their jurisdiction, and this means potential changes in the hierarchies 
inherent amongst clinicians (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005). Nurses have begun to 
execute tasks which were previously the sole responsibility of physicians, resulting in a 
blurring of professional boundaries. Such shifts in boundaries which enable clinicians to 
climb up professional hierarchies is termed ‘vertical substitution’ (Nancarrow and 
Borthwick, 2005).  
The easy access to information made possible by technologies such as the Internet 
(Henwood et al., 2003) challenge the indeterminate nature of professional knowledge 
(Boreham, 1983), and this potentially affects the dynamics of patient-doctor interaction 
as well (Evetts, 2013). The increasing overlap and fusion of roles enabled by technology 
usage often has to contend with an opposing tendency by clinicians to reinstate 
boundaries that reassert their professional autonomy and independence (Walter and 
Lopez, 2008). This aspect of professionalism may be one of the reasons for the 
emergence of new professional roles by means of hybridisation, which I discuss in section 
2.7. 
Carlile (2002, 2004) discusses the importance of ‘boundary objects’ (Star and Griesemer, 
1989) in dealing with knowledge boundaries which are present as a consequence of 
specialist expertise and tasks of professionals (Swan et al., 2007). Boundary objects refer 
to abstract or physical concepts which are positioned at the interface between different 
domains, and which are subject to multiple interpretations, perspectives and practices 
depending on the domain from which they are viewed (Star and Griesemer, 1989; Swan 
et al., 2007; Nicolini, Mengis and Swan, 2012; Barrett and Oborn, 2010). Boundary objects 
include technology (Gal, Lyytinen and Yoo, 2008), texts (Oswick and Robertson, 2009), 
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project contracts (Koskinen and Mäkinen, 2009) and timelines (Yakura, 2002), to name a 
few. The concept has been applied to a range of domains including software development 
(Barrett and Oborn, 2010), product development (Carlile, 2002), healthcare (McGivern 
and Dopson, 2010) and biomedicine (Swan et al. 2007). 
In referring to the knowledge boundaries which have to be overcome when dealing with a 
boundary object, Carlile (2002) emphasises that these separate knowledge sources act as 
both facilitators as well as inhibitors to product development. In the case of IS 
innovations too, there is a plethora of knowledge sources available as the IS field bridges 
several domains that have an interest in the innovation being developed (Wang and 
Ramiller, 2009). The effectiveness of boundary objects do not necessarily depend on their 
inherent characteristics, but also depends on how stakeholders make sense of them (Fox, 
2011). Those objects that gain prominence or encourage communication and adoption 
across stakeholder groups may be termed ‘positive boundary objects’, whereas those that 
inhibit such progress are ‘negative boundary objects’ (Fox, 2011). 
In looking at how technology itself acts as a boundary object between different 
stakeholders (e.g. different groups of health professionals), Fox (2011) highlights the 
capabilities of technology to be either facilitative or hindering to cross-boundary 
collaboration. Artefacts such as engineering drawings are a classic example of how 
boundary objects can be used for collaboration and communication between different 
epistemic groups, while simultaneously being used by dominant professionals groups (in 
this case, engineers) to maintain their expert authority in their jurisdictions (Bechky, 
2003). 
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Unlike boundary objects which may be either physical or abstract, epistemic objects are 
generally abstract ‘objects of inquiry’ (Ewenstein and Whyte, 2009: 9) situated within 
epistemic practices (Cetina, 1997; McGivern and Dopson, 2010). Rheinberger (1992) 
explains how epistemic objects transform and evolve, and this may be understood 
through Cetina’s (1997) example of computer systems that are modified and improved 
over the years. Epistemic objects situated between different epistemic practices enable 
boundary spanning, resulting in the simultaneous existence of epistemic and boundary 
objects in such cases (Ewenstein and Whyte, 2009; McGivern and Dopson, 2010). 
Technical objects serve as fixed representations that contain a specific epistemic object 
(Rheinberger, 1992).   
Yakura (2002) introduces the concept of ‘temporal’ boundary objects and proposes the 
notion of ‘concert in time’ wherein clinical professionals in a hospital setting may be able 
to estimate the time of the day by merely observing the activities which take place at any 
given time. Similarly, project timelines facilitate a clear distinction between project 
phases, with each phase viewed differently by stakeholders (Yakura, 2002; Chang, 
Hatcher and Kim, 2013). By regarding project timelines as ‘placeholders’ or temporal 
boundary objects it is possible to distinguish between project phases and how 
stakeholders perceive and interpret each such phase (Yakura, 2002: 957). For instance, a 
deadline might signify receipt of payments for those who supply a product or service, 
while for clients it implies debit and payment of bills. Similarly, working overtime for 
some would be a cause for resentment, having to work unpaid hours, while for others it 
provides a way of showing their commitment to their work (Yakura, 2002). Epistemic 
objects may be contained within temporal boundary objects, as different phases are 
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subject to multiple interpretations and inputs, and perceptions of each of these phases 
may vary over time, facilitating the transition to the next phase in the project.  
Scholars have also studied contracts as boundary objects (Gal, Lyytinen and Yoo, 2008), as 
they interface between organisations and stakeholders, enabling collaboration and 
influencing work practices which are relevant to both parties involved. In their capacity as 
boundary objects, contracts provide a mechanism to manage risks and uncertainties as 
they provide all parties involved with a clear statement of expectations, and define 
common terms which may otherwise be interpreted differently by those involved 
(Koskinen and Mäkinen, 2009). This means that the planning phase prior to the creation 
of contracts must involve all stakeholders, and those who have decision making powers 
should be well informed regarding the nature of the project. However, as elaborated in 
Section 2.2.1, this is often not the case, as project plans and forecasts are often 
manipulated or not well informed, due to political reasons as well as a lack of sufficient 
credible information (Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl, 2007; Wachs 1990a, 1990b). An overview 
of the different types of objects is provided in Table 2.1 (see page 26). 
In their discussion on how objects are ‘transformed’, Engeström and Blacker (2005) 
suggest that objects are transient and may get devalued or discarded during their 
lifetime. Objects may ‘die’ but do not necessarily ‘disappear’, as  they may be revitalised 
by ‘reconceptualising’ the objects, so that they are ‘reincarnated’ (McGivern and Dopson, 
2010) in a different manner from what was originally envisioned. This is dependent on 
how different stakeholder groups perceive the object and reconceptualise it so that it is 
used for a different purpose. Carlile and Rebentisch (2003) discuss the need for a shift 
from using boundary objects to creating new boundary objects, to represent differences 
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and dependencies in knowledge that may not have been relevant or known previously, 
but are of current importance. This is often the case in settings where novelty increases, 
mandating new or updated knowledge (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003). 
Table 2.1 Key characteristics of epistemic, technical, boundary and temporal objects 
Key characteristics of different types of objects 
 
Epistemic object - Not fixed; abstract 
- Characterised by incompleteness; continuously evolves in a 
series of instantiations  
- Facilitate knowledge flow within epistemic communities 
(Cetina, 1997; Ewenstein and Whyte, 2009; McGivern and 
Dopson, 2010; Rheinberger, 1992) 
Technical object - Static and repeatable  
- Provide a representation of epistemic objects;  
(Cetina, 1997; Engeström and Blackler, 2005; Ewenstein and 
Whyte, 2009; Rheinberger, 1992) 
Boundary object - Concrete, single object, interpreted differently by different 
groups.  
- Enables coordination and knowledge flow between domains 
(Ewenstein and Whyte, 2009; Star and Griesemer, 1989; Swan et 
al., 2007) 
Temporal object - Interpretations and management of time (and associated 
tasks) vary between project stakeholders. 
- Enable temporal coordination (across time). E.g. timelines. 
(Chang, Hatcher and Kim, 2013; Yakura, 2002)  
 
In understanding the way knowledge is shared across boundaries, of particular 
importance are ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ boundaries, which go a step beyond the 
‘transfer’ of knowledge which occurs at ‘syntactic boundaries’ (Carlile, 2004). Carlile’s 
(2004) framework for knowledge flow across these different types of boundaries is 
depicted in Figure 2.1 (see page 28). Semantic boundaries facilitate the translation of 
knowledge, taking into account the diverse views and perspectives of different actors, so 
that there is the creation of shared meaning between these groups. This acts as a 
precursor to transformation of knowledge at pragmatic boundaries, as engaging in 
Chapter 2 
27 
 
meaningful dialogue with a clear understanding of how other users perceive an object is 
essential to reconciling disparities and incongruent technology frames (Carlile, 2004; 
Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). Stakeholders may have different interests and work practices 
which shape the way they perceive and use objects such as technology. Efforts to protect 
their professional interests can conflict with the need to use IT in a collaborative manner, 
confirming Carlile’s (2002) suggestion that knowledge can be ‘at stake’ and that 
individuals may often have to make a choice between protecting their interests and using 
technology in a manner that facilitates knowledge sharing. 
The challenges of knowledge sharing across boundaries, or the ‘stickiness’ of knowledge 
(von Hippel, 1994), often acts as a barrier to new types and forms of knowledge, and this 
is a challenge to be contended with when dealing with innovations and hybrid knowledge 
and professionals (Carlile, 2004). Much of this inertia may also be attributed to the 
different technology frames with which users perceive, interpret and use technology (Gal 
and Berente, 2008; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). 
Technology frames provide a shared framework to organisational members or individuals 
of a particular user group, through which they make sense of the technology (Gal and 
Berente, 2008). The conflicts and tensions between these different groups implies that 
there is often an issue of incongruent technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994), 
that poses challenges to consistent and successful implementation of technology, due to 
differences in user perspectives. 
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Figure 2.1 Management of knowledge flow across boundaries (Carlile, 2004) 
Health technology, with its complex involvement of several user groups and stakeholders 
presents itself as a suitable example to discuss the many different perspectives shaping 
the use of specific technologies such as EHRs. When developing health technology, it is 
not sufficient to try and understand what users (clinicians and patients) want, as different 
people have their own perceptions of the world. What they say they want and what 
would actually be beneficial to them in practice often differ (Karsh et al., 2010), adding an 
additional layer of complexity to understanding the multiple interpretations of an object. 
Differences in the way users make sense of technology are evident between clinical 
professionals as well. This draws attention to the existence of different technology frames 
(Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) with which people view technology as an artefact, and also 
explains why boundary objects in the technology domain are viewed by stakeholders 
through different lenses. 
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The incongruence of technological frames in an inter-organisational setting due to the 
diverse stakeholder groups involved (Davidson, 2006) points to a need for investigating 
the dynamics between stakeholder groups, and this is offered by the discourse based 
approach around which the concept of ‘organising visions’ (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) 
is centred, and which will be elaborated on in the next section. This approach not only 
allows us to discuss interactions between stakeholder groups and their influence in 
steering the way technology is adopted, but it also allows us to study the overarching 
discourses relevant to the vision, in this case being the national implementation of EHRs.  
2.4  Organising visions 
When implementing new technologies, it is argued that organisations should observe 
best practices, and learn from the experience of past IT implementations by other 
players, keeping in mind the need to tailor IT to specific contexts (Avgerou, 2001). 
However, when the technology in question is relatively new, and there are limited past 
success stories, the best approach would not be looking back at history, or looking at 
peers, but looking forward to identify develop a clear vision to steer current efforts 
towards it (Murphy, 2011). The term ‘organising vision’ coined by Swanson and Ramiller 
(1997) refers to the manner in which IS innovations are diffused, and how these 
technologies are interpreted, legitimised and mobilised in the course of their 
implementation plan. It acknowledges the heterogeneous nature of the IS field (Avison 
and Myers, 1995), and the potential existence of conflicts and competing interests due to 
the multiple actors involved.  
Swanson and Ramiller (1997:460) use the term organising visions in the context of new 
innovative technologies, and define it as ‘a focal community idea for the application of 
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information technology in organisations’. Dominant discussions or ‘buzzwords’ provide a 
glimpse into the ‘community discourse’ steering the vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; 
2003). This also indicates the instability of innovations, as they undergo a process of 
scrutiny, discussion amongst dominant stakeholders, and further refinement (Ramiller, 
2001b). The community discourse of an organising vision is constituted and influenced by 
a community of stakeholders who have a common interest in the vision (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). 
While other scholars have suggested that the early stages of IS innovation adoption were 
defined by a rational choice by specific organisations (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), Swanson 
and Ramiller suggest that institutional elements are at play right from the beginning, as 
the perceptions and decisions of specific stakeholders are shaped by the on-going 
discourses on the innovation. These may take the form of reports, papers, conferences, 
and activities of other stakeholder groups, and play a role in shaping the concepts 
underlying the IS innovation. These discourses wherein IT suppliers flaunt the 
transformative powers of technology and persuade non-IT stakeholders of the need for 
new innovative technologies, using the rhetoric of ‘transformation’ or ‘novelty’ (Ramiller 
2001a, 2006) can often be misleading. 
The ‘interpretive flexibility’ of technology (Pinch and Bijker 1984, 1987) is reflected in the 
multiple perspectives and inputs of stakeholder groups in an organising vision (Swanson 
and Ramiller, 1997). While there are often conflicting views amongst stakeholder groups 
in the heterogeneous community, they share a common platform, in that they have a 
mutual understanding of what the vision represents (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). This is 
associated with technology frames (see Section 2.3) which acknowledges the diverse 
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perspectives of users, lending technology its equivocal nature (Ramiller, 2001b). The 
concept of epistemic objects is also relevant to this discussion, given that they are subject 
to different interpretations which may vary with time (Cetina, 1997; Rheinberger, 1992), 
similar to buzzwords in organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) as I shall discuss 
in Chapter 5.  
Organising visions have been employed to study a range of IS innovation technologies 
including EHRs, telehealth and telecare (Davidson and Reardon, 2005; Greenhalgh et al., 
2012, Klecun-Dabrowska and Cornford, 2002). EHRs, given their relatively new and 
innovative nature, the diverse range of stakeholders (clinicians, technology workers, 
patients, etc.), the many on-going debates and uncertainties surrounding them, and the 
increased attention and investment they are receiving, are one of the rapidly evolving 
organising visions in the area of healthcare IT (Davidson and Reardon, 2005). Greenhalgh 
et al. (2012) study the organising vision of telehealth and telecare technologies, looking at 
how the very definitions and perceptions of these have developed with time. They also 
suggest that inconsistency and conflicts within visions may explain why many of them do 
not see completion.  
The distinctive nature of organising visions, as a point of departure or discontinuity from 
existing practices or technologies may account for the frequent lack of concordance 
between various stakeholders (Davidson and Chiasson, 2005; Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997). This fundamental existence of competing discourses within a community has the 
potential to shape and be shaped by an organising vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). 
The involvement and inputs of multiple perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders in 
the creation of an organising vision emphasise the context dependant nature of IS and 
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the general aspiration to emulate success stories and best practices of industry peers 
(Avgerou, 2001).  
Two preconditions for an agenda to be termed an ‘organising vision’ are distinctiveness 
and plausibility (Davidson and Chiasson, 2005; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). To enable 
fulfilment of the vision it has to have the added features of being interpretable and 
important, so that the value of the innovation under consideration is recognised, and 
easily communicated to the community (Davidson and Chiasson, 2005; Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). These are challenging conditions for any IT project, and even more so for 
one as massive as the NPfIT which was the world’s largest civil IT project, and meant for 
the English NHS which is the largest public sector organisation in Europe (Brennan, 2007).  
Organising visions serve three functions, namely 'interpretation', 'legitimation' and 
'mobilisation' (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). Interpretation occurs in the early phases of 
IS innovation, when exploratory efforts are undertaken to understand the new 
technology and its implications. An organising vision legitimates an IS innovation by 
providing rationale for developing a technology through the inputs of multiple 
stakeholders, and also through the reputation and influence of those who have 
successfully undertaken implementation of the innovative technology. The third function, 
mobilisation, refers to the ability of an organising vision to support the progress and 
realisation of an innovation, as implementers draw on the discourse characterising the 
organising vision to inform their understanding and to acquire the needed resources and 
knowledge necessary to implement the technology. A discussion on how the NPfIT may 
be regarded as the carrier for the organising vision of EHRs in England is found in 
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Chapters 3 and 5, which provide a more detailed account of the national programme and 
its care record component. 
The drive to use latest innovative technologies is not necessarily linked to a quest towards 
efficiency, but could be the ‘bandwagon effect’ – an attempt to be like others in the field, 
with competing aspirations towards legitimacy or performance (Abrahamson, 1991), as a 
result of isomorphic institutional tendencies (Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf, 1993; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Normative influences which cause 
organisations to adopt technologies because it is the ‘done thing’ may blind adopters to 
what is actually in their best interest (Ramiller, 2001a).  
The power of texts and talk surrounding innovative technologies is not to be 
underestimated either, as often, much of what managers know of such applications is 
from community discourse (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) and textual information to 
which they ascribe a high level of authority (Ramiller, 2001a). Attributing a high level of 
legitimacy to a text, to the extent that it is given more importance than the topic it 
addresses is termed ‘textual attitude’ (Ramiller, 2001a) and this could potentially lead to 
‘mindless’ adoption of technology (Swanson and Ramiller, 2004) if IT adoption decisions 
are clouded by the voice of the crowd as described in supposedly authoritative 
documents and publications. Such texts provide a valuable insight into the propaganda of 
key stakeholders in highly visible projects such as the NPfIT, as there is a plethora of 
documentation, communication and media publicity with which such initiatives may be 
researched. 
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With this brief introduction to organising visions, I shall briefly discuss the significance of 
stakeholder groups and other factors that influence the discourse surrounding an 
organising vision. 
2.4.1 Elements influencing discourse surrounding organising visions 
The organising vision discourse depends on multiple factors including the business 
problematic, community discourse and IS practitioner subcultures (Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997), illustrated in Figure 2.2 (see page 35). The interests of technology developers and 
managers are reflected in the IS practitioner subculture and business problematic 
respectively, which together form a layer of ‘cultural-linguistic resources’ that inform the 
vision. The debates which stakeholders engage in revolve around a commonly recognised 
subject using mutually understandable language and expressions. However, technology 
experts often bring their own domain specific terms into a project (Murray, 2001), and 
this gives rise to jargon or ‘legitimated vocabulary’ specific to the organising vision itself 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). These are to be distinguished from buzzwords which 
emerge and subside during the lifetime of the organising vision, depending on what 
issues are prioritised at various points of time.  
The ‘business problematic’ emphasises the relevance and need of the organising vision. 
Available core technologies determine the capabilities of the vision, as they can both 
facilitate as well as constrain its development. ‘Commerce’ represents those enterprises 
with material stakes in the organising vision. The adoption and diffusion of innovative 
technologies also influence the discourse surrounding the organising vision, as multiple 
stakeholders including vendors, consultants and business people are involved in the 
adoption and diffusion processes (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). 
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The career path of an organising vision is determined by factors such as the shifting 
buzzwords, dominant discourses and the general reception of the vision by community 
stakeholders (Lucas, Swanson and Zmud, 2007; Swanson and Ramiller 1997, 2004). The 
presence of diverse actors in the community implies that tensions, frictions and 
disagreements may arise and/or subside during the development of the organising vision 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), and has parallels to incongruent technological frames 
(Davidson, 2006; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994).  
 
Figure 2.2 Factors influencing the production of organising vision discourse (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997) 
 
The perspectives of these community stakeholder groups not only vary between each 
other but also vary across time. On-going discourses shape the viewpoints of these 
different users, and initial conflicts may be appeased by filtering out ideas, or negotiating 
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or shifting one’s frame to be more aligned with others (Ovaska, Rossi and Smolander, 
2005).  
The complexity of healthcare implementations mandates a large and diverse community 
of stakeholders involved in the creation and evolution of organising visions in this context 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2012). Sauer and Willcocks (2007) identified three ‘Greek choruses’ in 
the NPfIT, drawing an analogy to ancient Greek amphitheatres where crowds raised their 
voices in efforts to make themselves heard. These choruses in the NPfIT were those of the 
programme’s ‘defenders’, ‘sympathetic critics’ (who were actually impacted by the NPfIT 
systems) and the ‘professional critics’ (who were more distanced and critiqued the 
programme as external observers). These will be elaborated on in Chapter 5, drawing on 
my data sample which has representations from these three groups.  
Much of the rhetoric surrounding innovative technologies is characterised by 
‘exaggeration’ or ‘communicative distortion’, in an effort to persuade people to embrace 
new technologies (Ramiller, 2006). Some tactics often used include rhetorics of ‘urgency’ 
(the need for early adoption of technology), ‘novelty’ (the radical nature of the 
innovation), ‘transformation’ (the value offered by the innovation), ‘implementability’ 
(the feasibility of achieving the benefits promised by technology) and ‘accomplishment’ 
(the legitimation of the innovation by drawing on previous successful implementations) 
(Ramiller, 2006). These types of communication mechanisms influence organising vision 
discourse and buzzwords as stakeholders may be subject to persuasive rhetoric employed 
by those who promote the innovative technology.  
While Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) model depicts the way an organising vision is 
shaped and influenced by diverse community groups and acknowledges the possible 
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friction between them, discussion on how these groups interact with each other is 
limited. Studies have demonstrated the tensions as well as complementarities between 
physicians, nurses, managers, and IT professionals (Hunter, 1992; Marshall, 1998; 
Robinson, Beaton and White, 1994). The professional differences between these groups 
are a key determinant in shaping their technology frames. It is also likely that some form 
of community learning takes place, as actors learn by doing, by drawing from the on-
going discourse and from other stakeholders (Wang and Ramiller, 2009). From an 
organising vision perspective, these inter-group dynamics are likely to have an impact on 
the path and career of organising visions. The limitations of organising visions in 
understanding inter-group dynamics and areas of contention between stakeholders can 
be addressed by employing the concept of boundary objects (see section 2.3), as I 
illustrate in Chapter 5 where I juxtapose these two concepts to discuss the NPfIT.  
Changing needs, expectations and demands of user groups might lead to shifts in their 
roles and inputs in an organising vision. For example, the role of patients in healthcare is 
becoming increasingly empowered, to the extent of being viewed as consumers and 
partners in healthcare, rather than passive recipients of care from experts (Anderson, 
Rainey and Eysenbach, 2003; Herzlinger, 2006; Liang, 2007; Newman and Vidler, 2006; 
Tritter and McCallum, 2006).  
With this overview of organising visions and the role of community discourse in steering 
their path, I now proceed to focus more closely on health IT in particular, and some of the 
key debates and issues which are relevant to EHR usage. 
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2.5  IT in health care 
Healthcare is generally considered to be slow in incorporating ICT into its work practices 
(Bates, 2002; Ilie et al., 2009). The technology advances seen by the health sector in the 
past few decades is a relatively recent phenomenon compared to the use of information 
and communication technologies (ICT) in other areas. Going paperless is an ambition to 
which many, the healthcare sector included, aspire (Grimson, 2001; Sprague, 2004). 
Realistically however, elimination of paper cannot be immediate (Sprague, 1995), and 
would need to be transitional, with the primary role of paper documents changing. 
Although electronic storage of health records can be traced back to the 1970s (Hersh, 
1995), early efforts towards computerised health records were fragmented, and were 
slow to embrace the need for collaborative, interoperable and seamless communication 
of health information between providers.  
The EHR is regarded as a key instrument for clinical governance today, and is a rapidly 
expanding area of IT in healthcare, being given increased priority in local, regional and 
national e-health initiatives (European Commission, 2009; Hassey et al., 2001; Lawler, 
Hedge and Pavlovaic-Veselinovic, 2011; Robertson et al., 2010). These advances have 
been accompanied by growing public demands and expectations. Given the progressive 
nature of technology, and people’s rising expectations from health service delivery, it 
would be expected that the implementation of electronic healthcare should present 
minimal additional challenges. This, however, is not the case. The health sector lags 
behind others in the adoption of IT, suggesting that in addition to the usual problems 
faced in IT implementations, there are other challenges unique to healthcare (Cho, 
Mathiassen and Nilsson, 2008; Chiasson and Davidson, 2004). 
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The highly institutionalised nature of the health sector poses challenges (Currie and Guah, 
2007; Fennel and Alexander, 1987), and there is a need for increased efforts to overcome 
the resistance against redefining existing boundaries and work practices (Walsh, 2004). 
The complex and sensitive nature of health information contributes to the many 
apprehensions and barriers in adopting healthcare information systems (Bates, 2002; Ilie 
et al., 2009; Chiasson and Davidson, 2006). Recently, renewed efforts have been 
channelled toward the promotion of e-health technologies including EHRs, e-prescriptions 
and telehealth, to provide seamless healthcare to people (European Commission, 2009). 
However, these large scale ICT projects in healthcare have often been incomplete and 
unsuccessful (Brennan, 2007; Cresswell et al., 2011; Robertson et al., 2010).   
The implementation of any new technology has to contend with the responsiveness and 
receptiveness of the users, and this is particularly true in healthcare, where clinical 
professionals take pride in their autonomy and independence (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 
1985). The possibilities of technology acting as a monitoring or controlling mechanism 
(Timmons, 2003a) contribute to clinical professionals’ general wariness in trying out new 
and innovative technologies.  
Professionals leverage on their specialist knowledge to define jurisdictional boundaries 
(Freidson, 1988). Technology is increasingly acting as a mediator in the determination of 
these boundaries, as it permits an increasing overlap of tasks between roles such as 
physicians and nurses (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005). Professionals’ identities are 
typically defined by the tasks they undertake (Abbott, 1988) and today, this is increasingly 
intertwined with the technology available to them (Eriksson-Zetterquist et al., 2009; Lamb 
and Davidson, 2005).  
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Further, the context dependent nature of technology implementation implies that what 
works in one setting will not necessarily be as effective in another; the episodic nature of 
mediation of technology use (Davidson and Chiasson, 2005) determines whether systems 
are adopted or adapted by users (Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, 2000). This holds true in the 
healthcare setting as well, with varied needs and usage between different professional 
groups and geographical locations, resulting in difficulties with standardisation and 
interoperability (Jensen and Aanestad, 2010). Consequently, there is often a chasm 
between national health policy targets and implementation in practice (Mars and Scott, 
2009). 
2.5.1 The need for ICT in healthcare 
The fragmented nature of healthcare services and the mobility of individuals (Wilks, 
2010), have triggered efforts towards the provision of integrated e-health services for 
seamless, efficient and reliable care (European Commission, 2009; Iakovidis, 1998). 
Increased patient mobility has given rise to demands for cross-border healthcare and 
transferable patient information using interoperable systems and EHRs (Bates et al., 
2003; Goldschmidt, 2005; Wilks, 2010). However, difficulties may be encountered due to 
local and regional units seeking to retain their existing systems (Bates et al. 2003; Jensen 
and Aanestad, 2007b).  
The increasingly multi-disciplinary nature of healthcare calls for quick and reliable 
exchange of up to date data between health professionals (Bates et al., 2003; Galliers et 
al., 2011; Goldschmidt, 2005). Despite the recognised need for electronic mechanisms in 
the delivery of healthcare services, barriers exist with regard to their user awareness, 
acceptance and adoption. These are due to reasons which include institutionalised work 
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practices, concerns regarding autonomy in work practices, concerns regarding (undesired) 
blurring of boundaries between clinical roles, security and confidentiality of data, and 
costs of implementation (Goldschmidt, 2005; Hartswood et al., 2003). While clinical 
stakeholders may in theory appreciate the benefits of such electronic systems, in practice 
they often seek alternatives and workarounds to new technology (McGrath et al., 2008) 
thus mediating the very nature of technology use (Davidson and Chiasson, 2005).  
The development of new technologies has resulted in an array of terms related to e-
health, which need to be understood before going into further detail regarding their use. 
EHRs are gaining increasing importance and prominence in the field of healthcare IT, and 
have also been subject to this use of multiple distinct but often interchangeably used 
terms. 
2.5.2 The constellation of electronic health record terminology 
The development and diffusion of IT in healthcare has been accompanied by a 
proliferation of very similar terminologies for these technologies, which are often not 
clearly distinguished (Cusack, 2008; Lawler, Hedge and Pavlovaic-Veselinovic, 2011; 
Thomas, 2006). EHRs are enveloped within the broad spectrum of e-health, and they too 
are subject to multiple and ambiguous definitions (Greenhalgh et al., 2009). Electronic 
health records (EHRs), electronic patient records (EPRs), electronic medical records 
(EMRs), computerised patient records (CPRs) and personal health records (PHRs) are but 
a handful of the terms which are often interchangeably used by scholars, but regarded as 
distinct from each other, by some.  
This section does not attempt to redefine these different terminologies, but explains the 
type of records this research explores. For the purpose of this study, I focus on electronic 
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records in the healthcare sector, and this would include those which facilitate entries 
pertaining to patients’ clinical history, by health professionals as well as patients. The 
reason for this all inclusive consideration of electronic records, is that while there is a 
distinction between EHRs which permit entries by staff, and PHRs which are primarily for 
the use of the patient, in some cases, EHRs do permit (minimal) entries by patients, and 
to assume that there is no patient involvement in all EHR implementations may be 
erroneous. 
CPRs, EPRs and EMRs may all be regarded as types of EHRs (Hayrinen, Saranto and 
Nykanen, 2008). According to this view, CPRs and EPRs are similar, in containing patients’ 
clinical information from a single hospital (Boaden and Joyce, 2006; Hayrinen et al., 2008), 
while Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) may be either departmental, inter-
departmental, hospital or inter-hospital (Hayrinen et al., 2008) and are intended primarily 
for clinical staff (Whetstone and Goldsmith, 2009).  
Personal health records (PHRs) differ from these as they are centred on the patient, may 
be patient-controlled (Hayrinen, Saranto and Nykanen, 2008), and have all or a part of the 
information entered by the patients themselves (Hayrinen, Saranto and Nykanen, 2008; 
Wynia, Torres and Lemieux, 2011). The same, in England, are referred to as Electronic 
Patient Records (EPRs), with their summary version being labelled as Summary Care 
Records (SCRs) (Whetstone and Goldsmith, 2009). This alternative definition of EPRs 
differs from that of Hayrinen et al. (2008) who identify the source of the record (in this 
case being from a single hospital) as the defining characteristic of EPRs.  
While Boaden and Joyce (2006) have a similar definition of EPRs as Hayrinen, Saranto and 
Nykanen (2008), they distinguish their definition of EPRs from EHRs, by attaching a 
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longitudinal attribute to EHRs, making them ‘cradle to grave’ records of patient 
information. There are a plethora of acronyms used for very similar yet different 
applications, and ambiguity around their actual definitions causes them to be used 
interchangeably.  
Some studies, when using these terms interchangeably, fail to delineate their exact 
definitions (Hippisley-Cox et al., 2003). Interestingly, the majority of those which fail to 
explicitly explain their terms tend to refer to electronic records which facilitate clinician 
recording as opposed to patient recording. This may be because patient empowerment 
and involvement is a relatively new and emerging concept, and the use of PHRs as 
defined by Hayrinen, Saranto and Nykanen (2008), is still not widespread (Munir and 
Boaden, 2001). 
McGinn et al. (2011) conducted a review of literature on EHRs identifying similarities as 
well as variations between user groups regarding their perceptions of EHRs. The majority 
of the studies they reviewed focused more on physicians compared to other healthcare 
professionals, and this seems to reflect the traditional dominant role played by the 
medical profession (Freidson 1970, 2007). McGinn et al. (2011) also pointed out that 
some of the common points raised by different user groups were regarded by some as 
positive, and by others as concerns rather than facilitators to EHR usage. This indicates 
possible differences in the professional roles and characteristics of the different user 
groups.  
Much of the general literature on e-health and health information systems (HIS) is 
applicable specifically to EHRs, as EHRs are recognised as one of the key components of 
electronic healthcare having contentious debates surrounding them. The rhetoric on EHRs 
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has included conflicting opinions on their impact on quality of health care services, 
patient-doctor interaction, cost benefits and medical errors (Sidorov, 2006; Ash, Berg and 
Coiera, 2004). This may account for the resistance often encountered in implementation 
of these systems. The next sections cover some of the conflicting views regarding EHR 
use. 
2.5.2.1 Impact on medical errors 
Whether EHRs actually have a positive impact on healthcare in terms of reducing medical 
errors, is debatable. Emphasising the need to employ tools such as EHRs to aid clinicians, 
Weed (1997: 231) cautions against ‘misplaced faith in the unaided human mind’ and calls 
for clinical professionals to ‘abandon the arrogance of professional “expertise” that shuns 
such tools’. EHRs have the potential to help reduce medical errors as they provide instant 
up to date access to patients’ clinical information, facilitate better tracking of patient 
history, assist in decision making and provide reminders or alerts to health professionals 
(Ilie et al., 2009). Despite these advantages, they also have a tendency to cause errors or 
impede seamless healthcare, often due to issues with their user interface and 
inappropriate usage (Ash, Berg and Coiera, 2004; Harrington, 2011; Hartswood et al., 
2003). This has led to the coinage of the term e-pathogenesis, to refer to any form of 
patient harm which may be linked to the use of healthcare IT (Weiner et al., 2007).  
Healthcare professionals have been known to use various abbreviations and symbols in 
handover documents, and this raises questions regarding the safety of such practices 
(Galliers et al., 2011). The use of electronic systems for such entries is not a guarantee of 
error free inputs either, since staff may resort to alternative symbols which resemble 
their intended notation as some keys for symbols are not easily accessible on a keyboard. 
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This is potentially unsafe (Galliers et al., 2011). Unless the computer systems provide a list 
of usable symbols which staff can select from, electronic entry can result in increased 
ambiguity and medical errors, rather than safe and standardised data entry.  
Providing patients with access to their EHRs offers possibilities of reduced medical errors 
as they can then inform their healthcare providers of possible errors in their records 
(Boaden and Joyce, 2006). This facilitates a dialogue between health professionals and 
patients, and also resonates with the increasing focus on patient empowerment through 
EHRs (Munir and Boaden, 2001; Ueckert et al., 2003). However, this draws attention to 
debates on the ownership of EHRs, a much contended subject due to parallel concerns 
related to patient data privacy and confidentiality.  
2.5.2.2 Ownership 
With the improved exchange of health information through the use of EHRs and other 
electronic mechanisms, the question arises as to who actually owns the patients’ 
information. It may be argued that prior to the use of electronic records, ownership of 
patient data was more clearly defined, as there existed only a single (paper) copy of 
records (Hersh, 1995). The use of integrated EHRs involves multiple providers who can 
access information entered previously by each other, thus blurring the boundaries of 
ownership. Increased emphasis on patient empowerment prompts the question of what 
extent of these records may be viewed, controlled and owned by the patients themselves 
(Ueckert et al., 2003; Munir and Boaden, 2001).  
This issue of patients’ access to their own records is a particularly grey area. One of the 
main fears people have regarding electronic storage and exchange of their personal 
health information is the issue of confidentiality and security (Miller and Tucker, 2009a; 
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Kaelber et al., 2008). This has resulted in privacy protection standards, which in 
themselves create barriers to the use of EHRs, as compliance to these regulations 
sometimes result in higher costs (Miller and Tucker, 2009a).  
Such debates regarding who owns, accesses and modifies the EHR are no doubt concerns 
for medical professionals, who regard themselves as the authority on their patients’ 
conditions. This then forms an external threat to the independence of healthcare 
professionals, and may possibly account for the increased interest in technology usage by 
some professionals (see Chapter 7). 
2.5.2.3 Autonomy versus control mechanisms 
While medical professionals have traditionally enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and 
dominance, recent shifts in healthcare have undermined or threatened their position. 
These include the introduction of new technologies such as EHRs into their work 
practices, and the increasing trend of patient consumerism (Anderson, Rainey and 
Eysenbach, 2003; Berwick, 2009; Korica and Molloy, 2010; Newman and Vidler, 2006; 
Timmons, 2003).  
The flexibility allowed by EHRs has been subject to debate. The instant and synchronised 
access to patient data which EHRs are intended to provide, means that clinicians should 
no longer have to manually send for test results and patient data from other units, but 
instead, have it a few clicks away, at their fingertips (Kaelber and Bates, 2007). However, 
the transparency and exchange of information that is facilitated by EHRs also creates the 
potential for clinical staff being monitored and audited more easily, causing some to feel 
controlled and even uncomfortable with their notes being visible to other system users 
(Jensen and Aanestad, 2007b; Halford, Obstfelder and Lotherington, 2010). The improved 
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auditing of the clinical electronic trail has been linked to threats of litigation (Miller and 
Tucker, 2009b), and this may add to the sense of control imposed on clinical staff. 
The very nature of data entry required by electronic systems challenges clinicians’ 
autonomy and flexibility. Structured fields and prescribed formats of data entry, though 
beneficial for the purpose of standardisation between systems, can be yet another cause 
for feelings of restricted freedom in recording patient information (Ash, Berg and Coiera, 
2004). They are often also regarded as being a disruption to professionals’ busy schedules 
and as an interference with time that could be better spent attending to the needs of 
patients (Ash, Berg and Coiera, 2004). 
EHRs may also provide decision support capabilities to staff, making the process of 
healthcare relatively standardised for certain conditions, allowing for redistribution of 
tasks across clinical staff roles (Halford, Obstfelder and Lotherington, 2010). The 
boundary spanning capabilities of technology clearly lead to encroachment of medical 
jurisdiction by other clinical peers. Consequently, nurses may take over basic care 
routines and treatments using these support functionalities, helping to alleviate 
physicians’ workloads.  
Studies have indicated however, that doctors often tend to draw a line between their 
duties and those of nurses (Tjora, 2000), and regard boundary dissolving work practices 
as an invasion into their turf (Waring and Currie, 2009). Such changes disrupt existing 
practices, and add to the resistance against the adoption of EHRs, making it challenging to 
integrate them into existing work practices (Lawler, Hedge and Pavlovaic-Veselinovic, 
2011). The medical profession’s autonomy and dominance in the professional realm 
(Freidson, 1988) is hence not restricted to maintaining control over external non-clinical 
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forces, but is also evident in the dynamics between physicians and other healthcare 
professionals (Coburn, Rappolt and Bourgeault, 1997).  
2.5.2.4 Cost effectiveness 
The automation of various tasks, facilitated by the use of technology, provides 
opportunities for cost cutting and resource re-allocation. In healthcare, the possibilities of 
reduced medical errors, better and quicker decision making, and improved management 
of clinical resources are some of the benefits offered by the use of EHRs, which in turn 
could result in reduced costs in the delivery of care. However, these alleged cost-reducing 
opportunities are refuted by some scholars who suggest that the use of EHRs may 
increase the risk of medical errors and drive up costs (Sidorov, 2006). The investment 
required to develop and implement a quality health IT system is significant, despite the 
long term cost benefits. These are concerns which need to be borne in mind when 
investing in health IT, given that costs are often underestimated or underplayed at the 
start of such projects. The NPfIT was one such example, with an initial estimated budget 
of £6 billion (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007) which spiralled up to nearly £9.8 billion (NAO, 
2013).  
2.5.2.5 Doctor-patient dynamics 
Quality decision making, improved efficiency and quicker access to information are all put 
forward as attractions of EHRs. On the other hand, it has also been suggested that 
increased use of computerised records may detract from the quality of doctor-patient 
interaction, as clinicians’ attention is not devoted entirely to their patients. The rise in 
patient consumerism wherein healthcare is being increasingly regarded as a ‘product’ 
that patients want to control and manage on their own, triggers shifts in the traditional 
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dynamics between them and their healthcare providers (Anderson, Rainey and 
Eysenbach., 2003; Newman and Vidler, 2006; Herzlinger, 2006; Liang, 2007).  
Medical professionals occupy a position of expert authority in their jurisdictions, and their 
knowledge has been acquired through a combination of prolonged training as well as 
experience (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1985). The concept of the expert patient (Donaldson, 
2003; Fox, Ward and O’Rourke, 2005) has implicated a shift from physicians as 
professional authorities in their domains, to professional guides and advisors to their 
patients; though some would question this assumption that patients can take sole or 
increased responsibility for the management of their illness (Greenhalgh, 2009).  
The notion of handing over an element of control to their patients, whom they regard as 
novices in making judgements on healthcare, is one which may not be welcomed by many 
clinicians (Berwick, 2009). Another school of thought would suggest that patients are the 
ones in the best position to assess their conditions, and make informed decisions with the 
guidance of their doctors. Consequently, increased attention has been given to the notion 
of patient-doctor partnership in healthcare. The use of technologies such as EHRs, which 
transcend established boundaries and facilitate this provider-patient partnership, would 
clearly have a direct impact on both the quality of patient-doctor interactions, as well as 
the level of control afforded to each party.  
2.5.3 Government initiatives towards nationalised healthcare ICT usage 
The benefits offered by healthcare technologies such as EHRs have spurred several 
countries to engage in large scale national health IT projects (Robertson et al., 2010; 
European Commission, 2009). The presence of numerous stakeholder groups in health IT 
projects, each having very different needs and attitudes (Herzlinger, 2006), suggests a 
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high degree of complexity of such initiatives in the health sector. These dynamics in a 
public sector IT setting have the added dimension of political influence and government 
control. Scholars have devoted much effort into investigating the nuances of EHR 
implementations at various levels including national level projects (Atkinson et al., 2002; 
Ilie et al., 2009; Robertson et al., 2010).  
The mismatch between government visions and local needs is one of the main hindrances 
to successful implementation of such large scale implementations. The Nordic countries, 
considered to be exemplary in their provision of services to the general public, are no 
exception to large scale project failures. Attempts to implement a national level EPR 
system in Denmark failed due to challenges related to the geographical area, temporal 
span and functional scope of the project (Jensen and Aanestad, 2010).  
The UK is another recognised e-health forerunner (Dobrev et al., 2008) which has faced 
significant difficulties in its national EHR implementation. Huge investments were made 
to facilitate integrated healthcare through England’s NPfIT, which envisioned 
interoperable and seamless care for all by means of improved use of ICT. This project, 
conceived in 2002, identified the implementation of a national electronic care record 
service as one of its key components. However, a number of challenges including political 
agenda, overly ambitious targets and lack of clinical engagement were encountered, and 
national efforts culminated in termination of the project in 2011 (Sauer and Willcocks, 
2007; Brennan, 2007; Robertson et al., 2010; NAO, 2011). Chapter 3 provides a more 
detailed discussion of the NPfIT project which serves as the context for this research 
study. 
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The tensions between the state and clinical professionals were evident in the national 
programme. While autonomy is regarded as an integral characteristic of the medical 
profession (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1988), Freidson (2007) distinguishes between 
economic and political autonomy on the one hand, and technological or scientific 
autonomy on the other. When physicians do have a level of control over their practice, it 
is solely due to the legal support afforded to them by the state, as it may provide them 
with legitimacy, funding, licensing and setting of appropriate regulatory measures (Evetts, 
2013; Freidson, 2007). While this aspect of autonomy varies between different regions, 
the content of professional work, i.e. establishment of domain specific guidelines for work 
practices, inevitably lies in the hands of professionals themselves (Freidson, 2007). Much 
of this struggle to retain their autonomy is either facilitated or hindered by the use of 
technology, depending on the manner in which clinicians opt to approach health 
technology implementations in their practice. While Prasad and Prasad (1994) suggest 
that computerisation aids or enhances professionalisation, more recent studies however 
highlight the perception of health IT as a threat to professionals (Walter and Lopez, 2008; 
Timmons, 2003a). Keeping in mind the challenges of technology in healthcare, including 
the struggle to retain clinical autonomy in response to threats which arise from 
technology use, and increasing external control from markets as well as states as a result 
of new public management (Crawford and Helm, 2009; Timmons, 2003b), I now briefly 
discuss some of the nuances of professionals’ interaction with technology. Following this, 
I will highlight how these tensions may lead to the phenomenon of professional hybrids. 
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2.6  Professionalism and technology use in healthcare 
Considered the archetype professions medicine offers various approaches to define what 
constitutes a professional such as internalisation of skills acquired through long intensive 
training, acquisition of a certain status within society, and autonomy (Abbott, 1988; 
Freidson, 2007). Professions exist to resolve problems requiring specialist knowledge and 
expertise, thus making the tasks in their jurisdiction a distinguishing feature of their role. 
These jurisdictional boundaries are prone to shifts as the nature of certain problems may 
require the attention of multiple experts, and the professional holding dominant control 
over the problem determines the subjective qualities of the task at hand (Abbott, 1988).  
Further, as already discussed, technology also mediates these professional boundaries by 
facilitating boundary spanning activities (Lamb and Davidson, 2005; Eriksson-Zetterquist 
et al., 2009) and enabling people to carry out new tasks that may overlap into other 
professionals’ jurisdictions (Barley, 1986). Nurses are able to take on more responsibilities 
due to the increased number of duties which they are able to attend to as a result of 
computerised systems. This may account for the rise in new roles such as the nurse 
practitioner and the nurse consultant, who are positioned in the spectrum between that 
of the traditional nurse role on the one hand and the physician on the other (Horrocks, 
Anderson and Salisbury, 2002; Hewitt, 2001; Robinson, Beaton and White, 1993). 
Tensions between nurses and their medical counterparts have been recognised by 
scholars (Stein, 1968). The increased overlap between their jurisdictions (Currie, Finn and 
Martin, 2010; McMurray, 2010) is then a matter which would be disconcerting to many 
medical professionals. 
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The professional status afforded to physicians because of their training and specialist 
knowledge makes them differ in terms of the adoption and usage of IT (Walter and Lopez, 
2008). Clinical resistance to technology has been a chronic challenge in health technology 
implementation (Jensen and Aanestad, 2007a; Walsh, 2004), with reasons including 
clinicians’ efforts to retain autonomy and control over their clinical jurisdiction (Abbott, 
1988; Freidson, 1985) and a general apprehension using new technologies (Alshawi et al., 
2003; Goldschmidt, 2005). Their expertise and skill in the medical domain elevates them 
to a position which necessitates something more than an ‘easy to use’ system, and must 
instead, gain their trust. First, it needs to meet their clinical needs, and secondly, it needs 
to ensure safety at all times to their patients (Walter and Lopez, 2008).  
One of the main qualifiers for medical professional dominance is the cultural belief that 
physicians have the expertise and skills to cure people (Light and Levine, 1988). This 
belief, say Light and Levine (1988:12), ‘is the most fundamental source of professional 
power; but it is subtle, intangible, and may shift the ground from under the feet of the 
profession as deference is replaced by wariness’. Today, increased calls for patient 
empowerment, people being aware of their choices, and having access to more 
information via technology such as the internet (Henwood et al., 2003), threatens this 
implicit trust and deference toward physicians. The technology itself is then a threat to 
physicians’ professional autonomy (McGinn et al., 2011). 
The increasing knowledge accessible to patients due to computerisation, bridging the 
knowledge gap between doctors and patients and resulting in diminished trust in doctors, 
is termed ‘deprofessionalisation’ (Haug, 1988). The rise in patient consumerism, distrust 
of so called medical experts, and the trend toward patient-doctor partnership in 
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healthcare delivery is yet another field of blurred boundaries, as patients seek to become 
more in control of their health (Hewitt, 2001; Timmermans and Oh, 2010). 
 Propagation of patient empowerment agendas and patient involvement are coming to 
the forefront (Newman and Vidler, 2006; Tritter and McCallum, 2006), and medical 
professionals have to contend with this additional form of accountability and control that 
is gaining increasing traction. While trust is a crucial component of doctor-patient 
interactions, Evetts (2013) suggests that this need for trust in professionals triggers 
increased measures for regulation and surveillance measures that challenge professional 
autonomy. Freidson (1985) however dismisses the threat of deprofessionalisation due to 
consumer dominance as being relatively insignificant and over-hyped.  
For instance, despite the increased knowledge available to patients, and while clinicians 
realise the relevance of patient access to their records, this creates challenges and 
potential burdens for them in dealing with their patients’ concerns. Patients may 
misinterpret their health records using their lay knowledge, and therefore physicians 
need to take the effort of making sure that the information has been understood 
correctly by their patients (Fisher and Britten 1993).  
Professionals must explain to patients the meaning and implications of the content held 
in their EHRs, which suggests a gradual erosion of indeterminate knowledge (Boreham, 
1983), forcing clinicians to facilitate their patients’ clinical understanding of their health 
conditions albeit at a very basic level. The esoteric nature of their professional knowledge 
(Reed, 1996) and their position as the main authority over their patients’ health 
information could be challenged by the increased communication and involvement that 
EHRs offer to patients, and the increased empowerment afforded to patients. 
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In discussing the construction of illness, Freidson (1970) distinguishes between that 
constructed by professionals’ knowledge, and that constructed by patients’ lay 
knowledge. 
‘Where there is a profession there is by definition a lay population ignorant of at 
least some of its esoteric body of knowledge and practice, and therefore always in 
some way responding differently to its ills than would the profession.’ (Freidson, 
1970: 278) 
It is this disparity between the knowledge of medical professionals and that of patients, 
that enables professionals to not only treat patients’ manifested symptoms but to also 
discern a problem about which the layman is unaware (Freidson, 1970). This then 
challenges the notion of ‘expert patients’ who are supposedly those in the best position 
to understand their own conditions. This is not to undermine the role of patients as they 
have a pivotal role giving professionals an account of their symptoms, and this is clearly a 
necessity for their effective treatment (Weed, 1997). However, modern technology offers 
the possibility to combine medical knowledge as well as patients’ inputs through means 
such as EHRs. 
‘Proletarianisation’, or increased managerial dominance over the medical profession, is 
yet another impediment to clinical autonomy (Freidson, 1985). However, such threats do 
not sprout from non-clinical professionals and consumers alone, as the sovereignty of 
physicians is being increasingly threatened by other externalities which include the 
market and the state (Starr, 1978; Evetts, 2013).  This includes the increasing interest by 
governments as well as industry players to promote the use of certain technologies (such 
as EHRs and other auditing tools) at local as well as regional and national levels in 
healthcare. However, the increased transparency that this facilitates could also be a 
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source of political control, as outcomes of such audits could be used to trigger changes in 
clinical work practices and funding, highlighting clinicians’ ‘reactivity’ to transparency 
mechanisms (McGivern and Fischer, 2012). 
In their efforts to retain control over their jurisdictions, professionals employ various 
tactics in response to external threats to their independence, autonomy and authority 
(Reed, 1996).  Professionals typically assert internal control and self-regulation within 
their professional community to pre-empt control by the external ‘lay society’ (Goode, 
1952). These include efforts to maintain the indeterminacy of their specialist knowledge 
(Boreham, 1983), and the deliberate adoption of additional roles to avoid control or 
‘colonisation’ (Waring and Currie, 2009) by non-professionals. This brings me to the 
subject of professional hybridisation, or the adoption of dual roles by professionals, which 
I discuss in next section.  
2.7   Professional hybridisation 
While professionalisation of occupations has facilitated autonomy of workers 
(Noordegraaf, 2007; Wilensky, 1964), scholars have highlighted the increasing boundary 
spanning nature and dualism of emergent forms of professionalism, a phenomenon 
termed hybridised professionalism (Ackroyd and Muzio, 2007; Doolin, 2002; Fitzgerald 
and Ferlie, 2000; Muzio and Kirkpatrick, 2011; Noordegraaf 2007, 2011; O’Reilly and 
Reed, 2011; Thomas and Hewitt, 2011). Professional hybridisation is an emerging and 
important area of research (Noordegraaf, 2007; Spurgeon, Clark and Ham, 2011), and has 
significant impact on how different domains (e.g. medicine and management) are bridged 
by integration of their specialist knowledge.  
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The prevalence of problems spanning multiple domains draws attention to the limitations 
of expertise limited to specialist knowledge, and emphasises the need for professionals to 
develop skills to work in such ‘multi-professional environments’ (Noordegraaf, 2011: 
1361). The unique dual roles of hybrid professionals enables them to bridge different 
domains such as healthcare and management (Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000), highlighting 
the possibility for individuals to act as boundary objects facilitating the transfer, 
translation and transformation of knowledge across these domains (Carlile and 
Rebentisch, 2003). 
Quinn, Anderson and Finkelstein (1996) highlight the different levels of intellect present 
amongst professionals, namely cognitive knowledge (acquired through training), 
advanced skills (the application of their knowledge to practical real world situations), 
systems understanding (intuitive deep knowledge of the relationships and interactions 
related to their discipline) and self-motivated creativity (the driver for adaptability to 
changing external circumstances in order to preserve their knowledge advantage). 
Creativity not usually being the prime focus of professional work, most professionals 
concentrate on perfecting the first three levels of intellect to meet the needs of those 
whom they serve. However, when faced with threats to their jurisdictional autonomy, 
professionals may leverage on their creativity to retain control over their work, and this 
may be seen in the case of professional hybrids. 
The majority of the studies on professional hybrids concentrate on the managerial 
functions taken up by professionals, resulting in hybrids such as the clinician manager 
(Doolin, 2002; Ferlie et al., 2011; Fitzgerald, 1994; Llewellyn, 2001; Montgomery, 2001), 
despite the often discussed chasm between clinicians and managers (Hunter, 1992; 
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Fitzgerald, 1994). The position occupied by clinicians is viewed as having shifted from that 
of dominant professional groups to those that are now exploited or ignored by their 
increasingly powerful managerial counterparts (Farrell and Morris, 2003; Davies and 
Harrison, 2003). However, the division between professionals and managers is gradually 
dissolving, with the former taking up managerial responsibilities, and the latter also often 
having professional expertise (Farrell and Morris 2003).  
Authority over their jurisdictions is one of the defining elements of professional roles 
(Abbott, 1988) and points to a territorial possessiveness and control exerted by 
professionals over their domain. The threat of being controlled by external entities has 
led to a struggle for wider jurisdiction by clinical professionals, as in the case of clinical 
managers. Whether management itself can be regarded as a profession in its own right 
has been debated by scholars, as rather than being specialist in a specific task or area, it 
brings together and coordinates people and tasks of different disciplines (Barker, 2010).  
Some scholars suggest that the clinician-manager hybrid is not a new phenomenon, but 
that it has merely become more visible in recent years. Most of the managerial positions 
occupied by clinicians in the past were on a part-time or voluntary basis (Montgomery, 
2001). While managerial responsibilities had been taken up by professionals who 
previously self-managed their work prior to encroachment of their territory by non-
clinical managers, the distinction between their clinical and non-clinical responsibilities 
would have been made more visible by the consequent shift of control from clinical 
professionals to non-clinical managers (Bolton, Muzio and Boyd-Quinn, 2011). The 
subsequent efforts to defend and protect their professional interests by adopting hybrid 
clinical-manager roles then drew attention to the distinct roles which clinicians are 
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capable of adopting, resulting in much scholarly attention to the area of professional 
hybridisation (Fitzgerald, 1994; Montgomery, 2001; Noordegraaf, 2007).  
Prior to the increased prominence of managerialism as a separate role, managerial 
functions were implicitly ‘fused in the person of the professional’ (Bolton, Muzio and 
Boyd-Quinn, 2011: 685), as they managed their own work and had undisputed authority 
over their tasks. The introduction of new managerial roles however meant that the 
source of control was moved away from professionals and placed into the hands of 
external people, giving them a point of entry to a work environment which was previously 
inhabited solely by professional experts (Bolton, Muzio and Boyd-Quinn, 2011). 
Changes in the way healthcare treatment is delivered, with the increasing presence of 
external regulatory mechanisms have resulted in the emergence of the ‘administrative 
elite’ amongst clinicians (Montgomery, 2001: 218), or the clinician-manager hybrid 
(Doolin, 2002; Fitzgerald, 1994). The rise of the clinician-manager hybrid may be 
accounted to the medical profession’s efforts to retain autonomy, giving rise to 
restratification and professional buffering, wherein new roles or increased efforts to 
retain control over their independence are triggered (Freidson, 1985). Other reasons 
attributed to the emergence of these hybrids include the threat of external control from 
non-clinical individuals that impacts on the professional autonomy of clinicians (Dopson, 
2009; Waring and Currie, 2009). The blurred boundaries between clinical professionals as 
a consequence of the increasing overlap between different roles has been accompanied 
by a transformation in the hierarchies inherent in the medical profession (Currie, Finn and 
Martin, 2010; McMurray, 2010), and a tendency for clinicians to take up responsibilities 
outside their traditional clinical jurisdictions (Doolin, 2001) in order to retain control over 
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their work and the indeterminate nature of their professional knowledge (Boreham, 
1983).  
Despite these changes in professional control, the setting of standards, supervision and 
review of work is handled by members of the profession, thus enabling them to resist 
external control to a certain extent. This suggests internal changes amongst clinical 
professionals themselves, resulting in internal stratification (Freidson, 1985). Coburn, 
Rappolt and Bourgeault (1997) suggest that restratification of the medical profession 
indicates increased control exerted by a handful of medical professional elites not only 
over external (non-clinical) forces, but also over their clinical peers, evocative of the 
hierarchies present amongst clinicians (Marsden, 1977). The ease of administration 
offered by computerised systems, and efforts to incorporate clinical tasks and data entry 
on computer systems, offer yet another possibility for blurred boundaries, and this may 
also account for the rise of clinical managers, as doctors find it easier to juggle their 
clinical and administrative duties as a result of technology use.  
‘Commercialised professionalism’ (Hanlon, 1998) suggests that a combination of 
technical, managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities is necessary for professionals to be 
successful. This highlights the increasing importance given to managerial abilities, in 
contrast to the traditional emphasis on professional knowledge alone. Commercialised 
professionalism also indicates the need for managerial skills to keep clients satisfied as 
they are increasingly informed and tend to question professional judgement (Hanlon, 
1998) – a phenomenon that is reflected in healthcare as well, given the emphasis on 
patient empowerment and patients’ ease of access to online health information 
(Donaldson, 2003; Fox, Ward and O’Rourke, 2005; Newman and Vidler, 2006). 
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Both, resistance to imposed control as well as a genuine interest in the managerial aspect 
of healthcare delivery have served as antecedents to the adoption of such dual roles. This 
phenomenon of hybrid roles is particularly relevant to the public sector where efforts to 
monitor performance, modernise services and encourage collaborative working have 
given rise to new structures and reforms which exploit hybrid forms to meet these 
aspirations (Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006; Nooredegraaf, 2007). The English NHS is a classic 
example having seen much reforms and reorganisations in efforts to both monitor 
healthcare delivery and to place clinicians in positions of leadership (Stevens, 2004).  
This emergence of dual roles may be attributed to a need for managers with experience 
and understanding of the managed professional group, a strategic approach to better 
work opportunities, or even being a defensive response by professionals who seek to 
thwart managerial attempts to usurp control over their work practices (Dopson, 2009). 
Taking up dual roles to protect their professions from external control may be explained 
in the context of Freidson’s (1985) observations on the restratification of the medical 
profession, and illustrates the phenomenon of ‘reverse colonisation’ (Waring and Curie, 
2009) wherein professionals challenge and resist colonisation of their jurisdictions by 
external threats such as managerial control.  
However, in taking up additional management oriented roles, clinician manager hybrids 
need to contend with the risk of being regarded as traitors to their profession (Doolin, 
2001; Witman et al., 2011) due to the conflicting professional and organisational needs 
(Kippist and Fitzgerald, 2009). The lack of professional status associated with 
management (Barker, 2010) may also result in clinical professions having an attitude of 
condescension or disdain for managerial tasks. This leads me to briefly discuss ‘dirty work’ 
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that refers to work that is perceived as being tainted physically (associated with unclean 
settings), socially (related to stigmatised groups or that entail subservience to others) or 
morally (involving ethically questionable virtues or methods) (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999; 
Hughes, 1958).  
Given people’s aspiration to establishing positive images and reputations for themselves, 
those who engage in work that is regarded as tainted often use techniques of ‘reframing’, 
‘recalibrating’ or ‘refocusing’ (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999) their work to retain legitimacy 
and respect in society. Reframing entails contributing positive value to the work in 
question, or neutralising the negativity associated with their execution of the task by 
denying responsibility (due to subordination to superiors) or the negative impacts that 
ensue. Recalibration involves amplifying the existing positive qualities of the work, while 
refocusing ignores the stigmatised part of the work to refocus on other aspects such as 
better pay or flexibility in working hours (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999). Individuals may 
also face threats to their identities, requiring them to protect their identities and employ 
tactics to deal with this challenge (Kreiner, Hollensbe and Sheep, 2006).  
The ways in which people negotiate and reconstruct their identities due to conflicting 
roles, threatened identities and the challenge of being regarded as engaging in dirty work, 
all serve as antecedents to ‘identity work’ which entails people ‘forming, repairing, 
maintaining, strengthening or revising the constructions that are productive of a sense of 
coherence and distinctiveness’ (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003: 1165).  
Much research highlights the tensions between clinicians and both managers as well as IT 
consultants (Davies and Harrison, 2003), putting the spotlight on clinician resistance in 
health IT implementations. This is reflected in clinicians’ resistance to the state’s role in 
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health IT, as in the case of the NPfIT. Discussing how stakeholders’ perceptions of the NHS 
Care Record Service (NCRS) were influenced by their professional identities, Cresswell et 
al. (2011) highlight data illustrating some clinicians’ views that the systems made them 
feel more IT-oriented, and distracted from their clinical responsibilities. While this may be 
the case for some, there are a significant number of clinicians who have moved into the IT 
development arena and adopted dual roles, as I shall discuss further in Chapter 7.  
In the case of IT, technology development does require a level of technical knowledge, 
though this does not necessarily require prolonged and formal training as in the case of 
professions such as medicine (Abbott, 1988). While some scholars (Denning and Dunham, 
2001; Denning, 2001) regard IS or IT as a profession in itself, Orlikowski and Baroudi 
(1988) advocate that IS cannot be elevated to the status of a profession, but is an 
occupation which has a presence in multiple disciplines and settings. The suggestion that 
IT development cannot be regarded as a profession in its own right, but rather, as an 
occupation (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1988), is likely to be a concern for clinical 
professionals as they would object to being controlled or managed by occupational 
groups that lack the professional status of medicine or nursing, and this may partly 
account for the increasing tendency for clinicians to take an interest in health IT.  
The challenge of incongruent frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) is also faced by 
professional hybrids, as they must deal with potentially conflicting technology frames, 
roles and obligations in the different domains in which they operate. However, once this 
initial barrier is overcome and there is increasing congruence between the users’ 
technology frames, the fusion of roles into a hybrid professional role may be regarded as 
internalised.  
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While hybrid roles are gradually formed by the fusion of two different professional or 
occupational identities, Ibarra (1999) also proposes the concept of ‘provisional selves’ 
wherein individuals trial different roles by forming temporary transitional selves when 
adjusting to new roles and identities. This opportunity to trial new roles offers the 
possibility of stepping out of the profession that one is entrenched in, to experiment with 
other interests and ‘ephemeral roles’ (Kreiner, Hollensbe and Sheep, 2006) which could 
complement one’s accustomed professional role. Professional hybrids may be born out of 
such circumstances, and reach a point where professional roles become internalised, 
creating a single hybrid role. 
Reed (1996) distinguishes between ‘independent’, ‘organisational’, and ‘entrepreneurial’ 
professionals or knowledge workers. The medical profession would be categorised as an 
independent profession given its autonomy, dominance and indeterminate knowledge 
(Boreham, 1983; Freidson, 1988). Organisational professions (e.g. management) lack the 
indeterminate knowledge and specialist expertise of their independent counterparts, as 
their work skills are dependent on the situation at hand (Reed, 1996). Clinical managers 
may be regarded as hybrid professionals combining characteristics of independent and 
organisational professions. The likelihood of conflicts between professional and 
organisational values (Kippist and Fitzgerald, 2009) indicates the potential conflicting 
roles that these hybrids adopt. Entrepreneurial professionals utilise specialist technical 
skills to protect their jurisdictions and gain economic benefits, and have a degree of 
flexibility and autonomy not afforded to independent or organisational professionals 
(Reed, 1996). Independent professionals (e.g. physicians) are often threatened or 
controlled by the other organisational and entrepreneurial professionals (Reed, 1996), 
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and this is seen in the case of the NPfIT (see Chapter 3). These external threats might 
account for the rise in independent professionals stepping into the shoes of 
organisational or entrepreneurial professionals to reassert their authority, resulting in 
professional hybridisation. 
Technology too has been recognised as a challenge to clinical professional autonomy 
(Walter and Lopez, 2008; McLaughlin and Webster, 1998). Scholars have highlighted how 
technology is often viewed by the established clinical profession with apprehension, 
suspicion, and in some cases, outright rejection (Heath, Luff and Svensson, 2003; 
Goldschmidt, 2005; Walsh, 2004). The possibility of codification of their expertise and 
practices by means of technology (Walter and Lopez, 2008) is also a challenge to their 
indeterminate knowledge (Boreham, 1983). The ubiquitous use of technology by patients 
results in rising expectations and better service from their healthcare providers (Kassirer, 
2000), providing a reason for clinicians to embrace health technology and cater to their 
patients’ needs. However, technology needs to be designed with the needs of its users in 
mind, and this is particularly important in a complex healthcare setting. The need for 
clinical input and appropriate design of EHRs which are sensitive to the reasons why 
clinicians enter data in a particular way (Heath and Luff, 1996) must not be 
underestimated. This may account for the increasing presence of clinicians in the IT field 
(see Chapter 7). 
Although the presence of clinicians in the IT domain (Kay and Hayes, 2011; Smith et al., 
2011) to resist the potential control mechanisms imposed by technology (Timmons, 
2003a) is not new, this professional hybrid role has not been subject to empirical 
research. Scholars have recognised the importance of involving clinicians in IT 
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development, but acknowledge the lack of research investigating this unique ‘healthcare 
IT workforce’ (Hersh, 2006; Smith et al., 2011).  
While professional bodies such as the UK Council for Health Informatics Professionals 
(UKCHIP), the British Computer Society Health group and the International Medical 
Informatics Association (IMIA) have been formed (Kay and Hayes, 2011), clinical 
informatics is a niche area that is very young and is yet to be recognised as a profession in 
itself (Hersh, 2006). Scholars have suggested that while clinician-manager hybrids also 
face challenges in being regarded as an independent and distinct professional role, the 
development of organisations such as the British Association for Medical Managers signal 
the increased recognition and institutionalisation of these hybrids (Fitzgerald et al., 2006). 
Though the British Association for Medical Managers was dissolved in 2010, the more 
recently established Faculty of Medical Leadership and Management continues to 
promote the importance of clinician-manager hybrids (BMA, 2012). The establishment of 
similar organisations for clinical informaticians is possibly an indicator of the increasing 
appreciation of clin-IT hybrids.  
Freidson’s (1985) theory of restratification suggests that new roles are created in 
response to threats to professional autonomy. While the clinician-manager hybrid has 
received significant scholarly interest, findings from this research indicate the emergence 
of a different hybrid, as clinicians are increasingly engaged in technology development 
and implementation. Chapter 7 provides a detailed discussion of this key finding, where I 
investigate the circumstances which trigger the formation of this hybrid role of clinician-IT 
professionals. Clearly, the use of technology, its mediating role and boundary spanning 
capabilities, all work together toward redefining traditional professional boundaries and 
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jurisdictions. Having provided a brief review of the challenges of technology 
implementation in healthcare and how professional roles are closely related the success 
of such implementations, I will now highlight the research objectives of this thesis on the 
basis of reviewed literature. 
2.8  Research focus 
Studies have investigated EHRs including their benefits (Cusack, 2008; Goldschmidt, 
2005), challenges (Boaden and Joyce, 2006; Cusack, 2008), implementation, impacts, 
cost-benefit value and the parts played by different stakeholders (Aderibigbe et al., 2007; 
Leicht and Fennel, 2008). Although the importance of involving users from multiple 
groups - clinical as well as non-clinical - to enable the successful implementation of EHRs 
and e-health in general, has been recognised (Bates, 2002), there is insufficient research 
on the role of healthcare technologies from the perspective of diverse user groups (Leicht 
and Fennel, 2008).  
The complex nature of the healthcare field indicates a need to look beyond technology, 
and to focus more closely on the dynamics between the key stakeholders involved in 
large scale health IT projects. This requires a deeper understanding of the nature of 
healthcare professionals, given their longstanding position of autonomy and dominance 
(Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 2007). It would appear that these traits are at odds with the 
controlling effect that technology often exerts on individuals. For this reason, this thesis 
investigates the evolution of a large scale health IT project, namely the NHS Care Record 
Service component of England’s NPfIT, taking into consideration the diverse stakeholders 
involved in it.  
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While studies have critically evaluated the NPfIT programme and discussed the challenges 
of EHRs in England, this research study seeks to go a step further, by tracing the 
discourses from multiple stakeholder groups which have surfaced, subsided and persisted 
with regard to the use of EHRs over the course of the NPfIT project. Multiple voices and 
efforts served as inputs to this massive project, and formed a rich, dense tapestry of 
interwoven dialogues revolving around various themes and focal points. I identify some of 
the dominant voices which steered the NPfIT organising vision, and highlight how 
interests and visions may have shifted over the course of the project. 
Literature on technology frames and boundary objects (see section 2.3) brings to light the 
varied perspectives of different stakeholders. Applying this to the EHR itself, I investigate 
how this technology may be utilised for different purposes by multiple users, highlighting 
its role as a boundary object in itself.  
 Further, given the shifting roles of professionals, resulting in the phenomenon of 
professional hybrids, I explore the significance of hybrid roles in the context of the 
national programme. My findings point to the existence of a niche group of clinicians who 
are involved in IT development, implementation and policy making. This study 
investigates reasons for the emergence of this new hybrid role and the specific challenges 
they have to contend with. To date, the literature on clinical professional hybrids has 
focused on clinician-managers and has not investigated the existence of clinicians who 
are actively engaged in IT development. 
The objectives of this study are to address the following questions:  
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1. How did the NPfIT organising vision develop under the influence of the 
discourse prevalent amongst stakeholders during the project?  
2. How do different users perceive EHRs, and how do professional roles influence 
how EHRs are used to mediate interactions and knowledge flow across 
boundaries? 
3. What triggers the formation of the clinician-IT hybrid, and how does this align 
with Freidson’s theory of restratification amongst medical professionals? 
Having identified the research focus for this study, I will now proceed to provide an 
overview of the development of the NPfIT to set the context for the findings and 
discussion chapters (Chapters 5 to 7). 
 
 
 CHAPTER 3  THE NPFIT STORY 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter sets the context for the subsequent findings chapters (Chapters 5 to 7), by 
elaborating on the national initiative for EHR development in England: the NPfIT. The 
complexity of the NPfIT is hard to capture within the confines of a chapter – partly due to 
its vastness, and partly because there is much that is left to be uncovered and which 
people are unwilling to talk about. These challenges are not easily overcome and explain 
why there have been numerous attempts to research the programme and to probe its 
inner workings.  
In this chapter I present the NPfIT story, and identify the different phases that marked the 
programme (see Figure 3.1, page 87). While Chapter 6 illustrates how EHRs can be 
regarded as boundary objects subject to multiple views and interpretations, Chapter 5 
applies the concept of boundary objects to the NPfIT as a whole, considering the different 
phases it went through (see Figure 3.1, page 87) as boundary objects, and the national 
programme itself as a temporal boundary object. Before venturing into these details 
however, an overview of the NPfIT project from its inception is presented in this chapter. 
A summary of some of the key events in the NPfIT is provided in Appendix D. I begin by 
tracing some of the main markers in the history of the project to provide the reader with 
a holistic picture of how the NPfIT progressed from 2002 to 2011. 
3.2  The NPfIT NCRS story 
This section provides an overview of how the NPfIT unfolded, with a focus on the NHS 
Care Record Service (NCRS). I highlight some of the main transitions and markers of the 
programme, using documentary data and reviewed literature. An overview of some of the 
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key events in the NPfIT is provided in Appendix D. Figure 3.1 (page 87) highlights some of 
the main phases in the NPfIT NCRS implementation. 
3.2.1 The birth of the NPfIT 
The increased emphasis on modernisation of the public sector after the Labour 
government came into power in 1997 (Cabinet Office, 1999) was an antecedent to the 
1998 information strategy and the NHS Plan (DH, 2000). These in turn served as the 
foundation for the NPFIT (The NHS Confederation, 2003a), as it was realised that it was 
necessary to have an increased investment in health IT (Wanless, 2002) if these aims were 
to be achieved. The political drive towards modernisation of the public sector was the key 
trigger for the initiation of the NPfIT which was conceived in a joint meeting between 
policy makers and industry experts behind the doors of 10 Downing Street on 18th 
February 2002 (Cross, 2004; Ritter, 2008). This meeting was preceded by a meeting 
between the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and software tycoon Bill Gates, where the 
latter convinced the Prime Minister of the transformative potential of information 
technology (Brooks, 2007). The persuasion exercised by such industry players, the 
increased use of health IT in other countries such as the US, and the under-investment in 
technology in the NHS (Wanless 2002; Brooks 2007; House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2007), all acted together to accelerate the launch of the National Programme 
for IT.  
In his letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer which preceded the report on the future 
of the NHS, Wanless (2002) advocated ‘at least a 10 year programme of change’ to see 
through the modernisation of the NHS. The initial agreed timescale for the NPfIT on the 
other hand, was two years and nine months after negotiations between attendees of the 
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previously mentioned meeting (Brooks, 2007). This was a gross underestimation of the 
project’s complexity and scale and indicates that the national programme though 
launched under the banner of modernisation, appeared to be the brainchild of specific 
individuals within the upper echelons of policymaking.  
3.2.2 Drawing up the specifications 
The early phase of the NPfIT saw some level of initial support by clinicians and 
representative bodies as the ‘idea’ of the national programme was acknowledged as 
being a good one, though many respondents indicated that this was accompanied by 
some apprehension about its implementation. Factors such as doctors’ contractual limit 
on their hours of work mandated the need for suitable mechanisms for information 
sharing between work shifts, and these were not in place at the time (BMA, 2003). The 
programme would have offered the possibility of providing the means to meet this need. 
The drive for integrated healthcare led to increased talk of a single national health record, 
and this was the main selling point for the EHR proposed in the ‘Delivering 21st Century 
Support for the NHS: National Strategic Programme’ report by the DH (2002a). The idea of 
‘connectivity’ in the initial strategic plan for the NPfIT (DH, 2002a) revolved around the 
idea of connectivity to a broadband network, rather than actual connectivity and 
interoperability between systems. The focus at this time was very much on a single 
integrated system (DH, 2002a; 2002b). It later emerged that the original version of this 
report (DH, 2002b) indicating a high risk associated with the project was supressed, and 
the published version had this section and references to it removed (Brooks, 2007). Such 
lack of transparency is one of the pitfalls in large scale public sector projects (Bruzelius, 
Flyvberg and Rothengatter, 2002). The NPfIT seemed to have started off on this note, 
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suggesting the absence of appropriate communication, engagement and buy in for the 
project from community stakeholders.  
The NPfIT held greater promise for secondary care than primary care, given their less 
established use of computerised systems (Benson 2002a, 2002b). While secondary care 
respondents criticised GPs’ lack of communication regarding their patients’ information, 
the unbalanced nature of communication between primary and secondary care in a pilot 
project indicated that hospital doctors benefited from increased access to information 
from primary care, whereas GPs still faced long waits before receiving information from 
hospitals (NPfIT, 2004c). This was partly attributed to secondary care clinicians’ lack of 
experience using computers (NPfIT, 2004c). The variation in actual benefit afforded to 
different groups of clinicians, depending on their existing work practices, confirms that 
perceptions and uses of objects vary for different users at any given point of time 
(Nicolini, Mengis and Swan, 2012). The NPfIT had very different implications for the many 
stakeholders and user groups involved or impacted by it. Reconciling the diverse needs of 
these many groups was a challenge, and significant difficulties were encountered during 
the project in trying to resolve this.  
In March 2003, the Clinical Care Advisory Group and a patient advisory group, two of the 
initial channels for clinical and patient inputs into the NPfIT (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2007) prepared a proposal on behalf of the Ministerial 
Taskforce on Information Technology (2003), where the concept of a ‘spine’ health record 
was introduced. This spine was intended to bring together summarised health 
information from multiple sources for each patient, and would be accessible to the 
patient who would be the carrier of this information. Healthcare delivery was to use the 
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combination of information from this spine as well as organisational systems which 
contained more details (Ministerial Taskforce on Information Technology, 2003). These 
specifications presented the idea of an individual spine for each patient. While this 
proposal did include the creation of a national system, the conceptualisation of the spine 
was ‘person-based’, and revolved around the individual rather than a national level 
record.  
 The concept of the person-based spine mutated into the national Spine, which was to act 
both as a conduit holding all information relevant to a patient at a national level, as well 
as a messaging system (Connecting For Health, 2005b). The single integrated health 
record, called the NHS Care Record Service (NCRS) was also to include a Secondary Uses 
Service (SUS) which utilised anonymised patient data for research and reporting purposes 
(Connecting for Health, 2005b; The NHS Confederation, 2004). While EHRs have the 
potential to act as a tool and data source for researchers, there is often much concern 
regarding the possibility of unauthorised use of patient information for secondary use 
(Foster and Young, 2012; Safran et al., 2007). This use of patient data was a source of 
apprehension later in the project when issues related to confidentiality and privacy of 
records were raised.  
Alongside the move towards integrated systems, the programme also sought to create a 
semblance of oneness through the Common User Interface component (NPFIT, 2004c; 
The NHS Confederation, 2003b) by providing all clinicians with a consistent standard 
interface to improve patient care and safety and facilitate easier use of different systems 
by clinicians who shifted locations. This standardised user interface would be particularly 
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beneficial to individuals who had difficulty adapting to new systems and had to work in 
multiple locations.  
The Summary Care Records (SCRs) and Detailed Care Records (DCRs) were introduced as a 
part of the NCRS in 2007 (Braunold, 2007). This transition from the idea of a single 
national record to two separate records was questioned by the House of Commons 
Health Committee (2007), as it reflected a shift in what was originally specified and raised 
questions as to why two records were being proposed. The perpetual justification for the 
summary care records, that if a patient lived in one place and fell ill when visiting another 
location, doctors need to have quick and easy access to the patient’s information (NHS 
Confederation, 2004), is a situation which is relatively uncommon (Craig and Brooks, 
2006).  
The initial specifications as per the Ministerial Taskforce on Information Technology 
(2003) report were designed to hold summary health information in the individual 
person-based spines. The Summary Care Records, introduced in 2007 (Braunold, 2007) 
were intended to hold this very same information. Evidently, the understanding of what 
the spine was, changed significantly over the course of the NPfIT. The spine had 
transformed from the concept of multiple patient-based spines holding summary 
information of a single patient, to a national Spine which provided access to multiple 
EHRs, connected local systems and supported a secondary uses service, electronic 
prescription service as well as a messaging service (Connecting for Health, 2005b; Coiera, 
2007). The summary information which was previously understood to be part of the 
patient-centred spine was now contained within the banner of the ‘Summary Care 
Record’.  
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The inundation of terminologies and labels in the project led to confusion and ambiguity. 
The House of Commons Health Committee (2007) report suggests a difference between 
the Detailed Care Records and the Patient Administrative Systems (PAS) which were being 
introduced, recognising the latter as supporting systems to the Detailed Care Records.  
There was a lack of clear specifications (Coiera, 2007) and this resulted in further 
divergence between what different users expected, exacerbating the incongruences of 
the technology frames within which the various stakeholders work (Orlikowski and Gash, 
1994).  
As a consequence of these vague specifications, the contents of the Summary Care 
Records and the access and consent mechanism to be adopted for them were areas of 
contention. The option of ‘role-based access’ and ‘sealed envelopes’ (Connecting for 
Health, 2005b) were raised in response to this, although some questioned the feasibility 
and security of these mechanisms (Randell, 2007). Further, the implications of patient 
access to their records have been debated (Ross and Lin, 2003; Ross, 1986; Fisher and 
Britten 1993), and the possibility of patients restricting access to parts of their records by 
means of sealed envelopes would have defeated the purpose of the record as a tool 
around which clinicians plan and coordinate healthcare delivery (Berg, 2002).  
Much of the debate regarding the ‘opt-in’ versus ‘opt-out’ options for patients was raised 
because of patients’ concerns as to how their data would be used, and the initially 
planned ‘sealed envelopes’ were intended to give patients the option to prevent parts of 
their record being accessed for the purpose of secondary use (Anderson, 2008). The 
upload of patient data from the Summary Care Records onto the NHS Spine for research 
purposes using the Secondary Uses Service was a source of concern, as patients could not 
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opt out of the Secondary Uses Service unless they opted out of the Summary Care Record 
(Foster and Young, 2012). This approach was described in the media as the Department of 
Health ‘manufacturing consent’ (Dunt, 2010). Clearly, the use of EHRs for research 
purposes is closely linked to discussions on privacy and confidentiality – issues which 
were given more prominence in the NPfIT toward the latter stages of the programme. 
While the British Medical Association advocated an opt-in approach wherein patients had 
to deliberately choose to have their details uploaded onto the summary care record, this 
was contested by the government (Anderson, 2008).  
There was much ambiguity and lack of consensus regarding the contents and usage of the 
Summary Care Records as late as 2007 (House of Commons Health Committee, 2007). The 
proposal of a hybrid consent system with an opt-out option for the creation of the 
Summary Care Record, but an opt-in option for inclusion of further information in it 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2008; House of Commons Health Committee, 2007) indicates some 
accommodation for patients’ preferences. The programme appeared to make efforts 
toward increased patient empowerment by means of this hybrid consent system, the 
possibility of sealed envelopes allowing patients to restrict access to their records, and 
the plans for enabling access to Summary Care Records from homes by means of 
HealthSpace (House of Commons Health Committee, 2007). The latter two aims did not 
see fruition due to the complexity of developing sealed envelopes and the low uptake of 
HealthSpace (Greenhalgh et al., 2010a) to the extent that it was closed down in 
December 2012 (HealthSpace, 2012).  
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3.2.3 Procurement of the contracts 
While the NPfIT’s Local Service Providers (LSPs) were large IT companies with a successful 
track record in several IT projects, they were blissfully unaware of the complexity and 
possible unfeasibility of the NPfIT. As with many large projects, there was clearly an 
expansion of the initially anticipated scope of the project; in this case, this was partly due 
to insufficient research on the part of the programme regarding what clinicians needed 
and expected out of the NPfIT.  
In September 2003, in an interview with the Director General of the NPfIT and the then 
Chairman of the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, the latter emphasised that ‘the aim 
of the NPfIT is to involve all parties to build on existing systems, preserve what is good 
and avoid the disruption of a “big bang” approach’ (The NHS Confederation, 2003b: 2). 
The programme at this time stated that it did encourage continued investment in local IT 
(The NHS Confederation, 2003b). GPs however had a general fear that their established 
and successful computer systems would be ripped and replaced by a monolithic structure 
that was the NCRS, and this concern would have been exacerbated by the conflicts 
between the GMS and the LSP contracts. 
The NPfIT began with the identification of five geographical clusters catered by the LSPs 
(see Table 3.1, page 79). With the withdrawal of Accenture in 2006, the two clusters (East 
and East Midlands cluster and North East cluster) were merged with Computer Science 
Corporation’s North West and West Midlands cluster. In 2008 the contracts with Fujitsu 
were terminated and BT took over some of the work that was previously to be 
undertaken by Fujitsu (NAO, 2011).  
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Table 3.1 NPfIT clusters and Local Service Providers 
Clusters LSP Sub-contractors for the PAS 
systems 
London  British Telecom IDX systems initially; Switched to 
Cerner (Millennium system) in 
2006 
South Fujitsu (contract terminated in 2008, 
taken over by British Telecom) 
IDX systems initially; Switched to 
Cerner (Millennium system) in 
2005 
East & East 
Midlands 
Accenture  
(withdrew in September 2006 and was 
taken over by Computer Sciences 
Corporation) 
iSoft 
North East Accenture  
(withdrew in September 2006 and was 
taken over by Computer Sciences 
Corporation) 
iSoft 
North West & 
West Midlands 
Computer Sciences Corporation  iSoft (Lorenzo system) 
 
The project was rooted in a setting where there was much negativity and friction 
between the different groups involved – the clinical users on the one hand, and the 
technology savvy suppliers and their managers on the other. Ironically, the very people 
who did have proven experience in using IT in their clinical practice, were deliberately 
ignored, given that GPs in England had a track record of successful use of computers in 
their practices even prior to the NPfIT (Benson 2002a, 2002b).  
3.2.4 Restructuring, engagement and pre-emptive placation 
Soon after the signing of the LSP contracts concerns were raised by clinical advisors to the 
programme, and as a consequence a number of key people either left or were terminated 
by the NPfIT management. The Clinical Care Advisory Group, the National Clinical 
Advisory Board (NCAB) and the Patient Advisory Board (PAB) were the engagement 
mechanisms which the NPfIT began with (eHealth Insider, 2003; NHS NPfIT, 2004). While 
early reports discussed the valuable and guiding role of groups such as the NCAB and the 
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NHS IA, some of the individuals from these groups who were identified as having a key 
role early on in the Programme (NPfIT, 2004a) either resigned of their own volition or 
were terminated by the programme management (eHealth Insider, 2004a; British Journal 
of Healthcare Computing, 2005b) for reasons including efforts towards clinical 
engagement by ‘talking to all those doctors’ (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2007: Ev34). This tendency to deliberately distance themselves from clinicians 
was not conducive to the process of clinical engagement. By describing clinicians as ‘those 
doctors’, the NPfIT leadership seemed to have established a gulf between management 
and clinicians, and did not welcome attempts to bridge this gap. The initial support 
extended by clinicians toward the programme, as was reported by the programme (NPfIT, 
2004a) shifted as these same clinical leaders eventually realised that the consultation was 
‘a charade’ (British Journal of Healthcare Computing, 2005a). 
Criticisms of the contracting process, with clinicians not being privy to the final agreed 
specifications, led to the resignation of the Chair of the NCAB in April 2004 (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). September 2004 saw the departure of 
the joint Senior Responsible Owner of the programme after a mere six months of holding 
his position (eHealth Insider, 2004a). Late 2004 saw the establishment of CFH National 
Clinical Leads (NCLs) to act as representatives of clinical professionals. The closure of 
NCAB was followed by the entry of a new board, namely the Care Records Development 
Board (CRDB) (eHealth Insider, 2004b).  
There were efforts by the programme to keep the public informed about its progress, 
through published reports and newsletters. However, as is the case with many other 
media channels, much of these were masked by what the programme wanted the public 
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to know and believe. The number of ‘regular news updates’ through the ‘makingITwork’ 
newsletter from the national programme (NPfIT 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Connecting for 
Health 2005) dwindled rapidly, suggesting a declining commitment to communication to 
the public, and the general uncertainty of the programme.  
The Director General’s vision for the NCRS in 2004 (The NHS Confederation, 2004) 
included increased patient involvement, increased choice and reduced waiting times; 
however, not all of these targets could have been achieved from the NCRS alone, and it 
would appear that potential benefits from other components such as Choose and Book 
(e.g. increased choice) were made to appear as though they would be boons of the NCRS 
as well. It seems that there was a struggling effort to justify the needs and the benefits of 
the NCRS, and often the essence of what was described as hugely beneficial, was that it 
served as an electronic repository of patient information. This does not appear to be a 
huge step forward, but with the programme management and the government blowing 
the trumpet for the NPfIT, there was a clear attempt to sell it as a project with huge 
potential for the transformation of healthcare.  
In 2005 the Care Records Development Board (CRDB) published the Care Record 
guarantee which was to be subject to six-monthly reviews. The website of the National 
Information Governance Board for Health and Social Care (2013) indicates that this 
frequent revision of the guarantee ensured compliance with best practice. While this may 
be true, Connecting for Health (2005a: 4) explained these periodic reviews of the 
guarantee to ‘update it as the NHS CRS develops’. While the underlying essence of their 
justification of the reviews of the care record guarantee may be similar, it also has the 
subtle implication that the NCRS was not geared toward meeting the requirements of the 
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guarantee, but that rather, the guarantee was likely to change dependent on the progress 
and capabilities of the Care Record Service.  
In April 2005, the NPfIT was renamed Connecting for Health (CFH) and established as an 
executive agency of the Department of Health (NPfIT, 2004b). The NHS Information 
Authority (NHS IA) which had been responsible for the approval of NPfIT related functions 
prior to this was dissolved.  
3.2.5 Criticisms and inquiries into the NPfIT 
While undergoing significant restructuring and trying to gain clinical support through new 
engagement mechanisms, the NPfIT began to be subject to increased public scrutiny. By 
2004, the BMA raised concerns over the lack of clinical engagement in the programme, 
and it was clear that the early optimism was gradually transforming into feelings of doubt 
and neglect (Oates, 2004). The BMA raised concerns over the NCRS and patient privacy in 
2005, and following the 2007 Electronic Patient Record inquiry by the Health Select 
Committee, the BMA reiterated its concern regarding the security, confidentiality and 
safety of Summary Care Records (BMA, 2007; BJHC, 2005). In April 2006, a group of 23 
academics (Anderson et al., 2010) put forward a ‘dossier of concerns’ which continued to 
be updated until 2010 when the centralised approach of the programme was abandoned. 
This dossier consolidated several concerns related to the NPfIT collected from multiple 
sources including published reports and media articles. The NAO (2006) report which was 
published two months later, although mildly critical of the programme, did not give as 
negative a review of the programme as anticipated. This NAO (2006) report was delayed 
to such an extent that it was suspected that there had been much haggling over its 
contents, before the Department of Health finally consented to its publication (Dunleavy 
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et al., 2009), and a more realistic review was presented by a later report by the 
Committee of Public Accounts in 2007.  
The government’s dogmatic insistence on an unreasonably ambitious timescale was 
viewed as a precursor to high expectations by the public, leaving many disillusioned 
(BMA, 2006; BMA, 2008). The vagueness of the NCRS’ aims were highlighted by the 2007 
Electronic Patient Record inquiry which also indicated that some people felt that original 
aims may have been abandoned because of the many challenges encountered (House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2007). Much hype had been made of the Picture Archival 
and Communications System (PACS) which was not part of the initial core deliverables but 
was part of a wider phenomenon of scope creep (Kreps and Richardson, 2007) in the 
project, with other added features including the Quality Management and Analysis 
System (QMAS) and GP-to-GP systems (House of Commons Health Committee, 2007; Car 
et al., 2008). While included later as one of the programme’s deliverables (Car et al., 
2008), PACS was already in use in certain sites.  
While imaging systems were mentioned in early plans of the programme (NPfIT 2004a, 
2004b), they did not form part of the four core deliverables (The NHS Confederation, 
2003d). The programme intended to provide a broader context for the PACS deployment, 
as opposed to the previous local ‘mini PACS’ implementations (NPfIT, 2004a).  
In a House of Commons Hansard Debate (2009) the then Secretary of State for Health 
quoted a BMA (2009) statement released that day, to support his view that the 
programme had clinical support and appreciation for the improved patient safety and 
reduction in errors that had been enabled by IT. The BMA (2009) statement however 
read: ‘We welcome the commitment that the systems which clinicians find most useful 
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will not be scrapped. Good IT is central to efficient, effective safe patient care’, and this 
seems to refer to the existing GP systems which had been under the threat of the rip-and-
replace approach. This showcased an example of distorted use of media communication, 
with politicians suggesting that the success of GP systems was a by-product of the 
programme, and that clinicians were wholly supportive of their approach. 
While in 2009 the RCGP indicated its support for the Summary Care Records (Gerada and 
Field, 2009), the BMA was not convinced and called for a suspension of their rollout until 
further independent reviews of pilots had been conducted (BMA, 2010). One such review 
had been conducted earlier by University College London (Greenhalgh et al., 2008), 
following which the BMA accepted the roll-out of Summary Care Records on a limited 
capacity subject to further evaluations and acceptance of the recommendations of this 
initial review. Despite this conditional acceptance of SCRs, there was an accelerated roll-
out of SCRs without meeting the terms put forward by the BMA, resulting in amplified 
calls to bring it to a halt (BMA, 2010). 
3.2.6 Disruptions to NPfIT leadership 
In 2007, the programme saw the resignation of its Director General, Richard Granger, who 
had been with the programme since 2002. He was succeeded by Gordon Hextall in 
January 2008. However, Hextall left the Programme in April 2008, and the programme 
was taken up jointly by two other individuals in September 2008, one of whom resigned 
in 2009 (House of Commons Health Committee, 2007; Sauer and Willcocks, 2007; 
Robertson et al., 2010). 
These changes were during and immediately following the multiple inquiries and reviews 
the NPfIT had been subjected to. The programme management began the process of 
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trying to undo the mistakes previously committed, by engaging in negotiations with 
suppliers (Cresswell et al., 2010) and collaborating with clinical professional bodies to 
establish standards for interoperable systems and record keeping (AOMRC, 2008a; RCP, 
2009). 
While the departure of some of the leadership personnel may have been welcomed by 
many, the subsequent lack of stability in leadership was unhelpful, given the precarious 
direction in which the programme was heading.  
3.2.7 Attempts to salvage the NCRS 
Following much of the criticisms faced in the inquiry by the House of Commons Health 
Committee (2007), there was an effort to address some of the project lacunae. The Royal 
Colleges had communicated their dissatisfaction with not being invited to give their 
inputs on what the NHS Care Record Service was to contain (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2007). This may have been one of the reasons for the initiation of a CFH-
funded project led by the RCP Health Informatics Unit and approved by the Academy of 
Medical Royal Colleges (RCP, 2009; AOMRC, 2008a), in recognition of the need for clear-
cut standards for medical records. This project was formulated for the purpose of 
informing and guiding hospital doctors (AOMRC, 2008a, 2008b) – an indicator of primary 
care physicians’ awareness of record standards.  
There was also the RCGP’s Shared Records Professional Guidance project which was 
commissioned by Connecting for Health, and which looked at the issues related to shared 
detailed care records (RCGP, 2009). The absence of record standards has been attributed 
to the absence of a well-defined structure and the practice of learning to enter data by 
observing other clinicians’ practices rather than consciously abiding by specified 
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standards (AOMRC, 2008a, 2008b). The RCP’s (2010) proposition of ‘patient-focused 
records’ emphasised the need for preventive care, as quality care should focus on the 
patient rather than the disease. It advocated the necessity of a dialogue within the 
record, driving home the point that patients too should be allowed to edit and access the 
record, thus empowering them as partners in their own healthcare.  
Although increased focus was directed toward establishing record standards, there were 
those who considered these efforts redundant. An RCP led project advocated the use of 
‘clinical headings’ to standardise health records and mandate the entry of specific clinical 
data (RCP, 2012).  
3.2.8 The closure of the NPfIT 
The NPfIT was subjected to significant amounts of publicity, hype, negative coverage and 
public scrutiny during its period of operation (Coiera, 2007). Given the dominant feeling 
that it was not fit for purpose or tailored to what people actually wanted, whether it 
would ever see completion was a question on many people’s minds. With the first half of 
the project marked by centralised top-down leadership, ‘ruthless standardisation’ (DH, 
2002a) and much dissatisfaction amongst clinicians (Coiera, 2007), the latter half of the 
project following the various reviews and evaluations saw an attempt to rectify some of 
its failings.  
An inkling to its demise may be seen in the Department of Health’s announcement in 
2010 that the future of the NPfIT would be modular and locally led (Bruce, 2010; DH, 
2010). A subsequent review by the Major Projects Authority (2011) concluded that the 
programme was ‘not fit to deliver the modern IT services that the NHS needs’, leading to 
the accelerated dismantling of the NPfIT in September 2011 (DH, 2011).  
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Figure 3.1 Key Phases in the NPfIT 
 
3.3  Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of some of the key phases (see Figure 3.1) in England’s 
NPfIT, a large scale government project that envisioned national level electronic health 
records accessible to clinicians and patients through a national Spine (Brennan, 2007; 
Connecting For Health, 2005b).  
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Launched in 2002 with strong political support, the programme began with an ambitious 
plan and timescale. The contracts were signed relatively quickly between October 2003 
and February 2004, resulting in significant dissatisfaction amongst clinicians as they were 
not consulted nor informed of the details of these contracts.  
Early 2004 was the beginning of a period of restructuring and changes in engagement 
mechanisms. The National Clinical Advisory Board and the Patient Advisory Board that 
were channels for clinical and patient involvement in the programme, were dissolved and 
replaced by the Care Records Development Board (eHealth Insider, 2004b) that was led 
mainly by businesspeople according to my empirical data. National Clinical Leads were 
appointed to represent clinical groups and to facilitate communication between the NPfIT 
and clinicians. This was followed by a period of turbulence in the supplier market as some 
contractors withdrew, leading to changes in the areas covered by the remaining providers 
as they catered to more clusters. In 2005, there were further changes as the NPfIT was 
renamed Connecting For Health, subtly highlighting the need for connectivity and 
interoperability as opposed to the initial monolithic ‘one system fits all’ (Major Projects 
Authority, 2011: 12) approach adopted by the NPfIT. 
Concerns regarding the feasibility and progress of the NPfIT triggered a number of 
reviews and evaluations of the programme. The NAO’s (2006) review of the programme 
however was only mildly critical, and evidence points to the high possibility that the 
contents of the report were subject to haggling between the Department of Health and 
the NAO. This resulted in a further investigation by the Public Accounts Committee (2007) 
the following year, and this brought to light several concerns including the delays, the 
capabilities of the suppliers and the lack of clinical engagement. Alongside this increased 
Chapter 3 
89 
 
scrutiny of the NPfIT, issues related to patient confidentiality and privacy with regard to 
the Summary Care Records began to be raised. Mechanisms such as sealed envelopes and 
patient access to their records were increasingly discussed. In June 2007 the House of 
Commons Health Select Committee also undertook an investigation into the programme, 
following heightened concerns on its progress. The same month, the NPfIT’s Director 
General, Richard Granger resigned, and the programme underwent multiple changes in 
leadership over the next two years.  
The latter part of the programme was marked by an increased focus on improved record 
keeping standards and ways to improve interoperability, rather than integration of 
systems into a single monolithic national system. This shift to a modular approach (DH, 
2010) was a positive step after the ‘ruthless standardisation’ (DH, 2002a) that marked the 
early stages of the NPfIT. However the programme continued to face criticisms. The 
Major Projects Authority (2011) pointed out the lack of a business case for the NPfIT as a 
whole, despite its individual components having their own distinct business cases. This 
led to the dismantling of the NPfIT in September 2011 (DH, 2011), with some of its 
individual components in continued operation though not under the banner of a national 
programme. 
The NPfIT was marked by these key phases that I have briefly elaborated (see Figure 3.1, 
page 87). The scale of the programme meant that there were numerous stakeholders 
involved, and that there was a need to take into account the different technology frames 
(Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) and perspectives employed by them. The innovative nature 
of the programme makes it comparable to an organising vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 
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1997) that is characterised by buzzwords that emerge and subside, subject to discourse 
by stakeholders involved in the vision. This is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
Having provided a brief overview of the NPfIT, I will now discuss the research methods in 
the next chapter.  
 
 
 CHAPTER 4  RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1  Introduction 
The choice of methodology is crucial to research as the methodology and the nature of 
the study are mutually shaped by each other. While the methods depend on the issue 
being researched, the outcomes are influenced by the means in which the study was 
carried out. This chapter discusses the research paradigm, research design and methods 
employed in this study. 
The term research methodology encompasses both philosophical view points as well as 
research methods (Finlay and Ballinger, 2006). Some of the traditional well known 
dichotomous debates on research approaches include quantitative versus qualitative 
research and realism versus relativism (Fitzgerald and Howcroft, 1998). The need to 
isolate one’s preconceptions and possible biases is another debate amongst scholars. 
While phenomenologists such as Husserl advocate the separating of one’s personal pre-
understandings, also known as ‘bracketing’, later scholars such as Heidegger and 
Gadamer firmly support the view that consciousness is not distinguishable from the world 
and that an element of pre-understanding is essential in order to engage in the 
hermeneutical circle (Laverty, 2003). The very decision as to whether to isolate a single 
ideology or to develop an approach which includes concepts from multiple research 
traditions has spurred further discussion as well (Fitzgerald and Howcroft, 1998). 
From the onset of my research, I have been aware of the numerous stances which may be 
taken with regard to any research project, and emphasise that adherence to one ideology 
does not necessarily exclude the suitability or validity of another approach. I now 
elaborate on the underlying philosophy and paradigm adopted in this study. 
Chapter 4 
92 
 
4.2   Research paradigm 
Research paradigms are defined by the positioning of three factors in a research study: 
the ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (the relationship between the 
researcher and knowledge) and methodology (the means by which knowledge is attained) 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  
To address my research objective of tracing the competing discourses surrounding EHRs 
in the NPfIT, I draw upon the viewpoints of multiple stakeholder groups, and build upon 
these multiple and varied experiences. This leads me to the ontological question of 
whether these multiple social constructions are realities in themselves, or if there is a 
single objective reality which exists apart from the many constructed perspectives which 
people have. The limitations of data collection and the selective nature of research – 
whether qualitative or quantitative (Mays and Pope, 1995), indicate that knowledge and 
findings attained through research are not necessarily representative of the complete 
truth or reality. My approach acknowledges differences in people’s perceptions of 
realities, but deviates from social constructionism by advocating the presence of an 
objective reality which exists independent of these individual perceptions.  My focus is 
hence on understanding the subjective perspectives formed by key stakeholders while 
keeping in mind the existence of a separate reality which is beyond our grasp due to the 
existence of individual bias and variation in perspectives (Lincoln and Guba, 2000).  
With regard to my relationship to my data and knowledge, I concur with the suggestion 
that most research projects begin with the researcher’s interest and some pre-awareness, 
indicating the inevitable presence of personal bias, no matter how minimal (Steward, 
2006). Some scholars emphasise the need to bracket and put aside one’s biases and 
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assumptions in the process of research (Laverty, 2003). Schwandt (2000) recommends 
that rather than isolating one’s personal opinions and biases, one should engage them 
while doing research, and continually refine them in the process of understanding the 
object under study. To strike a balance, I employed preliminary sensitising interviews (see 
section 4.4) to help ensure that pre-determined ideas were not skewed towards my 
personal opinions but took into account the concerns of relevant stakeholder groups as 
well. I suggest that by attempting to fuse my (informed) preconceived knowledge with 
the perspectives and experiences of another individual, a more all rounded and holistic 
understanding of the situation under study was attained.  
This research has close links to the IS field which is known to support pluralist 
methodologies given its multi-disciplinary and heterogeneous nature (Avison and Myers, 
1995; Landry and Banville, 1992; Mingers, 2004; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). The field 
of IS was initially dominated by positivist research (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). 
However, the multidisciplinary nature of IS (Mingers, 2004) and its close relation to social 
contexts (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) resulted in a recognition of the lacunae of 
positivist methods. Some of the reasons for social scientists to deviate from quantitative 
research towards more qualitative and inductive studies include pluralisation of 
interpretations and the fast changing nature of the social world (Flick, 2002). This rapidly 
changing nature of the social environment is highly relevant in the IS field which is 
continuously developing, and even more so in healthcare IT which is a relatively new area. 
With this in mind, I chose to adopt a qualitative approach to investigate how individuals 
view EHRs and relate to their experiences using them.  
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Qualitative research itself inherently focuses on multiple methods (Flick, 2002) and the 
changing and blurred boundaries between paradigms (Lincoln and Guba, 2000) often lead 
to an overlap between different approaches. The highly versatile nature of the human 
mind and social interaction makes it difficult to theorise and then confirm one’s 
hypotheses. As a result, social scientists gravitate towards inductive strategies wherein 
sensitised concepts are created to explain social phenomena. This is not to say that there 
is no theoretical knowledge prior to observation or data gathering. On the contrary, an 
initial understanding of current literature and theory is required, to guide the researcher 
in the collection and analysis of data (Yin, 2009). As mentioned by Creswell (1994), 
although more associated with an inductive approach, qualitative research may use 
existing literature to employ a known theory and contextualise it to suit the phenomenon 
or context which is being studied. Further, qualitative research is often discounted by 
scholars who regard it as lacking in objectivity and hard facts, imbibed with researcher 
bias (Mays and Pope, 1995). However its absence of enumeration has been frequently 
mistakenly synonymised with an inability to measure or assess, and its capacity to explain 
social phenomena has been downplayed (Pope and Mays, 2006). 
While some element of researcher bias or preconceived ideas is unavoidable in a research 
study, I wished to minimise uninformed preconceptions in the main data collection 
phases. For this purpose I engaged in an initial phase of sensitising interviews where I 
talked to individuals (clinicians as well as non-clinicians) who had used EHRs. This initial 
data collection phase was informed by my knowledge on EHRs and the wider field of 
electronic healthcare by means of reviewed literature. This equipped me with an 
informed understanding of the way individuals used EHRs in practice. The findings from 
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these interviews and from my initial review of documents were instrumental in helping 
me identify areas which could be probed further. I employed elements of organising 
visions in IS (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), public sector IT management, and EHR usage, 
combined with informed understanding from my sensitising interviews and documentary 
data, to guide the final stage of my data collection. 
Retrospective studies of change efforts have the likelihood of being biased due to the 
researcher’s awareness of the final outcome of the project (Van de ven, 1992). While this 
may be true, I am also aware that given the sensitive nature of the NPfIT and the multiple 
interests which were at stake, the timing of my data collection and consequent findings, 
i.e., immediately after the dismantling of the project, could have been a factor in 
encouraging certain key informants to participate in my study. 
Interpretation is an inherent part of any research study as one needs to analyse and make 
sense of one’s findings (Silverman, 2005). In order to understand interactions between 
key stakeholders and systems, and the changing foci of EHR initiatives, stakeholder 
perspectives need to be interpreted in a manner that can provide an explanation 
regarding the envisioned as well as the actual adoption of EHRs. When interviewing and 
listening to people talk about their views and experiences, I sought to probe beneath the 
face value of statements, knowing that interpreting individuals’ accounts required me to 
question points which might often be taken for granted (Pope and May, 2006). I 
delineated the research process into distinct stages, employing sensitising concepts from 
the first phase to inform the documentary analysis, and these findings in turn to identify 
and interview key informants in the final stage. This facilitates a ‘fusion of horizons’ (Koch, 
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1995), so that there is a convergence of perspectives and understanding by this approach 
of triangulation (Mathison, 1988). 
In order to ensure validity and reliability of my data, I employed techniques including data 
triangulation and respondent validation (Burnard et al., 2008) by sending respondents 
interview excerpts that I wished to use (see section 4.7.2). I requested these respondents 
to inform me if there were any errors in the excerpts, or if they wished to be attributed 
differently given the multiple affiliations of several respondents (see Appendix A). I 
formulated a sampling strategy (see section 4.5) to include multiple stakeholder groups 
relevant to the NPfIT to ensure internal validity (Malterud, 2001). The combination of 
academic theories and the analysis of multiple interpretations and experiences of the 
care record component of the NPfIT, facilitates a broader application of this research to 
other public sector projects in IT, particularly in the health care area.  
As my research objective is concerned with the study of discourses in the area of EHRs, I 
will now discuss what is meant by a discourse in the context of this study.  
4.3  The study of discourses 
In seeking to understand the existing and changing discourses surrounding electronic 
health records, it is essential to understand and define what is meant by a discourse. 
Discourses go beyond mere collections of words and language, but represent collective 
bodies of ideas, texts or behaviours which identify with a specific social issue (Allan, 
2007). While these collections may be categorised and distinguished by means of themes, 
the focal point is not the over-arching themes themselves, but what is contained within 
their expanse, i.e., the ‘blank spaces’ within the grid, where the grid represents the 
categorisation of knowledge or discourse (Allan, 2007; Foucault, 1966). 
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Discourse analysis as a research methodology has numerous strands, and the boundaries 
between analytical methods such as content analysis, thematic analysis and discourses 
analysis are often blurred (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Krippendorf, 2004; Phillips and Hardy, 
2002). For this reason I shall explain how this study seeks to study the shifting discourses 
surrounding EHRs in England’s NPfIT.  
Several content analysis and discourse analysis studies venture into the quantitative 
domain, using frequency counts and statistical inferences. However, this research seeks 
to trace the discourses between identified stakeholders in the English health system with 
regard to the use of electronic records over the past decade. To use the terminology 
‘discourse analysis’ might give rise to expectations such as analysing linguistic details and 
frequency counts, which does not adhere to the requirements of this research. For the 
purpose of this study, I regard discourses as domains of statements or practices, reflective 
of perspectives on various issues, and which may be influenced by individuals’ roles and 
identities. Though this study does seek to understand the current scenario in the NHS 
with regard to the use of IT with the help of past reports and other documents, it does 
not seek to probe into the linguistic details of language use, but is concerned with the 
wider themes and issues of discussion. 
Discourses may be manifested publically or privately in the form of documents, 
conferences and inter-personal interactions (Davidson and Reardon, 2005; Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). To gather data from these multiple strands of possible discourse, I 
employed multiple methods of data gathering, including interviewing and documentary 
analysis using a qualitative content analysis approach. Workshops and conferences of a 
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relevant nature were also attended, to identify and understand the latest contemporary 
discourse surrounding the research topic.  
I now outline the research design, before proceeding to discuss the data collection and 
analysis phases. 
4.4  Research Design 
Triangulation builds up the credibility and validity of the study, and this research employs 
both data triangulation as well as methodological triangulation to collect data from 
multiple sources using multiple methods (Denzin, 1989; Mathison, 1988). I gathered data 
through initial sensitising interviews, documentary data, and further interviews with key 
informants on the basis of findings from the first two stages (see Figure 4.1 below). This 
incorporation of two key qualitative methods, namely interviewing and document 
analysis, draws on the strength of concurrent tools to aid triangulation in qualitative 
research (Hall and Rist, 1999). 
1. Sensitising interviews
 14 interviews
 Informed by 
literature review
2. Document analysis
3. Interviews with key 
informants
 Reports and 
publications 
identified, 
categorised and 
analysed
 Guided by findings 
from previous 
stages
 
Figure 4.1 Research design 
4.4.1 Sensitising interviews 
To strike a balance between awareness and sensitivity of the themes to be studied (Kvale, 
2007), and the need to be led by the data and the respondents (Silverman, 2006; Kvale, 
2007), I conducted 14 semi-structured sensitising interviews to identify the key areas to 
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be considered. Respondents in clinical roles were identified, and a combination of 
opportunity sampling and snowball sampling (Noy, 2007; Patton, 2002; Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003) was employed to identify and select participants. This allowed the sample to 
emerge during this phase, and allowed for recruitment of further interviews as it 
facilitated identification of relevant future interviewees by the respondents themselves, 
making the sampling process respondent-driven (Dilley, 2000; Noy, 2007; Patton, 2002). 
Being informed and sensitised to key concepts in the research field is a tool guiding the 
research process (Flick, 2002; Patton, 2002). The purpose of these interviews was 
primarily to inform and sensitise me to the issues and challenges encountered by 
professionals in the area of e-health and EHRs.  
4.4.2 Documentary data 
Documentary data including reports and publications by the UK government, Department 
of Health, and professional bodies are valuable unobtrusive instruments providing 
records of progress and viewpoints at multiple points of time. They can also potentially be 
used to steer future data gathering from interviews with key informants (Patton, 2002). 
I gathered documents published since the year 2000 by various stakeholder groups. These 
groups include the UK government, Department of Health, NHS and professional bodies 
such as the Royal College of Physicians (RCP), Royal College of General Practitioners 
(RCGP), Royal College of Nurses (RCN) and the British Computer Society (BCS). The 
documents identified are mainly related to England’s National Programme for IT (NPfIT), 
as the implementation of EHRs over the past decade has been envisioned in the context 
of this national project. Other reports related to the general priorities and concerns 
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regarding healthcare in the country have also been included, as they form an important 
part of the context in which the NPfIT was operating. 
I then organised the reports chronologically by the publishing body (see Appendix B). 
These were then sifted and key reports were identified which formed the core thread 
related directly to the area of EHRs in the NPfIT. 
4.4.3 Interviews with key informants 
Once a preliminary analysis of the documentary data was completed, I conducted a final 
phase of interviews with a further 37 key informants, resulting in a total of 51 interviews. 
These were selected based on the findings from both the initial interviews and the 
documentary analysis (see section 4.5 for details on the sampling strategy). Prior to 
interviewing any individuals, I made it a point to read any reports or academic papers 
published by them, to familiarise myself with their likely position and viewpoint. Appendix 
C provides the interview agenda I used for this phase of interviews. All interview excerpts 
in the findings chapters are from key informants from this final phase of interviews unless 
mentioned otherwise. 
4.5  Sampling Strategy 
The nature of the sampling approach highlights the manner in which the field is studied 
and attempted to be understood (Flick, 2002). This research, being exploratory, and 
investigating the process and underlying tensions at various stages in the NPfIT’s EHR 
implementation, does not begin with a predefined sample, but lets the sample develop by 
building on the findings from previous phases of the research process. A non-
probabilistic, focused and purposive sampling approach was employed at all stages of the 
research given the qualitative nature of this study (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003), meaning that 
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the sources used are not necessarily statistically representative but have been selected 
on the basis of specific characteristics (professional role) and associations with electronic 
healthcare and EHRs specifically. The sources were not further filtered by other attributes 
such as location, age, etc., as this was not relevant to my research question. 
I adopted a combination of opportunistic sampling and snowball sampling (Noy, 2007; 
Patton, 2002; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) during the first phase of my research study. The 
criterion for respondents in the initial sensitising phase was their familiarity with e-health 
technologies. Having identified the importance of sensitising myself to the field (Patton, 
2002; Flick, 2002), I wished to hear first-hand accounts from professionals regarding their 
experience with e-health implementations, with a focus on EHRs. Further to identifying 
personal contacts who worked in the health sector and were familiar with the use of 
EHRs, I targeted two health technology conferences and used these as opportunities to 
generate samples by flow populations (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). These events served as 
venues to meet relevant people and I requested their future participation as interview 
respondents for my study. All participants were asked if they could suggest others who 
would be willing to participate in the study, and this contributed to the sample frame. 
This allowed the sample to emerge during this stage, enabling recruitment of further 
interviews as it facilitated identification of relevant future interviewees by the 
respondents themselves, making the sampling process respondent-driven (Dilley, 2000; 
Noy, 2007; Patton, 2002). I conducted 14 interviews in this first phase, and respondents 
included general practitioners, hospital doctors, nurses, nurse practitioners and 
administrative personnel. 
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Following the preliminary interview phase, I entered the next stage of my research, which 
involved the gathering and analysis of documents relevant to EHR implementations in 
England in the context of the national NPfIT project. Triangulating multiple sources 
enables a sampling strategy that considers differences in time, place and person, 
strengthening the research (Flick, 2002; Patton, 2002). This is achieved in this study, by 
studying documents from different points of time, published by specific relevant 
professional groups. As the setting of my research is within England, the place variable did 
not play a part in the selection of documentary sources.  
The NPfIT project has been the subject of numerous debates, reports and publications 
over the last 12 years, resulting in a plethora of documentary sources which address 
various aspects including funding, patient and clinician involvement, privacy and security 
challenges, and incentives. Consequently, the selection of relevant documentary sources 
required careful sifting. The document samples were initially selected by searching for 
publications by the Department of Health, NHS and Connecting for Health, related to 
electronic healthcare, the NPfIT, and EHRs, in a chronological manner ranging from 2000 
to 2011. Findings from the sensitising phase of my research helped highlight some 
publications or sections within them which contained relevant areas of focus as well. I 
then identified groups which were representative of the professionals I interviewed in the 
first phase, and who had an active voice in on-going debates and consultations 
surrounding the NPfIT. A total of over 150 documents were identified and categorised 
(see Appendix B). The actual material sample was narrowed down further to those which 
dealt with EHRs and the NPfIT specifically. These document sources included publications 
by the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Royal College of Physicians, the Royal 
College of Nurses and the British Computer Society. 
Chapter 4 
103 
 
Respondents for the final stage of interviews were identified by searching for relevant 
persons from the organisations whose publications were analysed in the second phase. 
While the sample itself is not intended to be statistically representative, respondents 
from these selected organisations in many cases speak for specific professional 
populations and are drawn from a range of professional groups such as general 
practitioners, secondary care physicians and nurses.  
Relevant respondents were identified by online searches on the institutions’ websites. 
The presence of health informatics or e-health subgroups within some of the 
organisations helped identify individuals who were likely to have an interest in EHRs. In 
cases where names or contact details of people were unavailable from the website, I 
identified authors of selected publications from these organisations as possible 
respondents, and approached the media office of the respective organisation for further 
contact details of these individuals. The media contacts of all these organisations were 
also asked to forward requests for participation to any other individual whom they 
consider appropriate to approach for this purpose.  
The targeted sample size for this stage was initially 15 to 20 respondents. I identified over 
30 potential respondents within this sample frame, making allowance for the eventuality 
of a low response rate. I asked participants if they could provide further information-rich 
contacts relevant to the research study at the time of interviews, to facilitate a snowball 
sampling approach (Patton, 2002; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). On the completion of 34 
interviews in this phase, my findings pointed to the significance of clinicians who were 
involved in IT design and development. This prompted me to conduct interviews with 
three more individuals who occupied such roles. The resultant sample size for this phase, 
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by the end of my data collection, was 37 respondents. For an overview of the distribution 
of respondents by professional groups, see Appendix A. 
4.6  Data Collection  
I employed data triangulation using a combination of interviews and document review for 
my data collection. This section elaborates on the process followed for both these modes 
of data collection.  
4.6.1 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews with open ended questions and themes for discussion (see 
Appendix C for the topic guide) were employed so that respondents could talk about their 
experiences without being led by the interviewer (Silverman, 2006; Yin, 2009). In this 
process, there is an element of ‘qualified naïveté’ (Kvale, 2007) as well as I needed to be 
open to new or emergent ideas rather than be influenced solely by pre-supposed 
assumptions. Kvale (2007) warns against a total lack of awareness of the topic being 
researched, as the interviewer needs to have a level of sensitivity and discernment to 
highlight the various nuances of the themes being studied. There is therefore a tension 
between these two contrasting needs – that of naïveté and that of sensitivity to the 
research subject (Kvale, 2007), and this needs to be kept in balance. During an interview, 
respondents themselves may discover new things they were not aware of earlier, and 
may change their perceptions of a theme, and embark on a process of reflection, making 
the interview a learning process for both participants of the interview (Kvale, 2007).  
Majority of the 51 interviews were conducted as voice calls over the telephone or Skype, 
due to time and place constraints. 21 interviews were conducted face to face, and 1 
interview was a video call via Skype. All interviews with key informants (second phase of 
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interviews) were recorded using a Livescribe smartpen. Informed consent was obtained 
and recorded from all interview respondents after providing them with details regarding 
the purpose of the research. Participants were assured of their confidentiality and 
privacy, with a clear and mutual understanding of who could access the information they 
provided (Kvale, 2007).  
My first stage of data collection involving sensitising interviews was useful in helping me 
improve my interviewing technique. As I transcribed these before I embarked onto the 
main interviews, I was able to see some of my faults such as unconsciously leading 
questions and interrupting the respondent with a follow-up question. I realised that in 
instances when I wanted further details on the issue being discussed, it was usually 
sufficient and less intrusive to use elaboration probes (Patton, 1990) rather than cutting 
in to verbally raise a question. I kept these points in mind, and made a conscious effort to 
avoid these pitfalls in the later stages of my data collection.  
All the interviews were transcribed completely by me. Though a time consuming process, 
I chose to do the transcribing manually on my own, using it as an opportunity to 
familiarise myself with my data, and to use the transcribing process as an interpretive tool 
in itself (Lapadat, 2000). I had over 48 hours of recorded interview data in total (see 
Appendix A), and spent approximately 190 hours transcribing them.  
As I was predominantly interested in the informational content of the interviews rather 
than the linguistic details, I employed denaturalised transcription and chose to omit most 
of the pauses and response tokens (such as ‘hmm’, ‘uhm’, etc.) indicating a momentary 
pause for thought (Lapadat, 2000; Oliver, Serovich and Mason, 2005). In some instances, 
non-verbal cues can be very important, as in the case of one respondent who was 
Chapter 4 
106 
 
extremely cautious with what he said, given the sensitive nature of the topic being 
discussed, and pointed at pictures or documents to indicate who or what he was referring 
to. Whenever possible I noted down the gesture used and what it was meant to indicate, 
and used my handwritten notes to link to the right points in the transcript.   
I recognised there would be a likelihood of some ‘privileged’ stakeholders in my sample 
(Leys, 2002), given the context specific nature of the research question, and the need to 
address it. As a result, the majority of my respondents were clinicians (see Appendix A). I 
did find that despite my efforts to form a sampling framework by identifying individuals 
from specific organisations (see section 4.5), it was hard to pin certain respondents to a 
single representative body as several of those in the professional bodies also worked with 
Connecting for Health and other Department of Health units or with academia. Table 4.1 
below provides a summary of the distribution of respondents across different categories 
(bearing in mind that these categories overlap). More details are provided in Appendix A 
which lists the 37 key respondents, their various affiliations and the organisations which 
are included in the categories specified in Table 4.1. The affiliations listed for each 
respondent are not necessarily their current ones, but also include past relevant 
affiliations which may have caused me to include them in my sample.  
Table 4.1 Distribution of respondents across categories 
Category 
Number of 
respondents 
Clinical professional bodies 12 
Non-clinical professional bodies 4 
Government/ Department of Health/ NHS bodies 20 
Consumer and patient groups 2 
Industry 6 
 Policy advisors / politicians 4 
 Academia 10 
Other health-IT projects and roles 1 
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4.6.2 Documentary data 
Documents provide useful sources for data triangulation, thus improving the validity of 
research (Patton, 2002; Miller and Alvarado, 2005). In tracing historical events and 
discourses, documents provide a frozen snapshot of aims, accounts and debates 
pertaining to the subject being investigated (Miller and Alvarado, 2005). This preserved 
account of events is invaluable for the purpose of uncovering factual descriptions and 
both individual as well as collective views of key stakeholders in a project. Their ‘inter-
textuality’ and characteristic of drawing upon other relevant documents in the field may 
be seen in the example of parliamentary consultations, responses from key stakeholder 
groups and published reports by government bodies.  
Miller and Alvarado (2005) highlight three points to address when using documentary 
data: the document selection process, the social exchange of documents and source 
criticism. The first of these has already been discussed (see section 4.5). The social 
exchange of documents relates to their accessibility and availability. As my document 
sample was intended to include publications by the UK government, the NHS and 
professional bodies, these reports were easily accessible online. The sensitive nature of 
the NPfIT does mean however, that there would have been confidential reports and 
accounts which were not made available to the public. I did gain access to a few such 
reports through my interview respondents. One report I received was unlikely to have 
been a confidential report, but was however unavailable on the Connecting For Health 
website as it was dated almost ten years previously and did not seem to be available in 
the online archives. The third point, namely source criticism, requires a critique of the 
authenticity and accuracy of the source (external critique), and the ability of the source to 
be a reliable source of information (internal critique). As discussed by Hall and Rist (1999), 
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document analysis is dependent upon the quality and reliability of the document under 
study. The documents I shortlisted were published by government bodies, the NHS, or 
professional bodies, all of whom are either the originator of the topic under discussion, or 
are reputed and capable of providing an informed and representative account of the 
discussion at hand. The reports were accessed from the websites of the organisations 
publishing them, or from the Department of Health website which housed all the 
responses to consultation documents in a single place. 
While the documents selected were from reliable sources, their public nature gives 
reason to be cautious in accepting them at face value, as they may be polished and 
strategically written for targeted groups (Miller and Alvarado, 2005). This point surfaced 
during some of the interviews, when respondents highlighted concerns regarding the lack 
of transparency and ethical procedures in the publication of certain reports. 
4.7  Data analysis  
The combination of documentary data as well as interview data facilitated triangulation 
not only with regard to my sources but in terms of time as well, given the longitudinal 
nature of the NPfIT (Mathison, 1988). The capability of documents to capture historical 
events (Miller and Alvarado, 2005) combined with a range of interview respondents who 
were involved with the NPfIT at different stages, right from its inception, helped me 
validate my understanding of how it evolved. I shall now briefly elaborate on my data 
analysis, first discussing the documentary followed by the interview data. 
4.7.1 Documentary data analysis 
The analysis of documentary data in itself is an act of social construction on the part of 
the researcher (Flick, 2002), as the data needs to be interpreted and analysed. Hajer’s 
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(2006) ten steps to discourse analysis advocate the starting point being desk research, 
using ‘a first chronology and first reading of events’. In keeping with this, apart from 
maintaining a systematic list of all reports and documents which contribute not only to 
the main dialogues to be considered but also to the background context of the NPfIT 
project, I began a chronological review of relevant reports and publications regarding 
EHRs and the national programme. Relevant documents can be tracked chronologically 
and systematically by considering three purposes of content analysis, namely the 
‘manifest characteristics’, the antecedents (the why) and the consequences (the effects) 
of the documents (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004). To manage the documentary data, I 
organised them by publishing body and chronologically, using a document management 
table incorporating these three key features (the characteristics, antecedents and 
consequences) of the manuscripts (see Table 4.2 below). Further details on the 
documentary sources classified by year and organisation are provided in Appendix B. 
Table 4.2 Document tracking template 
Year Stakeholder group Document details Key points Antecedents Consequences 
2001 Government 
publications 
    
    
Professional groups 
– reports and 
responses 
    
    
Corporate groups – 
reports and 
responses 
    
    
2002 Government 
publications 
    
    
Professional groups 
– reports and 
responses 
    
    
Corporate groups – 
reports and 
responses 
    
    
… etc.      
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The institutionalised nature of documentary data suggests that they can be used to infer 
the aims and ideologies of their authors or representative organisations (Wolff, 2004). 
However, Wolff (2004) also highlights the potential for myth and fiction in the creation of 
these documents, as reports may be published for bureaucratic purposes or to legitimise 
certain actions or events. 
4.7.2 Interview data analysis 
Caution needs to be exercised when interpreting qualitative data from interview 
transcripts due to possible inaccuracies as a result of change in medium (audio to text), 
and as context may be lost when drilling down to isolated extracts of the interview 
(Gibbs, 2007). Further, the subtle nuances emphasised by voice modulation in an 
interview are lost when transferred to a transcript (Gibbs, 2007). Whenever possible, I 
made brief notes about each interview immediately after it, recording my initial thoughts 
and what I thought were the key points brought out. These were useful later on as quick 
reminders of the interview discussion (Burnard, 1991).  
I also sent my respondents the interview excerpts that I wished to use, giving them an 
opportunity to correct any inaccuracies in the transcribed data (Forbat and Henderson, 
2005; Mero-Jaffe, 2011; Poland, 1995). Respondents may be asked to validate the 
analyses of their interview excerpts as well, to ensure appropriate interpretation of the 
data by the researcher (Krefting, 1991). However, this is a time consuming process. 
Moreover, the non-academic background of some respondents, and their limitations in 
understanding the analysis due to their restricted view of my data would have posed 
challenges (Burnard et al., 2008). For these reasons, I chose to send my respondents only 
the interview excerpts that were likely to be used, and requested them to inform me if 
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there were any inaccuracies or if they preferred that the excerpts be attributed 
differently. 
 Out of the thirty-four respondents I emailed for the purpose of validating the excerpts, 
eighteen responded. Three of these respondents corrected transcription errors, and four 
respondents edited the excerpts to better express their ideas without changing the 
original meaning (Poland, 1995). Seven respondents requested that their quotes be 
attributed in a manner giving them more anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the 
topics discussed. Three respondents requested certain phrases or quotes to be omitted as 
they considered them controversial, or not ‘socially desirable’ (Burnard et al., 2008: 431).  
Transcribed interviews were read several times to immerse myself in the data and to 
better comprehend the interviewees’ frames of reference (Burnard, 1991). By identifying 
latent themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006), I sought to understand the semantic content of 
my interview data, examining the underlying reasons for respondents’ views. Informed by 
my understanding of academic literature, I began the coding process by identifying initial 
open codes to organise my data (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Schmidt, 2004) using NVivo 10, 
a qualitative data analysis software tool. Unlike quantitative data analysis software, 
qualitative data analysis software do not perform the actual data analysis, but are 
instrumental in organising and facilitating the process (Weitzman, 2000). This approach 
mandates a degree of interpretation on the part of the researcher during the coding 
process.  
The interview notes I had written using my Livescribe smartpen were also imported onto 
my computer. The Livescribe Desktop software synchronises the notes written by hand 
using the smartpen with the audio recording, and clicking or tapping on the written notes 
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automatically plays back the corresponding audio recording (Tannen, 2008). This was a 
useful and time-saving feature of the software, as I was able to quickly and easily listen to 
specific parts of my interview recordings without having to do a manual search or listen to 
unnecessary sections of the recording. 
Once I had completed open coding for an initial subset of my interviews, I began to 
cluster these codes (termed as ‘nodes’ in NVivo 10) into broader analytical categories or 
themes (Schmidt, 2004). Initially coded as ‘free nodes’, i.e. without a hierarchical 
structure, once I clustered the codes into groups, they formed what are termed ‘tree 
nodes’ in NVivo 10, due to the hierarchical tree structure created. Figure 4.2 provides a 
screenshot showing an example of how I clustered these nodes. 
 
Figure 4.2 A snapshot of the coding categories 
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Transcripts were analysed carefully, keeping in mind that while themes form a pattern 
within a data set, the extent of their presence and frequency within a data item or across 
a data set is not necessarily an indicator of their importance (Braun and Clarke, 2006). I 
used my judgement and knowledge from reviewed literature and documentary data to 
assess how important a theme was, bringing in a level of interpretation at this stage to 
the analysis of my data. 
The clustering and rearrangement of nodes helped refine my themes and categories, as 
some codes were merged with other codes, renamed or deleted (Saldana, 2009). While 
engagement with one’s data is important, Gilbert (2002) warns against the dangers of 
getting ‘sucked in’ to coding, and emphasises the need to step back, and balance the 
need for closeness to the data with distance from the data. One suggested strategy to 
address this is to reflect on the coding tree or hierarchy (Gilbert, 2002), which I found 
useful as this helped me consider the implications of my codes, and how they could be 
linked to each other.  
The restructured node hierarchy I formed informed the analysis and coding of the 
remaining interview transcripts, but was subject to modification when I identified new 
themes in subsequent data (Saldana, 2009). One of the emergent findings, for example, 
was the involvement of several clinicians in IT design and development, or who served in 
advisory roles in health IT committees (see Chapter 7). Consequently, I turned back to the 
literature on professional hybrids to better understand this phenomenon, and I secured 
interviews with three more respondents who fell into this clinician-IT hybrid category. The 
analysis phase therefore employed a combination of inductive and deductive code 
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generation (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) or iterative theorising (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 
1999). 
I restructured the nodes into three main hierarchies – the first focused on EHRs in 
general, the second focused specifically on the NPfIT, and the third on dynamics between 
clinical and non-clinical stakeholders of EHRs and this included codes related to 
professional hybrids and their development. A total of 397 codes were generated and 
categorised within these hierarchical node structures. 
The themes which defined my data were informed by the key theoretical concepts I 
employed, and by clustering my codes under specific broader categories, I was able to link 
them effectively to my theoretical lens. For example, the different codes related to the 
use of EHRs were divided under categories related to the use of EHRs, their challenges, 
and the interactions between professionals in their use of EHRs. This helped identify the 
different ways in which EHRs occupy a boundary role and act as a boundary object, which 
forms the basis of my findings in Chapter 6. 
4.8  Summary 
This chapter outlines the research methods I employed for this study. I discuss the 
research paradigm and design adopted, and the sampling strategy used to identify my 
documentary as well as interview sources. 
This study triangulates data from multiple sources (Denzin, 1989; Mathison, 1988) and 
includes 51 semi-structured interviews and documentary data from relevant government 
and professional organisations. I gathered my data in three phases, beginning with 14 
sensitising interviews. Following this I identified over 150 documents from a range of 
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relevant organisations including the Department of Health, the NHS, Connecting for 
Health, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Royal College of Physicians and the 
Royal College of Nursing (see Appendix B). The first 34 respondents for the final phase of 
interviews were identified on the basis of their association with these organisations or 
their involvement or interest in the NPfIT. My emergent findings pointed to the 
significance of the role played by clinicians who are actively engaged in IT development. 
This led to the identification of three more interviewees who were in this particular 
category, resulting in a total of 37 key informants in this stage of interviews.  
All 51 interviews were transcribed completely by me, and were analysed using NVivo 10. 
Iterative theorising (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999) was employed and 397 codes were 
generated and clustered into node hierarchies.  
My findings from this data are presented in the next three chapters, and offer insights 
into the story of the NPfIT (chapter 5), the boundary spanning capacity of EHRs (chapter 
6) and a unique professional hybrid, the clinician-IT professional (chapter 7). The next 
chapter discusses how the NPfIT can be regarded as an organising vision, and uses the 
concept of boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) to explain the dynamics between 
stakeholders and how their interpretations and interests in various aspects of the 
programme differed. 
 
 
 CHAPTER 5  THE NPFIT AS AN ORGANISING VISION 
5.1  Introduction 
In this chapter I draw on my interview data, documentary evidence (see Chapter 3) and 
Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) work to explain how the NPfIT may be viewed as an 
organising vision. I discuss the roles and dynamics of the stakeholder groups involved 
using the concepts of technology frames (Davidson, 2002; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) and 
boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989).  
In tracing the history of the NPfIT, the transformation of the original aims and the 
complex dynamics between its many stakeholders (including the Department of Health, IT 
suppliers, NPfIT leadership, clinicians and the general public) showcase how the inputs of 
specific groups steered the course of the national programme. The innovative nature of 
the programme and the involvement of numerous stakeholders, make it comparable to 
an organising vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) that is characterised by buzzwords that 
emerge and subside, subject to discourse by stakeholders involved in the vision. The 
perception and requirements of the various groups involved in this high profile health IT 
project can be compared to the existence of technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 
1994) which highlight the cognitive structures that determine how groups of individuals 
use technology. This may in turn be influenced by factors such as their professional 
training and roles (Berg and Bowker, 1997).  
Viewing an EHR as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer, 1989) subject to use, 
interpretation and information exchange by multiple user groups (Carlile, 2002; Nicolini, 
Mengis and Swan, 2012; Berg and Bowker, 1997) draws attention to the NPfIT which 
amplifies this communication and negotiation between different EHR stakeholders as one 
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of its key components was the NHS Care Record Service. The programme had shifts in 
priorities and activities over the course of time, drawing parallels to the concept of 
temporal boundary objects (Chang, Hatcher and Kim, 2013; Yakura, 2002), wherein 
different phases in a project may be likened to abstract boundary objects. For example, 
project phases such as requirements specification and contracting are subject to 
negotiation between multiple groups and are subject to the multiple perceptions and 
inputs of those parties involved (Koskinen and Mäkinen, 2009). These dynamics were also 
evident in the NPfIT, with varied inputs and criticisms from those involved in and 
impacted by the project as I illustrate in this chapter. 
Being an ambitious and large scale project which aimed to transform healthcare delivery 
in the UK, the NPfIT was initially regarded as the answer to innovation and modernisation 
in the healthcare sector (Mark, 2007). The complex and evolutionary nature of large scale 
long-term projects and the notion of temporal boundary objects (Chang, Hatcher and 
Kim, 2013) can be discussed in the context of organising visions which see the diffusion of 
innovative technologies and the emergence, subsidence and persistence of ‘buzzwords’ 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). These buzzwords represent the prevalent thinking and 
rhetoric surrounding new innovations among diverse stakeholders, and I link them to the 
different phases of the NPfIT as a temporal boundary object (Yakura, 2002). Given their 
evolutionary nature and interpretive flexibility (Pinch and Bijker, 1987) subject to the 
views of multiple stakeholders I suggest that each of these phases can be regarded as 
inter-epistemic boundary objects (McGivern and Dopson, 2010; Rheinberger, 1992). 
McGivern and Dopson’s (2010) study documenting different phases in the transformation 
of objects suggests the notion of ‘re-incarnation’ of objects in different forms from what 
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might have been originally envisioned. This was evident in the NPfIT as well, and I discuss 
how ‘discarded objects’ (Engeström and Blackler, 2005) in the NPfIT resurfaced at a later 
point in the programme.  
Various forms of communication including spoken as well as written forms contribute to 
community discourse (Greenhalgh et al., 2012) in an organising vision, and reflect the 
different technology frames employed by stakeholders (Davidson, 2002; Orlikowski and 
Gash, 1994). This is demonstrated in Chapter 3 where I employ documentary sources to 
provide an overview of the NPfIT story. In this chapter I supplement this account of the 
NPfIT with key excerpts from my interview data.  
In the next section I present findings from my interview data that are of relevance to the 
story of the NPfIT that was presented in Chapter 3. I use this data to illustrate some of the 
tensions that were inherent in the national programme, and the differences between the 
stakeholder groups involved. With this background, I then explain why the NPfIT may be 
regarded as an organising vision. Following this, I highlight some of the main boundary 
objects that were present in the NPfIT organising vision, discussing their inter-epistemic 
nature and how they were transformed (McGivern and Dopson, 2010). I conclude the 
chapter by summarising my key findings and highlighting the relevance of the concept of 
boundary objects to organising visions in the NPfIT context. 
5.2  Tensions and dynamics inherent in the NPfIT 
The account of the NPfIT presented in Chapter 3 drew from documentary sources 
including government reports and academic literature. From both, documentary sources 
as well as my interview data, it was evident that there was much conflict and 
dissatisfaction with the national programme right from its inception. Respondent R17 
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described a conversation with a person who had been required to present the case for 
the national programme at the initial meeting with high level policy makers:  
He showed me a policy guide and his set of slides (…) I said, ‘Okay, [Person A], if 
this is purely about persuading [Person B] to raise money or to do something, fine. 
But you do understand that this isn’t anything, it doesn’t make any sense, it’s not 
something you can do’. And he said, ‘Oh, no no, I do understand’. So he went in, 
and famously, [Person B] asked how long it would take, and [Person A] said ‘3 
years’, for no reason at all. [Person B] said ‘No that’s too long, two years’. And 
they settled on 2.5 years. ‘How much does it cost?’, and he came up with some 
number, and this was based on nothing! – R17, Clinical informatician, NHS IA 
Those involved in the decision making were clearly aware of the risks and uncertainties 
involved, and proceeded with the specifications of the programme in spite of this. The 
above quote indicates the limited foundations on which the project was built, and 
foreshadows the downward spiral which characterised the later phases of the NPfIT. 
The drawing up of the specifications (see Section 3.2.2) was characterised by ambiguity 
and miscommunication. The development of the Spine was an example of this, as it was 
initially intended to provide an individual spine for every individual, but was transformed 
into the National Spine. The reasoning behind the concept of person-based Spines was 
that despite multiple providers being involved in the diagnosis and treatment of a 
patient’s condition, because of the increased specialisation of clinicians and the 
fragmented nature of healthcare delivery, the only entity that stayed constant was the 
actual patient. Referring to this fictional patient as Mrs. Smith, respondent R17 
elaborated on why it was essential to consider the patient as the hub holding together 
the different pieces of health information  
You’d be seeing people who may have already had £20,000 of healthcare with 
that problem (…) Expert thought, people thinking about it, and coming to 
conclusions. And we do all that and throw it away! And they show up, standing 
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with a blank piece of paper. ‘Well hello, Mrs Smith! I hear you spent £20,000 on 
this problem. We’ve spent some of the finest minds on this problem, and do you 
know what we’ve done? We’ve thrown it away!’ (laughs) – R17, Clinical 
informatician, NHS IA 
 This issue would have been at least partly resolved with the idea of individual spines, 
where each person had access to the multiple strands of their records, and could be the 
carriers of their own health information. This idea however got submerged beneath the 
plans drawn up by the dominant groups including the programme management and the 
suppliers. Respondents who had been closely involved with the NPfIT at later stages did 
not seem to be even aware of the initial conceptualisation of the spine. 
This is a wonderful example of how things metamorphosed without anybody 
realising what happened. The phrase ‘the spine’, was first coined by [person X] 
(....) And [person X] had drawn a little diagram which said, all sorts of these things 
happen to Mrs. Smith, but we need something where the key stuff is, so if things 
happen, this thing was running along in some way, and it’s holding key stuff. And 
[person X] said, ‘like a spine’. And so the phrase ‘the spine’ became the short hand 
for this. Now, the change in interpretation that happened, and people didn’t even 
realise they had changed the interpretation, and this reflects how deeply 
embedded the organisational model of healthcare is. The spine I just described in 
that picture, was the spine of Mrs. Smith’s healthcare (…) I used to say, no we’re 
not creating a national system. We’re getting 50 million systems, one for each of 
us (laughs) (…) This then went into all the stuff I was talking about, the 
Department of Health, contracts everything else and the people writing the giant 
thing. And they called it the spine. And they called it the NHS Spine. It was the 
spine of the NHS. It was the spine to hold the NHS together. It was like they were 
deaf! – R17, Clinical informatician, NHS IA 
The ambiguity surrounding the programme’s specifications was accompanied by a 
plethora of terminologies that were understood differently by those involved. The 
definitions of these various terms were extremely vague, as seen from the words of a 
respondent who had a role within CFH:  
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‘Detailed care records’ was just a term we dreamt up for differentiating between 
the summary care record and the detailed record that existed in different 
institutions. - R12, GP, Connecting for Health National Clinical Lead 
The above quote by a previous clinical lead in Connecting for Health indicates that much 
of the jargon and terminology employed lacked clear definition, adding to the ambiguity 
of the project’s aims and general direction. This lack of mutual understanding between 
the NPfIT stakeholders was reflected in the contracts as well, as explained by Respondent 
R23: 
The problem was the definition of what was in the contract. When things started 
falling apart, people then went back to, ‘Well the contract says…’, and that could 
be interpreted as something very simple or something very complex. The clinicians 
obviously want the complex technical solution which is easy for them to use. 
Whereas people writing the systems were very much ‘How can we get away with 
that, get a tick in the box without doing much work’ - R23, Clinical informatician, 
Clinical Lead for one of the NPfIT regional clusters 
Following the lack of clarity on the NPfIT’s specifications, there was much concern raised 
regarding the confidentiality and privacy of patients’ information, leading to the proposal 
of solutions such as sealed envelopes (see Chapter 3). A nurse interviewee suggested that 
options to control access to their records should be available to patients; whether or not 
they use them, is a different matter. According to her, this facilitates the trust 
relationship, as patients might feel that they are welcomed as partners in their 
healthcare. 
I think that if you don’t offer it, you won’t get by and won’t get trust from 
patients. Probably in reality there will be very few that actually do that (…) but it 
has to be on offer. There is a balance… if you don’t offer it, you may not get 
patients’ consent to share anything. I think it’s just being pragmatic. You might not 
get the people to share it all. But you might get their approval to share some. - 
R13, Nurse informatician, RCN 
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 HealthWhich? and NPfIT (2003) also highlighted this patients’ perspective, that they 
should be able to view their records if they wish, although most patients admitted that 
they were unlikely to actually do so. The option of patient access to records then, 
becomes one which is a virtual engagement mechanism in itself, whether or not the 
patient chooses to exploit the opportunity. User engagement in this case was enabled by 
the possibility of patient involvement, rather than actual participation of patients in their 
record access. Enabling patient access to records then offers a pre-emptive measure to 
ensure users can be more active in the management of their care, and avoids potential 
criticisms that patients are deliberately barred from being well informed on their health 
condition. A similar example of technology offerings to provide a semblance of 
engagement is described by Respondent R32 below with regard to sealed envelopes: 
I don’t believe they [sealed envelopes] are going ahead. The sealed envelope was 
to try to deal with the concerns around information governance. I think it was just 
too complicated and too complex. It was really a device to placate the very vocal 
critics who were very concerned about access to personal information on such a 
large scale. I think it’s proved to be unworkable really - R32, RCGP 
This account of the sealed envelopes to appease vocal dissenters has parallels to 
Respondent R13’s view (page 121) that certain technologies and options are offered with 
the purpose of engaging people. The motive behind the offer of sealed envelopes is 
brought to question, as on the one hand it offered patients a degree of control over their 
records, and yet their complexity and challenge of implementation causes some to 
suggest that the sealed envelopes were a mere placation mechanism which could not see 
fruition within the timeframe of the NPfIT. 
My empirical data also pointed to significant dissatisfaction amongst clinicians as they 
were not consulted or informed of the details of the contracts. In drawing up the 
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contracts, the national programme was oblivious to the 2003 General Medical Services 
(GMS) contract which was intended to provide GPs with possibilities of choice (regarding 
the EHR systems they used), the Quality Management Analysis (QMAS) system, and inter-
GP transfer of information (GP2GP). The ignorance of existing contracts may have been 
due to lack of engagement with clinicians, or due to a disregard for existing arrangements 
which gave GPs a choice of systems.  
They had two contractual processes going on independently. One was the GP 
contract, one was the LSPs. And it was only at the last minute they realised the 
contracts had incompatible clauses (...) The LSP contracts said that you would 
have exclusive rights to all the NHS systems in that territory; and the GP contracts 
said the GPs would have choice of systems. And both were signed by the Secretary 
of State for health. – R6, Health informatician, A national computer organisation 
This quote illustrates the incompatibility between the NPfIT’s LSP contracts and the GP 
contracts which were meant to provide GPs with a choice of systems. The GP Systems of 
Choice (GPSoC) contracts later provided GPs with the option to choose between LSP 
provided systems or an approved system from an approved supplier (Greenhalgh et al., 
2010b; Connecting for Health, 2013). 
While the suppliers were large and established companies, their lack of specialisation or 
experience in large scale health IT implementations was a worry for many stakeholders. 
Given the general lack of clinical engagement, there was a definite need for suppliers who 
were able to comprehend clinical needs and requirements.  
Everything to [company] looks like a telephone network. Well, God bless them, 
they try hard, but basically everything looks like a telephone network. And I said, 
‘what about the national thing?’ And he said, ‘What about it?’ ‘Well you know, 
constructing a record...’ and he says, ‘What? That’s a store and forward messaging 
system, it’s a network, a database, we do that all the time in telecoms, and we 
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know how to do that. That’s not difficult. We don’t want any help in that’. And I 
sat there thinking, Oh my... Because actually, a stupid purchaser can be 
compensated for by an intelligent supplier. When both ends don’t know what they 
are talking about, you have no hope! I just sat there, completely agog! (laughs) – 
R17, Clinical informatician, NHS IA 
This indicates an underestimation of the complexity of the programme on the part of the 
suppliers. Respondent R17 mentioned that the supplier had a misplaced confidence and 
assumed an understanding of the requirements and contracts. There were clearly 
different understandings of the contracts, as both the suppliers as well as the NPfIT 
leadership had different (and insufficient) understanding of the programme’s 
requirements, as indicated by the above respondent.  
Despite this, policy makers and NPfIT management were persuaded by the smooth talk of 
industry ‘experts’ who were keen on securing the contracts. 
The reason national records had not taken off across the world, and they haven’t 
still, and they’re still struggling, in the UK, is because, they try and build the record 
around what the companies can offer. - R5, Hospital doctor, National Clinical 
Advisory Board 
They [the suppliers] had no experience of delivering healthcare. Whereas the 
people who had experience of delivering healthcare were seen as being awkward 
buggers… Everything that they are now saying about what failed in the national 
programme, we would have told them. - R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT Committee  
The specifications were therefore supplier driven rather than user driven. The persuasive 
and dominant role of industry experts were evident right from the initial meeting with 
policy makers where they (industry players) put forward the benefits to be gained by 
launching a national programme. The priority given to these IT experts was continued 
later in the programme as clinicians were generally ignored. GPs who had successfully 
implemented computers in their practices would have possibly had a smug reaction when 
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they saw the programme fail in areas which they had not been consulted about, as 
suggested by the above respondent’s quote. 
A respondent who was involved in the Common User Interface of the NPfIT indicated that 
the importance of this aspect of the IT development seemed to have been undermined by 
the larger IT suppliers who were delivering the main components of the care record 
system:  
They regarded what we were doing as a bit of colours and lay out, and we tended 
to get asked, right at the end, when they had started the first user testing … users 
said ‘This is horrible, I don’t like it’… To put some lipstick on a pig, and try and 
make it better, rather than start from first principles. – R31, GP informatician, 
Connecting for Health, British Computer Society  
This snippet is evocative of a general sense of antipathy between the NPfIT management 
and suppliers on one side, and clinicians or clinician-led groups on the other, that 
surfaced frequently during the course of the NPfIT. There was an underestimation on the 
part of suppliers regarding the importance of an intuitive user interface, and they treated 
more as an afterthought than as a requirement for their systems. Respondent R31’s 
description of their attitude as putting ‘lipstick on a pig’ reflects an underlying view that 
the systems had deficiencies which the suppliers sought to cover up. Rather than tailoring 
systems to clinicians’ requirements, suppliers tried to convince clinicians that the new 
systems were what they needed, and sought to ‘dress’ the systems to make them look 
tailor-made and user-friendly. 
Tensions between the suppliers and the clinical users were also evident by the latter 
regarding the former as materialistic and naïve in their presumptions about the national 
project. Referring to the first meeting between policy makers and industry experts at 10 
Downing Street, a respondent commented: 
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These two flashy senior execs said ‘Give us a few billion, and we will computerise 
the NHS for you’. These execs, these slick suits… - R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT 
Committee  
Another point of interest was the discouragement of dialogue and collaboration between 
the suppliers and the actual end users:  
The original plan was to do a classic outsource. So you say to [company] ‘I want 
you to create this capability in this geography and I am going to give you total 
responsibility for that. So you would take over what was already there. And then 
you decide whether you continue to use what is already there, or replace it’ (…). 
It’s classic outsourcing (...) They’ll go in, they’ll take over (…) They’ll gently replace 
that which is mediocre over a time frame. One of the features of outsourcing is 
that most of the staff working in the existing organisation get transferred to the 
outsourcing company. (….) But at that time, there was a lot of trade union 
pressure on the Labour party about the degree of privatisation in the NHS. And 
the word came from above, ‘If your proposals involve a significant amount of 
transfer of existing NHS staff, then they won’t be considered’. So they killed the 
possibility of a classical outsource. And what it meant was that the LSPs had no 
responsibility for existing systems, and only made money by replacing them. – R6, 
Health informatician, A national computer organisation 
This would have added to clinicians’ anxieties as to whether their existing systems would 
be replaced, and would have also acted as a threat to the smaller suppliers already on the 
playing field. 
Concerns regarding the lack of engagement with clinicians and other end-users were also 
evident from my interview data.  
There was a massive consultation exercise but it was like a sacrificial anode on a 
ship. You can’t say, (because they are too powerful), to the doctors, ‘Go away, let 
us get on with it’. That’s what they wanted to do. ‘We’ll do a requirements 
collecting exercise with you and leave us to build it and deliver it. Keep your noses 
out’. They couldn’t say that. So they had a whole structure of pointless 
consultations which allowed the people who were building the systems to ignore 
what was going on. – R6, Health informatician, A national computer organisation 
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Respondent R6’s above analogy of a sacrificial anode2 illustrates the use of consultation 
mechanisms as a superficial layer of engagement to preserve the underlying interests and 
intentions of NPfIT management. By conducting such consultations, the management 
attempted to insulate itself from accusations of not having consulted end-users. 
According to respondent R6, the ‘engagement’ and ‘consultation’ mechanisms the NPfIT 
employed, like a sacrificial anode, came in contact with and were subject to external 
elements including clinical stakeholders. However, this ‘sacrificial anode’ of engagement 
was used to shield the underlying layer, namely the plans and intentions of NPfIT 
leadership. 
The CRDB which replaced the NCAB (see Chapter 3) was also criticised as having limited 
clinical representation, as seen in the below quote:  
It [CRDB] had one clinician on it. It was basically a board of six. It was dominated 
by business consultants. – R29, Clinical academic previously with NCAB  
The moniker that the same respondent attached to the CRDB reflects the cynicism with 
which the board was regarded: 
People in ministerial civil servant offices said, that organisation was bad to us; we 
better have a different one. The business managers who were coming in were 
very keen on a different vehicle that they would control. That’s when we got the 
care records development board coming up. They were called Cardboard. – R29, 
Clinical academic, previously with NCAB 
The informal play on the name CRDB, calling it ‘cardboard’, draws out an underlying 
attitude toward the board as one which failed to provide concrete guidance and support 
to the programme. Its establishment was mainly to replace the NCAB which had been 
clinician-led. Unlike its predecessor, the CRDB was dominated by non-clinical individuals, 
                                                          
2
 A sacrificial anode is a highly reactive metal used to coat a less reactive material surface to prevent it from 
corroding. The anode is consumed in place of the object it protects. 
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and exacerbated the problem of lack of clinical engagement. While concern regarding the 
lack of clinical input was expressed by several interview respondents, even when 
consultation exercises were conducted there was limited meaningful action in response 
to inputs received. Work related to confidentiality and patient preferences was done by 
the NHS IA early in the programme, but the outcomes of these consultations were not 
acted upon seriously. While there were apparent attempts between stakeholders such as 
the NHS IA and the Department of Health to talk and listen to each other, there were 
undercurrents which were aimed at preventing any fruitful dialogue. 
The privacy and confidentiality work which started (….) the proper outcomes were 
never published; they refused to let them out…. if you’re not going to pay any 
attention to people, you don’t want any information out that might create 
trouble. And this became clear when [person X] said to me, ‘Right, I know how to 
do this (…) have you hired the top twelve barristers in this area? So, queen’s 
council barristers. You only have to hire them for an hour’. ‘Sorry, why would you 
do that?’ [Person X] said, ‘To deny them to the opposition’. So it’s quite a common 
trick in these sorts of deals, particularly barristers with experience in the area, you 
might just hire them for a day or something, to advise you. Once they have 
advised you, they can’t in the future advise anybody else on it, because they are 
conflicted. So [person X] was saying, go out and hire the twelve top people for a 
day, to deny them to the opposition! And I said, ‘The opposition? Just remind me, 
who is the opposition? (laughs) is that the doctors? The people?’ (laughs) and 
[person X] said, ‘the people who try and stop us!’ so I’m trying to run this 
engagement process, and then I’m told to go and block the ‘opposition’. – R17, 
Clinical informatician, NHS IA 
The charade of engagement (as indicated by respondent R6’s metaphor of ‘sacrificial 
anodes’), combined with the wish to pre-empt any legal action as explained by 
Respondent R1 above, points to a deliberate effort by the NPfIT to ignore clinicians’ needs 
while continuing to engage in superficial consultations with them. While this plan to block 
the ‘opposition’ did not take place finally, it reflects the mind-set of the NPfIT 
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management. This indicates an absence of collaboration and listening between the 
community stakeholder groups relevant to the national programme. 
Some cynics regarded the NPfIT’s shifting engagement tactics as a consequence of being 
unable to garner support from certain user groups, and being forced to resort to other 
sources of support. The nursing professionals seemed to have an underlying feeling of 
being drowned out by the dominant voices of GPs, and when the programme did attempt 
to engage with them, they attributed it to the lack of support from doctors. Respondent 
R1 provides an interesting vignette of how interactions between the DH and clinicians 
shifted as a result of the tense dynamics between certain groups: 
I think the reason why there was a concentrated effort to endorse and embrace 
the RCN was because the British Medical Association was really adamant that the 
National Programme for IT is not working, it’s not going to work, and they were 
quite anti the NPfIT – R1, Nurse informatician previously with the RCN 
If clinician engagement was limited, patient engagement was even more so. As one 
respondent said: 
The Department of Health operates in a very simple way. Decide, consult, defend, 
implement. In other words, involvement is simply a showcase – R20, Co-Director, 
Patient Concern 
The idea that the programme’s consultation mechanisms were not genuine efforts to 
listen to people was evidently shared by respondents from more than one stakeholder 
group. The above respondent from a patient representative organisation felt that 
decisions were already made by NPfIT leadership prior to engagement. His opinion that 
‘consultation’ was followed by the DH ‘defending’ and ‘implementing’ their approach 
implies that consultation exercises may have been merely to alert the Department of 
Health regarding what aspects it needed to be prepared to defend itself about. Therefore, 
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in addition to being a ‘sacrificial anode’ and a pre-emptive defence mechanism, 
engagement exercises also served as a tool to plan the NPfIT’s defence and retaliation 
against potential criticisms. 
The same respondent, R20, also suggested that the Department of Health considered 
engagement and consultations as too expensive. Instead, they resorted to implementing 
the summary care records in a more convenient and cheaper manner, and defended it by 
trying to convince people of the benefits offered by their approach. 
We fought long and hard for the summary care record to be introduced on the 
basis of informed consent. In other words, people being told this was going to 
happen, given a copy of the information that was going to go up on it, they could 
check it, agree that it was accurate, and then confirm they were willing for this all 
to happen. That was far too expensive, and too much trouble for the Department 
of Health. So they instead introduced the system that you did have a right to opt 
out if you didn’t want to be a part of this. You were told that if you did opt out, 
you must be certifiable, because you would lose all these marvellous benefits, so it 
wasn’t an open choice; it was a deliberate effort to bring them all into line - R20, 
Co-Director, Patient Concern 
Certain respondents (R27, Former academic, health informatician; R8, Clinical academic) 
believed that the issue of lack of clinical engagement is often over-hyped. Whether this is 
true is debatable, as involvement of clinical advisory groups did not necessarily equate to 
their voices being actually listened to.  
The frequent restructuring that characterised several phases of the NPfIT was criticised as 
well. To many, this restructuring was pointless, and was more a demonstration of control 
on the part of the programme than responding to an actual need for dismantling 
established units and setting up new ones. Describing the views of some NHS IA staff at 
the time it was being dissolved, a respondent said: 
‘We’ll all just go, do as you will. But actually, what it takes to set up a legal entity 
to have proper HR, proper finance, proper employment arrangements, a lot of 
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these people are going to be in the new thing. Why throw everything into turmoil? 
We’ll all go, goodbye, do as you want. But just as a responsible cost effective 
thing, don’t waste money… take it over’. And the message came back, ‘No, it has 
to be seen to be executed’. So, we had a perverse situation in an office in 
Birmingham, where at one desk was the guy who used to be the secretary, 
meaning with capital S, of the Information Authority, was completing the final 
stages of closing down the information authority. It was a legal entity created by 
Parliament, had a seal and all those things. It was a whole rigmarole to shutting it 
down and transferring its responsibilities to other things. On the other side of the 
room was another group of people trying to create a special health authority, 
going and asking him, ‘How do you do it?’ And he’s in the process of shutting 
down the very thing that they are trying to create. - R17, Clinical informatician, 
NHS IA 
It appears evident that in pulling down organisations and setting up new ones, the 
programme was merely re-inventing the wheel. The functionality of the new units that 
were to be set up were similar to that of the NHS IA, and people questioned why there 
was the need for this restructuring. Considering the views of the above respondent, it 
appears unlikely that the new authority was formed for the primary purpose of 
discharging added responsibilities. This points to the possibility of attempts by the NPfIT 
management to eliminate certain players, or to have an increased control over particular 
functions. 
Another explanation for this restructuring may be found in Respondent R34’s account of 
how government propaganda is generated: 
How government propaganda has been organised, is that Downing Street plans 
out several months in advance which minister is supposed to be on the front 
pages of the papers on what day. So there’s a deliberate strategy that there 
should be a lead story, a second story, a third story, a fourth story. So if you’re the 
junior minister at the DH responsible for computers, you may be told that the 2nd 
Tuesday of every month is your slot. And you will come up with an announcement 
that will take up at least a quarter of a page in the Daily Telegraph. That’s one of 
your primary missions as a minister. It is what you get rated and assessed by, and 
is critical to your chances of promotion. What this means is that if you get a 
system which is specified and supposed to be delivered in 2014 and there are 48 
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ministerial announcements happen in the meantime, that may very well mean 30 
or 40 changes to the system, for which the supplier will charge you a million 
pounds a pop. If a minister is quiet for three years while his system is being built, 
then the Prime Minister will forget he existed and they will be passed over at the 
next reshuffle. So there’s a constant need for new initiatives - R34, Computer 
science academic with an interest in the NPfIT 
Respondents also highlighted attempts by policymakers and NPfIT management to 
suppress negative reports surrounding the NPfIT. The delay of the NAO (2006) report and 
the mild nature of the criticism contained in it (see Chapter 3) caused speculation that the 
Department of Health had haggled over it. This was confirmed by Respondent R30, who is 
a member of the Public Accounts Committee:  
NAO reports are subjected to what’s called a clearance process, (...) to make sure 
that the report is signed off by the department (...) It enables the audit process to 
take into account information they were unaware of and make sure the report is 
as up-to-date as it can be (...) The clearance process normally is a reasonably short 
process (…) In this particular case it was exploited by the Department of Health, to 
in effect grind down the National Audit Office and so the report which was 
published on the 16th of June 2006 was pretty innocuous. - R30, Member of 
Parliament, Public Accounts Committee 
Referring to the NAO’s (2006) report, respondent R17 confirmed its inadequacies and the 
pressures which compelled the NAO to publish a diluted critique of the NPfIT: 
That report was a complete misrepresentation, and the National Audit Office 
knew that. But the forces were so great, that they’d had to. I think maybe they’d 
played a very clever game, which they knew they were just never going to get that 
report agreed unless they agreed. But they knew that the Public Accounts 
Committee would in effect reject it and do its own report. And then it asks the 
same people in the National Audit Office to do that report. And they wrote a 
highly critical report. I think they wrote the report they wanted to write the first 
time - R17, Clinical informatician, NHS IA 
The use of an x-ray image as the cover page of the NAO’s (2006) report was regarded by 
one respondent as a subtle attempt to steer public opinion in favour of the NPfIT.  
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They added the Picture Archive Communication System, PACS, because it was 
good, it works. It had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the central clinical 
care record. But it worked, it was visible. If you looked at the June 2006 National 
Audit Office report, they even had on the front of it a photograph of a pair of 
hands being x-rayed...(…) it had this photograph of the PACS system on the front 
cover. It gave a misleading impression - R30, Member of Parliament, Public 
Accounts Committee 
The above respondent indicated that the inclusion of PACS as one of the programme’s 
deliverables stemmed from its already proven success, and not the other way round as 
suggested by the programme (that PACS was one of the successes of the NPfIT). 
An RCP led project advocated the use of ‘clinical headings’ to standardise health records 
and mandate the entry of specific clinical data (RCP, 2012). While the introduction of 
minimum standards and structures for EHRs is a progressive step, the usefulness of the 
headings specified by the RCP project was questioned: 
If you look at the Royal College of Physicians’ work on Headings, which has its 
weaknesses, well it’s generally a good thing. It’s interesting that we managed to 
build computerised record systems without any standards for records. And the 
first thing the RCP did was things like, ‘It’s a good idea to put the date and the 
patients’ name on the record’. And you’re thinking, ‘Well wouldn’t it! But doesn’t 
this happen?’ (laughs) Clearly it doesn’t – R6, Health informatician, A national 
computer organisation 
This respondent’s views question what purpose special interest groups within bodies such 
as the RCP served, and if efforts toward engagement could be better channelled 
elsewhere. The accomplishments of the RCP project seemed to be basic standards that 
should have been implicitly followed prior to the establishment of a separate project to 
determine ‘clinical headings’ for EHRs. However, the clinical headings advocated by the 
RCP include key fields covering the patient’s history, present condition as well as future 
treatment plan (RCP, 2012). Respondent R6’s description of the simplistic standards 
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proposed by the RCP could be indicative of an underlying feeling by the IT community 
that clinicians are incapable of knowing what they want and what systems are best for 
them (Karsh et al., 2010). While entering data such as the patient’s name on the health 
record is obvious and clinicians would not usually have to be explicitly reminded to do so, 
it is an essential part of the patient’s record.  
With this overview of my key empirical data, I proceed to discuss how the NPfIT may be 
regarded as an organising vision, following which I elaborate on the relevance of 
boundary objects to the national programme. 
5.3  The NPfIT as an organising vision for EHRs 
Having provided a brief overview of England’s NPfIT in Chapter 3, and now having 
presented my empirical data on the NPfIT, I apply the term organising visions to the 
project, as it served as the carrier for the EHR vision at a national level from 2002 to 2011. 
To clarify, an organising vision should not be considered synonymous with a project 
vision; while it represents a common interest to a heterogeneous community, it may 
trigger the creation of several projects, all attempting to implement the broader 
principles and aims of the vision itself. However, in some cases a particular initiative may 
dominate a setting to the extent that the organising vision is tightly intertwined with it in 
that particular context.  
The NPfIT may be regarded as one such example, wherein the organising vision of EHRs 
(Davidson and Reardon, 2005) in England has been inextricably linked to the NPfIT during 
its period of operation. The ‘business problematic’ (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) driving 
the NPfIT vision was a combination of a need for integrated healthcare using technology, 
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and a political drive to see increased investment in health IT in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Wanless (2002) review. 
The development of the programme resonates strongly with the concept of organising 
visions. As we have seen in Chapter 2, organising visions explain the manner in which the 
discourse surrounding innovative IS technologies change, taking into consideration the 
mutual influence between the technology (which is the organising vision) and the 
stakeholder groups which are involved in or have an interest in the innovation.  
These dynamics are often shaped by rhetorics of ‘transformation’ or ‘novelty’ (Ramiller, 
2006), as was seen right from the start of the NPfIT, when policy makers were the primary 
consumers of IT suppliers’ hyped promises with regard to a single national EHR. The 
misrepresentation of time and cost estimates to satisfy higher authorities and to promote 
the interests of industry players (Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl, 2007; Wachs, 1990b) played a 
significant role in the sanctioning of the NPfIT, as the decision to launch the national 
programme was informed by the figures and estimates presented to policy makers at the 
meeting at Downing Street. These estimates lacked logical calculations, according to 
respondent R17 (see page 119) as the initial time frame of 2.5 years for the NPfIT was 
agreed upon without any substantial planning, and was mainly to satisfy the policy-
makers present at this initial meeting. 
Swanson and Ramiller (1997) term the dominant rhetoric which characterise innovations 
as ‘buzzwords’, and these form a significant part of the dialogues which surround the 
vision. These buzzwords in each phase have parallels to the concept of boundary objects 
which are positioned at the interface between multiple stakeholder groups (Carlile, 2002), 
as I shall discuss in section 5.4. Before doing so however, I elaborate how the NPfIT fulfils 
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Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) three functions of organising visions: ‘interpretation’, 
‘legitimation’ and ‘mobilisation’. 
5.3.1.1 Interpretation 
Interpretation refers to the way in which a new technology or innovation is explored and 
understood in its nascent stages (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). This may be compared to 
the early efforts to develop EHRs in the primary care sector from the 1970s to 1990s 
(Benson 2002a, 2002b). The application of electronic health records clearly varied 
between different clinical groups, resulting in silos of health information. This signalled a 
need for improved information sharing (Burton et al., 2004), triggering the call for 
integrated healthcare in England. There was also a tendency to compare health IT 
progress in the UK to that in the US and other European countries such as France (House 
of Commons Health Committee, 2007). 
The NPfIT demonstrated continued differences in interpretation of the EHR vision, as was 
evident from the different proposed ways of implementing the NCRS. Beginning with 
clinicians’ proposal of a person-centred spine, the very notion of the spine was 
retranslated into a different form, namely a single national conduit connecting multiple 
repositories of patient information so that clinicians could easily access their patients’ 
records.  
This evolution of the spine concept, the multiple interpretation by community 
stakeholder groups such as clinical advisory groups and IT suppliers, and its subsequent 
‘reincarnation’ in a different form (McGivern and Dopson, 2010), i.e., as the National 
Spine and the Summary Care Records, lend it to being termed an inter-epistemic object, 
which I discuss further in section 5.4. 
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5.3.1.2 Legitimation 
Legitimation questions the need for the technology, and is also influenced by the 
reputation and authority of those who advocate it (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). The use 
of EHRs prior to the NPfIT was predominantly by GPs, many of whom had an active role in 
the development of the systems (Benson, 2002; de Lusignan and Chan, 2008), and most 
GP practices in England were computerised by the time the national programme was 
launched. The reputation of GPs who had reaped the benefits of EHRs, accompanied by 
the political will and support of the government, provided ample legitimation to initiate a 
national level integrated care records project. The benefits reaped from computerised 
practice in the UK, and the success stories of health IT in other countries, provided 
evidence to serve the persuasive tactics employed by commercial stakeholders, to 
convince policy makers of the need for a national health IT initiative.  
The appropriateness of this source of legitimation is to be questioned however, as the 
NPfIT was tainted by a political agenda and a façade of engagement with clinicians (see 
Chapter 3). While the government’s drive towards modernisation included aims to 
increase the use of IT in healthcare (Mark, 2007), the NPfIT itself was launched following 
decisions taken by policy makers behind the doors of 10 Downing Street (see page 119). 
This was a direct consequence of the persuasive power of leading IT vendors who 
convinced the less technology savvy policy makers of the transformative nature of health 
technologies, and their capabilities to deliver a large scale national project which would 
provide a single integrated health record for all individuals.  
‘Hype’ and ‘exaggeration’ are often used to convince users of the urgent need and 
readiness for implementing new innovative technologies (Ramiller, 2006), and the NPfIT 
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serves as a classic example of how this came into play. My interview respondents felt that 
vendors were naïve and underestimated the complexity of the NPfIT. Vendors, in their 
keenness to gain profits and secure NPfIT contracts exaggerated their capabilities and the 
potential of the systems they could deliver to transform healthcare delivery in the UK, 
employing a rhetoric of ‘transformation’ (Ramiller, 2006).  
A rhetoric of ‘novelty’, characterised by the innovative nature of the project, was 
accompanied as Ramiller (2006) suggests, by a rhetoric of ‘interpretability’, as both 
vendors as well as political players made efforts to convince the public that the project 
was not only feasible, but of great benefit to the health system. The 2.5 year timescale 
proposed by them at the initial meeting reflected their optimistic interpretation of the 
project’s feasibility and ease of implementation, which was proved wrong with time. 
The previously mentioned comparisons with health systems in other countries also 
contributed toward legitimising the project, as positive progress in other cases as well as 
the general trends and ‘buzz’ constituting community discourse often help justify the 
feasibility of new innovative projects (Ramiller, 2001a). 
Though the potential for transformation through health technology usage is not 
unattainable, it is extremely challenging and risky given the complex nature of the sector, 
and these difficulties were underplayed or underestimated by those who were 
responsible for launching and delivering the project. Ramiller (2001) discusses this 
prospect of IT projects being undertaken as a result of the persuasive power of those in 
the technology sector, and the dangers of new technology implementation with 
inadequate information.  
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However, another school of thought suggests that IT players leverage on the complexity 
of the healthcare sector and use it to justify or safeguard their position in the market. 
Respondent R31, a clinical informatician, quoted Mandle and Kohane (2012: 2241) who 
suggest that ‘EHR vendors propagate the myth that health IT is qualitatively different 
from industrial and consumer products in order to protect their prices and market share 
and block new entrants’. This is another example of the use of exaggeration and 
‘distorted communication’ (Ramiller, 2006) in IT implementation, and which likely 
influenced decisions within the NPfIT organising vision right from its nascent stages, as IT 
industry players persuaded policymakers of the need for increased investment toward a 
national health IT system. 
5.3.1.3 Mobilisation 
Mobilisation refers to the effect of the organising vision on the market (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). Before the launch of the NPfIT, the EHR market was characterised by 
several small suppliers and independent efforts by clinicians themselves (Sugden et al., 
2006; Benson 2002a, 2002b). The NPfIT changed the scene of the supplier market 
however, resulting in shifts in the relationships between the NHS, suppliers and clinicians 
by the establishment of four local service providers (LSPs) for the five clusters identified 
(Sugden et al., 2006; Connecting for Health, 2005b). This distribution of delivery 
responsibilities across four providers changed, as two LSPs left and the programme was 
shouldered entirely by two LSPs toward the latter stages (see Table 3.1, page 79). 
The complexity and scale of the NPfIT meant that the chosen suppliers had to be either 
proven experts in the health technology domain, or novices to the field who did not 
comprehend the challenges of the programme. That it was the latter that secured the 
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suppliers their contracts, was the dominant view of my interview respondents. Much 
concern was raised regarding the capabilities of these LSPs to see the vision to successful 
completion. Respondent R17’s account (see page 123) of the lack of understanding on the 
part of one of the suppliers reflects the apprehension surrounding the LSPs. Smaller 
supplier companies, many of which were clinician led, were also affected by the changes 
imposed by the national programme. As one respondent (R35, see page 232) explained, 
the only reason they survived was because the NPfIT did not. 
The original plan to outsource NPfIT systems did not materialise as the government made 
efforts to ensure that the positions of existing NHS staff were stable (Respondent R6, 
page 126). There hence seemed to be efforts by the government to protect the interests 
of the NHS staff, reflecting the potential conflicting roles governments need to play in 
large scale public sector projects (Bruzelius, Flyvberg and Rothengatter, 2002).This 
affected the way the LSPs worked, and may have compromised the way they 
implemented their systems. 
5.3.2 Community discourse and buzzwords 
The NPfIT had its share of ‘buzzwords’ and ‘legitimated vocabulary’. The transient nature 
of buzzwords in the career of organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 2003) is evident 
in the way the focal idea at the start of the programme was integration of healthcare, and 
how this later shifted to the idea of connected healthcare systems with ensured 
interoperability (NAO, 2011). The establishment of an agency named ‘Connecting for 
Health’ (Connecting for Health, 2005a) to carry forward the NPfIT echoes this shift. This 
renaming of the NPfIT may itself may be regarded as a rhetorical mechanism employed to 
persuade the public of a change in strategy (Ramiller, 2006). The project was also 
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characterised by vocabulary specific to its implementation, such as sealed envelopes, opt-
in/opt-out, Choose and Book, Summary Care Record (SCR), Detailed Care Record (DCR), 
N3 network, etc., constituting the legitimated vocabulary of the NPfIT NCRS organising 
vision.  
The NPfIT’s large scale and public sector setting involved numerous stakeholder groups 
including clinicians, IT suppliers, the government, the Department of Health and patients, 
all having varying interests and powers. These community stakeholders all have a role in 
shaping the discourse surrounding the organising vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997).  
The existence of different and potentially conflicting perspectives has parallels to 
pragmatic boundaries where people need to acknowledge differences in order to 
effectively transform and exchange knowledge across boundaries (Carlile, 2002). The 
interactions and tensions between the defenders, sympathetic critics and professional 
critics of the programme negotiated its progress, and formed the community discourse 
surrounding the NPfIT organising vision. The inconsistencies and disputes between 
stakeholders does however detract from the coherence of the organising vision, as was 
illustrated in the case of telehealth by Greenhalgh et al. (2012). These disparities may be 
the reason why technologies that offer big promises often fail to be widely adopted and 
consequently fail to deliver (Greenhalgh et al., 2012). 
Figure 5.1 (page 142) illustrates how these different choruses (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007) 
constitute the community stakeholder groups in the NPfIT organising vision (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). Swanson and Ramiller (1997) regarded the IS practitioner subculture as a 
distinct group which shapes the organising vision. While this is indeed true, as the 
specifications of the programme may have also depended on what the suppliers had to 
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offer as suggested by Respondent R5 (page 124), it is also important to recognise that 
suppliers too may be categorised along with the Department of Health and Connecting 
for Health as defenders of the NPfIT, as they needed to justify their performance and 
progress in the delivery of the systems. Further, while Sauer and Willcocks (2007) had a 
fixed categorisation of these three choruses, I suggest that the stakeholder groups in the 
NPfIT were not necessarily always contained within the same chorus. The complex 
dynamics of the NPfIT meant that those who were at one point defenders of the 
programme could at a later point move to being a critic of the programme due to the lack 
of engagement and the many other shortcomings of the NPfIT. 
IS 
practitioner 
subculture
Business 
problematic
Organising vision
(NPfIT Care Record Service)
Suppliers Clinicians Media
DH, CFH Patients
Non-
clinicians
Defenders Sympathetic critics Professional critics
 
Figure 5.1 Stakeholder groups in the NPfIT organising vision 
In retrospect, considering the highly turbulent path of the NPfIT, it is necessary to explore 
the need and demand for the programme, to understand how the organising vision 
developed over time. Whether it was a felt need or just ‘an expensive and problematic 
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solution to a non-existent clinical problem’, as Robertson et al. (2010) inferred from one 
of their respondents, is a question which begs to be answered. A recurring thought voiced 
by respondents was that it was a ‘good idea’. Ideas however need more than plans, 
specifications and development to be realised. The key underlying need was informed 
and contextualised specifications that took into consideration the views of the multiple 
stakeholder groups concerned.  
5.3.3 The manipulations and shifts in vision 
The NPfIT adopted a centralised top-down strategy, attempting to roll-out the ‘one 
system fits all’ approach (Major Projects Authority, 2011: 12) using ‘ruthless 
standardisation’ as stated in its early strategy document (DH, 2002a: 8). Once it was 
realised by the NPfIT leadership that this was an unworkable approach, the buzzwords 
changed and the focus shifted to connectivity and interoperability. The change in 
government in 2010 served as a catalyst for this shift, and by September 2010 the DH 
announced the abandonment of the centralised approach (DH, 2010; Bruce, 2010). While 
most respondents conceded that the idea of a national care record service was good, the 
approach taken was unfeasible. This shift may have been due to the significant concerns 
raised by stakeholders. Negative media publicity would have influenced the dynamics 
between the professional critics and the defenders (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007) of the 
programme, and played a role in rethinking the NPfIT strategy.  
The NHS CRS was regarded as essential to ‘join up’ the NHS to provide patient centred 
care (The NHS Confederation, 2004). While this might connect the different parts of the 
NHS itself, it didn’t seem to accommodate the possibility of connecting the patient to the 
NHS, something which probably needs to be given further consideration with the 
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increasing involvement of patients as partners in their care (Liang, 2007). This increasingly 
involved role of patients is evident from a survey (HealthWhich? and NPfIT, 2003) which 
indicated people’s wish to have online access to their records from home. 
Despite this evidence of patients’ interest in gaining better access to their records, and 
the initial proposal of a patient-centred spine as indicated by my interview data, the early 
strategy adopted by the programme did not give room for such patient involvement. 
While medicine is increasingly specialised creating highly fragmented healthcare delivery, 
the health needs of patients too are evolving and becoming more complex and difficult to 
confine to a single medical specialist (RCP, 2011). This may have been addressed by the 
creation of individual spines for each patient, in accordance with the original vision as 
expressed by Respondent R17 (see page 120). However, not only was the concept of the 
spine manipulated to create a national Spine which was not the initial intention, but 
clinicians were deliberately ignored and their dissent was taken as a sign of being 
uncooperative and stubborn.  
5.3.3.1 A semblance of success 
Launched with the NHS Care Record Service (NCRS) being one of the core features, later 
progress reports included other components portrayed as successes. The misleading 
illustration of an x-ray image on the cover of and NAO (2006) report (see section 3.2.5) 
was used to subtly convince people that the national programme was progressing 
smoothly. However, the reality that the core component, namely the NHS Care Record 
Service, was facing hurdles suggests that this use of an x-ray image on the cover of a 
report was a form of distortive communication (Ramiller, 2006). This ‘rhetoric of 
accomplishment’ (Ramiller, 2006) was employed by the NPfIT to justify its progress and as 
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a legitimising tool to proceed with the project despite a lack of success in other key 
components such as the NCRS. 
The use of the x-ray cover image illustrates how media was exploited to pervert the 
general awareness of the programme’s progress. Alongside this, however, there was a 
significant amount of negative media coverage as well on the project (Brooks, 2007). Such 
images and symbols constitute the written community discourse which structures and 
steers the organising vision (Greenhalgh et al., 2012). Interviewees acknowledged that 
there was much publicity surrounding the NPfIT, and the press coverage also had an 
influence on the general public perception regarding the national programme. The 
interplay of these diverse views and media publicity added momentum to the level of 
dissent, and likely acted as triggers for rethinking the approach adopted to the project. 
5.3.3.2 Changing structures 
The NPfIT was punctuated by the dismantling of established entities such as the NHS 
Information Authority, the National Clinical Advisory Board and the Patient Advisory 
Board, and saw the formation of new structures such as the Care Records Development 
Board (CRDB), Connecting for Health, and the various new engagement mechanisms such 
as the national clinical leads (NCLs) (see Section 3.2.4). Interview data pointed to a feeling 
that these changes were disruptive and served no real purpose, as suggested by 
Respondent R29’s description of the CRDB as ‘cardboard’ (see page 127). The lack of 
adequate clinical representation on the CRDB also meant that the engagement 
mechanisms employed did not draw on the different perspectives of the many 
stakeholders present in the NPfIT organising vision. Boards need to have a range of 
people to facilitate debate and the expression of alternative views by dissenters 
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(Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000). The NPfIT management objected to such dissenters 
however, and when encountered with opposition, opted to eliminate it, as in the case of 
the NCAB, rather than engage with it. 
 The NHS Care Records Service was one of the core components of the NPfIT and was 
described as the ‘main plank’ of the programme (House of Commons Health Committee, 
2007:p3). It comprised of the Summary Care Records (SCRs) at a national level and the 
Detailed Care Records (DCRs) at a local level. In the case of the NPfIT, ‘legitimated 
vocabulary’ did not sprout out of IT professionals’ jargon alone (Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997), but as a result of clinical and managerial inputs as well. This was evident from 
respondent R12 (a national clinical lead) who stated that terms such as DCRs were 
‘dreamt up’ merely to distinguish between existing systems rather than necessarily being 
new systems which were to be implemented. The already existing GP systems were hence 
the DCRs of the primary care sector; it was the secondary care DCRs which were pending 
development and which were the focus of the NPfIT.  
5.3.4 The NPfIT legacy 
At the end of its evolutionary journey, an organising vision could either fade into oblivion, 
failing to leave a mark, or it could become accepted, institutionalised and camouflaged in 
its landscape – in either case, ultimately losing its conspicuousness (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). Though officially dismantled in 2011 (DH, 2011), individual components 
of the national programme such as Choose and Book have been implemented, widely 
adopted, and continue to operate. The NHS Care Record Service which was to be 
connected to a national Spine on the other hand, was not seen through to completion. 
Neither of these components are entirely out of public discussion however, the former 
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being a relatively new service, and the latter being one that was and still is subject to 
various debates. Clearly, though the NPfIT may be officially dismantled, or as some would 
euphemistically say ‘reconfigured’, its organising vision has not ended. 
With Connecting for Health dissolved in April 2013, the Summary Care Records are now 
under the responsibility of the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC), and 
their implementation appears to be going ahead despite the absence of the NPfIT. The 
vision for EHRs then, is continuing in a different capacity from what was initially put 
forward in 2002 when the programme was born. Changes in the defenders (Sauer and 
Willcocks, 2007), due to new leadership for the Summary Care Records, and the modified 
scope of the spine from what was originally proposed are some of the reasons for this.  
While remnants of the NPfIT such as the Summary Care Records and Choose and Book 
continue to exist, they are no longer under the banner of a single national project like the 
NPfIT. The persistence and continued presence of these components can be discussed in 
terms of boundary objects that get ‘transformed’ and ‘reincarnated’ without completely 
disappearing (McGivern and Dopson, 2010). This is discussed further in Section 5.4. 
In order to see success in the implementations of these legacy components, it is useful to 
identify the barriers that were encountered and not overcome during the course of the 
national programme. Efforts are now being made to establish clinically approved 
standards, and these were lacking in the early formative years of the programme. The 
recognition of clinicians as experts in the needs of their clinical practice is a precursor to 
meaningful engagement. Further, the tensions which were evident between clinicians 
and suppliers during the NPfIT need to be ironed out, as it is increasingly evident that 
clinicians are taking a more active role in IT usage and development (see Chapter 7), and 
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are often adequately knowledgeable to state their requirements and specifications to 
providers.  
Given the presence of multiple stakeholders each having their own views on the 
emergent buzzwords in an organising vision, I suggest that the content of these 
discourses can be explained in terms of boundary objects which are also subject to 
multiple and evolving interpretations (Star and Griesemer, 1989; Rheinberger, 1992). 
Having illustrated how the NPfIT can be considered an organising vision, and elaborated 
on some of the stakeholder dynamics and discourses which were evident during the 
national programme, I now proceed to discuss how the concept of boundary objects can 
be applied to the NPfIT organising vision. 
5.4  Boundary objects within the NPfIT organising vision 
In looking at how technology itself acts as a boundary object between different 
community members (e.g. different groups of health professionals), Fox (2011) highlights 
the capabilities of technology to be either facilitative or hindering to cross-boundary 
collaboration. The multidisciplinary nature of information systems resonates with the 
idea of objects occupying multiple social worlds (Star and Griesemer, 1989). The NPfIT 
spanned multiple worlds (political, clinical, technical, commercial and academic) 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2010b), and is a classic example to discuss the concept of boundary 
objects. 
The flexibility and vagueness of boundary objects allows them to be interpreted 
differently by various community stakeholder groups (Fox, 2011), while at the same time 
retaining a structure recognizable and relevant to these different contexts (Pawlowski 
and Robey, 2004; Swan et al., 2007). This characteristic of boundary objects is particularly 
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relevant when considering their relevance to organising visions, as the discourses that 
constitute an organising vision see the emergence and fading away of buzzwords that are 
viewed with different and potentially conflicting perspectives by those involved (Swanson 
and Ramiller, 1997). Greenhalgh et al. (2012) highlight the different world views held by 
multiple stakeholders in the field of telehealth, and the conflicts between them meant 
that there was no clear organising vision in place. 
While the existence of boundary objects suggests a common subset of knowledge that 
overlaps across boundaries and binds different groups together, this same knowledge is 
used by different users to assess each other (Carlile, 2004). Consequently, knowledge at 
such boundaries does not always have a binding effect, but could also be a source of 
contention between various stakeholder groups, resulting in a combination of dialogues 
as well as tensions between them. This contributes to the stakeholder dynamics which 
are responsible for shaping organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), suggesting 
that boundary objects occupy a pivotal role in facilitating dialogues and the evolution of 
dominant buzzwords and rhetoric during the lifespan of an organising vision.  
Cetina (1997) and Rheinberger (1992) when discussing the distinction between epistemic 
and technical objects, emphasise the evolutionary nature of the former versus the fixed 
and concrete nature of the latter. Just as buzzwords or dominant rhetoric in an organising 
vision change over time with community stakeholder groups having different perspectives 
to them (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), epistemic objects are subject to multiple 
interpretations by different groups, and their representation (which may be in the form of 
a technical object) transforms with time, unlike technical objects.  
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Like organising visions that have a lifespan or career marked by emerging and fading 
buzzwords (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), objects too are subject to devaluation or 
declining importance (Engeström and Blackler, 2005). In discussing the NPfIT as an 
organising vision, the transient buzzwords and phases through which the programme 
travelled may be likened to abstract epistemic boundary objects, as the project had an 
amalgamation of diverse stakeholder groups that had different interests and levels of 
involvement.  
By representing the prevalent thoughts from multiple stakeholders regarding an 
innovation at any point of time, buzzwords mark the different stages in the career path of 
an organising vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). Those buzzwords which subside with 
time have parallels to negative boundary objects (Fox, 2011), as they fail to gain 
acceptance, and instead give way to other buzzwords which gain prominence and which 
can be likened to positive boundary objects (Fox, 2011). The concept of sealed envelopes 
in the NPfIT is an example of a buzzword which subsided, particularly due to the 
negativity associated with the potential for lapses in patient data confidentiality and 
security.  
There is little evidence of transformation of knowledge at boundaries in the NPfIT, as 
there was a tendency to resist engaging in meaningful sharing, translation and 
transformation of knowledge. Instead, my interview data indicated that the expertise 
acquired by clinicians in the IT domain was dismissed as irrelevant, and IT vendors and 
managers proceeded with their execution of the project without regard for the valuable 
knowledge possessed by clinicians who had successfully implemented their own IT 
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systems (Benson 2002a, 2002b). Chapter 7 elaborates on these technology adept 
clinicians, and their vital importance to future health IT projects. 
I now focus on the abstract form of boundary objects, which in this case is characterised 
by key phases and issues which marked the NPfIT. 
5.4.1 The NPfIT as a temporal boundary object 
While the NPfIT lacked a clear projected timeline at the time of its conception, as there 
was negotiation over the estimated duration of the project right from the meeting at 10 
Downing street (see section 3.2.1), it must be remembered that large scale projects often 
lack a holistic timeline due to the complexities and large number of stakeholders 
involved, increasing the levels of uncertainty (Chang, Hatcher and Kim, 2013). This implies 
shifts in priorities and activities over the course of the project, bringing into the picture 
the concept of temporal boundary objects (Chang, Hatcher and Kim, 2013; Yakura, 2002), 
where different phases in a project may be likened to boundary objects.  
While timelines can be portrayed through graphical representations as in Figure 3.1 (page 
87), they also have a narrative element, which is provided by a range of stakeholders 
having different subcultures, occupations and perspectives (Yakura, 2002). This has 
similarities to the discourse amongst stakeholders in an organising vision (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 2006). It is this narrative quality which distinguishes temporal boundary objects 
from other boundary objects, as it suggests the existence of a beginning, a middle and an 
end (Yakura, 2002). Analysing the NPfIT as a series of temporal boundary objects that 
marked the project timeline (see Figure 3.1, page 87), the varied and often conflicting 
interests of stakeholders are useful in understanding the transitions and shifts in the 
implementation of the programme. The ‘beginning’ of the NPfIT narrative was rooted in 
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the initial meeting between policy makers (see section 3.2.1). Yakura (2002) when 
discussing project timelines, discusses ‘prospective timelines’, recognising that the 
deadlines and milestones which are set are often not met (due to a lack of consideration 
of the multiple stakeholders having different subcultures), resulting in a gap between the 
intended and actual schedule. This is seen in the case of the NPfIT as well, where the time 
frame and schedule outlined when the programme was first conceived were very 
different from the way the programme was actually implemented. 
Prospective timelines are often made without taking into account the influence of 
multiple stakeholders with different subcultures (Yakura, 2002). It is for this reason that it 
is essential to distinguish between the phases of projects such as the NPfIT and use the 
concept of boundary objects to understand the different interpretations of the 
stakeholders involved.  Figure 3.1 (page 87) provides a retrospective timeline of the NPfIT 
project, using key literature, official publications and interview data to reconstruct the 
key phases of the NPfIT project as it was implemented. The ‘concreteness’ of such a 
timeline combined with the negotiations and flexibility involved in the interpretation of 
the various phases are key to the role of the timeline as a temporal boundary object 
(Yakura, 2002). 
The ‘death’ and ‘reincarnation’ of objects (McGivern and Dopson, 2010) can be observed 
by the way the spine was transformed, and reincarnated as Summary Care Records. The 
manner in which the remnants of the NPfIT proceed is also likely to reflect a degree of 
transformation and reincarnation (McGivern and Dopson, 2010), as initially envisioned 
aims adapt to the absence of a national programme to carry them through to 
implementation. 
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I now proceed to elaborate on the boundary objects which were evident in the NPfIT 
organising vision and which were part of the on-going community discourse.  
5.4.2 The boundary objects surrounded by community discourse 
The concept of interpretive flexibility (Pinch and Bijker, 1987) has been viewed as relevant 
to the NPfIT as there were diverse opinions regarding the implementation of its key 
components throughout the different project phases (Papazafeiropoulou and Gandecha, 
2007). This exposure to multiple interpretations is characteristic of epistemic objects 
which are subject to change, and unlike ‘technological objects’, are not fixed 
(Rheinberger, 1992).  
Following the initial contracting process, there were shifts in the engagement 
mechanisms adopted. While the programme began with the presence of formal clinical 
advisory groups such as the National Clinical Advisory Board, restructuring and political 
tensions resulted in a period of superficial engagement mechanisms (see section 3.2.4). 
Both, the contractual arrangements as well as the engagement mechanisms adopted may 
be regarded as boundary objects, as the different community stakeholder groups related 
to these in different ways, and had their own perspectives on the appropriateness of the 
strategy adopted. With time, the increasing recognition of the importance of patient 
empowerment and patient needs sensitised the programme to the need to address 
concerns surrounding patient confidentiality and security. I will now elaborate on these 
three aspects, namely planning and contracting, engagement, and privacy and 
confidentiality, regarding each of these as abstract inter-epistemic boundary objects 
which constituted the NPfIT.  
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5.4.2.1 Planning and contracting  
The conceptualisation and planning of the national programme began in February 2002 at 
the initial meeting between policy makers and industry experts (see section 3.2.1). This 
marked the beginning of the planning and contracting phase which is discussed here. 
However, the very start of this phase evidenced misrepresentation of data and a lack of 
transparency between policy makers, industry players and the end-users of the 
programme, similar to that described by Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl (2007).   
Respondent R17’s account of the initial meeting with policymakers at Downing Street (see 
page 119) illustrates how costs and benefits were misrepresented (Flyvberg, Holm and 
Buhl, 2007), as the initial figures regarding the NPfIT’s cost and timeline were proposed in 
an effort to meet the demands of superiors, rather than as a result of logical and 
systematic calculations. Those present seemed aware of the futility of the national 
programme, but may have been obliged to comply and consent to it in order to appease 
their superiors and satisfy their demands – an issue frequently faced in such large-scale 
projects (Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl, 2007). Such cost estimations manipulated to satisfy 
higher authorities indicate forecasts geared more toward justifying a project rather than 
genuinely evaluating its feasibility and benefits (Wachs, 1990b). The decision as to 
whether to proceed with the project may already have been taken by those who were in 
a position to do so, and the project estimates were utilised to support their decision, and 
not to assess it. Respondent R20’s description of the Department of Health’s strategy to 
‘decide, consult, defend, implement’ (page 129) reflects the dogmatic top-down decision 
making approach to the NPfIT project, wherein decisions were already made by decision 
makers even before consultation with the public.  
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This dominance and manipulation on the part of the NPfIT leadership influenced the 
nature and speed of securing the contracts, which themselves may be regarded as 
boundary objects (Gal, Lyytinen and Yoo, 2008; Koskinen and Mäkinen, 2009). The 
formation of the contract as a boundary object is often triggered by an initial project idea 
which arises out of a need for expansion or modernisation (Koskinen and Mäkinen, 2009), 
as in the case of the NPfIT (Cabinet Office, 1999; Wanless, 2002). Contracting and 
procurement in the NPfIT was carried out over a span of a few months, from late 2003 to 
early 2004. This was a relatively quick time frame considering the large scale and 
complexity of the programme.  
The signing of the contracts was not only a hasty process, but one which was subject to 
much secrecy (Brooks, 2007) The choice of suppliers was the outcome of a bidding 
process, although many respondents suggest that the LSPs were chosen not on the basis 
of their capabilities in the healthcare domain, but on their lack of such experience. Their 
ignorance meant that they were likely to be unaware of the magnitude of the national 
programme and the complexities involved, making it easier for the NPfIT management to 
convince them of the feasibility of the programme. This suggests a reticence on the part 
of the government and NPfIT management to genuinely welcome solutions that bridged 
boundaries between different users’ needs in favour of the rigid timescale and 
specifications which the NPfIT laid down.  
These dynamics between the suppliers on the one hand, and the government and NPfIT 
management on the other, also indicate that persuasive mechanisms such as rhetorics of 
‘transformation’ and ‘novelty’ (Ramiller 2001a, 2006) were employed not only by industry 
players to convince policy makers of the boons of a national programme, but by the latter 
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as well, to concur with IT suppliers and persuade them regarding the feasibility of the 
NPfIT.  
Despite the importance of clear communication and specifications to ensure the 
contracts were in agreement with what the different stakeholders required, the NPfIT 
was characterised by manipulation, miscommunication and political power, as is the case 
in many large scale projects (Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl, 2007; Wachs 1990a, 1990b). This 
was seen in the way policymakers negotiated the timetable for the NPfIT, beginning with 
an unrealistic two year timeframe and finally settling on a 2.5 year plan without any real 
discussion of what this entailed (see section 3.2.1). Not only did policymakers seem 
oblivious to the assumptions made in arriving at this optimistic time frame, as Wachs 
(1990a) suggested is often the case, but those who presented the project plans to these 
policy makers seemed to be obliged to come up with favourable estimates so that the 
project could proceed. This is in line with Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl’s (2007) suggestion 
that people are often under pressure during project planning meetings with higher 
authorities.  
The combination of overestimated demand and underestimated cost provide an optimal 
cost-benefit outlook for projects, and once such projects have been sanctioned, they are 
unlikely to be aborted even when cost overruns are identified. There is a high likelihood 
of increased efforts to somehow find funds to support a project once it is in progress 
(Wachs, 1990a). The NPfIT began with an initial cost estimate of £6 billion and this figure 
spiralled up to £11.4 billion (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007; NAO, 2011). Later the NAO (2013) 
reduced the estimated cost to £9.8 billion, as the number of systems rolled-out was 
reduced, and delays and renegotiated contracts with some LSPs made it difficult to 
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estimate an exact figure for some costs. Concerns were raised as taxpayers’ money was 
channelled toward this national project which had what many people regarded as an 
infeasible timeline (Randell, 2007).  
The contracting process, right from the invitation for bids to the negotiations and 
potential changes in specifications, is one which entails much interpretation of the 
contract documents by all parties, and there is a need for a common understanding and 
consensus to be reached between the different communities involved (Koskinen and 
Mäkinen, 2009). The inputs of multiple stakeholder groups during this phase was key to 
determining the finer details of the contracting phase, and had an impact on the overall 
path of the NPfIT organising vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). As was evident from my 
data, there were distinctions in the way different parties interpreted the very concept of 
the spine. The resultant NPfIT contracts conceptualised the spine as a single national 
Spine.  
Not only did the specifications get influenced by the intentions and technology frames of 
the more influential groups in the NPfIT (Davidson, 2002; Walsh and Fahey, 1986), but 
their dominant discourse steered different views (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) to such 
an extent that with time, people were unaware of the initial incongruence between the 
different conceptualisations of the spine. Subsequently, the initial concept of individual 
spines was not known to most people, as indicated by my interview respondents, 
illustrating the influence of technology frames of more influential groups in the decision 
making process of such projects (Davidson, 2002; Walsh and Fahey, 1986).  
Contracts are hence critical in formalising and making known the requirements, 
expectations and schedules for a project, and act as boundary objects between the 
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different project stakeholders by encapsulating the formal consensus on project 
specifications. However, they may also obliterate memories of processes and decisions 
taken prior to this phase, as they serve as the primary reference point in the future, 
regarding the project specifications. The initial concept of multiple ‘spines’ in the NPfIT 
for instance was not recollected by most of my respondents who knew the ‘spine’ as a 
single national Spine, as the contracts did not document the original idea of multiple 
people-centric ‘spines’.  
The lifetime of the spine as an object clearly has parallels to the three stages discussed by 
McGivern and Dopson (2010), namely vision, transformation and reincarnation. The spine 
acted as an inter-epistemic object (Cetina, 1997; Rheinberger, 1992), as it was subject to 
different interpretations by different stakeholder groups, and its conceptualisation 
changed significantly over the course of time. Initially intended to have multiple patient-
centric ‘spines’, the concept of the spine underwent transformation and was 
‘reconceptualised’ (Engeström and Blackler, 2005) in a different form, i.e., as a single 
national Spine. The nearest resemblance to the original conceptualisation of the patient-
centric spine is held by the Summary Care Record implementation that is meant to hold a 
summarised overview of patients’ health details. Thus the initially envisioned contents of 
the spine were reincarnated using a different technical object (McGivern and Dopson, 
2010), namely, the summary care record.  
Further ambiguity was created by the proliferation of NPfIT specific jargon, some of which 
were ‘dreamt up’ as explained by Respondent R12 (see page 121) as there was a lack of 
clear specifications with clinical input. Contracts need to incorporate clearly defined 
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agreements after consultation with stakeholders so that there is a common 
understanding on which suppliers can base their work.  
Respondent R23’s account of the lack of clear definition in the specifications (see page 
121) indicates that this ‘vagueness’ (Rheinberger, 1997) of the contracts lent an element 
of interpretive flexibility (Pinch and Bijker, 1987) to them as they could be interpreted 
differently by clinicians and IT suppliers. A similar example is seen in McGivern and 
Dopson’s (2010) study documenting the translation of genetics science into practice in a 
multi-disciplinary genetics science network, where the indeterminate nature of the 
contracts provided an opportunity for knowledge experts to take control of the project’s 
jurisdiction.  
In the case of the NPfIT, the lack of attention paid to clinicians who had successfully 
computerised their practices (see Chapter 7) meant that the ‘experts’ who controlled the 
contracts were the IT suppliers. Respondent R23’s description of the interpretation of the 
contracts indicates an underlying conflict in the way different stakeholders chose to 
understand the contracts. As IT development is a profit-making opportunity for IT 
suppliers, they opt to meet requirements with minimal effort. This suggests that 
ambiguity in contracts can result in sub-optimal results, as the IT product developed may 
be designed to meet the financial motives of IT suppliers, rather than the needs of clinical 
users. The interests of those who develop a system are likely to be reflected in its design 
(Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) and this was Respondent R23’s underlying concern. 
The need to take into account different kinds of knowledge when resolving problems is a 
characteristic of a boundary object (Carlile, 2002). The procurement process is one such 
example, which should have ideally included providers who had expertise not only in 
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large scale IT projects, but also in healthcare. The need for not just transferring and 
translating knowledge, but also transforming knowledge across these boundaries (Carlile, 
2004) should have been given priority, in order to build on the experiential knowledge 
acquired by those involved.  
The IT suppliers’ limited knowledge of the healthcare sector, as indicated by my interview 
respondents, may account for their initial optimism surrounding the NPfIT and the 
consequent cost and time underestimations. This was evident from respondent R17’s 
conversation with one of the IT suppliers who naively regarded the NCRS as a messaging 
system or a database (see page 123). Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl (2007) emphasise the 
importance of learning from past failures to help eliminate undue optimism at the start of 
projects, and this was lacking in the NPfIT.  
While many criticised the process for attracting suppliers who had no experience in the 
healthcare sector, the lack of clinical input and the unfeasible timelines, a minority of 
respondents viewed the contracting process as well executed, incorporating strategic 
tactics such as payment of suppliers only on delivery of the systems. Clearly, though there 
were different opinions surrounding the contracting process as a boundary object, the 
dominant view was that it was hasty and lacked clinical engagement.  
This lack of genuine meaningful engagement was one of key criticisms of the NPfIT 
(Brennan, 2007). This phase should have seen the consultation and involvement of that 
niche group of professionals, the clinician-IT hybrids, which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. These professionals who had a valuable combination of clinical as well as 
technical know-how, would have been critical to facilitating the transformation of 
knowledge across boundaries, so that the IT systems could be implemented in a manner 
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which met the specific needs of clinicians. Instead of leveraging their expertise, IT 
suppliers did not regard the work done by such clinician-IT professionals as important. 
This was seen by their practice of bringing in clinical programmers from the Common 
User Interface team relatively late in the development process – a tactic regarded by 
respondent R31 (page 125) as an attempt to mask the lacunae of the vendor-developed 
systems. 
The lack of clinical engagement intensified the resentment felt by clinicians toward the 
programme management and suppliers. Interview data presents a picture of suppliers as 
opportunistic, profit-seeking and too naïve to appreciate the complexities of the project 
they were getting themselves into. As Respondent R5 highlighted (see page 124), the 
specifications revolved around what the suppliers offered, rather than what the clinicians 
needed, and this defeated the purpose of the proposed systems which were not geared 
to meet clinical requirements.  
The suppliers’ lack of experience in the healthcare domain acted as a further barrier to 
facilitating knowledge translation and transformation (Carlile 2002, 2004) with regard to 
the NPfIT, and the programme tended to isolate and distance the technology and clinical 
domains, rather than seek to bridge the two. Hence, the choice of suppliers was itself a 
determinant to the nature of community dynamics and knowledge translation and 
transformation in the NPfIT.  
5.4.2.2  Communication and engagement 
As explained briefly in the previous section, concerns regarding communication and 
engagement (or lack of them) were a common denominator for most interview 
respondents, and were highlighted in the later audits and reports of the NPfIT. Discourse 
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surrounding an organising vision is prone to points of discord and friction (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). This drives home the need to engage with these different groups 
possessing different knowledge sources so that contentious issues that act as boundary 
objects between stakeholders may be resolved in a manner which takes into account the 
unique knowledge as well as needs of the diverse stakeholders involved.  
Ramiller (2006) discusses the use of ‘exaggeration’ as a type of rhetoric used to convince 
and persuade. He suggests that this may sometimes lead to ‘communicative distortion’ 
due to the tendency to accentuate the good, and omit the negative. I suggest that this 
represents two types of communicative distortion: ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ distortion. In 
communicating the progress of the project, the NPfIT engaged in the former, by 
exaggerating the successes of components such as PACS. The contracting process was 
exaggerated as one which generated value for money, though later in the project it was 
evident there were undercurrents that led to providers opting to withdraw from the 
programme. Negative distortion was also employed by concealing the risks involved in 
the project and deliberately ignoring the concerns of clinicians. Superficial mechanisms to 
engage clinicians, compared to a ‘sacrificial anode’ by respondent R6 (page 126), 
showcase the limited efforts made by the NPfIT. In short, these consultations with 
clinicians were a protective mechanism to shield the programme from later accusations 
regarding lack of clinical engagement, rather than an actual effort to listen to the clinical 
requirements of those who would be the actual users of the NPfIT systems. The use of 
superficial consultations thus served the dual purpose of being both a placation 
mechanism to appease stakeholders, as well as a pre-emptive defence mechanism 
against future possible accusations of not having engaged with end-users. 
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External sources, or what Sauer and Willcocks (2007) term professional critics, also played 
a role in communicative measures, as they accentuated the lacunae of the programme 
and propagated it to the general public (see section 3.2.5). This then, was a different form 
of communication distortion (Ramiller, 2006), where the negatives were highlighted, due 
to the different stakes and interests held by the media. The intentions of policy makers 
and NPfIT management were at odds with the press, despite their common use of media 
for communication purposes; the former gravitated toward positive distortion by means 
of highly optimistic progress reports, while the latter questioned the project due to its 
drive to produce eye-catching and sensational stories for public interest. In discussing the 
communication and engagement mechanisms which the NPfIT employed, it is essential to 
understand the roles of some of the key players such as the policy makers and the media.  
5.4.2.2.1 Political backing 
The project’s political backing (Cross, 2004) was clear, as several respondents pointed out 
the politically driven nature of the NPfIT. Evidence suggests that attendees at the famous 
Downing Street meeting at which the NPfIT was conceived (Cross, 2004) were well aware 
of the risks involved. The omission of the project’s risk analysis in an early report was 
regarded as deceptive (Ritter, 2007) and it is unclear why the risky nature of the 
programme needed to be concealed. Given that at least some of those who played a key 
role in the initial meeting deciding on the launch of the NPfIT were aware of the 
unfeasibility of the project proposal, it would seem that there was a deliberate attempt to 
camouflage the riskiness of the project in order to provide credence to the political 
drivers for the programme. The accelerated nature of the programme launch and 
contracting process resounds with a ‘rhetoric of urgency’ combined with a ‘rhetoric of 
implementability’ (Ramiller, 2006) due to the desire to be at par with other countries who 
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were ahead in the game, and to rectify the lack of sufficient investment in health IT up till 
that point (Wanless, 2002). Policy makers and the NPfIT management tried to convince 
themselves and others of the feasibility of implementing the project within the initially 
specified timeframe, though it later proved to be grossly underestimated. The ‘defenders’ 
of the programme (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007) evidently employed ‘distorted 
communication’ (Ramiller, 2006) with the intent to skew public perceptions of the 
programme. 
The dominant and controlling role played by NPfIT management and policymakers 
overpowered the potential for innovation that is the central focus of an organising vision. 
Despite the existence of clinician-led system specifications around the time the NPfIT 
began, these were ignored, misinterpreted and misrepresented to the extent that the 
very notion of the Spine as we know it today is in reality not what was envisioned by 
clinicians at the time. This could be due to manipulations by dominating stakeholder 
groups and their lack of understanding of clinical needs to the extent that they were 
oblivious to their misinterpretation of the specifications. It would also seem that 
prevalent institutionalised notions and the power of larger profit-seeking IT suppliers 
overpower creative and new ideas, thus presenting a conflict between the diffusion of 
innovative technologies (Christensen et al., 2000), which is what organising visions are 
centred around, and the views of the dominant community members involved in the 
organising vision.  
The dynamics between the management and the other stakeholders in the NPfIT was 
tinged with much friction, and though there were apparent attempts to talk and listen to 
each other, there were undercurrents which were aimed at preventing any fruitful 
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dialogue. This was seen by the suggestion that legal support be secured to pre-empt any 
attempts by end-users (regarded as ‘the opposition’ by a senior NPfIT official, as 
described by respondent R17, page 128) to question the NPfIT. While frictions are 
inevitable in the community discourse steering an organising vision (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997), they no doubt help inform and shape the views of the multiple 
community groups involved. In this case however, there was a wish to eliminate any 
possibility of dialogue, and to block possible channels of resistance.  
5.4.2.2.2 Role of media and communicating to the crowd 
The media played an important and dual role in the discourse in which the NPfIT 
stakeholders engaged. Not only was it a professional critic (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007) of 
the programme, but it was also a tool exploited by policy makers and the NPfIT to 
promote a picture and sense of false security, as seen by the use of a misleading cover 
image on the NAO (2006) report. This use of the media to influence public resulted in very 
different and conflicting versions of the programme’s progress. While management and 
suppliers portrayed an upbeat picture, this was questioned in light of the NAO (2006) and 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2007) reports that pointed out huge 
delays and the lack of clear quantifiable benefits of the programme. The need to take 
stock of the project with the help of inputs from multiple sources led to the Electronic 
Patient Record Inquiry in 2007 (House of Commons Health Committee, 2007). 
Much of the media coverage may have been for publicity purposes, rather than out of a 
genuine concern for the programme. The use of public channels of communication is 
closely linked with a political agenda, as they are used to propogate intentions that policy 
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makers have and may form a part of their ministerial duties, as explained by Respondent 
R34 (see page 131). 
Respondent R34’s opinion that much of the media publicity related to ministerial 
announcements is out of obligation and duty rather than actual need, resonates with 
McGivern and Dopson’s (2010) study on how specific community groups use epistemic 
objects for different purposes including improved credibility. Just as academics rely on 
publications to build up their portfolio and reputation in the academic community 
(McGivern and Dopson, 2010), media articles and ministerial announcements can hold 
similar value for politicians, as suggested by Respondent R34’s quote. 
Taking this into consideration, there is evidently also a close relation between the use of 
media for public discourse, political agenda, and the subsequent consequences in 
procurement costs as a result of these politician driven announcements that implicitly call 
for modifications to the systems being implemented. Communication of the project’s 
progress was a boundary object itself, as it was done by different stakeholders for 
different purposes. The defenders, sympathetic critics, and professional critics (Sauer and 
Willcocks, 2007), all had different reasons for wanting to engage in and receive 
communication regarding the programme.  
The ‘defenders’, caught up in the hype of the transformative power of technology, were 
dogmatic in their top-down centralised approach, and disregarded the inputs of the 
‘sympathetic critics’ who comprised the clinicians and other end users who would have 
experienced the impact of the NPfIT systems first hand. The ‘professional critics’, who 
were those in external professional bodies, would have typically been in a position to give 
an outsider’s unbiased opinion on the project. However, the large scale nature of the 
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NPfIT and the complex nature of health technology projects meant that it included a large 
number of stakeholders, and even those who were supposedly external to the project 
had a personal interest in it, as it was to affect the manner in which healthcare was 
delivered. Those ‘professional critics’ who were in organisations such as the Royal 
Colleges and the British Computer Society, and who had no direct role in the project, 
were able to give an (informed) view of the programme. Despite this, it would be worth 
noting that the national pride with which the English NHS is generally perceived 
(Neuberger, 1999), would suggest that even external critics would have a personal stake. 
This may be one of the reasons why the NPfIT invoked such vehement criticisms and 
media attention, as it had implications for the general public as well, and was funded by 
the country’s taxpayers. 
5.4.2.3  Privacy and confidentiality 
The privacy and confidentiality of patient data is highly debated (Foster and Young, 2012; 
Malin, Karp and Scheuermann, 2010). In the NPfIT, this issue was escalated to a higher 
level given the large scale and highly visible nature of the project. The prospect of easy 
access to patient data although of benefit to secondary care clinicians, was problematic 
for many GPs who regarded themselves as their patients’ medical advocate and 
gatekeeper to patients’ clinical information.  
Further, the disregard for their success in using computerised records was an insult to 
GPs’ capabilities, and they were reluctant to give up or compromise on what they had 
already achieved, and share information with secondary care easily, given the amount of 
effort they had already put into modernising their practices. Safeguarding their patients’ 
data was then not only for the purpose of maintaining the sanctity of the doctor-patient 
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relationship, but also to protect their own business interests. This argument is elaborated 
in the next chapter. 
While initial consultations on confidentiality issues were conducted by the NHS IA at the 
outset of the programme (NHS IA, 2002; Health Which? And NPfIT, 2003), according to 
one interviewee (Respondent R17, Clinical informatician, NHS IA) there was much that 
was not disclosed or taken into consideration. Instead, the programme reported that 
patients’ overall response to the NCRS was ‘extremely positive’ (Health Which? and NPfIT, 
2003, p3). This again illustrates how technology frames of more powerful and influential 
groups dominate projects (Davidson, 2002; Walsh and Fahey, 1986), and in this case, 
concealed or suppressed opposing views that conflicted with the intentions of the NPfIT. 
Later, issues related to privacy and confidentiality of patient records began to gain 
prominence, given the large scale of the project, the prospect of easy access to records 
from any place, and the increasing recognition of the role of patients in their healthcare.  
While the programme eventually promised increased patient involvement and access to 
records in support of patient empowerment, there were concerns regarding the use of 
patient data for research purposes (Foster and Young, 2012). Debates on who owned 
these data gave rise to increased efforts to protect patient information by means of 
access controls and sealed envelopes. While patients could supposedly restrict access to 
data contained within these sealed envelopes, this could be overridden to extract 
pseudonymised data for research purposes (Brown, Brown and Korff, 2010). The risk of 
re-identification of such pseudonymised data was significant, and the conflicting views of 
patients, clinicians and researchers, on the use of clinical data for research purposes had 
to be considered (Brown, Brown and Korff, 2010). Finally, due to the complexity of 
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implementing sealed envelopes, they were never realised, and the concept was 
eventually abandoned.  
With regard to the summary care records, Respondent R20 (see page 130) was clearly of 
the opinion that the Department of Health considered the opt-out option more 
convenient, and did not wish to take the extra effort of getting patients to make a 
deliberate choice. The Department of Health’s approach of highlighting the disadvantages 
of opting out of the summary care records was a persuasive tactic to convince the public 
that it would be in their best interests to consent to having their health information in a 
summary care record. 
 Amongst clinicians too there were disparities, with secondary care doctors expecting the 
programme to facilitate an increased flow of information from primary care to secondary 
care. GPs on the other hand regarded their professional interests and the patient-doctor 
relationship as their first priority, and had concerns regarding the transfer of their 
information across the primary-secondary care boundary. The concerns raised by 
patients, the quest to gain access to clinical data by researchers and the business 
interests of primary care physicians, all constituted the community discourse which 
surrounded the subject of privacy and confidentiality of patient records. Some of these 
conflicting views may be linked to professional differences that I elaborate in more detail 
in the next chapter. 
5.5  Conclusion  
The complex and large-scale nature of England’s NPfIT, and the dismantling of the 
programme in 2011 after several years of investment, make it an object of research for 
several scholars (Brennan, 2007; Car et al., 2008; Coiera, 2007; Cresswell et al., 2011; 
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Currie and Guah, 2007; Greenhalgh et al., 2010b; Sauer and Willcocks, 2007). By analysing 
phases in the NPfIT organising vision as boundary objects which evolve and shift in 
priorities, this chapter addresses two needs: the need for research on how objects are 
transformed (Engeström and Blackler, 2005; McGivern and Dopson, 2010) and for studies 
investigating large scale EHR programmes (Takian et al., 2012). Using the concepts of 
boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) and organising visions (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997), I present and analyse a brief narrative of the key phases in the NPfIT, 
illustrating how the programme evolved and was subject to multiple stakeholder inputs 
and perspectives as a part of the community discourse.  
While organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) are useful to study the discourse 
that characterises organising visions for IS innovations, they do not pay adequate 
attention to the interactions between the stakeholders who provide inputs to this 
discourse. This limitation is addressed by using the concept of boundary objects (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989) that interface between different epistemic groups and are subject to 
multiple interpretations as a consequence of incongruent technology frames (Orlikowski 
and Gash, 1994). This dual lens employing organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997) and boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) is a valuable tool as it helps 
understand not only the emergent buzzwords which constitute discourse in an organising 
vision, but also the dynamics between stakeholders for whom these buzzwords serve as 
boundary objects. 
The complex and evolutionary nature of large scale long-term projects and the notion of 
temporal boundary objects (Chang, Hatcher and Kim, 2013) can be discussed in the 
context of organising visions which see the emergence, subsiding and persistence of 
Chapter 5 
171 
 
buzzwords (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) representing the prevalent thinking and rhetoric 
surrounding new innovations in a community of diverse stakeholders. As buzzwords in 
organising visions are subject to multiple interpretations due to the presence of diverse 
community stakeholder groups, they can be regarded as epistemic objects which undergo 
transformation, are perceived differently by various groups and subject to change as 
interpretations change over time (Rheinberger, 1992). The large scale of the NPfIT and 
the multiple stakeholders involved suggested that it was rife with ambiguity and could be 
likened to a temporal boundary object (Chang, Hatcher and Kim, 2013; Yakura, 2002) as it 
saw the emergence and fading away of various phases and priorities (Brennan, 2007; 
Sauer and Willcocks, 2007). These key phases (see Figure 3.1, page 87) were subject to 
different interpretations by stakeholders. Each phase (contracting, engagement, etc.) has 
parallels to Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) notion of buzzwords in an organising vision. 
This chapter focuses on specific phases and issues of the project which were also subject 
to contention and the different views of those involved. 
Discourse involving various stakeholder groups shapes an organising vision, as buzzwords 
arise or subside at various points during the career path of the vision (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). The dominant buzzwords of the NPfIT varied over time, and moved from 
integration to interoperability, and from the notion of multiple individual spines for 
patients to a single large national Spine holding all patients’ health information. This 
illustrates the changing nature of the programme and relevance of boundary objects in 
this context, as the vision and constituent buzzwords were subject to different views and 
interpretations of the community stakeholders.  
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However, it is this very involvement of multiple groups having different professional and 
cultural perspectives that can potentially stifle the progress of innovation (McGivern and 
Dopson, 2010). The conflicts and tensions between the various epistemic and 
organisational groups involved in the NPfIT confirms recent research (McGivern and 
Dopson, 2010) on how such structures influence how objects are transformed.  
The contracts and components of the NPfIT did not have clear specifications, making 
them epistemic objects (Rheinberger, 1997) with much ambiguity and interpretive 
flexibility (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). Initial requirements put forward by customers may be 
weakly structured as there may be a misunderstanding of the underlying needs and 
problems, resulting in a boundary object which is likely to be subjected to much 
negotiation and change (Koskinen and Mäkinen, 2009). These negotiations play a critical 
role in forming a stronger structured boundary object in the form of contracts, and the 
absence of such dialogue was one of the lacunae of the national programme.  
In characterising the different technology frames of IT developers and users, Orlikowski 
and Gash (1994) highlight variations in the way these different groups regard the 
implementation strategy as well as the use of technology. The views of technologists and 
IT users are often in conflict with each other, and it is not uncommon for technology 
design to reflect the decisions of the former group who are responsible for its 
development (Davidson, 2002; Markus and Bjorn-Andersen, 1987), or the interests of 
management rather than clinical users (Berg, 2002). This too was evident in the NPfIT 
contracting process, given the lack of clinical input into the programme in the early 
stages.  
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Given the complex nature of this large scale health IT project and the many stakeholders 
involved (Brennan, 2007; Sauer and Willcocks, 2007), it was critical that the skills, 
requirements and perspectives of the multiple community stakeholder groups involved 
were taken into consideration so that there would be better utilisation as well as 
assessment of knowledge surrounding boundary objects (Carlile, 2004). In this context, 
the boundary objects include key issues such as technology procurement, patient data 
confidentiality, and communication and user engagement in the NPfIT. Inconsistencies 
and disparities between stakeholder groups often results in lack of coherency in an 
organising vision (Greenhalgh et al., 2012), and in order to bridge the difference between 
such groups, the need for translation and transformation of knowledge at boundary 
points is emphasised. However, rather than regarding them as disruptions to be 
eliminated, Walsh and Fahey (1986) suggest that the resolution of such conflicts can be 
leveraged to contribute positively to a project. 
Decisions made in a project are often dominated by the technology frames of more 
influential or powerful groups (Davidson, 2002; Walsh and Fahey, 1986). The NPfIT was 
initiated under the direction of high-level policy makers, and the IT suppliers and NPfIT 
management had greater leverage over the programme than the clinicians who were to 
be the actual end-users of the proposed systems. Markus and Bjorn-Andersen (1987: 500) 
suggest that IT designs that do not entirely meet with users’ expectations may be 
regarded as a ‘technical exercise of power’ by information systems professionals over 
users. This confirms the view that technologists and other influential stakeholders 
dominate technology development and implementation decisions when compared to 
technology users (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). The limited powers of those clinicians who 
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did occupy lead roles is evocative of the diminished authority of those in managerial roles 
in the public sector due to the coercive powers of those in more influential positions 
(Caudle, Gorr and Newcomer, 1991).  
Given that technology embodies the objectives of its developers and key proponents 
(Orlikowski and Gash 1994), the transformation of the Spine from a patient-centric 
concept to a national Spine reflects a lack of patient focus or empowerment during the 
early phases of the NPfIT organising vision. The tendency for policy-makers to have a 
‘monument complex’ (Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl, 2007) wherein they envision large-scale 
projects with high aspirations represents a different technology frame when compared to 
end-users of clinical systems who may be more interested in local tailored systems. The 
monolithic ‘big bang’ approach is often employed to meet politicians’ ‘need to show 
things are happening’ (Craig and Brooks, 2006: 206). The technology frames of influential 
and powerful policy-makers as well as IT players redefined and ‘reconceptualised’ 
(Engeström and Blackler, 2005) the Spine, illustrating how technology frames of dominant 
groups influence the frames of other stakeholders and steer the development of IT 
(Davidson, 2002; Walsh and Fahey, 1986). The ‘reincarnation’ of the patient-centric 
‘spine’ as a technical object, namely the Summary Care Record, is in agreement with 
studies that highlight the transient nature of objects, and the possibility of discarded 
objects resurfacing in different and more utilitarian forms (McGivern and Dopson, 2010; 
Engeström and Blackler, 2005). 
There are disputes as to whether incongruent technology frames disrupt technology 
development, or facilitate better technology solutions due to the possibility of taking into 
account diverse perspectives (Davidson, 2002; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). I suggest that 
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the possibility of improved interpretation of ambiguity by considering multiple technology 
frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) has parallels to the interpretation of boundary 
objects which are positioned at the locus of incongruent technology frames as they 
interface between different domains. While boundary objects allow for interpretive 
flexibility, they also have a level of structure which provides some commonality by which 
multiple user groups can recognise the object (Sapsed and Salter, 2004; Star and 
Griesemer, 1989). This presence of flexibility as well as commonality in boundary objects 
is similar to shared frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) which recognise the existence of a 
set of common core beliefs despite variations in interpretations between different 
individuals.  
The high visibility of public sector projects (Bretschneider, 1990) such as the NPfIT and the 
likelihood that the preferences and opinions that stakeholders form during the nascent 
stages of a project are unlikely to change significantly at a later point (Bruzelius, Flyvberg 
and Rothengatter, 2002), emphasise the need for projects to be evaluated from their 
formative stages (Coiera, 2007). However, policymakers responsible for making decisions 
on the basis of forecasts and estimates are usually unaware of the assumptions employed 
in making these calculations (Wachs, 1990a), as in the case of the NPfIT. There was a 
deliberate act of misinforming policy makers and underplaying time and cost estimates, 
which may be regarded as ethically and legally unacceptable irrespective of the reasons 
behind such underestimations (Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl, 2007).  
In discussing the inter-stakeholder dynamics and discourse which prevailed during the 
NPfIT, Ramiller’s (2006) work on exaggeration as a form of communicative distortion is 
relevant to highlight the types of engagement and persuasion mechanisms employed. The 
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NPfIT was characterised by a significant amount of media discourse which was used to 
both praise its progress as well as to discredit its supposed achievements.  
Building on Ramiller's (2006) discussion on exaggeration resulting in communicative 
distortion, I suggest a distinction between positive distortions and negative distortions, 
highlighting how these were evident in community discourse of the NPfIT organising 
vision. The high levels of scrutiny and evaluation typical in public sector projects 
(Bretschneider, 1990) was seen clearly in the NPfIT with multiple reviews by the NAO 
(2006; 2011), Committee of Public Accounts (2007) and the House of Commons Health 
Committee (2007). The media itself was used for both positive as well as negative 
distortion by the different ‘choruses’ of the programme, i.e. the defenders, sympathetic 
critics and professional critics (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007). While the defenders used 
media for positive distortion to exaggerate the successes of the NPfIT, the press and 
auditing bodies such as the Committee of Public Accounts utilised it to expose the faults 
and shortcomings of the programme, thus illustrating how media communication itself 
was used for very different purposes by the NPfIT organising vision’s stakeholders.  
The use of rhetoric as a strategy of legitimacy, employing persuasive language to either 
legitimate or oppose innovations (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) has relevance to 
organising visions, where diverse community stakeholder groups coexist and may be 
oriented to different technology frames (Orlikowkski and Gash, 1994). The dominant 
discourse or rhetoric very much shapes and steers their views, and can potentially 
facilitate congruency of their different standpoints toward the innovation (Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005). This was evident in the NPfIT in the way the different technology 
frames which shaped people’s perceptions of the spine were influenced by the dominant 
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groups, namely the NPfIT management and the suppliers, and with time these views 
converged to the point that most respondents were unaware of how the concept of the 
spine originated.  
The tensions between NPfIT management and suppliers, and clinicians, may have been 
aggravated by the latter who would not have relished the prospect of being subject to the 
control of managerial and IT groups who did not have the same professional status and 
reputation traditionally possessed by clinical professionals (Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000; 
Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1988). The resistance of clinicians to such manipulations further 
facilitates the phenomenon of restratification of the profession, which I elaborate in 
Chapter 7. 
Looking at the NCRS component of the NPfIT using the dual lens of organising visions and 
boundary objects to investigate key issues including procurement, engagement and 
privacy and confidentiality has set the context for the next two chapters in which I narrow 
my focus to two areas. First, the EHR itself as a boundary object, and subsequently (in 
chapter 7), I look at the significance of a niche group of hybrid professionals who play a 
vital role in bridging clinical and non-clinical domains. I now proceed to present my 
findings on the multiple perspectives and uses of the EHR as perceived by its various 
users. 
 
 
 CHAPTER 6  EHRS AS BOUNDARY OBJECTS BETWEEN USERS 
6.1  Introduction 
Having discussed the NPfIT organising vision and the boundary objects contained within 
it, in this chapter I shift the focus to EHRs specifically and how they too may be regarded 
as boundary objects with multiple functionalities, used by a diverse range of stakeholders 
including physicians, nurses and patients. EHRs were central to the NPfIT, which had the 
NHS Care Record Service as its primary component, and which was integrated by means 
of the ‘Spine’ (Brennan, 2007).  
The very concept of the EHR varies across contexts (Greenhalgh et al., 2009) making it 
comparable to a boundary object which is interpreted differently with time and context 
(Rheinberger, 1992). I therefore discuss these divergent views and uses of EHRs using the 
concept of boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989), as EHRs may be regarded as 
inter-epistemic objects (McGivern and Dopson, 2010) situated at syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic boundaries (Carlile, 2002, 2004) between different clinical professionals as well 
as patients.  
A key determinant shaping people’s attitudes toward technology is their professional role 
(Aydin and Rice, 1991). Views of health IT as a control mechanism (Timmons, 2003) and 
the imposed changes in work practices (Ford, Menachemi and Phillips, 2006) are some of 
the concerns that are in conflict with the professional autonomy of health professionals. 
For instance, Walter and Lopez’ (2008) study highlights the distinct way in which 
physicians perceive health IT including EHRs. Physicians’ professional role entails a high 
degree of autonomy, and the prospect of challenges to their autonomy and the possible 
erosion of the indeterminate nature of their knowledge due to the codification possible 
Chapter 6 
179 
 
through EHRs is likely to hinder their acceptance of the technology (Walter and Lopez, 
2008). Bechky (2003) provides a similar example of engineering professionals who avoid 
clear and complete codification of their knowledge in engineering drawings, instead using 
these drawings as epistemic tools to reinforce boundaries and maintain the 
indeterminate nature of their knowledge. In addition to clinical data entry, EHRs have also 
been employed to meet administrative and business needs particularly in the primary 
care sector (Berner, Detmer and Simborg, 2005), demonstrating variation in their uses 
across different settings. There are clearly differences in the way clinical groups use EHRs, 
and this has parallels to the multiple and on-going interpretations that epistemic objects 
are subjected to (McGivern and Dopson, 2010).  
The concept of technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) is also relevant to this 
discussion, as the very design of a system is dependent on the views of those who 
develop it (Davidson, 2002). The different epistemic communities between which EHRs 
are positioned have different technology frames that determine how they perceive EHRs, 
in terms of their purpose and actual use in practice. The tendency for technologies to 
reflect the interests of those who develop them (Davidson, 2002; Orlikowski and Gash, 
1994) makes the EHR symbolic of tensions and power struggles between its multiple users 
including primary care physicians, secondary care physicians, nurses and patients, as they 
serve different functions in healthcare delivery (Greenhalgh, 2009).  
I draw from my empirical findings to illustrate some of the competing discourses 
surrounding EHRs’ purpose and use. This chapter draws on reviewed literature on EHRs, 
professional roles and boundary objects (Chapter 2), as I discuss how different 
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professional groups relate to EHRs differently depending on their self-perceived roles as 
well as the way they regard their professional colleagues and counterparts.  
I now present my empirical data on the way individuals use and perceive EHRs. I first 
outline their relevance to clinicians, followed by the way in which EHRs influence clinician-
patient interactions. This is followed by a brief discussion of the knowledge differences as 
well as dependencies (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) between clinicians and patients, to 
highlight the importance of EHRs as boundary objects which interface between these 
differences and as platforms on which these dependencies may be fulfilled. Following 
this, I highlight some of the main uses and functionalities attributed to EHRs, and this is in 
keeping with the notion of EHRs as boundary objects that serve different purposes for 
different stakeholder groups. I go on to discuss these different uses of EHRs using the 
concept of boundary objects in greater depth, and this is followed by a brief summary of 
the chapter. 
6.2  EHRs: What do they mean to their users? 
My data indicates that not only do users’ attitudes towards EHRs vary, but their 
perceptions of its purpose also differ. Inter-professional dynamics were also evident, 
reflecting some innate differences between particular healthcare professionals. That 
professionals regard themselves in on the light of their professional roles has been 
discussed (Chapter 2), and will be further discussed in Chapter 7 which investigates the 
blurring boundaries between professionals and the emergence of new professional roles.  
I now present my empirical data highlighting the significance of EHRs to clinical users, and 
the diverse needs and requirements of different clinical groups.  
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6.2.1 The diverse needs of EHR users 
 This section explores some of the different viewpoints towards EHRs, depending on 
professional roles and responsibilities. I first present data that contrasts the perspectives 
of primary and secondary care physicians. I also explain how this differs from those of 
nurses, who have different clinical responsibilities compared to their physician 
counterparts. The views of patients is also presented, and I elaborate on how EHRs play a 
role in mediating the clinician-patient boundary. 
My interview data indicated clear tensions between primary and secondary care 
physicians, and their use of EHRs. The role of the GP as the first point of contact for the 
patient as the facilitator for continuity of care causes them to identify themselves as the 
primary user of the EHR, as opposed to their specialist colleagues. The friction between 
primary and secondary care physicians with regard to EHR usage is reflected in the 
following quote: 
Most secondary care doctors can’t understand why they don’t just share it. And 
part of that I think is a fundamental cultural difference. General practitioners 
record information for themselves to see it later - R3, National Clinical Lead, 
Connecting for Health 
Secondary care physicians believe that the motives for EHR data entry by GPs are very 
different from theirs. While the former claim to be supportive of sharing information, 
they are convinced that their primary care colleagues’ reasons for clinical data entry are 
driven by self-interest and a desire to record information for their own benefit. 
The nature of the nursing role however, is very different. Respondent R15 explains how 
the ‘caring’ nature of nurses’ responsibilities makes it challenging for nurses to employ 
standardised data entry practices: 
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You’re doing lots of stuff that isn’t quite so concrete. You’re sussing out how much 
the person knows, what they are feeling, what their anxieties are, it’s a much 
broader sort of softer, much more difficult to structure, and nursing hasn’t been 
good at structured record keeping. So their notes tend to be prose - R15, Nurse 
informatician, RCN 
The typical structure of the EHR is often geared more toward the needs of physicians, 
rather than nurses. This was evident from one respondent who sympathised with the 
challenges nurses face in using EHRs to meet their clinical requirements: ,  
My observation would be that many of the traditional GP record systems are not 
as good at meeting the core aims for some of our nursing colleagues. There are 
many similarities as we tend to benefit from sharing much of the key underlying 
information. Some of the nursing requirements are more descriptive and 
narrative, whereas many of the medical things are more based on disease and 
intervention encoding, results and investigations. So I think in many respects there 
is a challenge to meet subtly different needs. – R28, GP, Connecting for Health 
National Clinical lead 
The contents of EHRs are also contentious, and this is evident by the differences between 
the needs of clinical professionals. The quote below captures some of these differences, 
and illustrates how a single EHR can be viewed and utilised differently:  
If you go and ask a psychiatrist to show you his records, he will show you pages 
and pages of narratives handwritten text. If you go and ask an endoscopist to 
show you his record, he will show you a combination of lots of pictures, and 
operation reports. And if you ask a radiographer to show you his records, he will 
show you loads of images and scans. We all have very different requirements from 
our record systems. And the concept of a single care record whether it is a 
summary care or not, is that you can put all of that into one big bucket, and you 
can automatically or intelligently only show the records that are of interest to the 
person. – R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT Committee  
In addition to the utilisation of EHRs by clinicians to enter and interpret clinical data, EHRs 
can also be a valuable tool to mediate the dynamics between clinicians and their patients. 
With the increasing prominence of shared decision making, the very idea that clinicians 
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are not automatically able to see all their clinical information is inconceivable to some 
patients. 
It’s [improved and easy access to patients’ records by clinicians] obviously 
desirable, and people really take it for granted that it happens now. Without any 
reference to electronics or the... patients I would think, would assume that if they 
go to see a doctor, he probably is informed on every aspect of their health that he 
needs to be, in order to care for them - R20, Co-Director, Patient Concern  
To the above respondent, the need for clinicians to see all the information pertaining to a 
patient was so important, that it seemed unthinkable that this might not be the case. 
Patients’ access to their own records is being given increasing importance today, as 
described in Chapter 2. Some IT suppliers have gone a step beyond patient access to 
records, and provide patients with the capability to use secure messaging mechanisms to 
communicate with their providers. While the technology to facilitate this functionality is 
clearly available, not all practices enable it, even if their systems have this capacity. 
Respondent R10, a clinician who runs a clinical software company explained this: 
The system that [Supplier] offers does include secure messaging but I don’t think 
any practice has actually offered it to patients because they are terrified of having 
an avalanche of messages from patients – R10, GP, A health software supplier 
company (Interview phase 1) 
Clearly, this indicates a reluctance on the part of clinicians to deal with the large volume 
of queries that would be facilitated by the use of certain technologies.  
In addition to the variations between clinical and non-clinical stakeholders’ use of EHRs, 
and their different requirements, EHRs have been generally used to meet a number of 
functionalities outside clinical practice. I now briefly present empirical data to highlight 
some of these functionalities, before proceeding to the discussion of my findings. 
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6.2.2 The different functionalities of EHRs as perceived by their users 
 
Apart from the variations in the way different clinicians use EHRs and their contents 
depending on their clinical needs, there are also other variations in how the uses of EHRs 
are perceived and applied. This ranges from administrative functionalities, to clinical 
purposes, to business tools, as I shall illustrate with my data.  
One of the basic functionalities of EHRs is to meet administrative needs. Respondent R28 
explained that this was how his practice began, with more advanced clinical 
functionalities being incorporated into the IT system only much later. 
Initially it was to support some of the management and essential core business 
processes such as managing the patient list efficiently. Then over the years we 
started to use it increasingly for disease registers. And then we took the decision 
to start to use it interactively as a clinical record system, but only after a number 
of years of gaining confidence with using some of the background functionality. So 
initially it was in effect our patient administrative system. Then we added on 
repeat prescribing, which significantly automated a very tedious manual job and 
kept much better and safer records. - R28, GP, Connecting for Health National 
Clinical lead  
In the above case,  the utilisation of EHRs for other clinical purposes expanded once 
clinicians gained a level of confidence with the administrative system. Once these tasks 
were mastered, the elimination of duplicate tasks and improved record keeping was 
achieved, and this helped improve the performance of the practice by better utilisation of 
resources.  
Another application of administrative functionalities in EHRs deals with finances and 
reimbursement. Describing the way the nursing staff in her hospital were required to 
enter patient information, the respondent below explains how EHR data was used for 
fiscal purposes. 
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You need to write everything that happens to the patient... even though you 
couldn't see the reasoning, or you couldn’t see why things have been done, or 
how the patient was doing or anything like that. You could only see exactly what 
had been done to the patient… it’s more like a bank account, with things that have 
been done. So then the Trust would be paid according to what we’ve done to the 
patient. - R1, Nurse (Interview phase 1) 
At a certain point, the EHR transitions from being a static collection of data, and if used 
appropriately, may be used to compare health information not only within a patient’s 
own record, but between different patients as well.  
You got a computer, right click, show me all the episodes of cystitis. And it all goes 
in the record, and tracks all the entries coded cystitis, and displays on the screen. 
And so that means on my system, I can right click, I can select blood pressure, and 
I can see a graph of the patient’s blood pressures were going back as far as, you 
know, that’s a fantastically useful clinical tool. - R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT 
Committee  
This quote by Respondent R14 illustrates how clinical care can use the EHR not just as a 
database of patient information, but as a tool to make a meaningful diagnosis based on 
content other clinicians have collected. 
However, there is a limit to how useful a static repository of information can be. 
Respondent R14, talking about the proposed Summary Care Record component of the 
NPfIT says: 
If the patient is unconscious, it sounds like a very sensible idea that you should 
have a record. But the problem is, if it’s a multi-contributor record, are you going 
to base your decisions on what you see on that record, or are you going to base it 
on the information you can gain in an A&E department? Basically, no emergency 
doctor is going to ignore what he can access in his department, in preference to 
summary care records. - R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT Committee  
Although Respondent R14 acknowledged the potential benefits of the SCR, the issue of 
multiple contributors was raised, giving rise to the question of whose account (in the SCR) 
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of the patient’s condition was to be most relied upon. The respondent went on to 
highlight that in an A&E context, clinicians are most likely to act on the symptoms and 
problems they see immediately, relying on results from tests conducted at the scene, 
rather than on historic data recorded in the SCR. This draws attention to the intuitive 
nature of medical care, where clinicians rely on knowledge and expertise gained from 
experience, rather than solely on documented details of a patient’s health. 
One of the main purposes of the Summary Care Record was to provide a summary of 
patients’ information accessible to anyone, anywhere, and at any time. The case of 
medical emergencies away from home was a commonly quoted benefit of the Summary 
Care Record, although several respondents questioned the need for a separate record 
which contained a mere skeleton of one’s health information, and which was not likely to 
be used frequently except in cases of emergency such as in an A&E unit. The NPfIT 
justification for the summary care record was based on a situation which was relatively 
uncommon, and to IT suppliers and consultants it was ‘mouth-wateringly profitable, yet 
usually quite unnecessary’ (Craig and Brooks, 2006: 208). 
Continuing the discussion of EHRs as more than static collections of data, as voiced by 
respondent R27 (Former academic, health informatician), there is a need for ‘a shift from 
looking at informatics as being records, something which is there for posterity, to being 
communication, something which is passed as information from one person to another’. 
This possibility of information sharing triggers further debates on the security, 
confidentiality and ownership of EHRs. Before venturing into these issues, I consider how 
professionals themselves view the possibility of improved communication afforded to 
them by EHR technology. 
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Taking this a step further, some clinicians use EHRs for purposes that transcend mere 
static data storage, and utilise them to manage their practices and make profits. This 
often results in them having a significant degree of possessiveness over their records. This 
is particularly true in the case of GPs, as seen by the below quote by Respondent R14. 
Our records, to be honest, are our business tool. If we don’t have our records, we 
can’t run our practices and we can’t make money. Also, we can’t cater for patients 
(…) we must control our records, in order to run our businesses. So we are 
naturally very possessive - R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT Committee  
This utilisation of the EHR as a business tool causes ambiguity as to what actually 
constitutes the EHR, and whom it is meant for. Referring to the much discussed subject of 
patient access to their records, the above respondent continued: 
Access to their medical information is distinct from what you would describe as 
their record. I also log other things, I log the sort of reports I send out on patients. 
I also log whether I send the bills for travel vaccinations. I also log the fact that 
sometimes they’re a bit awkward to my staff. You know, there are lots of things 
that we record on our systems which I don’t believe are patients’ medical records. 
So I think there’s a distinction between the business tool that I use, and the 
patient’s record. - R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT Committee  
This interview excerpt highlights the ambiguity surrounding what actually constitutes the 
EHR. While some might suggest it refers to the clinical information related to a patient’s 
condition, others believe it is a more encompassing object which includes administrative 
data, payment details, and general notes and reminders by clinicians, in addition to the 
patients’ clinical information. It is clearly in the interests of business-oriented physicians 
to clearly demarcate the administrative and business functions of their EHR systems from 
the components which focus solely on clinical data. 
Having said this, there remains the question of who should be responsible for entering 
data into the EHR repository, and whether the user group responsible for the task of data 
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entry has exclusive rights over access to the data. The tensions between primary and 
secondary care clinicians was evident from my data, with the latter expressing the 
opinion that GPs did not share information with their secondary care counterparts. 
However, the implications of the proposed Summary Care Records in the NPfIT meant 
that much of the data that GPs entered would be easily accessible to secondary care. 
While this had potential benefits in terms of uniform access to patients’ basic details in 
times of emergency, it was in conflict with the business interests of GPs.  
A lot of GPs felt that by offering up the data they had collected, it’s certainly their 
data, raised concerns for the future of their practices… I would basically put the 
patients first and argue that patients’ safety is more important but it is a very 
basic argument that actually giving away their crown jewels was not in their 
interest (…) Secondary care is very eager for GPs to share their records, but they 
don’t have a record to share with the GPs. So the GPs felt paranoid that they were 
working for the entire health system, and nobody else is putting their weight (…) 
that’s not easy, they have to work hard to do it, they have to sweat over their 
records, and then people come along, and just nick them. – R10, GP, Connecting 
for Health National Clinical Lead 
The people who have the pain of making the record exist, are not the ones who 
get the final utility out of the product. That’s really difficult, because if you are 
going to do something where you know ultimately it will be beneficial to you, you 
will do it. If you’re asking GPs to do something above and beyond what they 
already do, which is to a point, I don’t think it’s a massive amount of work, but it is 
work. But they are never going to see any benefits from that. I think that’s a 
harder sell to make – R25, Nurse informatician, Connecting for Health 
GPs’ reticence (Respondent R10) to share information with secondary care can be linked 
to their reluctance to shoulder the ‘pain of making the record exist’ (Respondent R25, 
Nurse informatician), and having to share it with other clinicians who have not put in as 
much effort into it, as seen by the above quotes. Their entrepreneurial efforts to 
computerise their practices (Benson, 2002a, 2002b) have resulted in them prizing their 
patient records as their ‘crown jewels’, as expressed by Respondent R10.  
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In the case of the NPfIT, the proposed systems were of more benefit to secondary care 
than to primary care, and consequently, many GPs did not welcome the prospect of 
having their patients’ summary data uploaded onto the summary care records for the 
benefit of other clinical specialties. This is illustrated in the above quote by Respondent 
R25, who explained why the summary care record was viewed with apprehension by 
several clinicians.  
In addition to these functionalities of EHRs for administrative, clinical and business 
purposes, respondents also elaborated on how EHRs are useful for performance 
measurement and learning purposes. Respondent R29 explained how comparison of EHR 
data between different providers could act as a motivator for clinicians to be at par with 
their peers in other organisations. 
If you feed the data back to people, they compare themselves with the hospital 
down the road, and nothing drives people more than knowing your competitor is 
doing better – R29, Clinical academic previously with NCAB 
As seen by this respondent’s quote, using EHRs for this form of research encourages 
healthy competition between care providers. Respondent R29 explains how providers use 
their peers’ performance data as a yardstick, and strive to perform as well as, if not better 
than, their competitors. This is further elaborated on by another respondent who 
explained how EHRs can be used to document and evidence best practice in quality 
healthcare delivery: 
People actually capture data to provide evidence that what they’re doing is 
working or not working, so that we can all learn. Otherwise what’s going on in 
small pockets everywhere is just going to remain there and nobody is going to 
learn from it. – R12, Nurse practitioner (Interview phase 1) 
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Further, if this data is made available to the general public, patients too may be made 
aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the various healthcare providers available to 
them, enabling them to make more informed decisions regarding their care. However, 
the likelihood of EHRs being visible to others (such as patients or regulatory bodies) 
makes it likely that clinicians may resort to different data entry practices. This was evident 
from Respondent R14’s explanation of why patients are allowed access to GP records that 
are only recorded after a particular date. 
The information strategy has accepted that some GPs may say you can see your 
records, but only after a certain date, because the ones before that date weren’t 
created with in mind that you may be looking at them. Now the problem with that 
is, what that implies is an implicit acknowledgement that GPs will modify the way 
they create their records. - R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT Committee  
This modification of clinical data entry is a challenge to be taken into consideration when 
enabling easy accessibility to EHRs.  However efforts are now being made to standardise 
the way clinicians make data entries, as is evident by initiatives such as the RCP’s work on 
record standards (see Chapter 3). 
I now proceed to discuss the empirical data presented in this chapter. I first discuss the 
knowledge differences and dependences that are present between EHR users, and how 
they are resolved by means of EHRs. This is followed by a discussion on the different uses 
of EHRs, and how they act as boundary objects subject to interpretation by their multiple 
users. 
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6.3  Knowledge differences and dependencies surrounding EHRs 
As seen from my interview data in the previous section, there are not only differences in 
the reasons why clinicians use EHRs, but there are differences in the contents of EHRs as 
well, depending on who uses them.  Medical problems often transcend the manmade 
boundaries between medical specialties, and this could result in errors when medical 
professionals make diagnoses within the confines of their specialist knowledge or guided 
by their intuition (Weed, 1997). EHRs act as a bridge across such professional boundaries 
and enable clinicians to step beyond the bounded rationality of their particular domain of 
knowledge (Weed, 1997) and make informed decisions using information which has been 
shared via the EHR by their clinical colleagues. 
The tensions between primary and secondary care have been studied by scholars 
(Berendsen et al., 2006; Marshall, 1999; Marshall and Phillips, 1999; Westerman et al., 
1990), and interview respondents highlighted the cultural difference between the two as 
one of the reasons for this conflict. With the increasing specialisation as well as 
fragmentation of healthcare delivery (Guthrie et al., 2008; Nettleton, 2004), collaboration 
between primary and secondary care physicians is essential to provide patients with safe 
and high quality healthcare (Branger et al., 1992). Scholars have questioned whether such 
niche knowledge tends to narrow specialists’ expertise, rather than making them better 
equipped to handle the unexpected when treating patients, and it is for this reason that it 
is crucial that patients’ information be stored in a record which all clinicians treating the 
patient can access (Weed, 1997). 
The lack of sufficient information sharing is a complaint voiced by both GPs and hospital 
physicians against each other (Marshall and Phillips, 1999). Respondent R3 (see page 181) 
voiced this complaint as well, and explained that the very purpose of recording patient 
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data differed between secondary and primary care doctors. While the former do so for 
the purpose of sharing their findings with their clinical colleagues, GPs create EHRs for 
their own practices and their own reference. This is confirmed by scholars as well, who 
highlight the differences between primary and secondary care use of clinical reports and 
records, as secondary care may archive patient data due to the episodic nature of care, 
whereas for GPs this information is crucial to follow-up care and treatment of the patient 
(Berendsen et al., 2006) and not usually for the purpose of sharing with other clinicians 
(Booth, 2003).  
The nursing profession on the other hand, is regarded as having a more supporting care 
role that focuses on the continued care of the patient (Abbott and Meerabeau, 1998). As 
Respondent R15 (see page 182) put it, part of nurses’ responsibilities deal with patients’ 
feelings, fears and anxieties. Consequently, their EHR data entries are often more verbose 
and descriptive, as explained by Respondent R28 (see page 182). Traditionally considered 
to be dominated by their medical counterparts (Freidson, 1970), the role of nurses 
increasingly overlaps with that of physicians as they are more involved in decision-making 
and take on more responsibilities (Hughes, 1988; Currie, Finn and Martin, 2010; 
McMurray, 2010). EHRs act as a facilitator for this, as they are capable of providing 
nursing professionals improved access to patient information. 
The ‘prose’ and unstructured nature of data entry by nurses indicated by Respondent R15 
as well as Respondent R28 (see page 182) either points to an increasingly elevated 
position of nurses in the clinical hierarchy, or contests Berg and Bowker’s (1997) 
suggestion that the more wordy or unstructured EHR data is, the higher the position of 
the data inputter in the clinical hierarchy. The duties which accompany professional roles 
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therefore play a role in determining how EHRs are used, and how patient data is entered. 
This poses a challenge for the standardisation of records that is one of the most pressing 
needs for improved interoperability of systems, as highlighted by scholars (Carpenter et 
al., 2007) as well as my interview respondents.  
Nurse Respondent R15’s description of the use of EHRs for functions that are not 
‘concrete’ points to their interpretive flexibility (Pinch and Bijker 1984, 1987). Their 
capacity to cater to multiple and varied requirements of clinicians, combined with the 
subjectivity with which their contents are interpreted, render EHRs as classic examples of 
interpretive flexibility (Pinch and Bijker 1984, 1987). 
As seen from my empirical data, the content of EHRs is contested, as is their accessibility 
and visibility to different users. Once there is agreement on what information is held in an 
EHR, the challenge remains as to how this can be effectively shared with appropriate 
individuals. The traditional gatekeeper role of the general practitioner has been 
appreciated as well as criticised. Recent research has indicated patients’ wish that GPs act 
as gateways to specialist care (Bechtel and Ness, 2010), as opposed to gatekeepers, 
acting to limit their health information. The importance of ‘shared care’ (Hampson et al., 
1996) as well as continuity of care (Guthrie et al., 2008) is clearly felt by the patient 
population, so much so that patients find it inconceivable that this is not necessarily the 
case (see page 183). I now briefly turn to the boundary between professionals and 
patients, and discuss the relevance and challenges of EHRs in this context. 
The assumption that doctors are aware of their patients’ clinical histories to give them 
appropriate treatment and care (Respondent R20, see page 183), is reminiscent of times 
when patients had implicit trust in their physicians and relied on their expert knowledge 
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(Freidson, 1988; 1985). Physicians do not always have full information on a patient’s 
health condition and this is at odds with patients’ trust in their doctors. An increasing 
realisation of the deficiency of information available to clinicians from their patients 
records is a possible catalyst to the increased focus on patient empowerment, self-
management of healthcare and patient access to records (Anderson, Rainey and 
Eysenbach, 2003; Newman and Vidler, 2006).  
Increased accessibility of patients’ records and increased patient choice suggest changes 
to the established roles and powers available to health professionals. These include the 
possibility of changes to the gatekeeper role that GPs traditionally discharge so that they 
are on an equal footing with other healthcare professionals, as seen by the shifting 
rhetoric from ‘doctor-patient’ relationships to ‘patient-professional’ relationships (Shaw 
and Hegedus, 2005). 
The potential for EHRs to present a combination of data entered by professionals as well 
as patients indicate the capabilities of EHRs to bridge the gap between professional 
medical knowledge and patients’ understandings of their own health conditions. Such 
coupling of medical knowledge and patient inputs (Weed, 1997) is particularly important 
given the increasing attention given to patient-centred healthcare and shared decision-
making. By providing a platform on which to record patients’ accounts as well as 
physicians’ notes and diagnosis, EHRs provide a mechanism to bring together both the 
expert knowledge of professionals as well as the relevant lay knowledge of patients. The 
discussed differences in the type of knowledge held by clinical as well as non-clinical users 
of EHRs, and the dependencies between them, emphasise the importance of EHRs as 
boundary objects that aid the transfer, translation and transformation of knowledge 
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(Carlile, 2004; Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) between these different groups (see section 
6.5 for a more detailed discussion of EHRs as boundary objects). It could also be part of 
the basis for EHR content contestation, as what is essential for one clinical specialist may 
be perceived as superfluous by another. This contestation of what an EHR should contain 
was evident in the case of the Summary Care Record, as there was much debate over 
what information it held, and several clinical respondents were of the opinion that its 
contents were too superficial and scanty to be of real benefit to clinicians.  
Table 6.1 (page 196) summarises the main knowledge differences and dependencies 
(Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) between the key stakeholders of EHRs. The knowledge 
differences between clinicians and patients are reflected by the professional expertise 
that clinical professionals have acquired through prolonged training as opposed to the lay 
knowledge of patients (Freidson, 1970). This poses a challenge to patients’ interpretation 
of the content within their EHRs, as discussed in section 6.2.2.  
Among clinicians too there are differences in the types of knowledge possessed. 
Physicians may possess expert knowledge in a niche area, as in the case of consultants, or 
they could have a holistic and broad spectrum of medical knowledge for instance, as GPs. 
These knowledge differences suggest a degree of knowledge dependencies (Carlile and 
Rebentisch, 2003) between clinicians, as they may have to consult with each other to gain 
a clearer understanding of patients’ conditions (Weed, 1997).  
Differences in the role played by various clinicians in healthcare delivery also point to 
knowledge differences between physicians and nurses. Physicians’ employ scientific or 
‘case’ knowledge that is ‘independent of any particular patient’ enabling them to make 
medical diagnoses and decisions regarding treatment (Stein-Parbury and Liaschenko, 
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2007: 472). The caring role of nurses however requires ‘patient knowledge’ which 
involves an understanding of people’s experience of an illness (Stein-Parbury and 
Liaschenko, 2007: 472). 
Table 6.1 Knowledge differences and dependencies between EHR users 
 Knowledge differences 
K
n
o
w
le
d
ge
 d
ep
en
d
en
ci
es
 
 Physicians 
Nurses Patients 
Primary care Secondary care 
P
h
ys
ic
ia
n
s 
P
ri
m
ar
y 
ca
re
 
n/a 
Different types of 
specialist knowledge 
versus holistic general 
knowledge of GPs 
(Weed, 1997) 
Nurses’ caring 
role (‘patient 
knowledge’) vs. 
physicians’ 
diagnosis and 
treatment of 
patients (‘case 
knowledge’) 
(Stein-Parbury 
and Liaschenko, 
2007) 
Expert 
professional 
knowledge 
(physicians) vs. 
layman 
knowledge of 
patients (Freidson, 
1970) 
Se
co
n
d
ar
y 
ca
re
 
Communication and 
collaboration to 
make informed 
medical decisions 
(Weed, 1997) 
n/a 
Nurses Caring role of nurses subject to instructions 
and decisions of physicians (Berg & Bowker, 
1997) 
n/a 
Professional 
knowledge of 
nurses vs. layman 
knowledge of 
patients (Freidson, 
1975) 
Patients Patients dependent on physicians for medical 
diagnosis and treatment 
Patients 
dependent on 
nurses’ 
knowledge on 
caring and 
treatment 
n/a 
  
Further to these different views of EHRs dependent on professional roles, EHRs are 
attributed different functionalities and purposes. These too may be determined by the 
professional role of the stakeholder groups involved. Following a brief discussion on some 
of the functionalities of EHRs as evidenced by my interview data, I will go on to consider 
them in the context of boundary objects, and how the EHR boundary object acts as a 
bridge as well as a potential barrier between professional groups.  
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6.4  The multiple uses of EHRs 
In this section I discuss the multiple uses and functionalities of EHRs using interview data 
presented in section 6.2.2. Respondents highlighted EHRs met multiple functions ranging 
from administrative tasks to clinical and research purposes. I elaborate on these different 
functionalities and briefly discuss the significance and challenges of the same, with the 
help of reviewed literature. 
6.4.1 EHRS for administrative and fiscal purposes 
Early use of EHRs was focussed on administrative tasks such as data entry and payment 
processing (Berner, Detmer and Simborg, 2005). While these functionalities are the basics 
with which most EHR systems may have started with, they are pivotal to the continued 
growth and success of clinical practices. Respondent R28’s account (see page 184) 
confirms this, as he explained how his practice began using the technology for basic 
administrative purposes, but later progressed to more clinical functionalities. Further, 
documentation of the details of a patient’s conditions and treatments are often essential 
for clinicians to be reimbursed and funded (Hersh, 1995), as explained by Respondent R1 
(see page 185) as well as several GP respondents. Nurse Respondent R1’s description of 
EHR data entry indicated that the data was entered objectively without the ‘care’ details 
which are an implicit part of the nursing role (Fagermoen, 1997), and with the primary 
purpose being for funding and reimbursement purposes. 
Recording such details is also required for clinical audits, which in turn provide a measure 
of performance and efficiency (Roland, 2004). Not only is this linked to increased funding, 
but it also provides yardsticks by which practices are measured, and acts as a trigger for 
clinicians to improve the quality of care they provide.  
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Respondent R1’s account of EHRs as a record of ‘what happens to the patient’, comparing 
it to a bank account, illustrates how EHRs can serve as task organisers, as they provides 
clinicians with an overview of what has been given to the patient and what treatment is 
still pending (Berg and Bowker, 1997). Berg and Bowker (1997) suggest that the EHR itself 
embodies the hierarchies amongst clinical professionals, as it separates sections 
depending on who is allowed to access and modify parts of the record. The more 
unstructured a form in the EHR is, the higher in the clinical hierarchy the data inputter is 
likely to be (Berg and Bowker, 1997). However, the nature of the entries is not necessarily 
linked to hierarchy, but could reflect the differences in the type of content that various 
clinical professional deal with, as evident from the quote by Respondent R14 (see page 
182) who elaborated on the variations in the type of data used by different clinical 
professionals. 
6.4.2 EHRs as repositories 
The use of EHRs to enable financial payments (see section 6.4.1) is facilitated by their 
capabilities to act as repositories to document details regarding laboratory tests and 
treatment details (Hersh, 1995).  This capability of EHRs is particularly important, given 
the increasingly fragmented nature of healthcare delivery as a consequence of the 
proliferation of health specialists and isolated systems for recording patient data. One of 
the key functions of an EHR is therefore, to act as a static repository of clinical 
observations, diagnoses, treatment details and progress notes (Hersh, 1995), being a 
syntactic boundary object which enables the transfer of knowledge across boundaries 
(Carlile, 2004). This in itself is not a huge challenge and GP practices in England have been 
successfully doing this for a number of years (Benson 2002a, 2002b). The bigger challenge 
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comes as a result of the increasing need for continuity of care, collaboration between 
different health professionals, and the blurring boundaries between them (Bates et al., 
2003; Galliers et al., 2011; Goldschmidt, 2005; Hartswood et al., 2003). This implies 
transitioning from being a syntactic boundary object to a semantic or pragmatic boundary 
object in order to facilitate meaningful translation or transformation of EHR data (Carlile, 
2004) to meet patients’ needs. 
The historic clinical data from test results and x-rays in a patient’s record are often 
isolated, and summaries of a patient’s condition are continuously reconstructed by linking 
back to these details. Respondent R14 (see page 185) explained how historic data can be 
immensely useful in order to analyse variations of medical information such as blood 
pressure over a period of time. While the historic data provides a linear history, the 
summary and progress notes provide non-linear histories by linking back to the historic 
data and using the relevant details to rationalise the medical diagnoses and treatment 
(Berg and Bowker, 1997). The medical data in the EHR is thus subject to constant 
interpretation (until the data is considered old and irrelevant to the patient’s present 
state), and may be utilised differently by different clinical professionals at different times.  
6.4.3 Moving beyond the static: EHRs as transactional tools 
The word ‘record’ in the term ‘electronic health record’, can lead to conceptualising an 
EHR as a mere static collection of information or as a repository. However, EHRs have 
tremendous potential to facilitate not only knowledge transfer, but also knowledge 
translation and transformation across semantic and pragmatic boundaries (Carlile 2002, 
2004). There may be a cost associated with the sharing of information across boundaries, 
as the knowledge possessed by professionals is ‘at stake’ (Carlile, 2004: 556). This may be 
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linked to the previously discussed tensions between primary and secondary care clinicians 
(see section 6.3), with GPs regarded as being protective of their patients’ data and 
unwilling to share their carefully recorded information with secondary care clinicians.  
I now proceed to discuss the use of EHRs for purposes beyond the static storage of 
information, using interview data presented earlier in this chapter..  
6.4.4 EHRs as a business tool 
While the term EHR brings to mind an electronic record for the purpose of recording 
health data, one of the early uses of computerised systems in healthcare was for billing 
and administration (Hersh, 1995). Such functionalities are more relevant to those who are 
interested in the costs, profits and efficient processing of routine tasks involved in 
running a business or practice of their own. In the UK, GPs work either as independent 
contractors or as salaried GPs employed by independent contractors. For this reason, 
most GPs are driven by the aim to improve the efficiency and performance of their 
individual practices, viewing them as businesses that provide them with profits (Cohen 
and Musson, 2000). This was seen by Respondent R14’s admission of EHRs as GPs’ 
business tools (see page 187).  Consequently, GPs tend to be extremely possessive about 
their EHRs, as explained by Respondent R14 and Respondent R10 (see pages 187-188). 
 Hence, while professionals’ specialist knowledge equips them to provide their services 
and fulfil certain roles, they can also use this knowledge as a tool for their own self-
interests which could include monetary profits and retention of control over their work 
(Freidson, 1970; Bolton, Muzio and Boyd-Quinn, 2011). The notion of commercialised 
professionalism (Hanlon, 1998) encourages managerial as well as entrepreneurial traits in 
professionals, as the gulf between professionals and managers is being dissolved (Dent, 
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2003). This is evident in the case of GPs as they actively employ their computerised 
records to record their performance indicators and gain profits (Roland, 2004).  
From Respondent R14’s account (see page 187), it is evident that primary care physicians’ 
perceptions of EHRs as their business tools can be at odds with the view that EHRs are 
repositories that can be accessed for the benefit of those involved in healthcare delivery, 
including the patients themselves. There is an apparent conflict between the business 
interests of GPs, and a drive for patient empowerment through access to their records.  
Both, Respondent R10 as well as Respondent R25 (see page 188), explained how GPs 
often cling on to their EHRs as they do not wish to share their records which they have 
painstakingly maintained, with other clinicians. In the case of the NPfIT, they were 
expected to share their patient data with secondary care by means of the Summary Care 
Records, and this was not welcomed either. These illustrations of GPs’ possessiveness of 
their records and their reticence to share their data is an example of knowledge being ‘at 
stake’ (Carlile, 2002), as there is a cost involved if they share their computerised records. 
This potentially acts as a barrier to the effective of EHRs as boundary objects that mediate 
knowledge differences and dependencies. 
6.4.5 EHRs for research and learning purposes 
The use of clinical data for research purposes illustrates how the use of EHR content 
differs not only between users but across time as well; for instance, data entered for 
clinical purposes can be later used for research purposes (Foster and Young, 2012). In the 
case of the NPfIT, the use of EHRs for research purposes is closely linked to discussions on 
privacy and confidentiality – issues which were given more toward the latter stages of the 
programme (see Chapters 3 and 5).  
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Apart from using data entered in EHRs for the purpose of clinical research, performance 
of practices may be gauged by means of mechanisms such as the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (Roland, 2004). This information may be shared with the public in an effort to 
help people make informed choices regarding where they get treated, and is useful for 
research related to healthcare delivery. This is seen from Respondent R29’s account (see 
page 189) of how feeding healthcare performance data back to people has a positive 
impact on the nature of healthcare delivery. 
 However, this could also result in ‘reactivity’ on the part of clinicians to these 
transparency mechanisms (McGivern and Fischer, 2012). Consequently, clinicians often 
exercise caution when entering information in EHRs, and feel compelled to withhold 
notes that could be problematic for them at a later point (McGivern and Fischer, 2012). 
The very prospect of patients being able to view their medical records causes physicians 
to modify their EHR data entry behaviour (Berg, 2002), as indicated by Respondent R14 
(see page 190).  
However, using EHR information for research and learning purposes can also have the 
great benefit of supporting evidence based medicine and adoption of best practices 
amongst providers. Respondent R12 highlighted the dangers of not sharing such data, as 
it could lead to ‘pockets’ and silos due to the lack of information sharing. The utilisation of 
EHRs as administrative and performance measurement tools (see section 6.4.1) combined 
with the potential of sharing this data with peers, researchers and the public hence 
provides an excellent incentive for care providers to ensure and document the quality and 
efficiency of the care they provide to their patients.  
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Having discussed the knowledge differences and dependencies amongst EHR users as well 
as some of the uses of EHRs as perceived by their users, I now proceed to discuss how 
EHRs themselves may be regarded as boundary objects. 
6.5  The role of EHRs as boundary objects  
Objects may be conceptualised as ‘objectives of inquiry’ that adopt characteristics of 
agency (Engeström and Blackler, 2005; Star and Griesemer, 1989). The quest toward 
modernisation and computerisation of services includes the provision of functionalities 
electronically as opposed to traditional modes that require interaction between 
individuals. EHRs have helped automate processes within healthcare delivery, and have 
facilitated an increased overlap between the roles of different clinical professionals such 
as doctors and nurses (McLaughlin and Webster, 1998; Tjora, 2000). EHRs can therefore 
be regarded as boundary objects that not only act as an interface between different roles, 
but that negotiate the boundaries marking the distinction between these roles. 
Variations in the perceived use and purpose of EHRs (as administrative tools, repositories, 
transaction tools, research tools, etc.) illustrate the different technology frames present 
with regard to the ‘nature of technology’ and ‘technology in use’ (Orlikowski and Gash, 
1994), i.e., people’s understanding of the functionality as well as the use of a technology. 
EHRs may be deemed boundary objects by virtue of their capacity to transcend 
boundaries and the variations in the way different epistemic groups perceive and use 
them (Fox, 2011; Star and Griesemer, 1989; Carlile, 2002; Nicolini, Mengis and Swan, 
2012). This is seen from the previous discussion on the multiple uses of EHRs, and the 
knowledge differences and dependencies that surround them (see sections 6.3 and 6.4). 
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Fox (2011) and Bechky (2003) described how technologies and artefacts such as 
engineering drawings can be either facilitative or hindering in their roles as boundary 
objects. EHRs too demonstrate such variations, as they can facilitate communication and 
collaboration between different clinical professionals (McGinn et al., 2012), and could 
also potentially have negative effects, acting as inhibitors to change (Fox, 2011; Carlile, 
2002; Oswick and Robertson, 2009).  Respondents’ accounts of the tensions between GPs 
and secondary care doctors with regard to information sharing via EHRs is an example of 
how what could potentially be used to enhance clinical communication has instead 
resulted in resentment amongst clinical professionals.  
Respondent R14’s description of the different types of data that an EHR can potential 
hold (see page 182) also captures the potential of an EHR to act as a boundary object. This 
is because it holds information of pertinence to multiple care providers, in different 
formats, and depending on how the information is accessed, the relevant details are 
provided to the person who accesses it. Carlile (2004) discusses semantic boundaries that 
enable interpretation and translation of knowledge. In this context, EHRs offer a range of 
information in different formats, with care providers able to utilise that which is relevant 
to them, and if required, refer to those entries by other professionals as well. This entails 
a process of interpreting results, and translating information entered by other clinicians in 
a manner which is relevant to the patients’ condition, and to equip them to make an 
informed and intelligent diagnosis.  
The increased focus on patient empowerment and patient access to health records by 
means of EHRs (Pyper et al., 2004; Ross and Lin, 2003) draws attention to the clinician-
patient boundary where EHRs are positioned. Health IT has been described as a ‘loom’ 
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that can weave together two different types of knowledge: knowledge about the 
patient’s condition and clinical professional knowledge (Weed, 1997: 231). By facilitating 
this combinatorial knowledge, the boundary object capabilities of EHRs are again 
illustrated. 
Boundary objects need to be maintained, or as Bossen et al. (2012) suggest, they need to 
be ‘trimmed’ in order to support continued usefulness as boundary objects. The 
recognition of the role of non-clinical personnel in performing this task highlights the 
differences in the way different professionals use the clinical record. Further, Bossen et 
al. (2012) suggest that the EHR is not the primary work object of clinicians, as their 
primary duties and interests lie with the patient. However, with increasing capabilities for 
tele-consultations and the need for second opinions with fellow medical colleagues, there 
is potentially an increased reliance on the EHR as the first point of reference with regard 
to a patient. For this reason, the EHR may gradually become a step toward the social 
construction of the patient.  
Respondent R10 explained how IT can potentially be used to for communication between 
patients and doctors (see page 183). This highlights the potential for EHRs as boundary 
objects, to bridge the communication gap between patients and their physicians. 
However, as Respondent R10 elaborated, this capability is hindered not by failings of the 
technology, but by physicians themselves due to their reluctance to facilitate easier 
patient-doctor interactions because of the additional work it could entail (Ross and Lin, 
2003). The positive and facilitating capabilities of boundary objects are clearly negotiated 
and determined by the stakeholders on either side of the boundaries where they are 
situated.  
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6.5.1 EHRs at syntactic, semantic and pragmatic knowledge boundaries 
Regarding the EHR as a boundary object, GPs, secondary care physicians and nurses are 
three key clinical user groups that communicate and interact via their mutual boundaries. 
EHRs are positioned at the interface between these groups, and between them and 
patients as well, facilitating the movement of knowledge across different types of 
boundaries. Table 6.2 (see page 208) gives an overview of some of the different 
perspectives of EHRs held by various user groups, and the type of knowledge boundaries 
for which they employ EHRs as boundary objects. 
When regarding EHRs as static repositories (see section 6.4.2), the content and format of 
the records may be contested. As Respondent R14 (see page 182) noted, amongst doctors 
too, the very nature of data they record and access is different, depending on their 
specialty. EHRs hold information of interest to many different types of stakeholders 
including clinicians, patients, researchers, insurance companies and government bodies 
(Berg and Bowker, 1997). Efforts to integrate patient data from various sources into a 
single record, as was the vision of the NPfIT, suggest that a single EHR should meet the 
needs of multiple professionals by giving access to relevant data, and withholding 
unnecessary information. This move towards integrated health records recognises the 
EHR as an object positioned at the boundary between different clinical professional 
groups, reinforcing its inter-epistemic nature (McGivern and Dopson, 2010).  
In addressing the diverse practices and understandings of the different fields between 
which boundary objects are situated, the concept of standardisation becomes highly 
relevant as this establishes an underlying framework which provides a common structure 
across different social worlds (Lee, 2005), facilitating knowledge transfer across syntactic 
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boundaries (Carlile, 2002). Considering the case of EHRs in the NPfIT, the emphasis on 
standardisation was one that gained prominence only later in the programme. The role of 
EHRs as boundary objects which are perceived and used very differently amongst clinical 
professionals was one that was evidently not taken into consideration from the start of 
the NPfIT. Later efforts such as the RCP’s project to standardise records using clinical 
headings (see section 3.2.7) were instrumental in facilitating improved standardisation of 
the EHR as a boundary object spanning multiple professional groups. In the absence of 
such efforts to make the boundary object more understandable to those who use it, it 
then becomes a rigid structure which offers limited means of knowledge flow between 
various users due to their different views and technology frames (Lee, 2005; Orlikowski 
and Gash, 1994).  
Respondent R28 (see page 182) suggested that most EHRs do not meet the needs of 
nursing professionals, as nurses’ inputs tend to be more descriptive. This highlights a 
deficiency in the structure of EHRs at syntactic boundaries (Carlile, 2004) when the 
requirements of different clinical professionals are not taken into account right from the 
creation of the boundary object when data is entered into the EHR. The need for 
collaboration between clinical professionals when treating a patient highlights the 
knowledge differences as well as dependencies (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) inherent in 
healthcare delivery (see Table 6.1, page 196). 
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Table 6.2 The EHR boundary object: views of different users 
 GPs Hospital 
doctors 
Nurses Patients 
Purpose of 
EHR 
Repository; 
Business tool; 
Patient’s data, but 
GP’s record; 
Patient’s data 
different from GPs 
business tool; 
Not constructed with 
a view that they will 
be seen by patients 
(R14, GP) 
 
Information 
Sharing; 
Administrative 
and fiscal 
purposes  
(R3, National 
Clinical Lead) 
Facilitate 
continuity of care;  
Entry of ‘Soft 
data’ 
(R15, Nurse 
informatician) 
Access to own 
records; 
Increased control 
over own 
healthcare 
(R20, Patient 
Concern) 
Actual use Advanced; facilitated 
by incentives 
provided by 
government/compani
es (Roland, 2004; 
Benson 2002a, 2002b) 
Lags behind 
primary care; 
More complex 
environment 
for EHR usage 
(Benson 
2002b; R31, 
GP 
informatician) 
More receptive to 
new technologies, 
but EHRs are not 
well designed to 
meet nurses’ 
needs 
(R15, Nurse 
informatician) 
Patient access to 
records is being 
increasingly 
emphasised, but 
needs more buy in 
from clinicians 
(R10, GP, Interview 
phase 1; Ross and 
Lin, 2003) 
Perceptions 
of (other) 
professionals’ 
and their use 
of EHRs 
Dispute secondary 
care physicians’ 
complaint about GPS’ 
not sharing 
information  
GPs record 
info for 
themselves 
and regard the 
EHR as special, 
sacred, 
protected (R3, 
National 
Clinical Lead) 
Medical systems: 
more 
administrative; 
whereas nursing 
requirements are 
more ‘joined up’  
 
n/a 
Type of 
knowledge 
boundary 
Pragmatic 
 
Interpret data for 
patient diagnosis; 
Utilisation of EHR for 
multiple clinical and 
non-clinical 
purposes); 
Power tool (R9, GP) 
Pragmatic 
 
Interpret data 
for patient 
diagnosis 
Semantic 
 
Interpret data for 
patient care and 
treatment 
Syntactic/ 
Semantic 
(Self-entry of data; 
Use lay 
understanding to 
interpret clinical 
entries) 
 
While EHRs may serve as knowledge repositories providing details of a patient’s medical 
history, the nature of clinical care means that clinicians are expected to update the EHR 
boundary object, often using the information already present in it to inform their clinical 
decisions This resonates with Carlile and Rebentisch’s (2003) discussion on the need to 
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create new boundary objects due to the acquisition of new knowledge which renders the 
old boundary object incomplete or deficient in some way.  Records of historical medical 
data such as blood pressure, for instance, can help clinicians determine trends in a 
patient’s health, and thus assist in making a more informed diagnosis (Respondent R14, 
see page 185). The need for on-going inputs and transformation of the knowledge 
present in EHRs then highlights the novel and dynamic nature of healthcare, and the need 
to constantly ‘re-create’ EHRs with each episode of care. 
This re-creation of EHRs as boundary objects means that clinicians engage in a process of 
interpreting the existing contents of the health record, illustrating the semantic nature of 
the knowledge boundary in this case. By providing a repository of information (see 
section 6.4.2), EHRs present clinical specialists with opportunities to draw conclusions 
regarding a patient’s treatment, and to use the records as boundary objects around which 
medical opinions can seek to reach a common and meaningful understanding of a 
patient’s condition and needs.  
However, in order to reach a consensus, the syntax and structure used in the EHR have to 
be understood in the same way by those clinicians involved. The EHR mediates 
relationships between different professionals, and some of the coded entries are 
dependent on who enters the data; clinicians may interpret a condition differently and 
consequently the standardised codes clinicians use to describe a patient case may vary 
(Berg and Bowker, 1997). The differences and ambiguities inherent in the way clinical 
professionals interpret clinical data mandates the need to use the EHR as a semantic 
boundary object (Carlile, 2004) so that there is a shared understanding of what EHR 
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contents mean. This is essential to ensure safe and effective treatment, especially when 
multiple clinicians are involved in delivering care to a patient. 
Their re-creation of the EHR to reflect their interpretation of the existing record in 
combination with their diagnosis of patients’ problems by observing new symptoms, 
points to the potential altering of current knowledge and creation of new knowledge 
which is characteristic of pragmatic knowledge boundaries (Carlile, 2002) (see Table 6.2, 
page 208). 
As seen from my interview data, nurses’ responsibilities and roles are very different from 
those of doctors. Though they interpret EHR data to treat and care for their patients, they 
have limited decision making powers and would normally defer to the diagnosis and 
decisions made by physicians (Berg & Bowker, 1997). For this reason, the nature of the 
knowledge boundary where EHRs are positioned is semantic (see Table 6.2, page 208), as 
they interpret existing data, but unlike their medical counterparts, are not responsible for 
creating new knowledge in the form of diagnoses. 
The use of EHRs as business tools and for research purposes (sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.5) 
highlights the way that EHR data can be used beyond the mere transfer or translation of 
knowledge across syntactic or semantic boundaries (Carlile 2002, 2004). The view of EHRs 
as a business tool is held mainly by primary care physicians, (GPs), as their practices are 
operated as independent businesses (Cohen and Musson, 2000). Many GPs use the data 
contained in EHRs for the improved performance and profits of their practices, as 
evidenced by my data. This reflects a transformation of EHR contents by leveraging it to 
generate performance related data for mechanisms such as the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (Roland, 2004). This utilisation of EHRs for what some would consider 
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potentially conflicting purposes – quality of care, and improved profits, demonstrates 
how primary care physicians employ EHRs as pragmatic boundary objects (Carlile 2002, 
2004) by transforming static information into transactional and profitable data.  
The utilisation of patient records for purposes beyond clinical care (e.g. research) without 
consent, could possibly jeopardise the patient-doctor relationship due to violation of trust 
and confidentiality (Foster and Young, 2012). Unless a level of trust is established 
between the patient and the clinician, there is likely to be contestation over the 
ownership of the EHR and its contents. However, the idea that the EHR boundary object is 
owned by one particular group potentially violates the innate character of a boundary 
object: its characteristic of occupying a position between domains and between different 
stakeholders, each having their own views and perceptions regarding the object (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989).  
EHRs also offer possibilities for patients to view their record, and in some cases input 
basic data. In the latter case, patients merely transfer information into the EHR, using it as 
a syntactic knowledge boundary (Carlile 2002, 2004). Patients’ access to their records for 
the purpose of viewing their health data involves a process of interpreting the 
information they see. However, given their lack of professional medical knowledge, their 
attempts to ‘translate’ (Carlile, 2004) their medical information to lay terms may be 
limited and often erroneous, which is a concern for physicians (Fisher and Britten 1993). 
Scholars have also suggested that the increasing knowledge accessible to patients due to 
computerisation can potentially bridge the knowledge gap between doctors and patients, 
resulting in diminished trust in doctors and the subsequent deprofessionalisation of the 
medical profession (Haug, 1988). However, Freidson (1985) argues that the exponential 
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increase in medical knowledge and expertise means that the gulf between professional 
medical knowledge and that of laypeople will only increase, as computerisation does not 
necessarily enhance people’s understanding of the information they access. This then 
limits patients’ capabilities to use the EHR as a pragmatic knowledge boundary as they 
usually lack the specialist cognitive knowledge required to interpret the entire contents of 
their health records accurately and meaningfully. For this reason, the knowledge 
boundary with regard to patients’ use of EHRs is usually syntactic, as knowledge flow is 
usually limited to transfer rather than translation of knowledge. However, if patients have 
increased access to health information, and are well informed on their own health 
conditions, they may be able to meaningfully translate the information contained in their 
EHRs. Therefore, the knowledge boundaries mediated by the EHR object in the case of 
patients varies, and may be either syntactic or semantic (see Table 6.2, page 208). 
6.6  Summary 
The position of EHRs between different epistemic practices highlights their role as 
boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989), situated at the interface between different 
stakeholders including GPs, hospital doctors, nurses and patients. The manner in which 
the different clinical groups perceive and use EHRs may be linked to their professional 
roles and differences.  
Increased specialisation and fragmentation in the clinical field (Guthrie et al., 2008; 
Nettleton, 2004; RCP, 2011) has resulted in increased knowledge dependencies and 
differences (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) between various clinical professionals. These 
interdependencies mandate the need for EHRs to interface between healthcare 
professionals as well as between professionals and their patients, as I outlined in Table 
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6.1 (page 196). By acting as boundary objects between different clinical specialties, EHRs 
provide a ‘shared context’ (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) to facilitate the sharing of health 
information in a mutually understandably and useful format between clinical 
professionals.  
Just as boundary objects can have bridging or hindering effects, EHRs too have been 
recognised to have positive as well as negative effects on healthcare and the way health 
professionals communicate and collaborate (McGinn et al., 2012). The variations in user 
requirements, expectations and use of EHRs, justify the perception of the EHR as a 
boundary object.  
Incongruences between the technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) with which 
users view and use EHRs could be due to factors such as political, professional or cultural 
differences. This was evident from the very different requirements of nurses, compared 
to physicians, as indicated by my empirical data. The traditional caring role of nurses 
(Abbott and Meerabau, 1998) requires them to enter data describing a patient’s 
condition, unlike the relatively objective data entered by physicians. EHRs also act as 
potential symbols of professional boundaries and hierarchies, due to variations in access 
based on roles. This too was reflected in my interview data, and illustrates the political, 
professional and cultural differences which potentially affect the role of EHRs as boundary 
objects. 
While EHRs are capable of providing a pragmatic boundary across which knowledge can 
be transformed (Carlile 2002, 2004), I argue that that they are not exploited to this level 
by all users. This is due to reasons including the nature of their work, and their knowledge 
limitations (in the case of laypeople). A summary of how various users employ EHRs as 
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boundaries to meet knowledge differences and dependencies is provided in Table 6.2 
(page 208). 
Lee (2007) and Bossen, Jensen and Witt (2012) suggest that not all objects are boundary 
objects, as some artefacts negotiate and redefine boundaries rather than just acting as an 
interface between them. While EHRs can potentially redefine boundaries, they also serve 
as a bridging mechanism between different clinical professionals. They therefore have a 
dual role of interfacing across boundaries (by providing a record of patient information 
subject to clinicians’ interpretations) and pushing boundaries (by enabling clinicians to 
adopt tasks previously beyond their jurisdictions).  
Bal et al. (2007) in their study on referral letters between GPs and hospital doctors 
explain how such communication enhances seamless care while at the same time 
reinforces the different tasks and responsibilities which are taken up by medical 
professionals in different clinical domains. The possibility of both bridging as well as 
dividing primary and secondary care by means of electronic referral letters (Bal et al., 
2007) confirms the capability of technology to have a dual effect on professional 
boundaries (Bechky, 2003). Extending this to the case of EHRs, this chapter illustrates the 
role of EHRs as boundary objects interfacing between different EHR users, as well as its 
capability to shift boundaries by facilitating task drift and thus enabling vertical 
substitution (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005) wherein changes in boundaries enable 
professionals to climb up professional hierarchies. 
In order to use EHRs as boundary objects to transfer, translate or transform knowledge 
(Carlile, 2004), clinical professionals must be willing to share information. However, the 
problem of conflicting interests and the issue of ‘knowledge at stake’ (Carlile, 2004: 556), 
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can hinder the effective use of EHRs as boundary objects between clinical professionals. 
This was evident particularly between primary and secondary care physicians. Efforts to 
protect the indeterminate nature of clinical knowledge in order to retain professional 
autonomy thus affect the extent to which EHRs can serve as effective boundary objects.  
The influence of professional roles, clinical autonomy and jurisdictional boundaries 
(Freidson, 1988) are clearly relevant to the discussion on EHRs as boundary objects. I now 
proceed to the next chapter where I discuss how clinicians can attempt to assert their 
professional dominance by actively engaging with and developing technology, partly as a 
response to the potential threat imposed by technology itself (Walter and Lopez, 2008; 
McLaughlin and Webster, 1998). 
 
 CHAPTER 7  CLINICIAN-IT HYBRID PROFESSIONALS 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter draws on the sociology of professions (Abbott, 1988; Freidson 1985, 1988) 
and professional hybridisation (Llewellyn, 2001; Montgomery, 2001; Noordegraaf 2007, 
2011; Thomas and Hewitt, 2011), to highlight the presence of a group of hybrid 
professionals that has not been subject to empirical research: ‘clinician-IT hybrids’ (Koshy, 
McGivern and Tritter, 2013). Extant research on hybrid professionals has focused 
predominantly on professionals who adopt additional managerial roles to bridge 
professional and managerial domains (Doolin 2001, 2002; Farrell and Morris, 2003; 
Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000; Llewellyn, 2001; Muzio and Kirkpatrick, 2011).  
Clinician-IT hybrids, or ‘clin-ITs’, although present in the UK for over two decades, 
constitute a relatively small percentage of clinicians, and may not be as established as in 
countries such as the US. This is reflected in my data, as evidence of this dual role 
emerged from just a handful of respondents, who I focus on in this chapter. My data 
indicates the prevalence of this hybrid role amongst GPs, and much of the evidence is 
from this category of clin-ITs, whom I term GP-IT professional hybrids. Drawing on 
Freidson’s (1985; 1988) work on restratification and buffering in the medical profession, I 
illustrate how external threats account for the formation of these hybrid professionals in 
some cases. However, using my findings, I elaborate Freidson’s theory, and discuss other 
possible factors that facilitate the formation of clin-ITs.  
This chapter focuses on the emergence and drivers of the clinician-IT hybrid role by 
drawing on my empirical data, but also briefly discusses clinical leaders as hybrids in the 
context of the NPfIT. The increasing use of health IT by clinicians is accompanied by 
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patients having an interest in technology and its use for monitoring their own healthcare 
(Anderson, Rainey and Eysenbach, 2003; Newman and Vidler, 2006). Debates regarding 
who accesses and modifies the EHR are often concerns for doctors, who regard 
themselves as the authority on their patients’ conditions. This may be one explanation for 
the increased interest shown by clinicians in the use of EHRs. Tensions between clinicians 
and their system suppliers (see Chapter 5) and resistance against colonisation (Waring 
and Currie, 2009) by the IT industry are other possible reasons why some clinicians have 
stepped foot into the informatics field.  
I first present my empirical data illustrating how clinical hybrid professionals have 
interests that overlap between different domains including medicine, management and 
technology. My data highlights the increasingly blurred boundaries amongst professionals 
and some antecedents to their increasing amalgamation with non-clinical roles. This is 
followed by a discussion of clinical professional hybrids using my empirical data as well as 
reviewed literature. I discuss the presence of clinical leaders and their role in the NPfIT. I 
then elaborate on clinicians’ interest in IT development, highlighting the clinician-IT 
professional as an emerging hybrid role. I present some of the key factors that facilitate 
the development of clin-IT hybrids, following which I discuss why GP-ITs are the more 
prevalent amongst these hybrid professionals. I then discuss the challenges faced by clin-
ITs as evidenced by my data, and finally provide a summary of the chapter. 
7.2  Professionals and the struggle to adhere to boundaries 
Recent years have seen the increasing control exerted by external groups such as 
managers, and imposed mechanisms such as technology, over clinical professions. To be 
controlled or managed by occupational groups that lack the professional status of 
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medicine and nursing, and that challenge the jurisdictions of clinical professionals, is likely 
to be a concern for clinicians, and may account for the rise of professional hybrids such as 
clinician-managers and clin-ITs. 
Clinical professional hybrids were present in the NPfIT as well. The roles of the National 
Clinical Leads may be likened to those of clinician-managers, as their dual role 
incorporated clinical as well as advisory responsibilities. Their bridging role between the 
NPfIT management and clinicians required good communication skills and an 
understanding of both managerial as well as clinical domains, especially considering 
issues such as lack of transparency and the tendency for exaggerations and 
miscommunications in the programme (see Chapter 5). Respondent R12 who had been 
involved in such a boundary spanning role elaborated on the need for clinical hybrid 
professionals to gain the support of people from both the domains in which they worked: 
You have to learn to work with Chinese walls, and you have to get both sides to 
trust you. And so that’s why you had to have people appointed who were trusted 
from those roles, who had that kind of skill set. – R12, GP, Connecting for Health 
National Clinical Lead 
Despite their prominent position and their prescribed duties of facilitating engagement 
with their clinical peers, respondents questioned the actual power afforded to these 
National Clinical Leads. Further, the calibre and the influence of these Leads were 
questioned by some, as seen from Respondent R24’s quote:  
I wouldn’t say it [involvement of the National Clinical Leads] didn’t have any 
influence. It had some. But I think the calibre of the clinical leads they introduced 
didn’t reflect the challenge that was at the heart of what was happening – R24, 
Former Joint Senior Responsible Officer of the NPfIT 
While Respondent R24 acknowledged that the National Clinical Leads did have some 
influence in the programme, he suggested that these engagement mechanisms were not 
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adequate to meet the needs of the NPfIT. Scholars have identified the lack of credibility 
afforded to the National Clinical Leads as some of them were no longer actively engaged 
in clinical practice (Cresswell et al., 2011). This apprehension of hybrids’ capabilities due 
to their disengagement with clinical practice is true of clin-ITs as well, and I discuss this 
further in section 7.5.3. One of the clinical leads acknowledged a sense of being 
incapacitated within Connecting for Health, with limited capacity in the organisation to 
trigger change: 
I don’t think we realised it at the time, but the job we’d been given, lacked the 
responsibility inside the organisation that it needed to make the programme more 
successful than it was (…) They had us as an overarching theme, and some of them 
had lots of clinicians dotted about here (…) The role of the clinicians within the 
thing as a whole has gone down the hierarchy rather than up. – R3, National 
Clinical Lead, Connecting for Health 
This suggests that the National Clinical Leads may have served as figureheads put in place 
to provide a façade of clinical engagement. Rather than serving as a communication 
channel between clinicians and the NPfIT management, the movement of the clinical 
leads ‘down the hierarchy’ suggests that they were deliberately controlled by senior 
management, and may have been expected to comply to the programme’s aims 
irrespective of the clinical voice that they represented. 
The National Clinical Leads’ roles entailed much time and commitment their parts. 
However, their impact was constrained because of the need to juggle their clinical jobs 
with this role, and often dedicate not more than a day a week to their secondary role. 
Respondent R15, a nurse informatician, elaborates the time constraints faced by clinician-
manager hybrids in balancing their clinical and managerial responsibilities:  
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[In] the Department of Health quite often appointments are there to give advice, 
but they don’t really impact on anything. It was realised that we couldn’t do this 
role on half a day a week and a lot of willingness (laughs). – R15, Nurse 
informatician, Royal College of Nursing  
As explained by Respondent R15, the limited time that some clinician-managers spend on 
their managerial roles is perhaps another reason why the National Clinical Leads were not 
able to have sufficient influence and inputs into the NPfIT. 
Moving on to the significance of clin-ITs at the time the NPfIT was launched, the lack of 
clinical engagement and consultations before the contracts were secured, was a source of 
concern to clinical professionals, as they believed that the NPfIT was not fit for purpose 
(see Chapters 3 and 5). Despite the established use of computers in primary care in 
England, the programme management failed to consult with GPs who had developed 
their own systems and who had a better understanding of clinicians’ needs and 
requirements. The nature of the dual clin-IT role is an extremely sophisticated one which 
has perhaps been underestimated by many, including those involved in the NPfIT. 
Respondent R6 highlights this complexity of the clin-IT role: 
The failure to recognise that you needed a level of domain expertise, that you 
could only get if you engaged effectively with the clinical and the existing clinical 
informatics community… because it takes years, not months, to have an 
understanding. A doctor can’t do it; an IT person can’t do it. It’s that breed of 
people who have learnt a bit about each of them. And to reach that level of 
expertise, takes (…) years. The domain is so complex. – R6, Health informatician, A 
national computer organisation  
As seen from the Respondent R6’s comment, the clin-IT hybrid role is one that takes a 
significant amount of time to develop. Once clinicians have reached the point where they 
have adequate experience and knowledge in both domains to be classified a clin-IT 
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hybrid, there is perhaps the question regarding where their professional identities and 
priorities lie. Referring to the NPfIT, Respondent R6 commented: 
There were relatively few clinicians that were engaged. Most of them were the 
sort of people who had got to that stage where they were neither a doctor nor an 
IT person. They had become that merged entity. – R6, Health informatician, A 
national computer organisation 
The ability of clin-ITs to combine a comprehension of clinical professional tasks with 
technical expertise, puts them in a unique position where they can tailor systems to the 
actual functions that clinicians do, rather than what IT developers or even clinicians 
themselves think they want. As Respondent R31, a GP-IT noted: 
We had enough money to actually for the first time in health anywhere, to do 
user-centered design, which was sitting lots of clinicians down and instead of 
saying ‘Tell me what you’d like’, we said, ‘Tell me what you do, and we’ll try and 
show you how you can do it better’. – R31, GP informatician, Connecting for 
Health, British Computer Society 
Another respondent who fell into the clin-IT category echoed these thoughts, and in 
describing his role as a professional hybrid, explained his ability to interface between the 
clinical and IT cultures: 
I’d see myself as bridging that gap, because I understand right down to the 
programming level what can be done and what can’t be done. I can use that to 
inform GPs, don’t listen to what they think they want, but think in terms of what’s 
actually possible – R36, GP, IT programmer 
Both the above clin-ITs recognised the futility of merely asking clinicians what sort of 
computer systems they want. The combination of their IT skills and clinical backgrounds 
equipped both respondents to distinguish between the ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ of their 
clinical colleagues, and to know how best to meet these needs using technology. 
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The recognition of the value that clinicians can provide in the development of their 
systems is seen in their representation amongst clinical software companies. Their 
partnership with doctors may be regarded as a selling point for these companies. 
Respondent R9, a senior GP comments: 
One of the major suppliers had a famous advert which said ‘Designed by doctors 
for doctors’, in illegible handwriting like you would see in a prescription in the old 
days (laughs) – R9, senior GP involved with EHRs 
The use of the slogan ‘by doctors for doctors’ is evocative of the democratic slant 
employed by IT suppliers’ marketing campaigns, in a bid to persuade clinicians to use 
their IT systems. 
I now proceed to present further empirical data illustrating why different clinicians adopt 
the hybrid clin-IT role. As mentioned earlier, much of this evidence is from the primary 
care sector, and there appears to be a prevalence of the clin-IT hybrid amongst GPs. This 
is not to say that other clinicians are exempt from the clin-IT category, as some non-
medical respondents did show a strong inclination to IT development and formulation of 
guidelines. However, there is clearly a higher incidence of clin-ITs amongst GPs, and I will 
discuss why this might be so, following my general findings and discussions on the 
antecedents and formative factors in the development of clin-ITs.  
Prior to the launch of the NPfIT, there were incentives in place for GPs to use 
computerised systems, and several companies offered primary care practices free or 
subsidised systems (Heath and Luff, 1996; Jha et al., 2008). The subsidised use of IT 
offered primary care an opportunity to discover the advantages offered by such systems, 
and the potential they had to improve the performance of their practices. Respondent R9, 
a senior GP elaborates on these incentives: 
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There was a scheme called the free GP scheme (…) One was run by AAH Meditel, 
which is a computer software company, and the other was VAMP, another 
computer software company. And they did deals with the pharmaceutical industry 
to collect data from GP systems and prescribing data and with the proceeds that 
they got from the pharmaceutical industry, they gave us free networked 
computers. So from 1987 until about 1989, we used a computer system which is 
pretty good actually, to change the working practices in our practice. So we used it 
as a tool to transform the business processes in our practice. – R9, senior GP 
involved with EHRs 
Clearly, these incentives offered to primary care physicians worked to the benefit of both 
the medical professionals as well as to market players. While it opened GPs’ eyes to the 
possibility of improved performance as well as profit, it offered industry players the 
opportunity to obtain information from primary care practices and make money by 
utilising it for research purposes.  
IT in the clinical setting seemed to have been also driven by GPs’ wishes to enable clearer 
division of tasks, reinforcing the boundary between medical and nursing responsibilities. 
Respondent R31’s words below demonstrate how IT may be developed for this purpose 
of establishing boundaries between clinical professionals: 
Back in the early 80s it was still a very paternalistic model of healthcare. And the 
nurses were not the independent prescribing practitioners that they are these 
days. It was much more doctor’s handmaiden stuff. So, that was how I got into 
designing systems. Because I actually wrote some screens for the nurses to do 
basic screening for us. Height, weight, blood pressure, BMI, that sort of stuff – 
R31, GP informatician, Connecting for Health, British Computer Society 
While the role of technology has changed over time, and has shifted from being a divisive 
tool to one which encourages increased overlap between the nursing and medical role, it 
can also be used by doctors to clearly define what tasks they would permit nurses to 
undertake. 
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Differences in the way health professionals work also result in variations in the take up of 
technology between primary and secondary care. In Chapter 6 I briefly discussed GPs’ 
possessiveness of EHRs and how they utilise technology to the benefit of their practices, 
unlike secondary care clinicians who are comparatively unwelcoming to new technology. 
This is further illustrated in Respondent R9’s words: 
If you talk even now to doctors in the acute sector, they are not convinced that IT 
systems in general are going to deliver them benefits. They are more like tools for 
the management to find out information about the way they practice and 
constrain them. As a GP, it was my tool. I booked it. I could find information about 
care, and actually use the information that it contained. As a power tool to include 
the profitability of the practice and improve the way that we could get more 
money to do good patient care for our patients. So it was always my tool, or our 
tool, and it was really helpful. – R9, senior GP involved with EHRs 
The description of computer systems as ‘my tool, or our tool’ by Respondent R9 captures 
the possessiveness and close association of GPs with their systems, both individually as 
well as collectively. Their use of their systems as a ‘power tool’ reflects their autonomous 
style of working as opposed to their secondary care colleagues who are monitored and 
constrained via technology by their managers. The below quote by a health informatics 
consultant further illustrates this point: 
GP clinical systems were designed and developed by the GPs themselves. They 
had great ownership into it and they took great pride in developing systems that 
did exactly what they wanted them to do. The problem with secondary care is that 
a manager has dumped a PC on a consultant’s desk and he just looks at it and says 
to his secretary, ‘I don’t use these things’. – R7, Health informatics consultant, a 
national computer organisation 
As indicated by respondent R7, the very act of developing their own IT systems gave GPs a 
sense of pride, achievement and independence, as they were able to create finely honed 
systems tailored to their specific needs. 
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The tensions between primary and secondary care physicians, with the latter regarding 
the former as highly possessive of the information they possess was further elaborated by 
Respondent R3, a secondary care physician: 
The longitudinal record for individual practitioner use is regarded as very special, 
sacred, and it must be protected. Hospital practitioners record information for 
others. That’s why we write it down. So other people can read it and understand 
what’s wrong with the patients. (…) When a patient leaves, either the hospital for 
an in-patient stay or an outpatient episode, they are given a copy of the 
communication to their GP (…) So we’re used to sharing information, and sharing 
information with the patient. GP’s aren’t. – R3, National Clinical Lead, Connecting 
for Health 
This drive to record information for themselves may be one explanation for GPs’ interest 
in venturing into the IT domain alongside their clinical practice. From my data it was 
evident that a number of clinicians, GPs in particular, take the initiative to pioneer ideas 
and improved software in their practices, by either engaging in the technology 
development themselves, or establishing clinical software companies dedicated to 
creating clinician-friendly systems for this purpose. As Respondent R35 comments: 
I’m someone who saw IT as a way of enhancing the clinical practice. That’s 
completely where I come from. How can IT improve the quality of the care I offer 
as a doctor to patients, and how can it improve the quality of care that others can 
offer - R35, GP involved with a software company  
The above quote captures the service oriented nature of the medical profession. 
However, as GP practices in England are independent businesses that gain profits from 
improved performance (Roland, 2004), some respondents suggested that the need to 
measure outcomes through mechanisms such as the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
could be a reason for clinicians to use computerised records. This does not mean that 
personal profit necessarily replaces their obligation to provide quality care to their 
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patients, but is one which goes hand in hand with improved care and outcomes. The need 
to necessarily measure outcomes within GP practices using the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework mandated the implementation of systems to record patient data. As 
explained by Respondent R6:  
The way GPs were paid, changed (…) you couldn’t think about the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework without computerised records – R6, Health informatician, A 
national computer organisation 
There was also clearly a sense of ownership of the primary care systems, as GPs 
appreciated the value it brought to their practice. As Respondent R9 (see page 224) 
highlights, the identification of the system as their own tool is felt by the GP community 
collectively, and is not limited to a handful of isolated GP practices. This would have 
provided the few (but successful) existent GP-IT hybrids continued support from their 
professional community. 
Apart from reasons such as the need to measure performance outcomes and to improve 
the quality of care delivered, some respondents suggested that a genuine interest in IT 
development motivates clinicians to venture into IT development. Often, this is triggered 
by the feeling that they can improvise on the work of their non-clinical counterparts. This 
was expressed by Respondents R36 and R37: 
It’s always been of interest doing computers and things related to computers, 
right from childhood. And I learnt obviously some basic programming when I was 
a child, and then went off to medical school, qualified a doctor, and then a few 
years ago, I started to get interested in programming again, more as a hobby than 
anything else. And part of my practice where I work, I could see there was a need 
to develop an intranet for our practice. So I learnt to programme on the basis of 
that. I basically taught myself to programme just from books and online. – R36, 
GP, IT programmer 
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 I was quite frustrated with some of the existing solutions and thought we could 
probably do a better and easier one to use. - R37, GP, IT programmer, formerly 
involved with a local medical committee 
Both these respondents expressed their recognition of the need for better IT systems due 
to the deficiencies of those already in place. The difficulties in adopting systems that are 
insensitive to the complex nature of healthcare provide clinicians an impetus to be 
actively involved in clinical systems design and development, as indicated by Respondent 
R37. 
When asked how they identified themselves professionally, most clin-IT respondents 
regarded themselves primarily as clinicians, emphasising their stronger identification with 
their clinical professional role despite the increasing overlap of their work with the IT 
domain. Many clin-ITs consider their programming as a hobby rather than as an 
occupation or profession. They do not necessarily adopt this dual role in an explicit effort 
to exert control over their work, but engage in IT development out of genuine interest. 
Respondent R36 (GP, IT programmer) described himself as ‘mostly GP’. Another 
respondent explained that the purpose of his IT company was purely to meet clinical 
needs: 
The company came out of interests I had as a GP in primary care. The company 
was never intended as something to make money. It was purely a means of 
disseminating a product that was going to improve general practice, and that still 
is the case. – R35, GP involved with a software company.  
My empirical data indicated a higher prevalence of clin-ITs amongst primary care 
physicians. Reasons respondents offered for the comparatively quicker and widespread 
use of IT in primary care included the easier implementation environment in primary 
care, given that it is an office environment where a stationary desktop is practical to use, 
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unlike a hospital setting where people are more mobile and have to transition between 
different departments and locations. Respondent R31 noted: 
The patient comes into the GP surgery, sits down, and you don’t have to have 
anything complex about mobility. Whereas in the acute sector, you’ve only got 
that luxury sort of in out-patients. Because of the multi-disciplinarity of most 
outpatient departments you can’t guarantee there’ll be a desk and computer on it 
from one clinic to the next. – R31, GP informatician, Connecting for Health, British 
Computer Society 
The comparatively basic and simple nature of this consultation setting implies that GP 
systems are not as complex as those required in a secondary care setting, making it easier 
for GPs to apply themselves to the development of their systems, as it is a skill relatively 
easily learnt and not requiring exorbitant resources. Respondent R6’s quote below 
illustrates this further: 
They [IT systems] were typically built by people in garages. Because you could do 
that - you could build a PC of your own, you write your own operating system. And 
all of the early systems have that sort of root, starting from a PC… So general 
practice I think is an easier environment, you get your head around it, and you can 
do it with low cost hardware. - R6, Health informatician, A national computer 
organisation 
Another possible reason for this as pointed out by the same respondent, was the highly 
structured nature of primary care records themselves: 
A lot of time and effort has been spent on trying to make records computable. 
And I think some of the thought comes from primary care, because primary care 
records are highly computable, highly coded and highly structured. - R6, Health 
informatician, A national computer organisation 
 My interview data also highlighted several challenges faced by clin-IT hybrids. Despite 
their understanding of both the clinical as well as technological domains, clin-ITs seemed 
to have their skills and capabilities questioned. Respondent R31 commented: 
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Clinicians, if you ask them, ‘What’s the problem?’, they will tell you that it looks 
like the paper equivalent, because clinicians are not software architects, neither 
are they designers, neither are they process mappers. And so, inevitably, they 
design something which is a form which inevitably doesn’t deliver what they want. 
Because it’s a paper form with less functionality than the paper. – R31, GP 
informatician, Connecting for Health, British Computer Society 
Respondent R31 was himself a GP-IT hybrid, but acknowledged the shortcomings of the 
work of some of his clin-IT peers. His description of EHR systems developed by clin-ITs as 
‘a paper form with less functionality than the paper’ reflects a step backward, rather than 
forward, in terms of utility. Comparing these EHRs to paper forms also suggests 
challenges clin-ITs might have in designing a user-friendly interface for their systems, as 
the technology they develop may at face value appear to be very similar to already 
existing systems. However, while the user interface of GP systems may lack in some 
aspects, the specific needs and specifications of GP practices are best understood by 
those who have been in that work environment themselves. Respondent R9 comments:  
The systems were designed by doctors for doctors and they were treated 
therefore by the large scale IT industry people who came in, with some suspicion, 
because these were amateurish systems. They looked amateurish to their eyes. 
They weren’t based around Windows, and state of the art...But their functionality 
was exquisite. Their functionality is finely honed to the requirements of the GP, 
and very difficult to emulate. – R9, senior GP involved with EHRs 
This empathy with clinical IT needs gives clin-ITs an edge over standard IT suppliers. 
However, to successfully develop clinical software, or to start a company which does so, is 
only half the story. Another challenge faced by clinicians is convincing larger suppliers of 
the need for specific components which have been developed by independent clinicians 
or smaller companies started by them, as indicated by this GP respondent: 
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One of the difficulties we find is that producers of the GP systems or hospital 
systems haven’t had a commercial imperative to embed [IT systems] from outside 
into their products – R35, GP involved with a software company. 
This was one of the main problems of the NPfIT, wherein the proven success of GP 
systems was ignored. This may have been due to the lack of credibility of clinicians as IT 
developers, as I shall shortly discuss. Though a previous quote mentioned the difficulty for 
clinicians to develop systems that were entirely user friendly because of their non-
technical background, it has also been evident that functionality and not user-friendliness 
is the prime concern for most clinicians. Having said this however, there have been 
initiatives by more technically inclined clinicians to undertake development of more 
refined user interfaces. However, gaining recognition amongst the IT crowd as competent 
technology developers is a challenge for clin-ITs.  
Even in the case where clinicians had technical know-how and had taken up dual roles, 
there were occasional instances where they felt challenged with regard to the way people 
perceived them professionally, as they did not have formal IT training. Referring to a 
system being developed, one respondent says: 
I did wonder at one point whether I could commercialise that and sell it to other 
practices. I did talk to other practices, and they didn’t show much interest around 
it. That felt at the time to be likely because it was just me as an individual, rather 
than me as a part of a company, or part of a software company which had a name 
and brand, or a professional IT person. I felt that was maybe in the way. I thought 
if I’d gone to practices as a part of a software company or even as a self-employed 
software person, then I’d probably have a bit more credibility. - R36, GP, IT 
programmer 
Respondent R31’s account (see page 125) explains how clin-ITs’ work on the NPfIT’s 
Common User Interface was not incorporated right from the early phases of systems 
design, and how they were instead approached only toward the end of the systems 
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development phase, reflecting the lack of importance given to the user interface by the 
suppliers. Clearly, their seeming involvement in the development of the system was not 
sufficient, as timely inclusion of these clin-IT hybrid professionals is required for the 
successful design and implementation of technology. They were brought in at the very 
last stage to tweak the user interface more as an afterthought than as an essential part of 
the system design. This superficial involvement of clin-ITs seems to have parallels to the 
establishment of the National Clinical Leads whom many regarded as mere figureheads 
used to appease the general public, rather than to actually engage with users and make 
an impact on the way the NPfIT systems were being implemented. 
In the NPfIT, GPs in particular were not given the importance that was due to them as 
experienced users as well as developers of IT in primary care. As Respondent R9 notes: 
GP computing was thought to be a cottage industry which was irrelevant in terms 
of mainstream IT as used by banks, the oil industry, insurance companies, and the 
next place to go with that expansion of this commoditised IT industry, was health. 
– R9, senior GP involved with EHRs 
Respondent R31 adds:  
At the time, I was regarded as a bit of a propeller head. Because you know, I’d 
written medical systems, and I did the IT bit of the National Programme. And so I 
was viewed as not really a proper doctor. I was quite amusing and did good 
presentations. But you know, I wasn’t someone to be carefully followed – R31, GP 
informatician, Connecting for Health, British Computer Society 
The above quotes by Respondents R9 and R31 point to significant challenges faced by 
clin-ITs as they are not taken seriously by others. In the bigger picture, this lack of 
credibility and importance given to clin-ITs was a threat to the existing small health 
software companies which had been started up by clinicians, as their efforts were 
shadowed by the large scale NPfIT project. GP R35 notes:  
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Being part of a very small company, this [NPfIT] was a massive threat to us. And 
virtually, it drove us out of business, because at that time, the only IT that was 
being purchased in the NHS was IT that was part of the NPFIT (…) the companies 
that were a part of the national programme were very big companies. There was 
little space for small companies… it did affect us badly. But it could have affected 
us worse. The only reason it didn’t affect us worse was because of the slippage 
and failure of the NPFIT (laughs) - R35, GP involved with a software company 
Clin-ITs thus had to contend not only with non-clinical peers who questioned their 
capabilities and expertise in the technical sphere, but also the competition imposed by 
strong market players who had government support. The NPfIT’s challenging atmosphere 
as smaller IT suppliers were threatened by the larger Local Service Providers (LSPs) 
aggravated clinicians’ resentment and resistance, and contributed toward the increased 
chasm between clinician-led software companies and larger industry players. 
Several respondents mentioned the lack of commercial incentives and the absence of a 
clear cut career path for those professionals who wished to travel down the road of 
clinical IT development while at the same time retaining their clinical responsibilities. This 
vagueness and lack of recognition of the clin-IT as an independent professional role in 
itself causes these hybrids to prioritise one role over the other. 
In discussing the career challenges of being clin-ITs, physicians elaborated on their ability 
to alternate between their clinical and IT interests as they could always return to the 
former if their IT career interests did not prove fruitful. This ability to experiment with 
options due to their ability to return to medical practice, offers clinicians a unique 
opportunity to ‘try on’ other roles.  
Doctors, they can always go back to their day job, so they are not that easy to 
manipulate. – R6, Health informatician, A national computer organisation 
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When I joined the LMC, that was obviously a huge step, that was going from full 
time general practice, and working 3 days a week for the LMC, sorry. It was such a 
steep learning curve that I began to get a bit frustrated with my clinical time. So I 
thought, ‘when I’m doing this, I want to give it six months of just trying this and 
see how I feel and reassess after that’ – R37, GP, IT programmer, formerly 
involved with a local medical committee 
Respondent R37’s temporary shift in career path may have been facilitated by the 
knowledge of the ease of returning to clinical work, as highlighted by Respondent R6. He 
faced challenges in balancing his clinical responsibilities with his technology related role 
within a local medical committee. His decision to temporarily withdraw from clinical 
practice to pursue his IT programming interests is also evocative of the entrepreneurial 
trait of many GPs. 
Given the large scale of the NPfIT and the many stakeholders involved, conflicts and 
tensions were inevitable. However, such conflicts were not restricted to the project alone, 
but surfaced in the general differences between the interests of clin-ITs and those of IT 
suppliers. Respondent R36 notes:  
I did try to get permission as well to make it work for us as a practice. But I 
wouldn’t then be allowed to use that if I sold it elsewhere; so I couldn't then 
commercialise it. And what’s the point of putting extra stress into it, if it wasn’t 
going to be commercial. It’s going to be quite a lot of work, to actually get it 
integrated (…) In terms of developing shared records and things like that, it would 
be so much easier if we weren’t held to what the companies that wanted. The 
companies really want to kind of control it all themselves, to control the data. If 
you want to develop something, they want to develop it and build their system 
better, rather than integrate with someone else who might be better. – R36, GP, 
IT programmer 
Clearly then, despite what might be said by clinicians, profit making too is a key driver in 
their interest in developing IT for their practices. As expressed by respondent R36, 
commercialisation of developed software motivates clin-ITs to further develop and refine 
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their developed technology for the wider benefit of the health sector. However, the 
presence of an underlying power struggle between clinicians and IT suppliers, as the 
clinical data serves as a source of authority and as a power tool (Respondent R9, page 
224), means that both parties strive to develop IT systems suited to their own interests. 
GPs for instance regard themselves as the gatekeeper to their patients’ information, and 
their records serve as a business tool for their practices (see Chapter 6). IT vendors on the 
other hand seek ways to make data available to other user groups such as clinical 
researchers, and create another channel of profit making for themselves. As evident from 
the above quote, IT vendors are also reluctant to liaise with other developers or clin-ITs, 
preferring to develop their products independently rather than help small scale 
developers integrate their IT components into systems developed by larger industry 
players. 
I also observed resentment from secondary care colleagues who felt that GPs in particular 
did not serve any useful purpose in their IT development roles. Respondent R16 
comments:  
Clinical input in Connecting for Health was provided by, from what I could see…the 
core advice was given by a bunch of GPs who didn’t actually do general practice 
because they turned themselves into IT consultants – R16, A medical director, 
previously involved with Connecting for Health 
On being asked what he thought of those GPs who had stepped into IT roles, the same 
respondent voiced his ‘completely negative’ opinion of such clin-ITs:  
They know nothing about secondary care. A lot of GPs don’t know anything about 
a modern hospital. (…) A lot of dissatisfied GPs, which pretty much by definition 
they are, because GPs who enjoy being GPs would still be GPs, not working for 
CFH. They’re all freelancing on a £1000 a day contract, roaming around the place… 
– R16, A medical director, previously involved with Connecting for Health 
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Respondent R16’s opinion on the lack of capabilities of clinicians who were on-board the 
NPfIT was supported by another interviewee: 
Even the clinical people who were on it [NPfIT], were more technical than clinical. 
- R24, Former Joint Senior Responsible Officer of the NPfIT 
The clinicians that Respondent R24 referred to evidently distanced themselves from their 
clinical practice. Consequently, their clinical colleagues voiced their dissatisfaction and 
apprehension regarding the capabilities of these professionals to relate to their clinical 
requirements. Clearly, clin-ITs face significant challenges from both non-clinicians as well 
as clinical peers who question their credibility.  
I discuss these findings related to clin-ITs in greater detail in Sections 7.4 and 7.5. Before 
that however, I will briefly consider the clinician-manager hybrid and its presence in the 
NPfIT project, using the empirical data presented in this section. Much research has been 
done on clinician-managers, so I limit my discussion on this hybrid role, and devote 
majority of this chapter to the clin-IT hybrid role which has not been studied in great 
detail. 
7.3  Clinicians as managers in the NPfIT 
Although having shifted from being dominant professional groups to those that are 
increasingly controlled by management (Farrel and Morris, 2003; Davies and Harrison, 
2003), clinical professionals are adopting managerial roles, thus dissolving the boundaries 
between the clinical and management domains. The rise of the clinician-manager has 
been an area of avid interest to scholars (Kitchener, 2000; Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000) as 
Reed (1996: 592) predicted the ‘warring’ of professional and managerial groups and the 
potential merger of the two to form a hybrid role.  
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 While some scholars have warned of the risk of deprofessionalisation as a result of 
restratification and new roles, Kitchener (2000) suggests that this need not be the case, as 
clinician-managers often utilise their position to safeguard their clinical interests and 
maintain professional closure. Rather than the clinical field being colonised by managers, 
the emergence of clinical managers could be understood as an application of 
management techniques in the clinical domain, illustrating the phenomenon of reverse 
colonisation wherein ‘the tools of colonisation are used by the colonised to challenge the 
authority and gain independence from colonisers’ (Waring and Currie, 2009: 774). This is 
also illustrated in McGivern and Ferlie’s (2007) study where clinicians regarded externally 
imposed control measures as unnecessary bureaucratic mechanisms that did not benefit 
clinical practice. This prompted them to play ‘tickbox games’ to create the impression 
that they conformed to the requirements of various appraisal mechanisms while 
continuing their accustomed clinical work practices. 
Different stakeholder groups are likely to have conflicting interests or incongruent 
technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994), thus building walls to protect their 
interests. In the case of clinicians, resistance is often wielded against external control 
mechanisms that challenge their professional autonomy. Respondent R12’s (see page 
218) reference to ‘Chinese walls’ indicates the obstacles that hybrid professionals have to 
contend with, as they deal with stakeholder groups having different needs. However, 
hybrid professionals’ ‘dual commitment’ to different roles enables them to consider the 
needs of different domains, making them more ‘cosmopolitan’ than their comparatively 
‘parochial’ purely clinical colleagues (Coburn, Rappolt and Bourgeault, 1997). This is 
particularly important given the increased focus on consumer-driven healthcare and 
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managed care (Hoff, 2001) that requires sensitivity to yet another group, i.e. patients. By 
seeking the trust from both parties, hybrids form a conduit connecting two very different 
groups of people, thus enacting a boundary role (Doolin, 2001). In the case of the NPfIT 
however, clinician managers, i.e., the National Clinical Leads, had limitations to 
performing this boundary role effectively. Respondents reported that clinicians’ roles had 
gone ‘down the hierarchy’ and that the very calibre of the chosen Clinical Leads was to be 
questioned (see page 219). Despite their position as National Clinical Leads, these 
clinician managers were given limited powers within the programme. This is an example 
of clinical professionals being used or ‘co-opted’ by external forces to control or regulate 
the profession, resulting in erosion of clinical autonomy rather than its preservation 
through restratification (Coburn, Rappolt and Bourgeault, 1997; McDonald, 2012). 
Despite the potential for clinical hybrids to exercise reverse colonisation measures 
(Waring and Currie, 2009), in this case hybrid roles seemed to be exploited by the 
programme management to exert increased control over clinical professionals under the 
banner of clinical engagement. 
Respondent R15 (see page 220) highlighted the challenges faced by clinician managers in 
‘balancing between the two worlds’ of clinical practice and management (Witman et al., 
2011), and this too may have accounted for the National Clinical Leads’ limited influence 
over the NPfIT. On the other hand, Fitzgerald and Ferlie (2000) advocate that hybrids such 
as clinician-managers need to retain a strong link to their professional practice and take 
up managerial responsibilities on a part-time basis, in order to avoid being isolated, 
rejected or regarded as lacking credibility, by their clinical peers. A balance then needs to 
be struck between dedicating a sufficient amount of time to the managerial and 
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leadership duties involved in the National Clinical Lead roles, while at the same time 
continuing with professional practice alongside.  
Given the lack of power of clinical leads in the programme, clinicians needed another 
mechanism through which to input into the IT systems they were to use. This then leads 
me to the concept of the clin-IT hybrid that enables clinicians to bridge their clinical 
knowledge with the IT. Despite the existence of GPs who had successfully computerised 
their practices (Benson, 2002a), the NPfIT did not give sufficient importance to this 
important group of hybrids, and instead, the ‘ruthless standardisation’ (DH, 2002a) 
approach of the programme stifled and constrained local innovation by smaller 
entrepreneurial groups (see section 7.5.1). Despite these challenges, many clinicians had 
a sustained interest in IT development and possessed a valuable combination of clinical 
and IT knowledge. The need to avoid the mistakes committed in the NPfIT makes it 
important to understand and appreciate the significance of clin-ITs and the pivotal 
boundary spanning position that they occupy. 
7.4  Clinical informatics: Home to an emerging clinical hybrid 
In recent years there has been a rise in the number of clinicians having an active interest 
in health technologies. Clin-IT hybrid professionals include clinicians who have an interest 
in technology in either an advisory, entrepreneurial or development capacity. This then 
includes clinical informaticians who seek to transform healthcare by means of 
information and communication technology (ICT), and who are positioned at the 
intersection between the clinical and ICT fields (Gardner et al., 2009). Drawing on Reed’s 
(1996) categorisation of professionals as independent, organisational or entrepreneurial, 
clin-ITs are hybrid professionals with characteristics of independent and entrepreneurial 
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professionals, given their utilisation of technical skill (IT development) to defend their 
jurisdiction and autonomy.  
When faced by external changes and threats professionals often hone their creative skills 
to preserve their authority in their respective jurisdictions. The clin-IT hybrid meets this 
need by leveraging a combination of professional intellect and creativity (Quinn, 
Anderson and Finkelstein, 1996), to develop systems tailored to clinicians’ unique needs. 
Likewise, clinician-managers need to form adaptive strategies that enable clinical 
professionals to fulfil their clinical roles while simultaneously meeting performance and 
efficiency targets. Self-motivated creativity (Quinn, Anderson and Finkelstein, 1996) is 
therefore an inherent quality of hybrid professional roles in the clinical setting. 
Amongst the different clinical groups, my interview data suggests a higher concentration 
of these clin-IT hybrids amongst primary care physicians. This is not to say that nurses or 
secondary care physicians had no interest in clinical informatics; all five respondents from 
the nursing category regarded themselves as informaticians to different degrees, 
although not all were actively engaged in the actual development of systems. However 
these nurses constituted a relatively small percentage of the data sample (see Appendix 
A).  
Out of the thirteen GPs interviewed in my final phase of interviews, seven were GP-ITs, 
four of whom were actively engaged in IT development. The remaining three GP-ITs 
either held IT advisory roles or had started independent clinical software companies with 
the intention to provide fellow-clinicians IT systems that were informed by clinical inputs 
and therefore tailored to their needs. Amongst the ten secondary care physicians 
interviewed in the final phase, only five were clin-ITs. Two out of these five clin-ITs held IT 
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advisory roles to guide the formulation of best-practice guidelines for health IT use, and 
only three secondary care clin-ITs did hands-on IT development. 
GPs seemed to have a stronger and more active presence in the clinical informatics field 
compared to their other clinical colleagues, perhaps due to their entrepreneurial track 
record combined with their drive to improve performance of their practice (Cohen and 
Musson, 2000). I discuss this prevalence of clin-ITs amongst GPs in more detail in section 
7.4.2. Doolin (2002) discusses how clinicians’ entrepreneurial and business oriented 
nature can be context dependent, as evidenced by his study where clinicians in a public 
health system operated in line with the traditional service oriented nature of the medical 
profession, whereas these same clinicians adopted an entrepreneurial and commercially 
driven approach within their own private practices. This is evocative of a potential conflict 
of interests when clinicians work across multiple domains, and I discuss this further in 
section 7.5.3. 
Professions exist in order to resolve problems that require specialist knowledge and 
expertise, thus making the tasks in their jurisdiction a key distinguishing feature of their 
role (Freidson, 1988). These jurisdictional boundaries are prone to shifts as the nature of 
certain problems may require the attention of multiple experts, and the professional 
holding dominant control over the problem determines the subjective qualities of the 
task at hand (Abbott, 1988). This suggests that the treatment of these problems depends 
on the concerns and position of the professional group addressing them. Respondents 
R31 and R36 (see page 221) explained how their unique dual roles enabled them to 
understand the needs of their clinical peers and meet their requirements with the help of 
IT.  
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Karsh et al. (2010) emphasise that designing health technology involves more than merely 
asking users what they want as each user group has its own perceptions. As seen by 
respondent R31’s quote (see page 221), clinicians’ wants often differ from what would 
actually be beneficial to their practice, as their technical understanding is limited (Karsh et 
al., 2010). Clin-ITs occupy a unique position where they can balance clinicians’ wants with 
an awareness of clinicians’ actual work practices, as expressed by respondents R31 and 
R36, thus having a clear understanding of the complexities of clinical work and how best 
to leverage technology to meet clinical needs. Their hybrid knowledge helps them 
distinguish between clinical wants, requirements, and what is technically feasible. Despite 
their clinical knowledge, clin-ITs too need to listen to the specific requirements of their 
clinical colleagues, just as respondent R31 asked clinicians to tell him what they did. This 
also highlights clinicians’ different work practices and requirements from their clinical 
records (Berg and Bowker, 1997; McGinn et al., 2011), and a clinical background in one 
area does not qualify a person to design systems for professional colleagues without 
receiving their input. However, the common ethos of serving patients and promoting 
quality of care, may enable clin-ITs to empathise with what other clinicians want from 
their IT systems. 
With this brief overview of the clin-IT hybrid, I now turn to my empirical data to analyse 
the factors that facilitate the emergence of this clinical hybrid.  
7.4.1 Drivers for the emergence of the clin-IT hybrid 
In this section, I turn to my empirical data to discuss some of the drivers for the formation 
of clin-IT hybrids. Freidson’s (1985) theory of restratification suggests that new roles are 
created in response to threats to professional autonomy. Clinicians often adopt 
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managerial roles alongside their clinical work, to prevent control by those outside their 
profession (Ferlie et al., 2011; Montgomery, 2001). It is likely that there are similar 
antecedents that facilitate the development of clin-ITs, as I shall illustrate. In addition to 
these, I elaborate Freidson’s (1985) framework, and also propose other possible reasons 
for the emergence of the clin-IT hybrid. 
As indicated by my interview data, the significance of involving clinicians in IT 
development is being recognised by IT suppliers as well (see page 222). The attempt by 
suppliers to sell themselves by highlighting active clinical involvement in the design and 
development of their systems shows their recognition of the need for IT to be tailored to 
the unique requirements of clinical professionals. This need for clinical input in IT design 
may be one of the reasons why a significant number of clinicians have shown an interest 
in developing their own IT systems (Benson 2002a, 2002b). The question regarding what 
clinicians need from a computerised system needs to be asked, and clearly, no one would 
be in a better position to answer this than clinicians themselves (Smith, 1996). 
‘Illegible handwriting’ referred to in Respondent R9’s account of a company highlighting 
how it engaged with clinicians, is a frequently cited criticism of clinical data entry into 
paper records (Volpp and Grande, 2003). IT developers may also be of the opinion that 
data entered in clinical records are not organised and are reflective of bad data entry 
practices. However, Heath and Luff (1996) suggest that what appears to be unorganised 
data in a health record might be the result of complex clinical thought processes that 
inform decision-making. EHRs are embodiments of tacit clinical practices that ‘inform 
both the writing of the record and their reading by “any” general practitioner’ (Heath and 
Luff, 1996:355). In the mentioned quote, the ‘Designed by doctors for doctors’ slogan in 
Chapter 7 
243 
 
illegible handwriting may have been a tactic employed by the company to demonstrate 
its identification and understanding of how and why clinicians enter data the way they do. 
The company’s apparent empathy with clinical work practices combined with its 
involvement of doctors for systems’ design was used to legitimise their IT offerings, 
reflecting their underlying recognition of the benefits of clinical involvement in IT 
development and design. 
With this brief discussion on how IT companies themselves are beginning to encourage 
the involvement of clinicians in their design process, I now proceed to discuss some of the 
factors that trigger the emergence of clin-IT hybrids.  
7.4.1.1 External threats from the state and market 
 In addition to managerial control by non-clinicians, other externalities including the 
market and the state (Doolin, 2002; Evetts, 2013; Marsden, 1977), also pose threats to 
the autonomy and sovereignty of medical professionals (Starr, 1978). This has led to the 
‘progressive subordination of professionals’ (Muzio and Kirkpatrick, 2011: 394). Scholars 
have debated this subordination of professionals in the face of regulations and 
bureaucracy (Reed, 2007) given their capability to adapt and develop new strategies 
when they encounter such challenges (Muzio and Kirkpatrick, 2011). Restratification as a 
response to threats from the market and state (Freidson, 1985) reflects the latter 
approach, and was seen in the NPfIT.  
The NPfIT provides a classic example of a national level health IT project that was 
centrally controlled and that proposed the introduction of new systems without adequate 
consultations with the actual end-users, i.e. clinicians (see Chapters 3 and 5). This led to 
the increased prominence of resisting clin-ITs, particularly GP-ITs. ‘Cognitive dissonance’ 
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(Respondent R14, GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT Committee) between IT suppliers and clinicians 
who had experience in using computerised systems gave added impetus to clin-ITs who 
were convinced that they could develop better software solutions than those being 
offered (Respondent R37, GP, IT programmer). The friction between these different 
groups (clinicians, IT suppliers and policy makers) can be attributed to their incongruent 
technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) given their different views on the need 
and use of technology. The bridging role of clin-IT hybrid professionals can potentially 
alleviate this incongruence, as they are equipped with an understanding of both the 
clinical as well as technology domains. 
The IT suppliers responsible for delivering the NPfIT systems were regarded by some of 
my clinical respondents as materialistic and incompetent (see pages 124 and 126). The 
prospect of having to comply and make do with what the IT suppliers provided would not 
have been taken well by the medical profession, as IT developers cannot claim the 
professional status and reputation possessed by physicians (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 
1988).  
Respondent R14’s (GP, BMA-RCGP Joint IT Committee) description of the NPfIT’s IT 
suppliers as ‘flashy’ ‘slick suits’ who had ‘no experience of delivering healthcare’ (see 
pages 124 and 126) captures the antagonistic attitudes of many clinicians toward IT 
industry players. He described this situation as one of ‘cognitive dissonance’, and this 
resonates with Orlikowski and Gash’s (1994) theory of incongruent technology frames 
where the interests and perspectives of different user groups regarding technology are 
very different and often conflicting. 
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A similar resentment to control by managers, whom clinicians regard as non-professional, 
is highlighted by Fitzgerald and Ferlie (2000). This dissatisfaction at having to be 
subordinate to occupations that did not possess the professional status of medicine, 
combined with the lack of clinical engagement within the NPfIT may have spurred 
clinicians to continue with their independent ventures in an attempt to retain some 
autonomy over their practices. However, as one respondent pointed out, it was a highly 
challenging atmosphere as smaller IT suppliers were threatened by the larger Local 
Service Providers contracted by the NPfIT. These frictions aggravated clinicians’ 
resentment and resistance, and contributed toward the increased chasm between 
clinicians and the IT suppliers, resulting in renewed efforts by a small niche group of clin-
ITs, particularly GP-ITs, to exercise their autonomy in the face of state and market 
pressure. Such ventures reflect a deliberate move to protect their clinical practice from 
external authority and interference (Montgomery, 2001), and relates to Freidson’s (1985) 
notion of restratification, as professionals employ technical skills to maintain 
independence from external IT suppliers and government imposed control. 
7.4.1.2 Incentives 
The use of computers by GPs in UK has been far ahead of their secondary care 
counterparts (Benson 2002a, 2002b). This may in part be attributed to the incentives in 
place for GPs to use computerised systems. Respondent R9 (see page 223) elaborated on 
these schemes and explained how this enabled GPs to improve their working practices by 
means of computers. Incentives such as these free computer schemes (Heath and Luff, 
1996; Jha et al., 2008) and the need for measurement of quality as required by the 
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Quality And Outcomes Framework which was established in 2004 (Roland, 2004) acted as 
motivators to implement computer systems in GP practices in England.  
Initiatives by market players such as VAMP, where the systems were financed by selling 
GPs’ data to pharmaceutical companies (Heath and Luff, 1996) contributed to the spurt in 
computerised GP practices. Given that technology reflects the purposes of those who 
design or pay for the systems (Davidson, 2002; Walsh and Fahey, 1986; Anderson, 2008), 
the systems offered to GP practices may not have been conducive to the established 
practices of primary care. Data entry pertaining to patient diagnosis and treatment had to 
be inputted in formalised and specific formats, as they were to be used by pharmaceutical 
companies (Heath and Luff, 1996). This use of anonymised or pseudo-anonymised clinical 
information for research purposes has been debated (Foster and Young, 2012; Malin, 
Karp and Scheuermann, 2010) and is often the cause of much concern on the part of 
patients who may regard themselves the sole owners of their personal health 
information.  
The structured nature of EHRs and prescribed data entry formats may also be regarded by 
clinicians as disruptions or control mechanisms (Ash, Berg and Coiera, 2004). While 
standardised records and data entry standards are important for interoperability, 
collaborative healthcare, performance measurement, secondary use of data and patient 
safety (Wallis, 2007), in this case the standards would have been imposed by market 
players (AAH Meditel and VAMP) for their benefit and not necessarily with the interests 
of clinicians or patients in mind. The design of health records needs to be tailored to 
users’ needs (Wallis, 2007) and take into account the way clinicians interrogate their 
records when searching for data (Wyatt and Wright, 1998). As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
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needs of users vary between clinical specialties, posing further challenges to the design of 
EHRs. This emphasises the need for clinical input in the design of EHRs, to ensure that 
systems meet the needs of their diverse range of users.  
The Quality And Outcomes Framework, while encouraging the use of computers to record 
the performance of GP practices and consequently reward best practice (McDonald, 
2012; Roland, 2004), could be regarded as yet another platform from which the state 
exerts indirect control over the clinical profession. It can also be considered a form of 
‘enforced self-regulation’ (Dent, 2005) as GP practices that perform well are rewarded 
accordingly, thus encouraging clinicians to meet the measures of the framework. 
Representing state-driven priorities and indicators rather than recognising the intangible 
and often unquantifiable nature of quality of care, the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
with its incentives has been described by some as ‘deeply corrosive to the ethical practice 
of medicine’ (Mangin and Toop, 2007: 435).  
Although autonomy is considered an integral characteristic of the medical profession 
(Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1988), much of the autonomy and control physicians exert is 
with the support given to them by the state (Freidson, 2007). The support from the state 
could be extended in the form of funding and incentives to computerise practices as I 
have discussed. Whether the incentives provided by the British state and market players 
encouraged clinicians to embrace technology by providing them subsidised IT systems 
(Jha et al., 2008), or bred an environment where clinicians felt increasingly controlled and 
monitored by measures such as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (Mangin and Toop, 
2007), is a moot point. In either case they facilitated an interest in technology amongst 
clinicians, served the purpose of encouraging the increased use of computers in clinical 
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practice, and acted as a catalyst to the already existing GP efforts to develop tailored 
systems for their use. 
While economic and political autonomy varies between different regions, the content of 
professional work, i.e. establishment of domain specific guidelines for work practices, lies 
in the hands of professionals themselves (Freidson, 2007). Consequently, some clinicians 
adopt IT roles to retain the inherent professional boundaries and hierarchies amongst 
themselves (Coburn, Rappolt and Bourgeault, 1997; Marsden, 1977), resulting in internal 
stratification (Freidson, 1985).  
7.4.1.3 Delegation and division of work: reinforcing boundaries 
In Chapter 6 I highlighted the capacity of EHRs to shift and redefine professional 
boundaries due to the increased overlap of professional roles (Bossen, Jensen and Witt, 
2012), illustrating the potential for technology to ‘combine jurisdictions’ (Abbot, 1988: 
239). This too is a threat to medicine’s autonomy and distinct jurisdiction, as professional 
power, status and hierarchies are mediated by technology use (Barley, 1986; Tjora, 2000). 
The tensions between specific clinical groups such as primary care physicians, secondary 
care physicians and nurses, that I discussed briefly in Chapter 6, surfaced in my interviews 
with clin-ITs as well.  
Respondent R31 (see page 223) described how in the early 1980s he developed systems 
that had specific interfaces for nurses to enter basic data for physicians. Medical 
professionals delegate less important or mundane tasks to those whom they consider 
occupying lower ranks in the clinical hierarchy (McMurray, 2010; Nancarrow and 
Borthwick, 2005; Allen, 1998), and as indicated by respondent R31 nurses often serve as 
‘handmaidens’ to the medical profession (Currie, Finn and Martin, 2008). In this case, this 
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demarcation and delegation of tasks is done by clin-ITs right from the design phase of the 
system, thus attempting to embed professional boundaries and hierarchies within the 
system itself. Clearly, the development of health IT is often reflective of the hierarchies 
and jurisdictional boundaries that are characteristic of healthcare (Marsden, 1977; 
Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005).  
However, this traditional perception of nurses as subservient to the medical profession 
(Horrocks, Anderson and Salisbury, 2002), is one which has been changing, as seen by the 
establishment of new ‘less-bounded’ nursing roles such as nurse practitioners and nurse 
consultants (Currie, Finn and Martin, 2010). This is partly facilitated by technology, which 
enables re-negotiation of the doctor-nurse boundary (Tjora, 2000).  
The differences between technology use by primary care and secondary care were also 
evident from my findings. Respondent R9’s (see page 224) reference to GPs’ 
possessiveness over their systems as their tool illustrates the ownership of systems in 
primary care, enabling GPs to utilise computers for their own benefit, as they are 
remunerated on the basis of the recorded performance of their practices (Cohen and 
Musson, 2000; Doolin, 2002; Roland, 2004). While GPs might not deliberately adopt clin-
IT hybrid roles to reinforce the boundaries between primary and secondary care, their 
clear possessiveness of their IT system as their tools suggests an element of exclusivity in 
the way GPs use their systems. This might explain the ‘enthusiastic adoption of 
computing by general practitioners but widespread alienation of hospital doctors’ in this 
regard (Benson, 2002a: 1086). The next section discusses clinicians’ use of IT for improved 
performance and profitability in further detail. 
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7.4.1.4 Quality of care, improved performance and profits 
One of the traits commonly attributed to the medical profession is its traditional 
commitment to serve people (Freidson, 1988). Today, this takes the form of improving 
quality and efficiency of healthcare delivery, so that patients receive the best treatment 
possible. In the case of clin-ITs, this is seen in their interest to develop IT for the purpose 
of improved healthcare delivery, as was seen from Respondent R35’s quote (see page 
225). This showcases the service oriented nature of the medical profession (Abbott, 1988) 
as well as the self-motivated creativity (Quinn, Anderson and Finkelstein, 1996) of such 
clin-ITs as they endeavour to adapt their practices and the technologies used, to better 
serve their professional roles and responsibilities.  
While improved healthcare delivery is often the cited reason for embarking into the 
clinical informatics domain, and may well be the case, GP practices in the UK operate as 
businesses that profit from improved performance outcomes (Roland, 2004). This then 
questions the underlying reasons behind the increased use of IT by physicians, and the 
consequent phenomenon of the emergence of clin-IT hybrid professionals. While 
professionals’ specialist knowledge equips them to provide their services and fulfil certain 
roles, they can also use it as a tool for their own self-interests which could include 
monetary profits and retention of control over their work (Freidson, 1970; Bolton, Muzio 
and Boyd-Quinn, 2011). The introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework made 
it essential for primary care to record their performance details if they were to be paid 
(Roland, 2004). This was voiced by my respondents as well, and acted as an additional 
incentive for GPs to implement computerised records in their practices (Roland, 2004), as 
I discussed in the previous section. 
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The notion of ‘commercialised professionalism’ (Hanlon, 1998) is of relevance here, as it 
encourages managerial as well as entrepreneurial traits in professionals, as the gulf 
between professionals and managers is being dissolved (Dent, 2003). This is evident in the 
case of clin-IT hybrids as well, as they engage in independent and entrepreneurial 
initiatives such as setting up clinical software companies, to further the profits of their 
practices and also to commercialise the products they develop. 
7.4.1.5 Interest in IT as a hobby 
A general interest in IT programming is what often prompts clinicians to venture into the 
development arena. Some feel a sense of frustration with existing systems, and 
endeavour to take matters into their own hands, as they feel they may be able to address 
their needs and requirements in a better manner than external IT suppliers, as was 
evident from two interview respondents. This chasm between the types of systems IT 
suppliers provide and those that are developed by clinicians reflects the different 
technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) within which these different groups 
function. These respondents’ emphasis on the positive contribution that their clin-IT roles 
could make can be compared to Ashforth and Kreiner’s (1999) description of how 
individuals handle identity conflicts and challenges to their roles by means of reframing 
their work. They do this by highlighting how their IT programming role infuses value to 
clinical practice, and is not a threat or impediment to clinicians’ work practices which is 
how IT systems are often viewed (Timmons, 2003).  
Elaborating on this example of clin-ITs wanting to design their own systems, it is clear that 
unless there is clinical input, or an understanding of clinicians’ work processes, technology 
is unlikely to serve the needs of clinical practice. Computerised records promise clinicians 
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benefits including quicker and easier access to patient data. They may re-organise the 
structure of the patient record to make it clearer and tidier than traditional handwritten 
records (Heath and Luff, 1996). However, in doing so, Heath and Luff (1996) suggest that 
the EHR developers may undermine or be oblivious to clinical practices which account for 
the seemingly unorganised nature of physical records: 
By ignoring why the record is as it is, the design fails to recognise that the very 
consistencies which have been identified are themselves the products of 
systematic and socially organised practices. (Heath and Luff, 1996: 360) 
 My empirical data suggests that most clin-IT respondents identify themselves primarily as 
clinicians, and several do IT programming as a hobby rather than for commercial or 
business purposes. As hobbyist programmers work with IT mainly as a hobby, they enjoy 
more flexibility and freedom in choosing what they work on (Shah, 2006). While this 
poses challenges to completion of programming projects due to lack of formal 
monitoring, these IT developers play an important role in developing creative and 
innovative technologies as they are driven by an interest to do and learn, rather than by a 
mandatory requirement to complete a task by a given time (Shah, 2006).  
Extending this to the concept of clin-IT hybrids who engage in IT development as a hobby, 
clearly they are driven by their self-motivated creativity (Quinn, Anderson and Finkelstein, 
1996) which is vital to responding to external changes and threats to work practices. The 
pivotal boundary position occupied by these hybrid professionals at the interface 
between the clinical and technology fields, combined with their self-motivation and 
interest in IT programming, provide an excellent opportunity for the development of 
innovative technologies in the health sector, tailored to the needs of clinicians. The clin-
ITs amongst my respondents, particularly the GPs, also explained that some of the IT 
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development work they did was a result of observing their practices and addressing their 
obvious needs. In her discussion on hobbyist programmers, Shah (2006) mentions this 
tendency for hobbyists to respond to the needs of their surroundings, and this perhaps 
adds an element of agility and responsiveness to the nature of the GP-IT hybrid. 
7.4.2 Prevalence of clin-ITs amongst primary care physicians: GP-ITs 
While my empirical data included the accounts of nurses as well as doctors who had a 
strong interest in the development or formulation of guidelines related to health IT, 
evidence indicated a prevalence of the clin-IT hybrid amongst primary care physicians. 
The higher incidence of clin-ITs amongst GPs may be attributed to factors including the 
independent and business oriented nature of their practice (Cohen and Musson, 2000). 
The physical setting in which GPs work is also very different from that of secondary care 
physicians. As described by Respondent R31, the very nature of the GP setting where 
consultations are held within a single room makes the use of IT easier, thus facilitating an 
interest in its development (Benson, 2002b).  
The relative complexity of record keeping in secondary care has been discussed by 
Benson (2002b) who highlights the voluminous nature of hospital records and the 
complex workflow patterns inherent in secondary care, mandating higher security 
mechanisms. As suggested by Respondent R6, GP records on the other hand are not as 
complex and are comparatively more structured, making it easier to develop EHRs in the 
primary care setting. 
Despite scholars suggesting that GPs occupy the ‘bottom rung of the ladder’ in the 
hierarchies of healthcare (Coburn, Rappolt and Bourgeault, 1997), GPs possess a degree 
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of independence which is difficult for their secondary care counterparts to attain. Given 
their independent practices, GPs regard themselves as entrepreneurial businessmen, with 
their individual practices operating as businesses (see section 6.4.4). In the UK, this 
business oriented disposition was encouraged right from the 1990s when GPs were 
required to use IT to record data for the purpose of remuneration, thus triggering an 
interest among GPs to optimise their practice and to use technology towards this end 
(Cohen and Musson, 2000; Benson 2002a). Respondents highlighted this by citing the 
examples of GPs given subsidies for IT systems in the 1980s, and that of measures such as 
the Quality and Outcomes Framework which requires GPs to record their performance 
data in order to be rewarded for best practices. 
GPs’ aim of protecting their business interests (Cohen and Musson, 2000) causes them to 
restrict access to their data. This wish to retain control over their records was one of the 
reasons the Summary Care Record was opposed by many GPs (see Chapters 3 and 5). The 
content of the summary care records was to be derived from GPs’ records (Greenhalgh et 
al., 2010b), and there was a reluctance on the part of GPs to share the fruit of their 
labour, or the ‘crown jewels of general practice’ as described by Respondent R10 (see 
page 188).  
My interview data also showcased the sense of pride that GPs take in developing their 
own systems, unlike their secondary care counterparts who usually work under non-
clinical managers who impose control mechanisms on them by means of IT systems. GPs’ 
direct involvement in the design and development of their clinical systems made their 
relationship with their systems ‘mutually constitutive’ (Korica and Molloy, 2010). This also 
accounts for GPs’ sense of ownership of their systems as expressed by Respondent R9’s 
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description of GPs’ systems as ‘my tool, or our tool’ (see page 224). In contrast, secondary 
care consultants resent to having IT systems imposed by their managers, and are likely to 
express their dissatisfaction to their peers and non-clinical subordinates, as expressed by 
Respondent R7 (see page 224). This might result in the delegation of tasks to those whom 
they regard lower in the clinical hierarchy (McMurray, 2010; Nancarrow and Borthwick, 
2005; Allen, 1998) to relieve themselves of the responsibility of clinical data entry, since 
their minds may be resolved in their determination that they ‘don’t use these things’ (R7, 
Page 224).  
Given that professional knowledge and the information they hold acts as professionals’ 
source of power and authority (Quinn, Anderson and Finkelstein, 1996), it then follows 
that strong incentives are needed if GPs are to share information. Respondent R3’s views 
(see page 225) on information sharing practices among primary and secondary care 
clinicians highlight GPs’ apparent reticence to share their records. This however may be 
explained by the hard work that GPs have put into the computerisation of their practices, 
and their dissatisfaction at having to let others reap the benefits of their efforts. As 
Respondent R10 explained (see page 188), secondary care clinicians do not have 
established record systems like primary care practices, and GPs feel ‘they have to sweat 
over their records, and then people come along, and just nick them’. This is a classic 
example of knowledge ‘at stake’ (Carlile, 2002) as GPs do not wish to lose possession of 
their hard earned records and data by sharing them with secondary care.  
The complexity of the clinical domain (Bates, 2002; Ilie et al., 2009; Chiasson and 
Davidson, 2006) contributes to the indeterminate nature of medical knowledge 
(Boreham, 1983). The need for professionals who are not situated at extreme ends of the 
Chapter 7 
256 
 
clinician-IT spectrum, but who have a combination of clinical expertise as well as IT skills, 
was voiced by several respondents. The acquisition of specialist knowledge which spans 
different areas combined with the track record of successful computerisation of GP 
practices, places GP-ITs in a pivotal position with the capability to facilitate 
communication and collaboration in large scale health-IT projects such as the NPfIT. 
7.5  Challenges faced by clinician-IT hybrids 
Despite the benefits of having individuals with both clinical as well as IT know-how 
developing clinical systems, there is the barrier of legitimisation of their expertise and 
work. The seeming incompatibility of user-friendly versus clinically useful systems is an 
issue which often arises when clinicians develop IT themselves, as seen from my interview 
data. Two respondents (see page 229) highlighted the possible deficiencies of systems 
that are developed by clinicians. Despite perhaps knowing what they want in a system, 
clinicians are not always as adept as their IT counterparts in the actual development of an 
appropriate system.  
However, what GP systems might lack in user interface is compensated for by their 
‘exquisite’ functionality that is ‘finely honed’ to clinicians’ needs (Respondent R9, page 
229). Physicians prize the functionality of their systems over their ease of use (Walter and 
Lopez, 2008), and GP-ITs have an edge over IT suppliers as they have a clear 
understanding of clinical needs because of their own clinical knowledge and experience. 
This preference of functionality over user-friendliness of their systems may be linked to 
clinicians’ need to be able to trust their systems (Walter and Lopez, 2008), in order to 
provide their patients with the best quality care possible.  
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7.5.1 Attaining credibility in the shadow of IT giants 
The boundary role of professional hybrids means that they have to be fully engaged in 
both domains at the interface of their hybrid role, in order to retain their credibility to 
both parties. While insufficient time commitments to managerial or technical duties may 
result in questions regarding their suitability for the role, another factor which affects 
their credibility is their experience and expertise in both domains (Witman et al., 2011). 
Several interview respondents discussed challenges faced in earning the respect of non-
clinical groups such as IT suppliers. Some clinical respondents themselves voiced their 
apprehensions regarding their clin-IT colleagues, and were of the opinion that some clin-
ITs were not capable of fulfilling their responsibilities in either the clinical or IT domain.  
Medical professionals have undergone prolonged and extensive training to attain their 
independent professional status. However, not the same can be said about secondary 
roles such as management and technology development amongst professionals 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1988). Scholars have suggested that management and IT lack the 
‘professional’ nature of more established professions such as medicine (Barker, 2010; 
Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1988). This then means that those clinical professionals who have 
moved into a hybrid role, face significant challenges in terms of establishing their 
reputation and gaining trust in their new combined role.  
Although most of my clin-IT respondents did not encounter challenges to their credibility 
from their clinical peers, Respondent R36 (see page 230) suggested that his lack of formal 
qualifications or affiliation to an IT company could have deterred other clinicians from 
showing interest in a particular system he had developed. The NPfIT demonstrated a 
similar dismissal of GP-ITs as a collective group, and GPs themselves were aware of the 
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lack of seriousness with which they were taken, and considered that their unique dual 
role was perhaps regarded as unconventional or unprofessional by IT suppliers as well as 
the NPfIT management, raising questions regarding their perceived legitimacy as medical 
professionals.  
Clin-ITs clearly face a struggle in maintaining their esteemed professional position, as 
their new hybrid role might dilute their privileged reputation as authorities in the clinical 
domain (Freidson, 2007). This diminished respect for clinicians once they move into clin-IT 
roles may explain their general tendency to identify more strongly with their professional 
role such as medicine or nursing (Smith et al., 2011). Studies have shown that this 
stronger identification with their professional roles is true in the case of clinician-manager 
hybrids as well (Llewellyn, 2001).  
Clin-ITs who had started small scale health IT companies were also faced by threats in the 
market. Large scale national EHR projects are often tinged with political drivers (Takian et 
al., 2012) such as policymakers’ ‘monument complex’ (Flyvberg, Holm and Buhl, 2007), 
and the NPfIT was no exception. Smaller companies and start-ups by clinicians who were 
keen on developing tailored and useful systems for their practice were dwarfed by the 
magnitude of the national programme, and the big IT players who had been contracted.  
7.5.2  Career prospects and balancing of roles 
In their study which is in an Australian context, Smith et al. (2011: 132) suggest that 
clinical informaticians’ ‘lack of self-identification of the group’ causes them to identify 
more strongly with their professional roles. This might explain the absence of a well-
defined career structure for clin-IT hybrids, as they themselves do not always explicitly 
associate their role with that of a hybrid professional.  Respondent R6 (see page 221) 
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explained that clin-ITs in the NPfIT were neither clinicians nor technologists, and instead, 
had become a ‘merged entity’. This would have also been felt by the clinicians 
themselves, as their dual capabilities may have diluted people’s regard for them as clinical 
professionals, as they occupied an ‘in between’ state (Llewellyn, 2001) between clinical 
practice and IT. However, most clin-IT hybrids I interviewed identified more with their 
clinical role, and regarded themselves first as clinicians, with their IT interest being a 
secondary role. This is similar to past research findings that clinician-manager hybrids 
consider their managerial roles as supplementary to their clinical functions (Doolin, 2001; 
Llewellyn, 2001).  
In balancing their dual roles, hybrids are often challenged by time constraints as well as 
conflicting interests of the different domains within which they operate (Fitzgerald and 
Ferlie, 2000; Kippist and Fitzgerald, 2009). This may cause some to switch between these 
roles and experiment with ‘provisional selves’ (Ibarra, 1999) to balance their clinical and 
non-clinical responsibilities. Kreiner, Hollensbe and Sheep (2006: 1045) regard these 
provisional selves as ephemeral roles that involve ‘temporarily escaping one’s 
predominant role set and stepping into an entirely different role’, and that entail identity 
work (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003) as individuals deal with the challenges of their 
multiple roles. By exploring and trialling different roles, professionals can negotiate 
between their existing roles and those that they aspire to (Ibarra, 1999).  
This notion of ‘provisional selves’ (Ibarra, 1999) was reflected in one case where a GP 
respondent had moved away from clinical work in order to explore the possibility of 
starting an independent clinical software company (see page 233). Challenges in 
balancing time between clinical and non-clinical responsibilities often deters clinicians 
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from taking up dual roles, as they prefer to focus on their clinical work for which they 
have undergone prolonged training (Doolin, 2001), as in the case of Respondent R37. 
However, this respondent opted to step aside from his clinical role and focus on his IT 
interests, trialling this secondary role for a few months. While Kreiner, Hollensbe and 
Sheep (2006) used examples of participation in recreational activities and groups such as 
sports to discuss ephemeral roles, this can be extended to alternate work roles, 
particularly in the case of IT related roles as many clinical professionals engage in IT 
development as a hobby rather than out of commercial interest (see section 7.4.1.5). 
In section 7.3 I discussed the need for hybrid professionals to engage in their secondary 
roles on a part-time basis, to retain credibility in the eyes of their professional peers 
(Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000). In the case of hybrids such as respondent R37 who opt to 
shed their primary professional responsibilities to trial a new role, they may have to 
contend with issues regarding the trust and reliability afforded to them by fellow 
clinicians.  
Respondent R37’s decision to trial an IT oriented role by starting up a clinical software 
company showcases initiative and self-reliance – characteristics typical of 
entrepreneurship (Doolin, 2002). This feeds back into the discussion on the prominence 
of GP-ITs due to their independent and entrepreneurial nature compared to their 
secondary care colleagues (section 7.4.2). Respondent R37’s experience echoes the view 
that hybrid roles often result in internal conflicts due to the challenges of balancing time 
between two different and potentially conflicting roles (Kippist and Fitzgerald, 2009). He 
opted to trial (Ibarra, 1999) a purely IT role in response to the difficulties of juggling 
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clinical and IT tasks. However, although he put a temporary halt to his clinical practice, 
this does not indicate an abandonment of identification with his medical role.  
One respondent (R16, A medical director previously involved with Connecting for Health) 
expressed a negative opinion of GPs who had an IT role within Connecting for Health (see 
page 234), suggesting that they had turned away from their clinical responsibilities and 
did not contribute positively to IT development either due to their lack of understanding 
of the secondary care setting. In the case of respondent R37 however, there was a 
potential interest in returning to clinical practice, and his hiatus from clinical practice was 
partly due to his wish to cope with the initial steep learning curve which accompanied his 
IT role.  
Respondent R6 (see page 232) mentioned the advantage that medical professionals have 
in being able to always return to their clinical practice even if their other secondary roles 
did not prove successful. Not only does this again reflect the tendency of clinical 
professionals to identify themselves primarily with their clinical role (Smith et al., 2011), 
but it also reflects the unique position afforded to medical professionals in society 
(Abbott, 1988). Acknowledged as a profession which enjoys a preeminent position with a 
significant amount of autonomy and dominance, medicine, it has been suggested 
persuades people to ‘medicalise’ their problems and be convinced of their need for the 
services of the medical profession (Freidson, 1988; 1985). This then makes it less 
problematic for medical professionals to ‘trial’ other roles (Ibarra, 1999), and either 
balance their clinical and non-clinical tasks (Witman et al., 2011), or revert to their 
primary professional identity when they need to. However, this ease of switching roles 
(Ibarra, 1999) is a double-edged sword, as it could potentially be regarded as a lack of 
Chapter 7 
262 
 
professional commitment by peers (Witman et al. 2011), as I will discuss in the next 
section. Scholars have cautioned against such discontinuity and disruption to clinical 
practice due to the challenges of securing credibility in the eyes of professional colleagues 
who could regard hybrids as traitors to the profession (Farrel and Morris, 2003; Witman 
et al., 2011). 
7.5.3 Conflicts of interest 
Professional hybrids such as clinician-managers encounter conflicts between their 
professional and organisational roles. Identity work (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003), the 
way in which professionals deal with these differences and construct their identities is 
relevant to how hybrids balance their seemingly contradictory roles and responsibilities. 
The ‘constant struggle bringing about temporary views of the self, where certain identity 
versions dominate over the others, depending on the context’ (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 
2003) is operational in the concept of provisional selves (Ibarra, 1999), as individuals trial 
roles, and alternate between different contexts and work responsibilities (Kreiner, 
Hollensbe and Sheep, 2006). These conflicts between roles is present among clin-IT 
hybrids as well, as they may be perceived as having commercial interests in promoting IT 
systems as opposed to clinical professionals’ traditional purely service-oriented ethos 
(Hanlon, 1998). 
Efforts to balance multiple conflicting roles can cause people to create a hierarchy to 
distinguish the importance of their different roles and identities with higher ranked roles 
being the ones more likely to be enacted (Kreiner, Hollensbe and Sheep, 2006). This is 
another explanation for most clin-ITs’ primary identification with their clinical role as 
evident from my empirical data.  
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Respondent R35, a GP involved in a software company, explained that his primary aim 
was to improve the quality of clinical practice by means of the software developed by his 
company, and that it was not intended for profit making (see page 227). This respondent 
felt the need to clarify the motivation for setting up his IT company, possibly to refute any 
suggestion that this aspect of his work was morally ‘tainted’ (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999) 
by commercial drivers. His rationale also reflects his primary identification with his clinical 
role as a GP, and his aim to improve clinical practice rather than make profits alone.  
To Respondent R36 on the other hand, commercialisation of software developed by clin-
ITs was important, as it seemed futile to spend so much effort into IT development 
without being able to make any profits from it. Commercial incentives are then one of the 
drivers for the sustained development of the clin-IT role – be it profit out of marketing 
their developed software as expressed by Respondent R36, or through increased profit 
for their practice due to more efficient work practices facilitated by the implemented 
technology. 
Apart from conflicts and challenges from non-clinical elements, clinical hybrids often have 
to contend with their peers who may regard them as traitors or anomalies to the 
profession (Witman et al., 2011). The lack of professional prestige associated with 
managerial and IT oriented roles may cause clinical professionals to look down on hybrid 
professions who take up the ‘dirty work’ (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999) of controlling 
professionals via managerial or IT mechanisms. My empirical data did not suggest that 
clin-ITs themselves feel that their roles and work are regarded as ‘dirty work’ (Ashforth 
and Kreiner, 1999) that was viewed with condescension by their clinical colleagues.  
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However there were clinical respondents who did have extremely negative opinions of 
their clin-IT peers. Respondent R16’s condescending view of GP-ITs in the national 
programme (see page 234) reflects an underlying opinion that they were traitors or 
anomalies to the profession, and a similar perception is often associated with clinician-
manager hybrids (Witman et al., 2011). His negative attitude towards these GP-ITs was 
aggravated by the way they distanced themselves from their GP roles to ‘turn themselves 
into IT consultants’, and suggests that he regarded their IT responsibilities as ‘dirty work’ 
(Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999) that lacked the prestige, status and prolonged training that 
is characteristic of the medical profession (Abbott, 1988). His description of these GPs 
prompts the question, what constitutes a clin-IT? Clearly, the clinicians that Respondent 
R16 referred to had abandoned their clinical roles and no longer identified themselves as 
GPs. It is therefore essential to emphasise that the clin-IT role requires active involvement 
with both the clinical as well as IT domains, or an on-going interest and empathy with 
both areas.  
This respondent felt that those GPs who ventured into the technology arena did so for 
financial reasons and out of dissatisfaction with their clinical work. This is similar to 
Llewellyn’s (2001) findings that clinician-manager hybrids sometimes have to contend 
with others’ opinions that they move to managerial roles due to their lack of clinical skills. 
Respondent R16’s description of these GPs as ‘roaming around the place’ captures a 
picture of these clinicians not utilising their time and resources to any meaningful end, 
apart from their own personal profit, suggesting that he regarded their role as morally 
tainted (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999). The view that these GPs did not gain satisfaction 
from their medical work and preferred to identify themselves as ‘IT consultants’ fuelled 
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respondent R16’s antagonistic opinions of them, emphasising the need for clinical hybrids 
to maintain continuity with their medical practice to retain credibility and respect 
amongst their clinical colleagues (Witman et al. 2011). Therefore, to qualify as meaningful 
boundary spanning professionals, clin-ITs need to maintain their association with their 
clinical practice, or be able to retain their ability to understand their fellow clinicians’ 
needs, rather than crossing over entirely into the technical domain. Commitment to 
continued medical practice has been recognised to help preserve professional identity 
and facilitate a reputation of professional commitment (O’Connor et al., 2002), and this 
holds true in the case of clin-IT hybrids as well. 
7.6  Summary 
Despite the challenges of convincing clinicians of the benefits to be gained by the 
appropriate use of EHRs, there is already a small but enthusiastic group of clinicians 
whose professional interests have persuaded them to take part actively in health IT 
development and usage. While technology may diminish professional status or 
boundaries due to its ability to enable boundary spanning (McLaughlin and Webster, 
1998; Tjora, 2000), the recognition of the value of computerised systems, combined with 
the tendency for professionals to resist control by extraneous factors (including 
technology), result in hybrid roles that merge professional occupations with the 
technology development domain. This chapter makes a contribution towards the existing 
literature on hybridisation (Noordegraaf, 2007; Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000; Waring and 
Currie, 2009; Thomas and Hewitt, 2011; Doolin, 2002) by highlighting the existence of the 
clin-IT hybrid professional that has not been subject to significant empirical research.  
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The rise of the clin-IT hybrid reflects the need felt by healthcare professionals, particularly 
GPs, to retain control not only over their clinical processes and monitoring mechanisms, 
but the tools and technologies used for these purposes. This relates to Freidson’s (1985) 
restratification principle that stipulates the assumption of specific (additional) roles by 
professionals as a means of preserving their professional group from external control. 
Although these perceived threats from the state and market as a consequence of the 
NPfIT were felt by clinicians, there were more subtle encroachments into their work 
practices by means of state and market provided incentives such as subsidised computer 
systems. While these incentives motivated GPs to computerise practices, and did not 
appear to threaten clinical autonomy, technologies are often designed to meet the 
interests of those who develop or sponsor them (Davidson, 2002; Walsh and Fahey, 
1986). The ‘shelter’ provided by the state to professions (Johnson, 1995:10; Freidson, 
1988), although not constraining their technical work, limits their absolute autonomy as 
they need to comply with certain requirements of the state as their protective custodian 
(Freidson, 1988). While the technology incentives offered to clinicians by the state would 
at first glance appear to support the medical profession, it is likely that these incentives 
were intended to meet specific aims of market and state players, as was evident by the 
utilisation of data generated by GP practices for market research purposes. However, 
despite this ulterior motive, the incentives also had a catalytic effect on GP practices’ use 
of computerised systems. This sparked an interest in GPs who were keen to develop 
better solutions, as was the attitude of one clin-IT respondent 
Elaborating Freidson’s (1985) theory of restratification as a consequence of threats to 
professional autonomy, the formation of these professional elites or hybrids are not 
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necessarily a response to extraneous factors alone, but could also be due to internal 
threats amongst the professions (Coburn, Rappolt and Bourgeault, 1997). This effort to 
prevent colonisation (Waring and Currie, 2009) by clinical colleagues is directed towards 
preserving the traditional hierarchies present amongst clinicians (Marsden, 1977).  
In the case of clin-IT hybrid professionals, technology may be used to reinforce these 
hierarchies and further the degree of internal stratification. Clin-ITs who design health IT 
systems can determine how technology can be used to delegate tasks to specific 
clinicians, as opposed to the use of technology to facilitate task drift (Bossen, Jensen and 
Witt, 2012). For example, by delineating the responsibilities of physicians and nurses by 
means of technology, clin-ITs reinforce the traditional physician-nurse boundary and 
reduce the possibility of vertical substitution (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005) wherein 
professionals move up hierarchies due to shifts in role boundaries.  
Also, tensions between primary care physicians and secondary care specialists may exist 
due to the latter regarding GPs as lacking in specialist knowledge (Marshall, 1999) and 
feeling that they do not need to learn from their primary care colleagues (Berendsen et 
al., 2006). Such conflicts between medical professionals accentuate the divisions and 
boundaries between primary and secondary care. Whether GPs’ use of technology to 
manage their patient records as their ‘crown jewels’, as Respondent R10 described (see 
page 188), is a strategic move to assert themselves and cause other clinical professionals 
to depend on their primary care data, is an interesting possibility.  
While the discussion up to this point on why clinicians may take up dual clin-IT roles may 
be linked to the theory of restratification in response to threats to professional 
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autonomy, the latter two factors which I highlight, present two different characteristics 
that may be associated with clin-ITs. Freidson’s study does not account for the presence 
of other factors such as personal interests and entrepreneurial aspirations that also 
contribute to the restratification phenomenon. My findings indicate that in addition to 
possibly being a form of resistance to state and market imposed control, clin-ITs may 
emerge as a consequence of IT programming as a hobby amongst these professionals, 
and also as a result of the entrepreneurial nature of some physicians, particularly those in 
primary care. 
The entrepreneurial nature of clinicians, GPs in particular, prompts them to seek means 
by which they can improve the performance and profits of their practice, particularly due 
to the mechanisms in place to remunerate GP practices on the basis of their recorded 
performance (Cohen and Musson, 2000; Doolin, 2002). This breed of clin-ITs can be 
regarded as a fusion of independent and entrepreneurial professions (Reed, 1996), as 
they leverage their technical knowledge to facilitate and further their professional 
interests, while at the same time gain profits from their hybrid work. The concept of 
commercialised professionalism (Hanlon, 1998) is relevant to clin-ITs in such cases, as 
they combine their professional roles with entrepreneurial efforts to bridge the gaps 
between their clinical work and their IT needs. 
A general interest in IT development as a hobby was highlighted by most clin-ITs. 
Although scholars have suggested that the IS development cannot be regarded as a 
profession (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1988), technology development needs a certain 
amount of technical knowledge and interest, albeit not necessarily with formal training or 
qualifications (Abbott, 1988). Considering this point, it would seem that in the face of 
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threats by the market, state or other professionals, those clinicians who take up IT related 
roles as a defence strategy would not be completely new to the technology field. Instead, 
they would most likely be those who already regard IT as a hobby, or who have 
demonstrated entrepreneurial initiatives in designing technology for the commercial as 
well as clinical benefit of their practices.  
While external threats such as state and market control can result in restratification 
(Freidson, 1988) by prompting clinicians to take up dual clin-IT roles, these are not the 
primary reasons why clinicians engage in these roles. Instead, entrepreneurial interests in 
IT for commercial self-interest or as a hobby are the main underlying factors for the 
increasing prevalence of clinicians in IT development. However, this is not to deny the 
role of external threats in facilitating the phenomenon of clin-IT hybrids. I argue that 
these two factors, i.e., an interest in IT for commercial purposes or as a hobby, are pre-
requisites for the emergence of clin-ITs in response to market and state threats. Without 
this inherent interest and active engagement with IT, the expected outcome of imposed 
control by external threats would be either subordination (Reed, 2007) or heightened 
clinical resistance to technology, which have been the subject of numerous studies (Ford 
et al., 2009; Walsh, 2004).  
I have also discussed the key challenges faced by clin-IT hybrid professionals, including 
their need to retain credibility in the eyes of their peers, the competition and pressure 
they face from other IT players, and the many conflicts of interest which are inherent in 
the healthcare field. Efforts to deal with these external challenges and the conflicts 
between their multiple responsibilities might prompt clin-IT hybrids to engage in ‘identity 
work’ (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003). Clinicians’ possession of highly specialised 
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medical knowledge and expertise provides them with a stable foundation on which to fall 
back on, should their interests in technology development not prove successful. This 
anchors them firmly so that they are more confident to venture into non-clinical domains 
such as management and IT development, drawing parallels to Ibarra’s (1999) discussion 
on provisional selves and trialling of alternate ‘ephemeral’ (Kreiner, Hollensbe and Sheep, 
2006) roles.  
While most respondents agreed with the need for increased recognition of clinicians who 
have IT skills, a minority expressed dissatisfaction and resentment regarding the clinicians 
who were involved with the NPfIT in an IT oriented role. They regarded these clinicians as 
having transitioned into technology development out of dissatisfaction with their clinical 
roles, or due to monetary incentives, and were of the opinion that they had lost touch 
with their clinical side. This then emphasises the need for sustained involvement or at 
least interest in clinical practice, for clin-ITs to be effective. The general tendency of 
industry players to look down upon, or to ignore clinicians, may also trigger a need for 
clin-ITs to prove themselves capable of developing products which are as good as, if not 
better than those developed by their IT counterparts. These challenges suggest that clin-
ITs potentially engage in identity work (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003) to deal with 
conflicts between their multiple roles, difficulties in balancing their time between these, 
and the possible disparagement encountered from IT players as well as clinical peers. 
The important role of clin-IT hybrid professionals is one which needs to investigated in 
greater depth, given the tremendous potential offered by these hybrids to act as 
translators and intermediates between the clinical and IT domains. This chapter is a 
response to this need, and presents empirical evidence to stress the pivotal position 
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occupied by clin-ITs and the challenges they are typically faced with. Having presented my 
key findings and discussions, I now proceed to the last chapter where I provide a brief 
integrated discussion linking my three findings chapters, and my conclusions.  
 
 
 CHAPTER 8  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
8.1   Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide a brief integrated discussion which links the key points from my 
findings in a cohesive manner, and my conclusions from this study. The intention is not to 
elaborate on the discussions already provided in chapters 5 to 7, but instead to explain 
how these three separate strands of thought fit together in a broader way.  
The previous three chapters provided an overview of my main findings and discussions. I 
first presented the NPfIT story and used the concepts of organising visions (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997) and boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) to analyse some of the 
main phases that marked the programme. I then narrowed my discussion specifically to 
EHRs, illustrating their capacity to act as boundary objects interfacing between different 
users, facilitating knowledge flow across boundaries (Carlile 2002, 2004) and also 
potentially shifting these boundaries. Continuing on the theme of shifting and bridging 
boundaries, Chapter 7 put forward the concept of a unique professional hybrid, the clin-
IT, showing how such hybrid professionals step beyond the confines of their traditional 
professional jurisdictions by adopting new IT related roles in addition to their primary 
clinical role.  
In the next section I encapsulate the significance of my findings chapters in relation to 
each other. The key concepts of organising visions, boundary objects and professional 
hybrids are interwoven to explain the use of EHRs by different professionals and the 
boundary spanning capabilities of both EHRs as well as clin-ITs in the context of the NPfIT. 
This is followed by the presentation of my conclusions. I highlight my key findings and 
contributions, explaining how these meet the research objectives of this thesis. I then 
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briefly discuss the implications for practice, limitations of my study and scope for future 
research. 
8.2  Discussion 
Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) account of discourse within organising visions recognises 
the multiple and conflicting inputs from a range of stakeholders. However, the interaction 
between these groups is not highlighted in their work. The three ‘choruses’, namely the 
defenders, the sympathetic critics and the professional critics in the NPfIT (Sauer and 
Willcocks, 2007) had distinct interests and influenced the programme in different ways. 
The failure in attempts to engage with stakeholders during the different phases of the 
NPfIT led to a lack of consideration of the incongruent technology frames (Orlikowski and 
Gash, 1994) and the inter-epistemic nature (McGivern and Dopson, 2010) of its key 
component, the NHS Care Record Service.  
The use of boundary objects proves useful to investigate the on-going dynamics between 
stakeholder groups within organising visions.. By analysing the buzzwords in the NPfIT 
organising vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) as different phases or boundary objects 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989) contained within a larger overarching temporal boundary 
object (Chang, Hatcher and Kim, 2013) that was the NPfIT, Chapter 5 highlighted tensions, 
misinterpretations, re-interpretations and the changing nature of discourse in the 
organising vision.  
Figure 8.1 (see page 275) attempts to depict the relevance of boundary objects to the 
NPfIT organising vision as well as to the use of EHRs by clinicians and patients. However, it 
needs to be borne in mind that the complexity and murkiness of the NPfIT makes it 
difficult to represent these concepts within the confines of a diagram. Figure 8.1 merely 
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seeks to provide a basic representation of how the different strands of theory which have 
been discussed in previous chapters may be brought together in order to better 
understand some aspects of the national programme.  
While Sauer and Willcocks’ identification of the three choruses in the NPfIT enable the 
convenient representation of some of the key stakeholder groups in the programme in 
view of the theoretical underpinnings of this study, it has its limitations as well. Though 
Figure 8.1 categorises various stakeholders (such as IT suppliers, the Department of 
Health and clinicians) into these three choruses, my empirical data points to a high level 
of fluidity between these three categories  (represented by the bi-directional arrows 
between them in the figure). The volatile nature of the NPfIT led to much dissatisfaction 
amongst many, including some key clinical leads within the programme. My respondents 
included individuals who had held high level positions within the NPfIT, but were later 
eliminated from the programme due to differences between their interests that were 
driven by quality healthcare delivery, and that of the NPfIT management which was more 
interested in the speedy roll-out of the programme (see Chapters 3 and 5). People who at 
one time were ‘defenders’ of the programme thus later moved to the other end of the 
spectrum, becoming vocal critics of the NPfIT.   
Many of the ‘defenders’ who were Clinical Leads, would also fall under the category of 
the ‘sympathetic critics’ as they were clinicians whose practices would have been affected 
by the progress and outcomes of the NPfIT. Clearly, as mentioned earlier, the complexity 
of the programme is difficult to represent in a single diagram. However, Figure 8.1 meets 
the purpose of bringing together the key theoretical concepts of boundary objects, 
organising visions and professional hybrids, to illustrate them in the context of the NPfIT. 
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critics
Boundary objects in the NPfIT 
organising vision:
 Contracting
 Engagement
 Confidentiality & privacy 
Nurses
Physicians
      Patients
Department of Health/ Connecting for 
Health
EHRs as inter-epistemic 
boundary objects 
facilitating knowledge 
flow across boundaries
IT suppliers
Clinician-
manager 
hybrids
EHRs
Clin-IT 
hybrids
Limited influence in the 
NPfIT organising vision
Not given due importance in the NPfIT 
 
Figure 8.1 Encapsulation of key concepts: The significance of professional and boundary objects 
among the three ‘choruses’ in the NPfIT organising vision 
Scholars have highlighted the multidisciplinary nature of innovations in a biomedical 
context, and the importance of boundary objects in enabling knowledge sharing between 
different specialist groups involved (Swan et al., 2007). The NPfIT provides a similar 
example of multidisciplinary innovation because of the novelty of the proposed IT 
systems and the multiple worlds (political, clinical, technical, commercial and academic) 
that they spanned (Greenhalgh et al., 2010b: 15-16). These multiple worlds are included 
in Sauer and Willcocks’ (2007) categorisation of the three ‘choruses’ that are depicted in 
Figure 8.1. 
The NHS Care Record Service was essentially a glorified EHR, meant to enable storage of 
patients’ EHRs on a national Spine. In order to understand the complexities of EHRs at a 
national level, and the diverse needs of its users, the programme should have considered 
what the very notion of an EHR meant to its multiple clinical users. It is for this reason 
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that it is relevant to analyse EHRs separately, as boundary objects in their own right 
(Chapter 6).  
The different uses that stakeholders ‘inscribe’ onto a technology result in it serving 
multiple purposes, highlighting the ambiguity of technology (Spicer, 2005) and its capacity 
for interpretive flexibility (Pinch and Bijker, 1987) as an inter-epistemic boundary object 
(McGivern and Dopson, 2010). EHRs serve an array of purposes including being static 
repositories of data, financial and administrative tools, sources for data for secondary 
use, and business tools to improve healthcare delivery and boost profits of practices 
(Chapter 6). In discussing these different uses, the notion of knowledge differences and 
dependencies (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) becomes relevant as the different types of 
data used by users, and their different needs for data from other users, can be provided 
via EHRs. Figure 8.1 (page 275) illustrates the pivotal position occupied by EHRs as they 
facilitate knowledge flow across boundaries amongst clinicians and also between 
clinicians and patients. 
In their discussion on organising visions, Swanson and Ramiller (1997) also acknowledge 
the formation of new roles and the shifts in hierarchies that occur as a consequence of IS 
innovations. This was evident in the NPfIT with the incorporation of National Clinical 
Leads, who can be categorised as clinician-manager hybrid professionals (Montgomery, 
2001). The NPfIT however did not take into consideration the presence of yet another 
emerging role, the clin-IT hybrid.  
While EHRs have the potential to blur professional boundaries by enabling users to 
assume tasks previously beyond their jurisdictions (Bossen, Jensen and Witt, 2012), they 
are also capable of reinforcing existing boundaries (Bloomfield and Hayes, 2009). For 
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instance, when clin-ITs design systems to clearly demarcate the tasks done by physicians 
from those done by nurses (Chapter 7) this reinforces the control over these jurisdictions. 
Studies have also shown how medical physicians delegate less important or mundane 
tasks to those whom they consider to occupy lower ranks in the clinical hierarchy 
(McMurray, 2010; Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005; Allen, 1998). This highlights the 
capacity of clin-ITs to exploit EHRs to reproduce traditional clinical hierarchies by the way 
they delegate tasks through the technology. 
Clinicians who are actively and directly involved in the development and implementation 
of health IT have an increased sense of ownership of their systems, and their identities 
and the technology are likely to be more ‘mutually constitutive’ (Korica and Molloy, 
2010). Their use as well as non-use of technology influences the way they are regarded as 
professionals, as this could determine whether patients approach them for a particular 
problem (Korica and Molloy, 2010). The uses that they ‘inscribe’ onto a system could be 
reflective of efforts to exercise power and dominance over other groups (Spicer, 2005). 
Given the view that GPs do not occupy a high rank in the medical hierarchy compared to 
their secondary care colleagues (Coburn, Rappolt and Bourgeault, 1997), the enthusiasm 
for computerised records demonstrated by most GPs and the rise of GP-IT hybrids is 
possibly an indicator of GPs’ efforts to establish their status and independence by 
becoming ‘insiders’ (Korica and Molloy, 2010) to the development and implementation of 
computerised systems. 
However, clin-IT hybrid professionals play a crucial boundary spanning role as well, by 
bridging the two very different domains of healthcare and IT. While boundaries separate 
knowledge from different domains, acknowledging knowledge which is situated at these 
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boundaries and that overlaps multiple fields is important for cross-disciplinary efforts as it 
links groups that are typically isolated from each other in terms of their skills, capacities 
and knowledge (Carlile, 2004).  
In the case of the NPfIT, clin-ITs could have contributed significantly to the programme 
because of their hybrid knowledge and boundary spanning capabilities. However, their 
expertise and success in the use of health IT was not acknowledged, and the NPfIT did not 
make use of the opportunity to draw on their experiences. Despite the NPfIT’s lack of 
engagement with clin-ITs, this breed of professionals had a sustained interest in the 
development of IT.  
Although state support often facilitates clinical (economic and political) autonomy 
(Freidson, 2007), there may be a shift in dynamics when state interests are at odds with 
those of clinicians (Thomas and Hewitt, 2011). The NPfIT as the flagship government 
programme for health IT in the English NHS, had strong political backing to promote 
increased investment in health IT as recommended by the Wanless (2002) report. Most 
clinicians on the other hand, found the project questionable in terms of its feasibility and 
value for money, and felt that it was meant to serve political interests rather than clinical 
needs. In Chapter 7 I discussed how state and market threats may have a catalytic effect 
on clin-ITs as they leverage their technology interests and drive for improved 
performance to counteract challenges posed to their autonomy. Clearly, in the NPfIT clin-
ITs were compelled to distance themselves from the programme, rather than exploit their 
capacity as boundary spanners, as the programme’s aims did not align with their clinical 
aims and interests.  
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Disparities in the technology frames within which the different stakeholders were 
embedded were very clear, and the role of health professional hybrids, both clinical 
managers as well as clin-ITs was critical for successful rollout of a project as ambitious as 
the NPfIT. However, the involvement of these groups of hybrid professionals was either 
limited (in the case of the National Clinical Leads) or conspicuously absent (the clin-IT 
hybrids). Though the clinician-manager hybrid was present in the operation of NPfIT in 
the form of the National Clinical Leads, several respondents suggested that these clinical 
leads had limited influence and credibility in practice. Those clinicians who had IT related 
roles within the NPfIT were either not appropriately involved in the development process 
(for instance, involvement of the Common User Interface team at a relatively late stage) 
or were viewed by their clinical colleagues as neither satisfied with their clinical roles nor 
capable and efficient in their IT roles (see Chapter 7).  
The clinical-manager and the clin-IT hybrid professionals had the capacity to act as 
bridges between the defenders and sympathetic critics (Sauer and Willcocks, 2007) in the 
NPfIT (see Figure 8.1, page 275). The limited recognition given to these hybrids, 
particularly the clin-ITs, was an unfortunate shortcoming of the programme and 
contributed to the key criticism of the NPfIT, namely the lack of meaningful engagement 
mechanisms (Coiera, 2007; Cresswell et al., 2011; Hendy et al., 2005). 
Having summarised the discussions from my findings chapter and illustrated how they 
relate to each other, I shall now present my conclusions and their implications for 
practice.  
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8.3  Conclusion 
 In this section I return to the research questions that drove this thesis, and outline the 
key findings and contributions derived from this research. 
 The study began with the aim to investigate the progress of EHR implementation in 
England in the context of the recently dismantled NPfIT. The large scale of the 
programme and its high visibility made it subject to much media publicity as well as 
criticism. I employed the theoretical concepts of organising visions (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997), boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) to inform the research 
process. My research was initiated with the following research questions: 
1. How did the NPfIT organising vision develop under the influence of the 
discourse prevalent among stakeholders during the project?  
2. How do different users perceive EHRs, and how do professional roles influence 
how EHRs are used to mediate interactions and knowledge flow across 
boundaries? 
Emergent findings from the data collection and analysis phase prompted me to expand 
my research focus to investigate the significant presence of clinicians in advisory as well 
as design and development roles in health IT. This finding was of relevance to recent 
scholarly interest in the rise of hybrid professionals (Noordegraaf, 2007) such as clinician-
managers (Doolin, 2004; Fitzgerald, 1994; Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000; Montgomery, 
2001). The clin-IT however, is a distinct hybrid role that has not been researched in detail 
despite its importance to health IT implementations where it is critical to understand the 
complexity of the healthcare sector in order to develop useful health IT. Consequently, 
this thesis addresses the following additional research question: 
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3. What triggers the formation of the clinician-IT hybrid, and how does this align 
with Freidson’s theory of restratification amongst medical professionals? 
With this outline of what this research set out to address, I now elaborate my key 
findings. 
8.3.1 Key findings  
Although it was hoped that the NHS Care Record Service would provide continuity of care 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2003), instead it proved to be one of the 
more radical parts of the NPfIT, marked by points of discontinuity and shifts in focus 
during the course of the programme.  
Combining the concept of organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1999) and boundary 
objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989), I demonstrate how some of the key phases and 
buzzwords in the NPfIT organising vision can be regarded as boundary objects. The main 
boundary objects that marked the timeline of the NPfIT organising vision included the LSP 
contracts, , increased and varied engagement mechanisms, and later on, more patient-
focused debates that revolved around issues of confidentiality of data in the NPfIT’s NHS 
Care Record Service.  
While Swanson and Ramiller (1997) suggest that an organising vision either fades away or 
gets accepted and institutionalised, I argue that there is an alternate possibility. The 
transformation and re-incarnation of objects (McGivern and Dopson, 2010) can be 
extended to the case of organising visions given the multiple and often conflicting 
perspectives of stakeholder groups that characterise the buzzwords that emerge during 
different stages of the vision. The incongruent technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 
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1994) of these groups account for some of these inter-group tensions. I use the example 
of the transformation of the patient-centric notion of the individual’s electronic spine into 
a National Spine, and the subsequent reincarnation of the original spine concept in the 
form of the Summary Care Records. 
My findings on the multiple perspectives that EHRs are subjected to as boundary objects 
(Chapter 6) address my second research question. I link the knowledge differences and 
dependencies (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) inherent amongst clinical professionals and 
patients to the way they interface with each other using EHRs. Of particular significance is 
the way that professional roles and their associated jurisdictions and responsibilities 
influence how clinicians and patients can use EHRs to make use of knowledge held at the 
boundary where the EHRs are positioned.  
Scholars suggest that EHRs embody clinical hierarchies (Berg and Bowker, 1997) as well as 
tacit clinical practices (Heath and Luff, 1996). This stresses the significance of professional 
roles in the way EHRs are used, since clinical needs and requirements vary among 
clinicians (Berg and Bowker, 1997) as shown by my empirical data. Hierarchies inherent 
among clinicians (e.g. the traditional subordination of nurses to the medical profession) 
(Freidson, 1970) and the increasingly specialist nature of medical knowledge (Guthrie et 
al., 2008; Nettleton, 2004; RCP, 2011) indicate the need for clinical professionals to 
consult the knowledge and expertise of their clinical colleagues or superiors. The 
utilisation of the EHR to facilitate knowledge flow across syntactic, semantic or pragmatic 
boundary is therefore dependent on the roles, knowledge differences, and knowledge 
dependencies (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) among its users.  
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Drawing on users’ different perspectives on the purpose of EHRs, I elaborate how EHRs 
enable knowledge flow across syntactic, semantic and pragmatic boundaries, and how 
the nature of knowledge flow, i.e. transfer, translation or transformation (Carlile 2002, 
2004), varies between different clinicians as well as patients (see Table 6.2, page 208). 
The professional dominance and autonomy of the medical profession (Freidson, 2007) 
was reflected in my finding that the use of EHRs to transform knowledge across pragmatic 
boundaries is mainly among physicians.  
Physicians’ professional knowledge and their jurisdictional authority (Abbott, 1988; 
Freidson, 1985) enables them to make independent decisions based on patients’ 
symptoms and the information present in EHRs, following which they update or 
‘transform’ the contents of the record to reflect their findings. My findings also illustrate 
that primary care physicians go a step further by using EHRs as business tools, thus 
extending the utility of the record for non-clinical purposes as well. This also reflects the 
entrepreneurial traits of many GPs (Doolin, 2002), as they explore ways to improve the 
performance of their practices for remuneration purposes as discussed in Chapter 7, in 
the context of GP-ITs.  
Nurses on the other hand, have to defer to physicians’ decisions and knowledge (Berg and 
Bowker, 1997), and as a result are constrained to ‘translate’ or interpret EHR contents 
across semantic boundaries (Carlile 2002, 2004). Patients too are limited to this level of 
knowledge flow depending on the level of access they have to their own records. Their 
interpretations of their EHRs are constrained by their lay knowledge (Fisher and Britten, 
1993), imposing challenges to their capacity to use EHRs for knowledge ‘translation’ and 
‘transformation’ (Carlile, 2004). 
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Analysis of clinicians who adopt hybrid clin-IT roles was outlined in Chapter 7. In probing 
the reasons that prompt clinicians to move into such dual roles, my findings support 
Freidson’s (1985) principle of restratification within the medical profession, wherein 
professionals adopt additional roles as a response to external threats such as the market 
or the state. However, my analysis also provides evidence of other factors that facilitate 
the emergence of clin-ITs (particularly GP-ITs), including their personal interest in IT as a 
hobby, and their efforts to improve the performance and profits of their practices, 
reflecting their entrepreneurial nature (Cohen and Musson, 2000; Doolin, 2002; 
Llewellyn, 2001).  
I suggest that rather than external threats being the primary driver for the formation of 
clin-IT hybrids, the main pre-requisite for restratification in this case is an inherent 
interest in technology as a hobby or as a performance management tool. Given the need 
for a minimal amount of technical knowledge to develop IT (Denning, 2001) the 
acquisition of this knowledge is required before clinical professionals can meaningfully 
adopt additional technology related roles in response to external threats to their 
autonomy. Thus, while the presence of state and market threats facilitates the 
emergence of the clin-IT hybrid, resulting in restratification as proposed by Freidson 
(1985), it is technical knowledge or an understanding of IT design at the very least, that 
enables the actual formation of the clin-IT. 
In analysing the challenges faced by clin-ITs, my findings indicate that to a certain extent 
these hybrids engage in identity work (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003) to retain 
credibility and to balance the demands of their multiple roles. This includes trialling roles 
(Ibarra, 1999) and maintaining that the sole purpose of their entrepreneurial efforts at 
Chapter 8 
285 
 
developing IT are for improved quality of care as opposed to financial benefits alone. Like 
clinician-managers who are often regarded by their peers as traitors to the profession 
(Witman et al., 2011), clin-ITs too are subject to criticism from their clinical colleagues. 
My findings illustrate how clinicians opined that GP-ITs in the NPfIT had lost touch with 
their clinical side, and had transitioned to IT roles due to dissatisfaction and 
discontentment with their clinical roles. This points to the need for clin-ITs to maintain 
and balance dual (clinical and IT) interests to qualify as hybrids, lest they inadvertently 
disengage completely with their clinical side.  
Having provided an overview of my key findings, I shall outline the key contributions of 
this thesis. 
8.3.2 Contributions 
This research contributes to academic theory in the following ways.  
First, it responds to calls for studies on large scale EHR implementations (Takian et al., 
2012) given the higher concentration of research on EHRs at a more local level. The scale, 
complexity and huge investments involved in the NPfIT (Brennan, 2007; Coiera, 2007; 
Hendy et al. 2005) make it an ideal case to research, and I employ the concept of 
organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) to guide the analysis of my empirical 
data. 
Second, recognising the limitations of organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) to 
explain tensions and interactions between stakeholders, I complement my theoretical 
framework by using the concept of boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989). As 
organising visions are sustained by discourse between multiple stakeholders, Swanson 
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and Ramiller (1997) focus predominantly on the ‘establishment and maintenance’ of the 
discourse with limited consideration of the reasons behind possible conflicts between 
stakeholders perspectives that influence it. This shortcoming is overcome by utilising the 
concept of boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) that are positioned between 
different epistemic groups (McGivern and Dopson, 2010) and their capacity to mediate 
different types of knowledge boundaries (Swan et al., 2007; Carlile 2002, 2004). 
Conversely, the concept of boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989) alone is 
inadequate to investigate the development of projects such as the NPfIT. While boundary 
objects are useful to understand the dynamics and knowledge sharing between 
stakeholders, there is a need to understand how these boundary objects may be 
reconceptualised and transformed (Engeström and Blackler, 2005; McGivern and Dopson, 
2010) over time in the broader context of a project such as the NPfIT. This is similar to the 
way buzzwords in organising visions emerge and subside, and the ‘image of the future’ 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997: 460) towards which the organising vision aspires can 
influence what Engeström and Blacker (2005) term ‘the life of the object’.  
The juxtaposition of these two theoretical concepts as a dual lens is therefore a valuable 
contribution to theory, as it enables the analysis of inter-group dynamics that influence 
the discourse within organising visions, and also allows us to better understand the 
epistemic nature of the objects interpreted by these different groups.  
Third, by considering the buzzwords within the NPfIT organising vision as abstract inter-
epistemic boundary objects mediated by the multiple stakeholder groups involved, and 
how these changed over time, this study addresses the call for further studies 
investigating the transformation of objects (Engeström and Blackler, 2005; McGivern and 
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Dopson, 2010). Using my empirical data, I demonstrate the transformation (Engeström 
and Blackler, 2005) as well as re-incarnation (McGivern and Dopson, 2010) of specific 
aspects of the NPfIT.  
Fourth, this research contributes to literature on the nature of knowledge transfer, 
translation and transformation at boundaries (Carlile 2002, 2004) by identifying how 
professional roles, knowledge differences and dependencies can determine whether a 
syntactic, semantic or pragmatic approach is adopted to facilitate knowledge flow across 
boundaries. The dominance of the medical profession (Freidson, 2007) combined with its 
specialist knowledge enable physicians to ‘re-create’ the EHR by interpreting its existing 
contents as well as the current condition of the patient. GPs’ entrepreneurial traits and 
aims to improve their performance can cause them to leverage data contained in the EHR 
to generate performance related data for their practices, illustrating yet another example 
of transformation of knowledge. Nurses however, given their traditional subordination to 
the medical profession, need to defer to the decisions made by physicians, and are in 
most cases limited to using EHRs as semantic boundaries wherein they interpret EHR data 
to fulfil their caring role toward patients (Abbott and Meerabeau, 1998).  
Fifth, this study addresses the paucity of research on the importance of clinician-IT hybrid 
professionals. Professional hybridisation is an emerging and important area of research 
(Noordegraaf, 2007), and has significant impact on how different domains (e.g. medicine 
and management) are bridged by integration of their specialist knowledge. The high 
incidence of GP-ITs among these clin-IT hybrids may be explained by their drive to 
improve the performance of their independent practices for remuneration purposes 
(Cohen and Musson, 2000). Tensions between GPs and their secondary care colleagues 
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may also act as a motivation for GPs to assert their status in the clinical hierarchy 
considering the better status and resources traditionally afforded to the latter (Horder, 
1977). This could prompt GPs to emphasise their independence and ownership of their 
systems by actively engaging in the computerisation of their practices.  
While the clinician-manager hybrid form was gradually incorporated into the NPfIT, 
existing successful IT systems implemented by other clinicians and notably 
entrepreneurial general practitioners was ignored (Benson, 2002a). This suggests that the 
efforts to engage clinicians in the NPfIT did not take into consideration the expertise of 
clinicians with a strong interest in technology, and that this group constitutes a less 
researched hybrid role. I elaborate on Freidson’s (1985) restratification principle to 
discuss alternative explanations for the adoption of additional roles by clinicians, and in 
the case of clin-ITs, would argue that it is these alternative factors (i.e. interest in 
technology as a hobby, and an interest in leveraging IT to improve their profits and 
performance) that equip them to respond to external threats which arise in the form of 
market and state control mechanisms.  
8.3.3 Implications for practice 
Findings from this research are useful to guide future health IT efforts, as there is a clear 
need for improved and increased engagement not only with clinicians, but with clinician-
IT hybrids as well. This study addresses calls for research into large scale EHR 
implementations (Takian et al., 2012) by investigating England’s NPfIT. However, given 
the limited success in national health IT systems (Cresswell et al., 2011), EHR 
implementations need to draw from lessons learnt at regional and local levels as well.  
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The experience of GPs in England is one such valuable source of guidance that was not 
given adequate attention, as indicated by my empirical data. A pivotal role was played by 
the GP-IT professionals in this case, as they form a vital bridge between the complex 
healthcare domain and the technology development arena. The capacity of these 
professionals to bridge different domains (Llewellyn, 2001; Montgomery, 2001; Witman 
et al., 2011) and facilitate a convergence between incongruent technology frames 
(Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) is extremely useful in health-IT initiatives. Future initiatives in 
the health IT sector could learn from the failings of past projects such as the NPfIT, and 
appreciate the critical importance of exploiting the skills, knowledge and boundary 
spanning position of clin-IT professional hybrids.  
The complexity and variance of EHR use across different clinical groups (Chapter 6) 
suggests that engagement with clinical users is essential despite the clinical knowledge 
possessed by clin-ITs. The diverse needs of clinicians (Berg and Bowker, 1997) emphasises 
that clinical expertise in one area is not a sufficient qualifier for clin-ITs to engage in IT 
development without consultations with their clinical colleagues. This was a problem in 
NPfIT, as a secondary care respondent explained that GPs who were involved in IT roles in 
the national programme had no understanding of the needs of secondary care. Therefore, 
while clin-ITs act as a bridge between the IT and clinical domains, they themselves should 
not be regarded as representative of clinicians as a whole when they interact with IT 
players. However, their clinical background enables them to empathise with the needs of 
clinicians to a better extent compared to pure IT developers, and it is this hybrid 
knowledge that makes them pivotal to the successful implementation of health IT. 
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8.4  Limitations  
The timing of my empirical data collection was opportune, in that it was immediately 
after the dismantling of the NPfIT and this may have allowed some respondents to be 
more open and free in discussing their involvement with the programme. However, I still 
discerned traces of concern and a general air of cautiousness on the part of a few 
respondents, given the politicised and sensitive nature of the programme. I was refused 
an interview with one of the key individuals involved with the programme who gave the 
reason of ‘not wanting to talk about the National Programme at this point’. I attribute 
that to the prominent and visible role played by this individual in the NPfIT, and the 
person’s reluctance to resurrect the highly sensitive discussions that characterised the 
programme. 
 While the aura of secrecy left behind by the NPfIT may have influenced how much some 
of my respondents disclosed, my diverse range of respondents who had been involved 
with or had a close interest in the NPfIT during its different stages, helped with the 
triangulation of retrospective data from different points in time (Mathison, 1988) and 
facilitated a holistic understanding of how the programme evolved. 
The high visibility of a few key respondents made them initially wary about saying too 
much regarding the NPfIT. This is a common challenge with interviewing 'elites' (Mikecz, 
2012), and I found that in some cases I had to be extremely observant to note down 
verbal and physical cues (see Chapter 4). I was able to gradually establish a rapport with 
some of these respondents, and one such interview went on for well over two hours. 
It is possible that some of my respondents would have painted overly positive or negative 
pictures of the NPfIT due to their particular interests or roles in the programme. A few of 
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my respondents had held high level positions in the NPfIT and were the Leads or Senior 
Responsible Owners for specific components of the programme. I also interviewed one 
respondent who at the time of the interview was a key person in one of the continuing 
components of the NPfIT. This respondent openly admitted that it would be advisable to 
talk to other respondents as well regarding this particular area of the NPfIT as he had a 
vested invest in it. I therefore had to rely on my interpretive skills to read between the 
lines. As I had a wide range of interviewees - from those who had been actually involved 
in the NPfIT to those who were informed clinicians who could give me their outsider 
perspective on the programme, I was able to collect a significant amount of data with a 
reduced risk of a biased sample. 
When recruiting interview respondents from professional bodies via the media contacts 
available on the respective websites, I had to assume that all relevant people within the 
organisation had been contacted on my behalf. It is therefore difficult to give an estimate 
of the actual response rate of sample, as I was not given information on the number of 
people contacted within these professional bodies.  
Another possible limitation was the time constraints of some key respondents. Scheduling 
interviews with individuals was a long process as I had to liaise with their assistants and 
secretaries. I requested a minimum of 30 minutes with most respondents for the purpose 
of interviewing them. However one respondent whom I would have particularly liked to 
have interviewed for longer, gave me less than 30 minutes as he was in-between 
meetings despite my having scheduled an appointment with him. Clearly he had assumed 
that I was not expecting a longer interview. This may have been due to 
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miscommunication, as I had to liaise with his secretary to schedule the interview, and my 
respondent may not have been aware of my initial request of a 30 minute interview.  
In the initial interviews, one of the limitations was myself, as a researcher. As I discussed 
in Chapter 4, being new to qualitative research interviews, I committed mistakes typical 
of most novice researchers such as using leading questions and interrupting respondents. 
However with time and experience, this changed, and the second phase of interviews was 
much easier and proved to be extremely useful due to my improved interviewing skills. 
8.5  Scope for future work 
There are a number of avenues for future work based on this research. Of interest would 
be further studies to investigate what characterises the clin-IT hybrid. While my findings 
provide an account of why clinicians sometimes move into dual clin-IT roles, more 
detailed study is required to determine what distinguishes them from purely clinical 
colleagues, and at what point their interest in technology positions them at the boundary 
bridging the clinical and IT domains. 
Amongst clin-IT hybrids there appears to be different types of clin-ITs. Rather than a 
single categorisation of ‘the clin-IT hybrid’, it is likely that there are different layers of clin-
ITs having different degrees of involvement in IT. IT development need not be the key 
criteria to be characterised in the clin-IT category, as some clin-IT respondents did not 
engage in IT programming, but rather, were extremely knowledgeable about the 
capabilities of IT for clinical purposes, and therefore served in advisory roles. Further 
research could be carried out to sift through these layers of clin-ITs, and to identify 
clearer distinctions and characteristics of this unique hybrid group. The existence of a 
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more complex hybrid professional merging the clinical-manager with the clinical-IT 
professional is a possibility which could be investigated.  
Given the prevalence of GP-ITs amongst clin-ITs, it would be useful to conduct further 
research into this particular group of hybrids. The current study is restricted to data from 
a single country. Investigating the emergence of GP-ITs in other countries would enable a 
comparative study of the factors which facilitate the formation of GP-ITs. It would also be 
beneficial to extend the research focus to other clinical professionals such as secondary 
care physicians and nurses. The professional differences involved would play a role in 
steering the development of the different types of clin-ITs.  
It would also be useful to conduct research to investigate the presence of this breed of 
hybrids in other professions. Scholars have studied professional managerial hybrids in 
other professions including law and education (Whitchurch, 2006; Faulconbridge and 
Muzio, 2008; O’Connor and Smallman, 1995). It would be useful to investigate the 
presence of similar professional-IT hybrids in non-clinical contexts, and to compare these 
hybrids in different professional domains. 
Whether the factors which encourage clinicians to step into IT roles are evident in other 
professional domains is also an area of possible research. The dominance of the medical 
profession affords it a high degree of respectability in society. Future research could study 
whether this dominance of the medical profession influences the reputation and 
credibility of clin-ITs compared to other professional-IT hybrids. 
The juxtaposition of the theories of organising visions and boundary objects is one of the 
key contributions of this study. A future avenue for research involves a more detailed 
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study of the different types of objects and how an organising vision may be constituted of 
these. Given the diverse stakeholders present in an organising vision, this is a suitable 
theoretical lens with which to study the dynamics between different groups who use or 
perceive a boundary object. 
Returning to the central object of interest in this research, the EHR, further work could be 
done on investigating the nature of knowledge flow facilitated by the EHR between 
professional boundaries. Given the increasing responsibilities shouldered by nurses and 
other paraprofessionals who have traditionally been regarded as subordinate to the 
medical profession (Currie, Finn and Martin, 2010; McMurray, 2010), of particular interest 
would be if and to what extent such clinicians can leverage EHRs as pragmatic boundaries 
by transforming and creating new knowledge within the record.  
The increasing volume of rhetoric on patient empowerment, patient-centred healthcare 
delivery and patients as partners in their healthcare (Newman and Vidler, 2006), prompts 
questions about the capacity of EHRs to facilitate knowledge transformation at pragmatic 
boundaries (Carlile, 2004) for patients as well in the near future. Regarding knowledge 
differences between clinicians and patients as complementary, where patients’ 
experiential knowledge can support medical professional knowledge (Tritter and 
McCallum, 2006), rather than as lay versus professional knowledge, can potentially 
enable patients to employ EHRs using a pragmatic approach rather than their traditional 
syntactic or semantic approach. 
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8.6  Summary 
‘The end of the paper chase is going to cost each of us £1 per year, which seems a 
fair deal to me’ (Granger, 2003). 
Thus ran The Times’ quote of the day on Christmas Eve 2003. These words of the Director 
General of the NPfIT, the world’s largest civil IT programme (Brennan, 2007), offered the 
hope of fully computerised health records at an extremely affordable cost. More than ten 
years since the programme was launched, the ‘paper chase’ is still on, and taxpayers’ 
pockets have suffered the haemorrhage predicted by Craig and Brooks (2006:184), as the 
estimated costs escalated to £9.8 billion excluding future costs with the LSP systems 
(NAO, 2013). 
This thesis investigates the perspectives and uses of EHRs in the context of the NPfIT 
which had ambitious targets, high costs and an initial challenging timeframe of less than 
three years (Brooks, 2007) by drawing on multiple strands of literature. Compounding the 
theoretical concepts of organising visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) and boundary 
objects (Star and Griesemer, 1989), I discuss not only the emergent ‘buzzwords’ (Swanson 
and Ramiller, 1997) in the NPfIT organising vision, but also how these buzzwords act as 
inter-epistemic boundary objects (McGivern and Dopson, 2010) between the range of 
stakeholder groups involved. This dual lens is a useful tool which takes into consideration 
the different and often incongruent technology frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1997) of 
those involved, and how these influence the organising vision discourse. 
Although a detailed and comprehensive study of the entire NPfIT is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, this research offers valuable insights into the complexity of EHRs in terms of 
use amongst clinicians as well as in the context of large scale implementations. While the 
management of the NPfIT has been criticised extensively by the media, clinicians and 
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external bodies such as the Public Accounts Committee, it is easier to look back and 
identify lacunae in such initiatives, than it is to foresee challenges which can arise given 
the complexity of the health sector and the numerous number of stakeholders involved. 
As one respondent (R27, Former academic, Health informatician) put it, ‘Hindsight is 
20/20. Or as doctors would say, a “retrospect-oscope” is a very powerful diagnostic 
instrument’. 
This thesis also highlights the boundary spanning capacities of EHRs as they address 
knowledge dependencies and differences (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) between EHR 
users by enabling knowledge transfer, translation and transformation across boundaries 
(Carlile 2002, 2004). The nature of this knowledge flow (i.e., transfer, translation or 
transformation) is dependent on professional roles and responsibilities, since boundaries 
that mark professional jurisdictions may limit the way some clinicians (e.g. nurses) and 
patients can use EHRs.  
The recognition that the NPfIT components spanned multiple worlds suggested that the 
most important individuals or groups within the programme were those that occupied 
boundary roles bridging different sectors (Greenhalgh et al., 2010b: 15-16). However, the 
focus was predominantly on clinician-manager hybrids (Montgomery, 2001) who in this 
case were national clinical directors, leads or implementation managers (Greenhalgh et 
al., 2010b) and these roles too had limited influence as indicated by academic studies 
(Cresswell et al., 2011) and my empirical data. The importance of boundary roles was 
realised relatively late in the programme, and the lack of importance given to clinician-IT 
hybrid roles was an unfortunate mistake by NPfIT management. This study contributes to 
extant research on professional hybrids (Doolin 2001, 2002; Llewellyn, 2001; 
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Montgomery, 2001; Noordegraaf 2007, 2011) by highlighting the importance of clin-IT 
hybrid professionals, particularly GP-ITs. 
The insights offered by this study provide valuable pointers for future health IT initiatives. 
The NPfIT began with a centralised top-down approach which was abandoned in 2010 for 
a more modular approach (DH, 2010). Dismantled in 2011 (DH, 2011), the programme has 
left a legacy of multiple components being driven forward as distinct individual projects. 
A recent review by the NAO (2013) reported that three programmes (including the 
Summary Care Record) within the NPfIT have nearly 98% of their estimated benefits yet 
to be realised. Lessons from the national programme need to be filtered into the 
implementation of these remnants. This study addresses this by using a combination of 
academic theory and empirical data to provide an informed understanding of the 
underlying dynamics between key stakeholders in the NPfIT and the need engage with 
niche groups of hybrid professionals such as clin-ITs who can act as ‘two-way windows’ 
(Llewellyn, 2001) between the clinical and IT domains.  
Clin-IT hybrid professionals, though not given adequate representation in the NPfIT, 
continue to have a sustained interest in technology development, and like clinician-
manager hybrids, they too need to balance their clinical and non-clinical roles, and 
contend with possible friction with their purely clinical colleagues by engaging in identity 
work. Both, the changes in the NPfIT as a whole, as well as the way in which clin-IT 
hybrids engage in identity work to deal with their conflicting responsibilities reflect a 
constant state of flux, resonating with the words of Alice in Wonderland:  
‘I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have changed 
several times since then’ (Carroll, 2008). 
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The organising vision of the NPfIT deviated from its original ambitions, and the boundary 
objects that characterised its different phases have seen cycles of devaluation, 
transformation and reincarnation (Engeström and Blackler, 2005; McGivern and Dopson, 
2010). Though the NPfIT is no longer operational, its remnants offer the potential for 
‘discarded’ and ‘devalued’ objects to be ‘recycled’, ‘revitalised’ and ‘reconceptualised’ 
(Engeström and Blackler, 2005), and clin-IT hybrid professionals can potentially play a 
pivotal role in picking up the fragments of this monumental programme and piecing them 
together in a meaningful way for clinical practice. 
 
 
 REFERENCES 
Abbott, A. 1988. The system of professions. An essay on the division of expert labour. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Abbott, P. and Meerabeau, L. 1998. Professionals, professionalization and the caring 
professions. In Abbott, P. and Meerabeau, L. 1998. (Eds.), The sociology of the 
caring professions. (2nd ed.), UCL Press. 
Abrahamson, E. 1991. Managerial Fads and Fashions: The Diffusion and Rejection of 
Innovations. Academy of Management Review, 16(3): 586-612. 
Abrahamson, E. and Rosenkopf, L. 1993. Institutional and competitive bandwagons: using 
mathematical modeling as a tool to explore innovation diffusion. Academy of 
Management Review, 18(3): 487-517. 
Ackroyd, S. and Muzio, D. 2007. The reconstructed professional firm: Explaining change in 
English legal practices. Organization Studies, 28(5): 729-747. 
Aderibigbe, A., Brooks, L. And McGrath, K. 2007. Electronic Patient Records and Nurses’ 
Work: Rhetoric and Reality. Paper presented at Fifth Critical Management Studies 
Conference, Manchester Business School, July 11-13, 2007, Manchester. [WWW: 
http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/cmsconference/2007/proceedings/criticalt
hinking/mcgrath.pdf] (Accessed 10 December 2012). 
Ahmad, Y. and Broussine, M. 2003. The UK public sector modernization agenda. Public 
Management Review, 5(1):45-62. 
Allan, K. 2007. The social lens: an invitation to social and sociological theory. London: Sage 
publications. 
Allen, D. 1998. Doctor-nurse relationships: accomplishing the skill mix in healthcare. In 
Abbott, P. and Meerabeau, L. (Eds.), The sociology of the caring professions. (2nd 
ed.), UCL Press. 
Alshawi, S., Missi, F. and Eldabi, T. 2003. Healthcare information management: the 
integration of patients’ data, Logistics Information Management, 16(3/4):286-295. 
Anderson, J.G., Rainey, M.R. and Eysenbach, G. 2003. The impact of cyberhealthcare on 
the physician-patient relationship. Journal of Medical Systems, 27(1):67-84. 
Anderson, R. 2008. Confidentiality and Connecting for Health. British Journal of General 
Practice, 58(547):75-76. 
Anderson, R., Randell, B., Backhouse, J., Reddy, U., Bustard, D., Ryan, P., Carson, E., 
Sampson, G., Holt, P.O., Shepperd, M., Ibbett, R., Smith, M., Ison, R., Solomonides, 
T., Jung, A., Sommerville, I., Land, F., Thimbleby, H., Littlewood, B., Thomas, M., 
McDermid, J.A., Tully, C. and Newman, J. 2010. The NHS’s National Programme for 
Information Technology: A dossier of concerns. [WWW: 
http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/brian.randell/Concerns.pdf]. (Accessed 15 
September 2013). 
Ash, J.S., Berg, M. and Coiera, E. 2004. Some Unintended Consequences of Information 
Technology in HealthCare: The Nature of Patient Care Information System-related 
Errors. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 11(2): 104-112. 
References  
300 
 
Ashforth, B.E. and Kreiner, G.E. 1999. ‘How can you do it?’: Dirty work and the challenge 
of constructing a positive identity. The Academy of Management Review, 24(3): 
413-434. 
AOMRC. 2008a. A clinician’s guide to record standards – Part 1: Why standardise the 
structure and content of medical records? [WWW: 
http://www.rcoa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/FPM-clinicians-guide1.pdf] (Accessed 15 
August 2012). 
AOMRC. 2008b. A clinician’s guide to record standards – Part2: Standards for the 
structure and content of medical records and communications when patients are 
admitted to hospital. [WWW: http://www.rcoa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/FPM-
clinicians-guide2.pdf]. (Accessed 3 September 2012). 
Ash, J.S., Berg, M. and Coiera, E. 2004. Some unintended consequences of information 
technology in healthcare: The nature of patient care information system-related 
errors. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 11(2): 104-112. 
Ashurst, C., Doherty, N.F. and Peppard, J. 2008. Improving the impact of IT development 
projects: The benefits realization capability model. European Journal of 
Information Systems, 17(4): 352-370. 
Atkinson, C., Eldabi, T., and Paul, R.J. 2002. Integrated approaches to health informatics 
research and development, Logistics Information Management, 15(2): 138-152. 
Avgerou, C. 2001. The significance of context in information systems and organisational 
change. Information Systems Journal, 11(1): 43-63. 
Avison, D.E. and Myers, M.D. 1995. Information systems and anthropology: an 
anthropological perspective on IT and organizational culture. Information 
Technology and People, 8(3): 43-56. 
Avison, D. and Young, T. 2007. Time to rethink healthcare and ICT? Communications of 
the ACM, 50(6): 69-74. 
Aydin, C.E. and Rice, R.E. 1991. Social worlds, individual differences, and implementation. 
Information and Management, 20(2): 119-136. 
Bal, R., Mastboom, F., Spiers, H.P. and Rutten, H. 2007. The product and process of 
referral: Optimizing general practitioner-medical specialist interaction through 
information technology. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 76(1): 28-34. 
Barker, R. 2010. No, management is not a profession. Harvard Business Review, 88(7/8): 
52-60. 
Barley, S.R. 1986. Technology as an occasion for structuring: evidence from observations 
of CT scanners and the social order of radiology departments. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 31(1): 78-108. 
Barrett, M. and Oborn, E. 2010. Boundary object use in cross-cultural software 
development teams. Human Relations, 63(8): 1199-1221. 
Barrett, M., Oborn, E., Orlikowski, W.J. and Yates, J. 2012. Reconfiguring boundary 
relations: robotic innovations in pharmacy work. Organization Science, 23(5): 
1448-1466. 
References  
301 
 
Bates, D.W. 2002. The quality case for information technology in healthcare. BMC Medical 
Informatics and Decision Making, 2(1): 7-15. 
Bates, D.W., Ebell, M., Gotlieb, E., Zapp, J. and Mullins, H.C. 2003. A proposal for 
electronic medical records in U.S. primary care, Journal of the Americal Medical 
Informatics Association, 10(1): 1-10. 
Bechky, B.A. 2003. Object lessons: workplace artifacts as representations of occupational 
jurisdiction. American Journal of Sociology, 109(3): 720-752. 
Bechtel, C. and Ness, D.L. 2010. If you build it, will they come? Designing truly patient-
centred health care. Health Affairs, 29(5): 1-7. 
Benson, T. 2002a. Why general practitioners use computers and hospital doctors do not – 
Part 1: incentives. BMJ, 325:1086-9. 
Benson, T. 2002b. Why general practitioners use computers and hospital doctors do not – 
Part 2: Scalability. BMJ, 325: 1090-1093. 
Berendsen, A.J., Benneker, W.H.G.M., Schuling, J., Rijkers-Koorn, N., Slaets, J.P.J. and 
Jong, B.M. 2006. Collaboration with general practitioners: preferences of medical 
specialists – a qualitative study. BMC Health Services Research, 6:155 
Berg, M. 2002. Patient and professionals in the information society: what might keep us 
awake in 2013. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 66:31-37. 
Berg, M. and Bowker, G. 1997. The multiple bodies of the medical record: Toward a 
sociology of an artifact. The Sociological Quarterly, 38(3): 513-537. 
Berner, E.S., Detmer, D.E. and Simborg, D. 2005. Will the wave finally break? A brief view 
of the adoption of electronic medical records in the United States. Journal of the 
American Medical Informatics Association, 12(1): 3-7. 
Berwick, D.M. 2009. What ‘patient-centred’ should mean: confessions of an extremist. 
Health Affairs, 28(3/4): w555-w565. 
BJHC. 2005. BMA to meet NPfIT in privacy summit. News article, April 2005. [WWW: 
http://www.bj-hc.co.uk/archive/news/1/2005/n504006.htm]. (Accessed 15 June 
2012). 
Bloomfield, B.P. and Hayes, N. 2009. Power and organisational transformation through 
technology: hybrids of electronic government. Organisation Studies, 30(5): 461-
487.  
BMA. 2003. Poor IT putting patients at risk, say junior doctors. Press release. 9 May 2003. 
BMA. 2006. BMA comment on the National Audit Office Report – The National 
Programme for IT in the NHS. Press Release. 16 June 2006.  
BMA. 2007. Electronic health records will fail unless public and professional confidence is 
restored, says BMA. Press Release. 13 September 2007.  
BMA. 2008. BMA response to National Audit Office Report on the National Programme 
for IT in the NHS. Press Release. 16 May 2008. 
BMA. 2009. IT scale-back must not affect care, BMA says. Press Release. 7 December 
2009. 
References  
302 
 
BMA. 2010. BMA calls for roll-out of electronic patient records to be suspended. Press 
release. 10 March 2010.  
BMA. 2012. Taking charge: BMA launches committee for medical managers. News. 15 
August 2012. [WWW: http://bma.org.uk/news-views-
analysis/news/2012/august/taking-charge]. (Accessed 25 September 2013). 
Boaden, R. and Joyce, P. 2006. Developing the Electronic Patient Record: What About 
Patient Safety? Health Services Management Research, 19(2): 94-104. 
Bolton, S.C., Muzio, D. and Boyd-Quinn. 2011. Making sense of modern medical careers: 
The case of the UK’s National Health Service. Sociology, 45(4): 682-699. 
Booth, N. 2003. Sharing patient information electronically throughout the NHS. BMJ, 327: 
114-5. 
Boreham, P. 1983. Indetermination: Professional Knowledge, Organization and Control. 
The Sociological Review, 31(4): 693-718. 
Bossen, C., Jensen, L.G. and Witt, F. 2012. Medical Secretaries’ Care of Records: The 
Cooperative Work of a Non-Clinical Group. CSCW ’12, February 11-15 2012, 
Seattle, Washington, USA. 
Branger, P.J., van der Wouden, J.C., Schudel, B.R., Verboog, E., Duisterhout, J.S., van der 
Lei, J. and van Bemmel, J.H. 1992. Electronic communication between providers of 
primary and secondary care. British Medical Journal, 305, 1068-1070. 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 3(2): 77-101. 
Braunold, G. 2007. Introducing the electronic Summary Care Record. [WWW: 
http://www.icmcc.org/pdf/recordaccess/scrintroduction.pdf] (Accessed 20 March 
2013).  
Brennan, S. 2007. The biggest computer programme in the world ever! How’s it going? 
Journal of Information Technology, 22(3): 202-211. 
Bretschneider, S. 1990. Management information systems in public and private 
organisations: an empirical test. Public Administration Review, 50(5): 536-545. 
British Journal of Healthcare Computing. 2005a. Consultation on PACS a “charade”. News. 
April 2005. [WWW: http://www.bj-hc.co.uk/?id=90]. (Accessed 08 March 2013). 
British Journal of Healthcare Computing. 2005b. NPfIT: London cluster’s implementation 
director resigns. News. 27 April 2005. [WWW: www.bj-
hc.co.uk/archive/news/1/2005/n504024.htm]. (Accessed 11 March 2013). 
Brooks, R. 2007. System failure. Private Eye, No 1179, p17-24. 
Brown, I., Brown, L. and Korff, D. 2010. Using NHS patient data for research without 
consent. Law, Innovation and Technology, 2(2): 219-258. 
Bruce, S. 2010. NPfIT future is modular and locally-led. Ehealth Insider News, 9 September 
2010. [WWW: http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/ehi/6228]. (Accessed 15 May 2012). 
Bruzelius, N., Flyvberg, B. and Rothengatter, W. 2002. Big decisions, big risks. Improving 
accountability in mega projects. Transport Policy, 9:143-154. 
References  
303 
 
Burnard, P. 1991. A method of analysing interview transcripts in qualitative research. 
Nurse Education Today, 11: 461-466.  
Burnard, P., Gill, P, Stewart, K., Treasure, E. and Chadwick, B. 2008. Analysing and 
presenting qualitative data. British Dental Journal, 204: 429-432.  
Burton, L.C., Anderson, G.F. and Kues, I.W. 2004. Using electronic health records to help 
coordinate care. The Milbank Quarterly, 82(3):457-81. 
Cabinet Office. 1999. Modernising Government. White paper. [WWW: 
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm43/4310/4310.htm]. 
(Accessed 10 April 2012). 
Cabinet Office. 2011a. Government ICT Strategy. (Online). Available from: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-government-
government-ict-strategy_0.pdf 
Cabinet Office. 2011b. Government ICT Strategy – Strategic Implementation Plan. 
Available from: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/govt-ict-sip.pdf  
Car, J., Black, A., Anandan, C., Cresswell, K., Pagliari, C., McKinstry, B., Procter, R., Majeed, 
A. and Sheikh, A. 2008. NHS Connecting for Health and the National Programme 
for Information Technology. In: Car, J., Black, A., Anandan, C., Cresswell, K., 
Pagliari, C., McKinstry, B., Procter, R., Majeed, A. and Sheikh, A. 2008. The impact 
of eHealth on the quality and safety of healthcare: A systematic overview and 
synthesis of the literature. Report for the NHS Connecting for Health Evaluation 
Programme, March 2008. [WWW: 
http://www1.imperial.ac.uk/resources/32956FFC-BD76-47B7-94D2-
FFAC56979B74/]. (Accessed 10 May 2012). 
Carlile, P. 2002. A pragmatic view of knowledge and boundaries: Boundary objects in new 
product development. Organisation Science, 13(4):442-455. 
Carlile, P. 2004. Transferring, translating and transforming: An integrative framework for 
managing knowledge across boundaries. Organisation Science, 15(5):555-568. 
Carlile, P.R. and Rebentisch, E.S. 2003. Into the black box: The knowledge transformation 
cycle. Management Science, 49(9): 1180-1195. 
Carpenter, I., Ram, M.B., Croft, G.P. and Williams, J.G. 2007. Medical records and record-
keeping standards. Clinical Medicine, 7(4): 328-331. 
Carroll, L. 2008. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. (Originally published 1865) [WWW: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/11/11-pdf.pdf] (Accessed 20 September 2013). 
Cats-Baril, W. and Thompson, R. 1995. Managing information technology projects in the 
public sector. Public Administration Review, 55(6): 559-566. 
Caudle, S.L., Gorr, W.L. and Newcomer, K.E. 1991. Key information systems management 
issues for the public sector. MIS Quarterly, 15(2): 171-188. 
Cetina, K.K. 1997. Sociality with objects: Social relations in postsocial knowledge societies. 
Theory Culture Society, 14(1): 1-30. 
References  
304 
 
Chang, A., Hatcher, C. and Kim, J. 2013. Temporal boundary objects in megaprojects: 
Mapping the system with the Integrated Master Schedule. International Journal of 
Project Management, 31(1): 323-332. 
Chelsom, J. 2011. Open health informatics – A fresh approach for NHS IT. Centre for 
Health Informatics Challenge Paper. City University London. [WWW: 
http://www.ehealthopensource.com/wp-
content/uploads/storage/resources/2011-
01%20Open%20Health%20Informatics_Challenge%20Paper.pdf] (Accessed 10 
September 2013). 
Chiasson, M. and Davidson, E. 2004. Pushing the contextual envelope: Developing and 
diffusing IS theory for health information systems research. Information and 
Organization, 14: 155-188. 
Cho, S., Mathiassen, L. and Nilsson, A. 2008. Contextual Dynamics During Health 
Information Systems Implementation: An Event-Based Actor-Network Approach. 
European Journal of Information Systems, 17: 614-630.  
Christensen, C.M., Bohmer, R. and Kenagy, J. 2000. Will disruptive innovations cure health 
care? Harvard Business Review, 78(5): 1-10. 
Coburn, D., Rappolt, S. and Bourgeault, I. 1997. Decline vs. retention of medical power 
through restratification: An examination of the Ontario case. Sociology of Health & 
Illness, 19(1): 1-22. 
Cohen, L. and Musson, G. 2000. Entrepreneurial identities: Reflections from two case 
studies. Organization, 7(1), 31-48. 
Coiera, E. 2007. Lessons from the NHS National Programme for IT. Medical Journal of 
Australia, 186: 3-4. 
Connecting for Health. 2005a. makingITwork – A regular news update from NHS 
Connecting for Health. Issue 4, July 2005.  
Connecting for Health. 2005b. A guide to the national programme for information 
technology.  
Connecting for Health. 2013. GPSoC supplier systems. [WWW: 
http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/gpsupport/gpsoc/sy
stems/suppliers]. (Accessed 5 May 2013). 
Craig, D. and Brooks, R. 2006. Plundering the public sector. London: Constable. 
Crawford, L.H. and Helm, J. 2009. Government and governance: The value of project 
management in the public sector. Project Management Journal, 41(1):73-87. 
Creswell, J.W. 1994. Research design: Qualitative & quantitative approaches. London: 
Sage. 
Cresswell, K., Morrison, Z., Crowe, S., Robertson, A., and Sheikh, A. 2011. Anything but 
engaged: User involvement in the context of a national electronic health record 
implementation. Informatics in Primary Care, 19:191-206.  
Cross, M. 2004. In sickness or in health? IEE Review, 50 (10): 38-42. 
References  
305 
 
Cusack, C.M. 2008. Electronic Health Records and Electronic Prescribing: Promise and 
Pitfalls. Obstetrics And Gynaecology Clinics of North America, 35(1): 63-79.  
Currie, W. L. 2008. Evaluating the governance structure for public sector IT: The UK 
National Programme in the health service. In: Irani, Z. and Love, P. (Eds.), 
Evaluating information systems: Public and private sector. Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
Currie, W.L. and Guah, M.W. 2007. Conflicting institutional logics: a national programme 
for IT in the organisational field of healthcare, Journal of Information Technology, 
22(3): 235-247. 
Currie, G., Finn, R. and Martin, G. 2008. Accounting for the ‘dark side’ of new 
organizational forms: The case of healthcare professionals. Human Relations, 
61(4): 539-564. 
Currie, G., Finn, R. and Martin, G. 2010. Role transition and the interaction of relational 
and social identity: New nursing roles in the English NHS. Organization Studies, 
31(7): 941-961. 
Davidson, E. 2002. Technology frames and framing: A socio-cognitive investigation of 
requirements determination. MIS Quarterly, 26(4): 329-358. 
Davidson, E. 2006. A technological frames perspective on information technology and 
organisational change. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 42: 23-39. 
Davidson, E. and Chiasson, M. 2005. Contextual influences on technology use mediation: 
a comparative analysis of electronic medical record systems, European Journal of 
Information Systems, 14(1): 6-18. 
Davidson, E. and Reardon, J. 2005. Organising Visions for IT Healthcare: Analysis of the 
Discourse Surrounding Electronic Health Records. Academy of Management 
Conference, Health Care Management Track, 2005, Honolulu, Hawaii.  
Davies, H.T.O. and Harrison, S. 2003. Trends in doctor-manager relationships. BMJ, 
326:646-649. 
Davis, C.J. and Hufnagel, E.M. 2007. Through the eyes of experts: A socio-cognitive 
perspective on the automation of fingerprint work. MIS Quarterly, 31(4): 681-703. 
de Lusignan, S. and Chan, T. 2008. The development of primary care information 
technology in the United Kingdom. Journal of Ambulatory Care Management, 
31(3):201-210. 
Denning, P.J. 2001. The profession of IT. Who are we? Communications of the ACM, 44(2): 
15-19. 
Denning, P.J. and Dunham, R. 2001. The core of the third-wave professional. 
Communications of the ACM, 44(11): 21-25. 
Dent, M. 2003. Managing doctors and saving a hospital: Irony, rhetoric and actor 
networks. Organization, 10(1): 107-127. 
Dent, M. 2005. Post-new public management in public sector hospitals? The UK, Germany 
and Italy. The Policy Press: 33(4): 623-636. 
Denzin, N.K. 1989. The research act. (3rd ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
References  
306 
 
Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. 2000. Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative 
research. In: Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds). Handbook of qualitative research. 
(2nd ed), London: Sage. 
DH, 2000. The NHS Plan – A plan for investment, a plan for reform. Crown copyright. 
DH. 2002a. Delivering 21st century IT support for the NHS. National strategic programme. 
DH. 2002b. Delivering 21st century IT support for the NHS: National specification for 
integrated care records service. Consultation draft.  
DH. 2010. The future of the National Programme for IT. Press release. 9 September 2010. 
[WWW: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.
uk/en/MediaCentre/Pressreleases/DH_119293] (Accessed 20 September 2013). 
DH. 2011. Dismantling the NHS National Programme for IT. Press release. 22 September 
2011. [WWW: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dismantling-the-nhs-
national-programme-for-it]. (Accessed 15 September 2013). 
Dilley, P. 2000. Conducting Successful Interviews: Tips for Intrepid Research. Theory Into 
Practice, 39(3): 131-137. 
Dobrev, A., Haesner, M., Hüsing, T., Korte, W.B. and Meyer, I. 2008. Benchmarking ICT use 
among General Practitioners in Europe. Final Report. European Commission. 
[WWW document] 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/docs/benchmarking/gp_
survey_final_report.pdf (Accessed 29th January 2010). 
Donaldson, L. 2003. Expert patients usher in a new era of opportunity for the NHS. BMJ, 
326(7402): 1279–1280. 
Doolin, B. 2001. Doctors as managers – New public management in a New Zealand 
hospital. Public Management Review, 3(2): 231-254. 
Doolin, B. 2002. Enterprise discourse, professional identity and the organisational control 
of hospital clinicians. Organisation Studies, 23(3), 369-390. 
Doolin, B. 2004. Power and resistance in the implementation of a medical management 
information system. Information Systems Journal, 14(4): 343-362.  
Dopson, S. 2009. Changing forms of managerialism in the NHS: Hierarchies, markets and 
networks. In Gabe, J. and Calnan, M. (Eds.), The new sociology of the health 
service. London: Routledge. 
Dunleavy, P., Gilson, C., Bastow, S. and Tinkler, J. 2009. The National Audit Office, the 
Public Accounts Committee and the Risk Landscape in UK public policy. Report for 
the Risk & Regulation Advisory Council. [WWW: 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file53403.pdf]. (Accessed 5th August 2013).  
Dunt, I. 2010. Privacy fears raised as NHS IT project ploughs ahead. Politics.co.uk news 
article, 1 March 2010. [WWW: http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2010/3/1/privacy-
fears-raised-as-nhs-it-project-plough]. (Accessed 20 August 2013). 
References  
307 
 
eHealth Insider. 2003. NPfIT launches patient and clinical advisory groups. [WWW: 
http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/EHI/536/npfit-launches-patient-and-clinician-
advisory-groups]. (Accessed 1 September 2013). 
eHealth Insider. 2004a. Aidan Halligan to leave NPfIT for top Irish job. News, 22 
September 2004. [WWW: http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/ehi/870/aidan-halligan-to-
leave-npfit-for-top-irish-job]. (Accessed 15 June 2012) 
eHealth Insider. 2004b. Patient and clinical advisory boards to be replaced. News, 6 July 
2004. [WWW: http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/EHI/792/patient-and-clinical-advisory-
boards-to-be-replaced] (Accessed 20 June 2013). 
Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4): 532-550. 
Engeström, Y. and Blackler, F. 2005. On the life of the object. Organization, 12(3): 307-
330. 
Eriksson-Zetterquist, U., Lindberg, K. and Styhre, A. 2009. When the good times are over: 
Professionals encountering new technology. Human Relations, 62(8), 1145-1170.  
European Commission. 2009 The European files: ehealth in Europe. [WWW document] 
http://www.epractice.eu/files/The%20European%20Files%20-
%20eHealth%20in%20Europe%20-%20EN.pdf (Accessed 12th February 2010). 
Evetts, J. 2013. Professionalism: value and ideology. Current Sociology, 61(5-6): 1-19. 
Ewenstein, B. and Whyte, J. 2009. Knowledge practices in design: the role of visual 
representations as ‘epistemic objects’. Organization Studies, 30(1): 7-30. 
Fagermoen, M.S. 1997. Professional identity: values embedded in meaningful nursing 
practice. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 25(3): 434-441. 
Farrell, C. and Morris, J. 2003. The ‘neo-bureaucratic’ state: Professionals, managers and 
professional managers in schools, general practices and social work. Organization, 
10(1): 129-156. 
Faulconbridge, J. and Muzio, D. 2008. Organisational professionalism in globalising law 
firms. Work Employment and Society, 22(1): 7-25. 
Fennell, M.L. and Alexander, J.A. 1987. Organizational boundary spanning in 
institutionalised environments. The Academy of Management Journal, 30(3): 456-
476. 
Ferlie, E., Fitzgerald, L., McGivern, G., Dopson, S. and Bennett, C. 2011. Public policy 
networks and ‘wicked problems’: A nascent solution? Public Administration, 
89(2):307-324. 
Finlay, L. and Ballinger, C. 2006. Qualitative research for allied health professionals: 
Challenging choices. Chichester: Wiley. 
Fisher, B. and Britten, N. 1993. Patient access to records: expectations of hospital doctors 
and experiences of cancer patients. British Journal of General Practice, 43(367): 
52-56. 
Fitzgerald, L. 1994. Moving clinicians into management: A professional challenge or 
threat? Journal of Management in Medicine. 8(6): 32-44. 
References  
308 
 
Fitzgerald, B. and Howcroft, D. 1998. Competing dichotomies in IS research and possible 
strategies for resolution. Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Information Systems, Helsinki, Finland. 
Fitzgerald, L. and Ferlie, E. 2000. Professionals: Back to the future? Human Relations, 
53(5): 713-739. 
Fitzgerald, L., Lilley, C., Ferlie, E., Addicott, R., McGivern, G. and Buchanan, D. 2006. 
Managing change and role enactment in the professionalised organisation. Report 
to the National Co-ordinating Centre for NHS Service Delivery and Organisation 
R&D (NCCSDO). February 2006.  
Flick, U. 2002. An introduction to qualitative research: theory method and applications. 
(2nded). London: Sage. 
Flyvberg, B., Holm, M.S. and Buhl, S. 2007. Underestimating costs in public works 
projects: Error or lie? Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3): 279-
295. 
Folkerd, C. and Spinelli, G. 2008. User exclusion and fragmented requirements capture in 
publicly-funded IS projects. Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 
3(1):32-49. 
Forbat, L. and Henderson, J. 2005. Theoretical and practical reflections on sharing 
transcripts with participants. Qualitative Health Research: 15(8): 1114-1128. 
Ford, E.W., Menachemi, N. and Phillips, M.T. 2006. Predicting the adoption of electronic 
health records by physicians: When will health care be paperless? Journal of the 
American Medical Informatics Association, 13(1): 106-112. 
Ford, E.W., Menachemi, N., Peterson, L.T. and Huerta, T. 2009. Resistance is futile: but it 
is slowing the pace of EHR adoption nonetheless. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association, 16(3): 274-281. 
Foster, V. and Young, A. 2012. The use of routinely collected patient data for research: A 
critical review. Health (London), 16(4):448-463. 
Fox, N.K., Ward, K.J. and O’Rourke, A.J. 2005. The ‘expert patient’: Empowerment or 
medical dominance? The case of weight loss, pharmaceutical drugs and the 
Internet. Social Science & Medicine, 60(6): 1299-1309. 
Fox, N.J. 2011. Boundary objects, social meanings and the success of new technologies. 
Sociology, 45(1): 70-85. 
Foucault, M. 1966. The order of things. London: Routledge. 
Freidson, E. 1984. The changing nature of professional control. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 10: 1-20. 
Freidson, E. 1985. The reorganization of the medical profession. Medical Care Research 
and Review, 42(11): 11-35. 
Freidson, E. 1988. Profession of medicine: A study of the sociology of applied knowledge. 
The University of Chicago Press: Chicago.  
Freidson, E. 1970. Profession of medicine. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 
References  
309 
 
Freidson, E. 2007. Professional dominance: The social structure of medical care. 
Transaction Publising: New Brunswick. 
Fukami, C.V. and McCubbrey, D.J. 2011. Colorado benefits management system (C): seven 
years of failure. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 29(5): 
97-102. 
Gal, U., Lyytinen, K. and Yoo, Y. 2008. The dynamics of IT boundary objects, information 
infrastructures, and organisational identities: the introduction of 3D modelling 
technologies into the architecture, engineering and construction industry. 
European Journal of Information Systems, 17(3): 290-304. 
Gal, U. and Berente, N. 2008. A social representations perspective on information systems 
implementation: Rethinking the concept of “frames”. Information Technology & 
People, 21(2): 133-154. 
Galliers, J., Wilson, S., Randell, R. and Woodward, P. 2011. Safe use of symbols in 
handover documentation for medical teams. Behaviour and Information 
Technology, 30(4): 499-506. 
Gardner, R.M., Overhage, M., Steen, E.B., Munger, B.S., Holmes, J.H., Williamson, J.J., and 
Detmer, D.E. 2009. Core content for the subspecialty of clinical informatics. 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 16(2): 153-157. 
Gerada, C. and Field, S. 2009. RCGP supports use of summary care records. British Medical 
Journal, 338: b2516. 
Gibbs, G. 2007. Analysing qualitative data. London: Sage. 
Gilbert, L.S. 2002. Going the distance: ‘Closeness’ in qualitative data analysis software. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 5(3): 215-228. 
Goldfinch, S. 2007. Pessimism, computer failure, and information systems development in 
the public sector. Public Administration Review, 67(5): 917-929.  
Goldschmidt, P.G. 2005. HIT and MIS: Implications of health information technology and 
medical information systems, Communications of the ACM, 10(48): 69-75. 
Goodall, A.H. 2011. Physician-leaders and hospital performance: Is there an association? 
Social Science & Medicine, 73(4):535-539. 
Goode, W.J. 1952. Community within a community: The professions. American 
Sociological Review, 22(2): 194-200. 
Granger, R. 2003. Quote of the day. Times, 24 December 2003. The Times Digital Archive.  
Greenhalgh, T. 2009. Chronic illness: beyond the expert patient. BMJ, 338: 629-631. 
Greenhalgh, T. and Keen, J. 2013. England’s national programme for IT. British Medical 
Journal, 346: f4130. 
Greenhalgh, T., Wood, G.W., Bratan, T., Stramer, K., and Hinder, S. 2008. Patients’ 
attitudes to the summary care record and HealthSpace: qualitative study. BMJ, 
336(7656):1290-1295. 
References  
310 
 
Greenhalgh, T., Potts, H.W.W., Wong, G., Bark, P. and Swinglehurst, D. 2009. Tensions and 
paradoxes in electronic patient record research: A systematic literature review 
using the meta-narrative method. The Milbank Quarterly, 87(4): 729-788. 
Greenhalgh, T., Hinder, S., Stramer, K., Bratan, T. and Russell, J. 2010a. Adoption, non-
adoption, and abandonment of a personal electronic health record: case study of 
HealthSpace. BMJ, 341: c5814 
Greenhalgh, T., Stramer, K., Bratan, T., Byrne, E., Russel, J., Hinder, S. and Potts, H. 2010b. 
The devil’s in the detail. Final report of the independent evaluation of the 
Summary Care Record and Healthspace programmes. London: University College 
London. 
Greenhalgh, T., Procter, R., Wherton, J., Sugarhood, P. and Shaw, S. 2012. The organizing 
vision for telehealth and telecare: Discourse analysis. BMJ Open, 2: e001574: 1-12. 
Grimson, J. 2001 Delivering the electronic healthcare record for the 21st century, 
International Journal of Medical Informatics, 64(2-3): 111-127. 
Guthrie, B., Saultz, J.W., Freeman, G.K. and Haggerty, J.L. 2008. Continuity of care 
matters. British Medical Journal, 337a867. 
Hajer, M. 2006. Doing discourse analysis: coalitions, practices, meanings. In van den Brink, 
M. and Metze, T. (Eds.), Words matter in policy and planning: discourse theory and 
method in the social sciences. Netherlands Geographical Studies, 344, Utrecht, 
KNAG/Nethur: 65-74. 
Halford, S., Obstfelder, A. and Lotherington, A. 2010. Changing the record: the inter-
professional, subjective and embodied effects of electronic patient records. New 
Technology, Work and Employment, 25(3): 210-222. 
Hall, A.L. and Rist, R.C. 1999. Integrating multiple qualitative research methods (or 
avoiding the precariousness of a one-legged stool). Psychology and Marketing, 
16(4):291-304. 
Hampson, J.P., Roberts, R.I. and Morgan, D.A. 1996. Shared care: A review of the 
literature. Family Practice, 13(3): 264-279. 
Hanlon, G. 1998. Professionalism as enterprise: Service class politics and the redefinition 
of professionalism. Sociology, 32(43): 43-63. 
Harrington, L. 2011. Safety issues related to the electronic medical record (EMR): 
synthesis of the literature from the last decade, 2000-2009. Journal of Healthcare 
Management, 56(1): 32-43. 
Hartley, J. 2011. Public value through innovation and improvement. In Benington, J. and 
Moore, M.H. (Eds.), Public Value: Theory and Practice. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Hartswood, M., Procter, R., Rouncefield, M. and Slack, R. 2003. Making a Case in Medical 
Work: Implications for the Electronic Medical Record, Computer Supported 
Cooperative Work, 12(3): 241-266.  
Hassey, A., Gerrett, D. and Wilson, A. 2001. A survey of validity and utility of electronic 
patient records in a general practice. BMJ, 322: 1401-5. 
References  
311 
 
Haug, M.R. 1988. A re-examination of the hypothesis of physician deprofessionalisation. 
The Milbank Quarterly, 66(2): 48-56. 
Hayrinen, K., Saranto, K. And Nykanen, P. 2008. Definition, structure, content, use and 
impacts of electronic health records: a review of the research literature. 
International Journal of Medical Informatics, 77(5): 291-304. 
HealthSpace. 2012. Website homepage. [WWW: 
https://www.healthspace.nhs.uk/visitor/default.aspx]. (Accessed 15 February 
2012). 
Health Which? and NHS NPfIT. 2003. The public view on electronic health records.  
Heath, C. and Luff, P. 1996. Documents and professional practice: ‘bad’ organisational 
reasons for ‘good’ clinical records. Proceedings of CSCW ’96, Boston, MA. ACM 
Press. 
Heath, C., Luff, P. and Svensson, M.S. 2003. Technology and medical practice. Sociology of 
Health and Illness, 25(3): 75-96. 
Hendy, J., Reeves, B.C., Fulop, N., Hutchings, A., and Masseria, C. 2005. Challenges to 
implementing the national programme for information technology. BMJ Online, 
331: 331-336. 
Henwood, F., Wyatt, S., Hart, A. and Smith, J. 2003. ‘Ignorance is bliss sometimes’: 
constraints on the emergence of the ‘informed patient’ in the changing landscapes 
of health information. Sociology of Health & Illness, 25(6): 589-607. 
Hersh, W.R. 1995. The electronic medical record: promises and problems. Journal of the 
American Society For Information Science, 46(10): 772-776.  
Hersh, W.R. 2002. Medical informatics. Improving health care through information. 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 288(16): 1955-1958. 
Hersh, W. 2006. Who are the informaticians? What we know and should know. Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 13(2):166-170. 
Herzlinger, R.E. 2006 Why Innovation in Health Care Is So Hard. Harvard Business Review, 
84(5): 58-66. 
Hewitt, J. 2001. A critical review of the arguments debating the role of the nurse 
advocate. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 37(5): 439-445. 
Hippisley-Cox, J., Pringle, M., Cater, R., Wynn, A., Hammersley, V., Coupland, C., Hapgood, 
R., Horsfield, P., Teasdale, S. and Johnson, C. 2003. The Electronic Patient Record 
In Primary Care – Regression or Progression? A Cross Sectional Study. BMJ, 326: 
1439-43. 
Hoff, T.J. 2001. Exploring dual commitment among physician executives in managed care. 
Journal of Healthcare Management, 46(2): 91-111. 
Holsti, O.R. 1969. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley.  
Horrocks, S., Anderson, E., and Salisbury, C. 2002. Systematic review of whether nurse 
practitioners working in primary care can provide equivalent care to doctors. 
British Medical Journal, 324:819-823. 
References  
312 
 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts. 2007. Department of Health: The 
National Programme for IT in the NHS. Twentieth Report of Session 2006-07.  
Horder, J.P. 1977. Physicians and family doctors: a new relationship. Journal of the Royal 
College of General Practitioners, 27: 391-397. 
House of Commons Hansard Debates. 2009. NHS IT programme. 7 December 2009. 
[WWW: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm091207/debt
ext/91207-0004.htm]. (Accessed 1 June 2012). 
House of Commons Health Committee, 2007. The Electronic Patient Record. Sixth report 
of session 2006-07. London: Stationery Office. 
Hsieh, H. & Shannon, S.E. 2005. Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. 
Qualitative Health Research, 15(9): 1277-1288. 
Hughes, D. 1988. When nurse knows best: Some aspects of nurse/doctor interaction in a 
casualty department. Sociology of Health & Illness, 10(1): 1-22. 
Hughes, E.C. 1958. Men and their work. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
Hunter, D.J. 1992. Doctors as managers: Poachers turned gatekeepers? Social Science and 
Medicine, 35(4): 557-566. 
Iakovidis, I. 1998. Towards personal health record: current situation, obstacles and trends 
in implementation of electronic healthcare record in Europe, International Journal 
of Medical Informatics, 52(1): 105-115. 
Ibarra, H. 1999. Provisional selves: Experimenting with image and identity in professional 
adaptation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44: 764-791. 
Ilie, V., van Slyke, C., Parikh, M.A. and Courtney, J.F. 2009. Paper versus electronic medical 
records: the effects of access on physicians’ decisions to use complex information 
technologies. Decision Sciences, 40(2): 213-241. 
Jensen, T. and Aanestad, M. 2007a. How Healthcare Professionals ‘make sense’ Of An 
Electronic Patient Record Adoption. Information Systems Management, 24(1): 29-
42. 
Jensen, T.B. and Aanestad, M. 2007b. Hospitality and hostility in hospitals: a case study of 
an EPR adoption among surgeons. European Journal of Information Systems, 16(6): 
672-680. 
Jensen, T.B. and Aanestad, M. 2010. National initiatives to build healthcare information 
infrastructures. MCIS 2010 Proceedings, Paper 43.  
Jha, A.K., Doolan, D., Grandt, D., Scott, T., Bates, D.W. 2008. The use of health information 
technology in seven nations. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 77(12): 
848-854. 
Johnson, T. 1995. Governmentality and the institutionalisation of expertise. In Johnson, 
T., Larkin, G. and Saks, M. (Eds.), Health professions and the State in Europe. 
London: Routledge. 
References  
313 
 
Jones, S. 2008. Social dimension of IT/IS evaluation: Views from the public sector. In: Irani, 
Z. and Love, P. (Eds.) Evaluating information systems: Public and private sector. 
Butterworth-Heinemann: Oxford.  
Kaelber, D. and Bates, D. 2007. Health information exchange and patient safety. Journal 
of Biomedical Informatics, 40(6):S40-S45. 
Kaelber, D., C., Jha, A., K., Johnston, D., Middleton, B. and Bates, D.W. 2008. A research 
agenda for personal health records (PHRs). Journal of the American Medical 
Information Association, 15(6): 729-736. 
Karsh, B., Weinger, M.B., Abbott, P. and Wears, R.L. 2010. Health information technology: 
Fallacies and sober realities. Journal of the American Medical Information 
Association, 17: 617-623. 
Kassirer, J.P. 2000. Patients, physicians, and the internet. Health Affairs, 19(6): 115-123. 
Kay, S. and Hayes, G. 2011. The Big Society and HI professionalism. HiNow, Spring 2011. 
[WWW: http://www.bcs.org/upload/pdf/hinow-spring2011.pdf] (Accessed 23 
September 2013). 
Klecun-Dabrowska, E. and Cornford, T. 2002. The organising vision of telehealth. ECIS 
2002, June 6-8 2002, Gdańsk, Poland. 
Kim, H. and Kankanahalli, A. 2009. Investigating user resistance to information systems 
implementation: a status quo bias perspective. MIS Quarterly, 33(3): 567-582. 
Kippist, L. and Fitzgerald, A. 2009. Organisational professional conflict and hybrid clinician 
managers: The effects of dual roles in Australian health care organisations. Journal 
of Health Organization and Management, 23(6): 642-655. 
Kitchener, M. 2000. The ‘bureaucratization’ of professional roles: the case of clinical 
directors in UK hospitals. Organization, 7(1): 129-154. 
Klein, R. 1995. Big bang health care reform: Does it work? The case of Britain’s 1991 
National Health Service reforms. The Milbank Quarterly, 73(3):299-337.  
Koch, T. 1995. Interpretive approaches in nursing research: The influence of Husserl and 
Heidegger. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 21(5), 827-836. 
Korica, M. and Molloy, E. 2010. Making sense of professional identities: Stories of medical 
professionals and new technologies. Human Relations, 63(12): 1879-1901. 
Koshy, M.A., McGivern, G. and Tritter, J. 2013. The clinician-IT hybrid professional. 
European Group of Organization Studies, 2013, Montreal. 
Koskinen, K.U. and Mäkinen, S. 2009. Role of boundary objects in negotiation of project 
contracts. International Journal of Project Management, 27(1): 31-38 
Kostova, T. and Roth, K. 2002. Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations, Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 215–233. 
Krefting, L. Rigor in qualitative research: the assessment of trustworthiness. The American 
Journal of Occupational Therapy, 45(3): 214-222. 
References  
314 
 
Kreiner, G.E., Hollensbe, E.C. and Sheep, M.L. 2006. Where is the ‘me’ among the ‘we’? 
Identity work and the search for optimal balance. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 49(5): 1031-1057. 
Kreps, D. and Richardson, H. 2007. IS success and failure – The problem of scale. The 
Political Quarterly, 78(3):439-446. 
Krippendorff, K. 2004. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. London: 
Sage.  
Kurunmäki, L. and Miller, P. 2006. Modernising government: The calculating self, 
hybridisation and performance management. Financial Accountability and 
Management, 22(1): 87-106. 
Kvale, S. 2007. Doing Interviews. London: Sage. 
Lamb, R. and Davidson, E. 2002. Information and communication technology: Challenges 
to scientific professional identity. The Information Society, 21:1-24. 
Landry, M. & Banville, C. 1992. A disciplined methodological pluralism for MIS research. 
Accounting Management and Information Technology, 2(2): 77-97. 
Langley, A. 1999. Strategies for theorising from process data. The Academy of 
Management Review, 24(4): 691-710. 
Lapadat, J.C. 2000. Problematising transcription: purpose, paradigm and quality. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 3(3): 203-219. 
Lapointe, L. and Rivard, S. 2005. A multilevel model of resistance to information 
technology implementation. MIS Quarterly, 29(3): 461-491. 
Laverty, S.M. 2003. Hermeneutical phenomenology and phenomenology: A comparison 
of historical and methodological considerations. International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods, 2(3): 21-35. 
Lawler, E.K., Hedge, A., Pavlovic-Veselinovic, S. 2011. Cognitive ergonomics, socio-
technical systems, and the impact of healthcare information technologies. 
International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 41: 336-344. 
Lee, C.P. 2005. Between chaos and routine: Boundary negotiating artifacts in 
collaboration. Proceedings of the Ninth European Conference on Computer-
Supported Cooperative Work, 18-22 September 2005, Paris, France. 
Leicht, K.T. and Fennel, M.L. 2008. Institutionalism and the professionals. In Greenwood, 
R., Oliver, C., Suddaby, R. and Sahlin, K. (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of 
organizational institutionalism. Sage: London 
Leys, M. 2002. Health care policy: Qualitative evidence and health technology 
assessment. Health Policy, 65(3): 217-226. 
Liang, L. 2007. The gap between evidence and practice. Health Affairs, 26 (2): w119-w121. 
Light, D. and Levine, S. 1988. The changing character of the medical professions: A 
theoretical overview. The Milbank Quarterly, 66(2): 10-32. 
References  
315 
 
Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. 2000. Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions and 
emerging confluences. In Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds.), Handbook of 
qualitative research. (2nd ed.), London: Sage.  
Llewellyn, S. 2001. ‘Two-way windows’: clinicians as medical managers. Organization 
Studies, 22(4): 593-623. 
Lucas, H.C., Swanson, E.B. and Zmud, R.W. 2007. Implementation, innovation and related 
themes over the years in information systems research. Journal of the Association 
for Information Systems, 8(4): 206-210. 
Maguire, S. 2007. Twenty five years of national information systems in the NHS. Public 
Money and Management, 27(2):135-140.  
Major Projects Authority. 2011. Major Projects Authority Programme Assessment Review 
of the National Programme for IT. June 2011. [WWW: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
62256/mpa-review-nhs-it.pdf]. (Accessed 1 July 2013). 
Malin, B., Karp, D. and Scheuermann, R.H. 2010. Technical and policy approaches to 
balancing patient privacy and data sharing in clinical and translational research. 
Journal of Investigative Medicine, 58(1): 11-18. 
Malterud, K. 2001. Qualitative research: standards, challenges, and guidelines. The 
Lancet, 358(9280): 483-488. 
Mandle, K.D. and Kohane, I.S. 2012. Escaping the EHR trap – The future of health IT. New 
England Journal of Medicine, 366(24):2240-2242. 
Mangin, D. and Toop, L. 2007. The Quality and Outcomes Framework: what have you 
done to yourselves? British Journal of General Practice, 57(539): 435-437. 
Mark, A.L. 2007. Modernising healthcare – Is the NPfIT for purpose? Journal of 
Information Technology, 22(3): 248-256.  
Markus, M.L. and Bjorn-Andersen, N. 1987. Power over users: Its exercise by system 
professionals. Communications of the ACM, 30(6):498-504. 
Mars, M. and Scott, R.E. 2009. Global e-health policy: a work in progress. Health Affairs, 
29(2): 239-245 
Marsden, L.R. 1977. Power within a profession: Medicine in Ontario. Work and 
Occupations, 4(1): 3-26. 
Marshall, M.N. and Phillips, D.R. 1999. A qualitative study of the professional relationship 
between family physicians and hospital specialists. The Professional Geographer, 
51(2): 274-282. 
Marshall, M. 1998. How well do general practitioners and hospital consultants work 
together? A qualitative study of cooperation and conflict within the medical 
profession. British Journal of Medical Practice, 48: 1379-1382. 
Mathison, S. 1988. Why Triangulate? Educational Researcher, 17(2): 13-17. 
Mays, N. and Pope, C. 1995. Rigour and qualitative research. British Medical Journal, 311: 
109-112. 
References  
316 
 
McDonald, R. 2012. Restratification revisited: The changing landscape of primary medical 
care in England and California. Current Sociology, 60(4): 441-455. 
McGinn, C.A., Grenier, S., Duplantie, J., Shaw, N., Sicotte, C., Mathieu, L., Leduc, Y., 
Légaré, F. and Gagnon, M. 2011. Comparison of user groups’ perspectives of 
barriers and facilitators to implementing electronic health records: A systematic 
review. BMC Medicine, 9(46): 1-10. 
McGivern, G. and Dopson, S. 2010. Inter-epistemic power and transforming knowledge 
objects in a biomedical network. Organization Studies, 31(12): 1667-1686. 
McGivern, G. and Ferlie, E. 2007. Playing tick-box games: interrelating defences in 
professional appraisal. Human Relations, 60(9): 1361-1385. 
McGivern, G. and Fischer, M.D. 2012. Reactivity and reactions to regulatory transparency 
in medicine, psychotherapy and counselling. Social Science and Medicine, 
74(3):289-296. 
McGrath, K., Hendy, J., Klecun, E. and Young, T. 2008. The vision and reality of 
‘Connecting for Health’: tensions, opportunities, and policy implications of the UK 
National Programme. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 
23(33): 603-618. 
McLaughlin, J. and Webster, A. 1998. Rationalising knowledge: IT systems, professional 
identities and power. The Sociological Review, 46(4): 781-802. 
McMurray, R. 2010. The struggle to professionalize: an ethnographic account of the 
occupational position of advanced nurse practitioners. Human Relations, 64(6): 
801-822. 
Mero-Jaffe, I. 2011. ‘Is that what I said?’ Interview transcript approval by participants: an 
aspect of ethics in qualitative research. International Journal of Qualitative 
Methods, 10(3): 231-247. 
Mikecz, R. 2012. Interviewing elites: Addressing methodological issues. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 18(6): 482-493. 
Miller, F.A. and Alvarado, K. 2005. Incorporating documents into qualitative nursing 
research. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 37(4): 348 – 353. 
Miller, A.R. and Tucker, C.E. 2009a. Privacy Protection and Technology Diffusion: The Case 
of Electronic Medical Records. Management Science, 55(7): 1077-1093.  
Miller, A.R. and Tucker, C.E. 2009b. Electronic Discovery and Electronic Medical Records: 
Does the Threat Of Litigation Affect Firm Decisions To Adopt Technology. Federal 
Trade Commission. [WWW: 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/seminardocs/090430amiller.pdf]. (Accessed 15 July 2013). 
Mingers, J. 2004. Reali-izing information systems: critical realism as an underpinning 
philosophy for information systems. Information and Organization, 14(2): 87-103. 
Ministerial Taskforce on Information Technology. 2003. Integrated Health Information 
‘Spine’: Summary of a proposal for Phase 1 of a national scheme developed to 
meet the needs of patients. Unpublished internal document.  
References  
317 
 
Montgomery, K. 2001. Physician executives: the evolution and impact of a hybrid 
profession. Advances in Health Care Management, 2: 215-241. 
Moore, M. and Hartley, J. 2008. Innovations in governance. Public Management Review, 
10(1): 3-20. 
Morrell, K. 2006. Policy as narrative: New Labour’s reform of the National Health Service. 
Public Administration, 84(2):367-385. 
Munir, S. and Boaden, R. 2001. Patient empowerment and the electronic health record. 
Medinfo(1): pp. 663-665.  
Murphy, J. 2011. Leading from the future: Leadership makes a difference during 
Electronic Health Record implementation. Frontiers of Health Services 
Management, 28(1): 25-30. 
Murray, J.P. 2001. Recognising the responsibility of a failed information technology 
project as a shared failure. Information Systems Management, 18(2): 1-5. 
Muzio, D. and Kirkpatrick, I. 2011. Introduction: Professions and organisations – a 
conceptual framework. Current Sociology, 59(4): 389-405. 
Nancarrow, S.A. and Borthwick, A.M. 2005. Dynamic professional boundaries in the 
healthcare workforce. Sociology of Health & Illness, 27(7): 897-919 
NAO. 2006. The National Programme for IT in the NHS. Report by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, HC 1173, June 2006.  
NAO. 2011. The National Programme for IT in the NHS: An update on the delivery of 
detailed care record systems. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General.  
NAO. 2013. Review of the final benefits statement for programmes previously managed 
under the National Programme for IT in the NHS. Memorandum for the House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts. June 2013. 
National Information Governance Board for Health and Social Care. 2013. NHS Care 
Record Guarantee. [WWW: http://www.nigb.nhs.uk/guarantee]. (Accessed 1 June 
2013). 
Nettleton, S. 2004. The emergence of e-scaped medicine? Sociology, 38(4): 661-679. 
Newman, J. and Vidler, E. 2006. Discriminating customers, responsible patients, 
empowered users: Consumerism and the modernization of healthcare. Journal of 
Social Policy, 35(2):193-209. 
Neuberger, R.J. 1999. The NHS as a theological institution. British Medical Journal, 319: 
1588-1589. 
NHS. 2000. The NHS plan: A plan for investment, A plan for reform. Crown Copyright.  
NHS IA. 2002. Share with care! People’s views on consent and confidentiality of patient 
information.  
NHS NPfIT. 2004. Making IT happen. Information about the National Programme for IT.  
Nicolini, D., Mengis, J. and Swan, J. 2012. Understanding the role of objects in cross-
disciplinary innovation. Organisation Science, 23(3): 612-629. 
References  
318 
 
Nolan, R.L. 1973. Managing the computer resource: a stage hypothesis. Communications 
of the ACM, 16(7): 399-405. 
Nolan, R.L. 1979. Managing the crises in data processing. Harvard Business Review, 
57(March-April): 115-126. 
Noordegraaf, M. 2007. From ‘pure’ to ‘hybrid’ professionalism: Present-day 
professionalism in ambiguous public domains. Administration and Society, 39(6), 
761-785. 
Noodegraaf, M. 2011. Risky business: How professionals and professional fields (must) 
deal with organizational issues. Organization Studies, 32(10): 139-1371. 
NPfIT. 2004a. makingITwork – a regular news update from the National Programme for 
Information Technology. Issue 1, March 2004. 
NPfIT. 2004b. makingITwork – a regular news update from the National Programme for 
Information Technology. Issue 2, August 2004. 
NPfIT. 2004c. makingITwork – a regular news update from the National Programme for 
Information Technology. Issue 3, December 2004. 
Noy, C. 2007. Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in Qualitative 
Research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 11(4): 327-344. 
O’Connor, G. and Smallman, C. 1995. The hybrid manager: A review. Management 
Decision, 33(7):19-28. 
O’Connor, J.P., Nash, D.B., Buehler, M.L. and Bard, M. 2002. Satisfaction higher for 
physician executives who treat patients, survey finds. The Physician Executive, 
28(3): 16-21 
O’Reilly, D. and Reed, M. 2011. The grit in the oyster: Professionalism, managerialism and 
leaderism as discourses of UK public services modernization. Organization Studies, 
32(8): 109-1101. 
Oates, J. 2004. BMA calls warning on NHS IT. The Register, 3 November 2004. [WWW: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/03/bma_warns_nhs/]. (Accessed 1 May 
2013). 
Oliver, D.G., Serovich, J.M. and Mason, T.L. 2005. Constraints and opportunities with 
interview transcription: Towards reflection in qualitative research. Social Forces, 
84 (2): 1273-1289. 
Orlikowski, W.J. and Baroudi, J.J. 1988. The information systems profession: myth or 
reality? Information Technology & People, 4(1): 13-30. 
Orlikowski, W.J. and Baroudi, J.J. 1991. Studying information technology in organizations: 
research approaches and assumptions. Information Systems Research, 2(1): 1-28. 
Orlikowski, W.J. and Gash, D.C. 1994. Technological frames: Making sense of information 
technology in organisations. ACM Transactions on Information Systems, 12(2): 
174-207. 
Orlikowski, W.J. 2000 Using technology and constituting structures: a practice lens for 
studying technology in organizations, Organization Science, 11(4): 404-428. 
References  
319 
 
Oswick, C. and Robertson, M. 2009. Boundary objects reconsidered: from bridges and 
anchors to barricades and mazes. Journal of Change Management, 9(2):179-193. 
Ovaska, P., Rossi, M. and Smolander, K. 2005. Filtering, negotiating and shifting in the 
understanding of information system requirements. Scandinavian Journal of 
Information Systems, 17(1): 31-66. 
Papazafeiropoulou, A. and Gandecha, R. 2007. Interpretive Flexibility Along the 
Innovation Decision Process of the UK NHS Care Records Service (NCRS): Insights 
from a Local Implementation Case Study. International Journal of Technology and 
Human Interaction, 3:1-12. 
Paré, G., Bourdeau, S., Marsan, J., Nach, H. and Shuraida, S. 2008. Re-examining the 
Causal Structure of Information Technology Impact Research. European Journal of 
Information Systems, 17(4): 403-416.  
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology. 2003. Government IT projects. POST 
Report 200, July 2003.  
Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee. 2000. First report, Improving the delivery of 
government IT projects. [WWW: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmpubacc/65/65
03.htm]. (Accessed 14 April 2012). 
Patton, M.Q. 1990. Qualitative evaluation and research methods. (2nd ed.), London: Sage.  
Patton, M.Q. 2002. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. London: Sage. 
Pawlowski, S.D. and Robey, D. 2004. Bridging user organisations: Knowledge brokering 
and the work of information technology professionals. MIS Quarterly, 28(4): 645-
672. 
Phillips, N. and Hardy, C. 2002. Discourse analysis: Investigating processes of social 
construction. London: Sage publications. 
Pinch, T.J. and Bijker, W.E. 1984. The social construction of facts and artefacts: Or how 
the sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit each other. 
Social Studies of Science, 14(3): 399-441.  
Pinch, T.J. and Bijker, W.E. 1987. The social construction of facts and artifacts: Or how the 
sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit each other. In 
Bijker, W.E., Hughes, T.P. and Pinch, T.J. (Eds.), The new construction of 
technological systems. New directions in the sociology and history of technology. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Poland, B.D. 1995. Transcription quality as an aspect of rigor in qualitative research. 
Qualitative Inquiry, 1(3): 290-310. 
Pope, C. and Mays, N. 2006. Qualitative methods in health research. In: Pope, C. and 
Mays, N. (Eds.), Qualitative research in health care. (3rd ed.), Oxford, UK: Malden. 
Prasad, P. and Prasad, A. 1994. The ideology of professionalism and work 
computerisation: an institutionalist study of technological change. Human 
Relations, 47(12): 1433-1458. 
References  
320 
 
Pyper, C., Amery, J., Watson, M. and Crook, Claire. 2004. Patients’ experience when 
accessing their on-line electronic patient records in primary care. British Journal of 
General Practice. 54(498): 38-43. 
Quinn, J.B., Anderson, P. and Finkelstein, S. 1996. Managing professional intellect: Making 
the most of the best. Harvard Business Review, 74(2): 71-82. 
Ramiller, N.C. 2001a. The ‘textual’ attitude and new technology. Information and 
Organisation, 11(2): 129-156. 
Ramiller, N.C. 2001b. ‘Airline magazine syndrome’: Reading a myth of mismanagement. 
Information Technology & People, 14(3): 287-303. 
Ramiller, N.C. 2006. Hype! Toward a theory of exaggeration in information technology 
innovation. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, 2006: A1-A6. 
Randell, B. 2007. A computer scientist’s reactions to NPfIT. Journal of Information 
Technology, 22(3): 222-234. 
Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. 2003. Qualitative research practice: a guide for social science 
students and researchers. London: Sage. 
RCGP. 2009. Informing shared care. Final report of the Shared Record Professional 
Guidance Project. June 2009.  
RCP. 2009. Improving clinical records and clinical coding together. A project with the 
Audit Commission. August 2009. 
RCP. 2010. The case and the vision for patient-focused records. [WWW: 
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/sites/default/files/vision-statement-jan-2010.pdf] 
(Accessed 07 March 2013). 
RCP. 2011. RCP comment on Commission on Generalism report: Guiding patients through 
complexity: Modern medical generalism. Press release. 07 October 2011. [WWW: 
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/press-releases/rcp-comment-commission-
generalism-report-guiding-patients-through-complexity-modern-0]. (Accessed 23 
February 2013). 
RCP. 2012. Core clinical headings for electronic health records. London: RCP.  
Reed, M.I. 1996. Expert power and control in late modernity: An empirical review and 
theoretical synthesis, Organization Studies, 17(4): 573-597. 
Rheinberger, H. 1992. Experiment, difference, and writing: I. Tracing protein synthesis. 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 23(2): 305-331. 
Ritter, T. 2007. Private Eye special report on NHS IT programme. Computer Weekly [www: 
http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/public-sector/2007/03/private-eye-
special-report-on-1.html] (Accessed 1 July 2013). 
Ritter, T. 2008. Who was at Downing Street NPfIT meeting? Computer Weekly [WWW: 
http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/public-sector/2008/02/who-was-at-
downing-street-npfi.html] (Accessed 5 August 2013). 
Robertson, A., Cresswell,K., Takian, A., Petrakaki, D., Crowe, S., Cornford, T., Barber, N., 
Avery, A., Fernando, B., Jacklin, A., Prescott, R., Klecun, E., Paton, J., Lichtner, V., 
Quinn, C., Ali, M., Morrison, Z., Jani, Y., Waring, J., Marsden, K. and Sheikh, A. 
References  
321 
 
2010. Implementation and adoption of nationwide electronic health records in 
secondary care in England: Qualitative analysis of interim results from a 
prospective national evaluation. BMJ. 341: c4564 
Robinson, G., Beaton, S. and White, P. 1993. Attitudes towards practice nurses – survey of 
a sample of general practitioners in England and Wales. British Journal of General 
Practice, 43:25-29. 
Roland, M. 2004. Linking physicians’ pay to the quality of care – a major experiment in the 
United Kingdom. The New England Journal Of Medicine, 351(14): 1448-1454. 
Ross, S.E. and Lin, C. The effects of promoting patient access to medical records: A review. 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 10(2): 129-138. 
Ross, A.P. 1986. The case against showing patients their records. British Medical Journal, 
292: 578. 
 Safran, C., Bloomrosen, M., Hammond, E., Labkoff, S., Markel-Fox, S., Tang, P.C., and 
Detmer, D.E. 2007. Toward a national framework for the secondary use of health 
data: An American Medical Informatics Association white paper. Journal of the 
American Medical Informatics Association, 14(1): 1-9. 
Sahay, S. and Robey, D. 1996. Organizational context, social interpretation, and the 
implementation and consequences of geographic information systems. 
Accounting, Management and Information Technology, 6(4): 255-282.  
Saldana, J. 2009. The coding manual for qualitative researchers. London: Sage. 
Sapsed, J. and Salter, A. 2004. Postcards from the edge: local communities, global 
programs and boundary objects. Organization Studies, 25(9): 1515-1534. 
Sauer, C. and Willcocks, K. 2007. Unreasonable expectations – NHS IT, Greek choruses and 
the games institutions play around mega-programmes. Journal of Information 
Technology, 22(3): 195-201. 
Schmidt, C. 2004. The analysis of semi-structured interviews. In Flick, U., von Kardoff, E. 
and Steinke, I. (Eds.), A companion to qualitative research. Translation from 
German by Bryan Jenner. London: Sage Publications. 
Schwandt, T.A. 2000. Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry. In Denzin, N.K. 
and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research. (2nded.), London: Sage. 
Shah, S. 2006. Motivation, governance, and the viability of hybrid forms in open source 
software development. Management Science, 52(7): 1000-1014. 
Shaw, N. and Hegedus, G. 2005. The National Programme for Information Technology. 
The GP as gatekeeper – a bastion worth fighting for? British Journal of General 
Practice, 55(511): 85-86. 
Sidorov, J. 2006. It ain’t necessarily so: the electronic health record and the unlikely 
prospect of reducing health care costs. Health Affairs, 25(4): 1079-1085. 
Silcock, R. 2001. What is e-government? Parliamentary Affairs, 54:88-101. 
Silverman, D. 2005. Doing qualitative research. London: Sage. 
References  
322 
 
Silverman, D. 2006. Interpreting qualitative data: methods for analysingtalk, text and 
action. London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Smith, R. 1996. What clinical information do doctors need? BMJ, 313: 1062-8. 
Smith, S.E., Drake, L.E., Harris, J.B., and Pohlner, P.G. 2011. Clinical informatics: a 
workforce priority for 21st century healthcare. Australian Health Review, 35(2): 
130-135. 
Spicer, A. 2005. The political process of inscribing a new technology. Human Relations, 
58(7): 867-890. 
Sprague, L. 2004. Electronic Health Records: How Close? How Far to Go? NHPF Issue Brief, 
No. 800, September 29 2004. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB800_EHRs.pdf (Accessed 10 
November 2011). 
Sprague, R.H. 1995. Electronic Document Management: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Information Systems Managers. MIS Quarterly, 19(1): 29-49. 
Spurgeon, P., Clark, J. and Ham, C. 2011. Medical leadership: from the dark side to centre 
stage. London: Radcliffe Publishers. 
Star, S.L. and Griesemer, J.R. 1989. Institutional ecology, ‘translations’ and boundary 
objects: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley’s museum of vertebrate zoology, 
Social Studies of Science, 19(3): 387-420. 
Starr, P. 1978. Medicine and the waning of professional sovereignty. Daedalus, 107(1): 
175-193. 
Stein, L.I. 1968. The doctor-nurse game. The American Journal of Nursing, 68(1): 101-105.  
Stein-Parbury, J. and Liaschenko, J. 2007. Understanding collaboration between nurses 
and physicians as knowledge at work. American Journal of Critical Care 16(5): 470-
477. 
Stevens, S. 2004. Reform strategies for the English NHS. Health Affairs, 23:33-44. 
Steward, B. 2006. Strategic choices in research planning. In Finlay, L. and Ballinger, C. 
(Eds.), Qualitative research for allied health professionals: Challenging choices. 
Chichester: Wiley. 
Suddaby, R. and Greenwood, R. 2005. Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 50(1): 35-67. 
Sugden, B., Wilson, R., and Cornford, J. 2006. Reconfiguring the health supplier market: 
Changing relationships in the primary care supplier market in England. Technical 
Report Series, No. CS-TR-951, March 2006. 
Sveningsson, S. and Alvesson, M. 2003. Managing managerial identities: Organisational 
fragmentation, discourse and identity struggle. Human Relations, 56(10): 1163-
1193. 
Swan, J., Bresnen, M., Newell, S. and Robertson, M. 2007. The object of knowledge: The 
role of objects in biomedical innovation. Human Relations, 60(12): 1809-1837. 
References  
323 
 
Swanson, E.B. and Ramiller, N.C. 1997. The Organising Vision in Information Systems 
Innovation. Organization Science, 8(5): 458-474. 
Swanson, E.B. and Ramiller, N.C. 2004. Innovating Mindfully With Information 
Technology. MIS Quarterly, 28(4): 553-583. 
Takian, A., Petrakaki, D., Cornford, T., Sheikh, A., and Barber, N. 2012. Building a house on 
shifting sand: methodological considerations when evaluating the implementation 
and adoption of national electronic health record systems. BMC Health Services 
Research, 12(1): 105. 
Tannen, R. 2008. The researcher-tool mismatch: improving the fit between user 
researchers and technology. Interactions, 15(5): 74-78. 
The NHS Confederation. 2003a. The national strategy for IT in the NHS. Briefing. No. 88. 
August 2003. [WWW: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/doc
uments/digitalasset/dh_4071399.pdf] (Accessed 4 February 2012). 
The NHS Confederation. 2003b. National Programme for IT: An interview with Richard 
Granger and Peter Hutton. Briefing. No 89. September 2003. 
The NHS Confederation. 2004. The NHS Care Records Service. Briefing. Issue 105, August 
2004 
The Times. 2011. Connecting to nowhere. Editorial. 23 September 2011. 
Thomas, R.L. 2006. Learning the Alphabet of Healthcare IT. Healthcare Financial 
management, 60(3): 100-102.  
Thomas, P. and Hewitt, J. 2011. Managerial organisation and professional autonomy: a 
discourse-based conceptualisation. Organization Studies, 32(10): 1373-1393. 
Timmermans, S. and Oh, H. 2010. The continued social transformation of the medical 
profession. Journal of Applied Health and Social Behaviour, 51(S):94-106. 
Timmons, S. 2003a. A failed panopticon: Surveillance of nursing practice via new 
technology. New Technology, Work and Employment, 18(2): 143-153. 
Timmons, S. 2003b. Nurses resisting information technology. Nursing Inquiry, 10(4):257-
269. 
Tjora, A.H. 2000. The technological mediation of the nursing-medical boundary. Sociology 
of Health and Illness, 22(6): 721-741. 
Tolbert, P.S. and Zucker, L.G. 1983. Institutional sources of change in the formal structure 
of organisations: The diffusion of civil service reform. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 28: 22-39. 
Tritter, J.Q. and McCallum, A. 2006. The snakes and ladders of user involvement: Moving 
beyond Arnstein. Health Policy, 76(2): 156-168. 
Ueckert, F., Goerz, M., Ataian, M., Tessmann, S. And Prokosch, H. 2003. Empowerment of 
Patients and Communication With Health Care Professionals Through An 
Electronic Health Record. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 70(2): 99-
108.  
References  
324 
 
Van de ven, A.H. 1992. Suggestions for studying strategy process: A research note. 
Strategic Management Journal, 13(5): 169-191. 
Volpp, K.G.M. and Grande, D. 2003. Residents’ suggestions for reducing errors in teaching 
hospitals. The New England Journal of Medicine, 348(9): 851-855. 
von Hippel, E. 1994. ‘Sticky information’ and the locus of problem solving: Implications for 
innovation. Management Science, 40(4): 429-439. 
Wachs, M. 1990a. Ethical dilemmas in forecasting for public policy. Public Administration 
Review, 42(6): 562-567. 
Wachs, M. 1990b. Ethics and advocacy in forecasting for public policy. Business and 
Professional Ethics Journal, 9(1-2):141-157. 
Wallis, A. 2007. Clinical data standards and nursing. Nursing Management, 14(2): 26-28. 
Walsh, S.H. 2004. The clinician’s perspective on electronic health records and how they 
can affect patient care. BMJ, 328(7449): 1184-1187. 
Walsh, J.P. and Fahey, L. 1986. The role of negotiated belief structures in strategy making. 
Journal of Management, 12(3): 325-338. 
Walter, Z. and Lopez, M.S. 2008. Physician acceptance of information technologies: role 
of perceived threat to professional autonomy. Decision Support Systems, 46(1): 
206-215. 
Wang, P. and Ramiller, N.C. 2009. Community learning in information technology 
innovation. MIS Quarterly, 33(4): 709-734. 
Wanless, D. 2002. Securing our future health: Taking a long-term view. London: HM 
Treasury. 
Waring, J. and Currie, G. 2009. Managing expert knowledge: Organisational challenges 
and managerial futures for the UK medical profession. Organisation Studies, 30(7): 
755-778. 
Weed, L.L. 1997. New connections between medical knowledge and patient care. BMJ, 
315: 231-235. 
Weiner, J.P., Kfuri, T., Chan, K. and Fowles, J.B. 2007. ‘e-Iatrogenesis’: The most critical 
unintended consequence of CPOE and other HIT. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association, 14(3): 387-388. 
Westerman, R.F., Hull, F.M., Bezemer, P.D. and Gort, G. 1990. A study of communication 
between general practitioners and specialists. British Journal of General Practice, 
40, 445-449. 
Weitzman, E.A. 2000. Software and qualitative research. In Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. 
(Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research. (2nd ed.), London: Sage. 
Whetstone, M. And Goldsmith, R. 2009. Factors influencing intention to use personal 
health records. International Journal of Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Marketing, 
3(1): 8-25. 
References  
325 
 
Whitchurch, C. 2006. Who do they think they are? The changing identities of professional 
administrators and  managers in UK higher education. Journal of Higher Education 
Policy and Management, 28(2): 159-171. 
Whitfield, L. 2013. Hunt wants paperless NHS in five years. E-Health Insider, 16 January 
2013. [WWW: http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/ehi/8315/hunt-wants-paperless-nhs-
in-five-years] (Accessed 25 August 2013). 
Wilensky, H.L. 1964. The professionalisation of everyone? American Journal of Sociology, 
70(2): 137-158. 
Wilks, M. 2010. Task-shifting or task-sharing? – Reflections from within the European 
Union (EU). World Medical Journal, 56(1): 4-6. 
Witman, Y., Smid, G.A.C., Meurs, P.L. and Willems, D.L. 2011. Doctor in the lead: 
balancing between two worlds. Organization, 18(4): 477-495. 
Wolff, S. 2004. Analysis of documents and records. In Flick, U., von Kardoff, E. and 
Steinke, I. (Eds.), A companion to qualitative research. Translation from German by 
Bryan Jenner. London: Sage Publications. 
Wyatt, J. and Wright, P. 1998. Design should help use of patients’ data. The Lancet, 
352(9137): 1375-1378. 
Wynia, M.K., Torres, G.W. and Lemieux, J. 2011. Many physicians are willing to use 
patients’ electronic personal health records, but doctors differ by location, gender, 
and practice. Health Affairs, 30(2): 266-273.  
Yakura, E.K. 2002. Timelines as temporal boundary objects. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(5): 956-970.  
Yin, R.K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. (4th ed.), London: Sage. 
 
 
Appendices 
326 
 
APPENDIX A: List of respondents 
 
INTERVIEW PHASE 1: 
RESPONDENT LIST – INTERVIEW PHASE 1 [SENSITISING INTERVIEWS] 
Respondent Details 
Approximate 
interview 
length 
(hh:mm) 
R1 
 
Staff nurse, Community Hospital 00:25; 
01:40  
R2 Psychiatrist 00:24 
R3 Allied Health Professional (orthoptist) 00:55 
R4 Junior doctor (hospital) 00:54 
R5 Nurse Practitioner 00:30 
R6 Administrative supervisor (health centre) 00:59 
R7 Requirement Analyst & Content Management Executive in a 
clinical software company 
00:20 
R8 Locum GP  02:05 
R9 Hospital staff nurse. 00:25 
R10 GP; Director of a clinical software company 00:40 
R11 Pediatrician 00:25 
R12 Nurse Practitioner; Clinical lecturer 00:40 
R13 Programme Manager, National Technology Adoption Centre 00:30 
R14 GP; Director of a clinical software company 00:40 
Total:              11:32 
 
Distribution of interviewees by role [Phase 1] 
Primary role GP Hospital 
Doctor 
Nurse Allied Health 
Professional 
Other 
(IT/Admin) 
Number of interviews 3 3 4 1 3 
 
 
INTERVIEW PHASE 2: 
Distribution of interviewees by role [Phase 2] 
Clinical role* GP Hospital doctor Nurse 
Number of interviews 13 10 5 
*Note: Few respondents no longer practiced in a clinical capacity at the time of the interview, but have been 
included in this count as their new (IT/managerial/advisory) roles are informed by the clinical training and 
experience they have acquired 
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RESPONDENT LIST – INTERVIEW PHASE 2 [KEY INFORMANTS] 
 
R
es
p
o
n
d
en
t 
 
Professional 
bodies 
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t/
 
D
H
/N
H
S 
b
o
d
ie
s 
 
C
o
n
su
m
er
 
&
 
p
at
ie
n
t 
gr
o
u
p
s 
In
d
u
st
ry
 
P
o
lic
y 
ad
vi
so
rs
/ 
p
o
lit
ic
ia
n
s 
A
ca
d
em
ia
 
O
th
er
  
A
p
p
ro
xi
m
at
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
 
le
n
gt
h
 (
h
h
:m
m
) 
C
lin
ic
al
 
N
o
n
-
cl
in
ic
al
 
1         00:27 
2         00:40 
3         00:56 
4         01:00 
5         02:37 
6         02:40 
7         00:36 
8         00:17 
9         00:53 
10         00:57 
11         00:30 
12         00:48 
13         00:23 
14         01:02 
15         01:11 
16         00:54 
17         05:22 
18         00:41 
19         00:46 
20         00:40 
21         00:46 
22         00:31 
23         00:40 
24         00:31 
25         00:39 
26         00:43 
27         00:55 
28         00:52 
29         00:43 
30         00:38 
31         01:41 
32         01:06 
33         00:52 
34         00:34 
35         00:48 
36         00:32 
37         00:31 
37 12 4 20 2 6 4 10 1 36:22 
Clinical professional bodies Royal College of General Practitioners, Royal College of Physicians, Royal College of Nurses, 
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, British Medical Association 
Non-clinical professional bodies National computer organisations, e.g. British Computer Society 
Government/ DH/ NHS bodies Department of Health, Connecting for Health, NHS Information Authority, National Clinical 
Advisory Board, Care Records Development Board 
Consumer & patient groups Patient Information Forum, Patient Concern 
Appendices 
328 
 
APPENDIX B: Categorisation of documentary data sources 
  Organisation Year Title 
C
h
ie
f 
Ex
ec
u
ti
ve
 R
ep
o
rt
s DH 2002 
Department of Health. ‘Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS April 2001 – 
March 2002’.  
DH 2003 Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS  
DH 2004 Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS 
DH 2004 Autumn Performance Report 
DH 2005 Chief Executive’s report to the NHS 
B
u
si
n
e
ss
 P
la
n
s 
DH 
 
2006 
  
Business Plan. 
DH 2007 Business Plan. 
DH 2008 Business Plan. 
DH 2009 Business Plan. 
DH 2011 Business Plan - quarterly data summary 
DH 2011 Data Transparency plan 
DH 2011 Business Plan. 
D
H
 r
ep
o
rt
s,
 p
ap
er
s,
 c
o
n
su
lt
at
io
n
s,
 r
es
p
o
n
se
s 
DH 2000 The NHS Plan.  
DH 2000 Good practice guidelines for general practice electronic patient records.  
DH 2001 Building the information core - implementing the NHS plan 
DH 2001 Wanless Interim Report: Securing our future health: taking a long-term view 
DH 2002 Wanless Report: Securing our future health: taking a long-term view 
DH 2002  Wanless. Summary of Consultation Responses 
DH 2002 
Delivering 21st Century IT Support For the NHS: National specification for 
integrated care records service. Consultation Draft.  
DH 2002 
Delivering 21st Century IT support for the NHS. National Strategic 
Programme. 
DH 2002 
Delivering 21st Century IT Support For the NHS: Summary of the overall 
procurement strategy.  
DH 2002 
Companies registering expressions of interest for Local Service Provider 
and/or National Application Service Provider contracts.  
DH 2002 Delivering The NHS Plan. April 2002.  
DH 2003 
The National Programme for IT in the NHS: Key Elements of the 
Procurement Approach 
DH 2004 
Wanless Report: Securing good health for the whole population: Final report 
- February 2004 
DH 2004 
The NHS Improvement Plan. Putting People at the Heart of the Public 
services.  Executive Summary 
DH 2004 
The NHS Improvement Plan. Putting People at the Heart of the Public 
services.   
DH 2005 Good practice guidelines for general practice electronic patient records.  
DH 2006 Report of the Ministerial Taskforce on the NHS Summary Care Record.  
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DH 2006 Our Health, Our Care, Our Say - A new direction for Community Services 
DH 2009 
NHS 2010-2015: From Good to Great. Preventative, People-centred, 
productive.  
DH 2009 The NHS Constitution 
DH 2010 NHS constitution for England. 
DH 2010 National Quality Board Annual Report.  
DH 2010 
Liberating the NHS: Greater Choice and Control. A consultation on 
proposals.  
DH 2010 The NHS Constitution and WhistleBlowing – consultation 
DH 2010 Healthy Lives Healthy People 
DH 2010 Healthy Lives, healthy people – Impact Assessment.  
DH 2011 Health Is global 
DH 2011 Full Reponse to NHS Future Forum report.  
DH 2011 Government changes in response to NHS Future Forum 
N
H
S 
C
o
n
fe
d
. r
ep
o
rt
s The NHS 
Confederation 2003 The national strategy for IT in the NHS 
The NHS 
Confederation 2003 
National Programme for IT: an Interview with Richard Granger and Peter 
Hutton.  
The NHS 
Confederation 2004 Electronic Booking – An Initial Guide To Implementation.  
The NHS 
Confederation 2004 The NHS Care Records Service.  
N
H
S 
D
ir
ec
t;
 N
H
S 
IA
 NHS Direct 
2005 
to 
2010 107 press Releases from NHS Direct from 2005 to 2010 
NHS 
Information 
Authority 2002 
Share With Care! People’s Views on Consent and Confidentiality Of Patient 
Information.  
C
FH
 
NHS CFH 2004 Making IT Work. March 2004, Issue 1.  
NHS CFH 2004 Making IT work. August 2004, Issue 2.  
NHS CFH 2004 Making It Work. December 2004, Issue 3 
NHS CFH 2005 Making IT work. July 2005, Issue 4 
NHS CFH 2005 Making IT Better.  
NHS CFH 2005 Business Plan 2005-2006 
NHS CFH 2005 Business Plan Summary 
NHS CFH 2005 A Guide to the National Programme for IT (NPfIT) 
NHS CFH 2007 Better Information Better Health. 
NHS CFH 2007 The National Programme for IT Implementation Guide. Version 5, July 2007. 
N
H
S 
NHS 2003 
 
HealthWhich? And NHS National Programme for IT. (2003). The Public View 
on Electronic Health Records. 
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NHS 2005 An Introduction to NHS PACS.  
NHS 2006 Proposal for GP Systems of Choice.  2006 March 
NHS 2006 Proposal for GP Systems of Choice. Briefing for the NHS. Update. 2006 June 
NHS 2006 
Proposal for GP Systems of Choice. Briefing for the NHS. Update. 2006 
October.  
NHS 2007 Memorandum of Information. (GP Systems of choice). 
NHS 2011 The Care Records Guarantee 
NHS Future 
Forum 2011 NHS Future Forum’s Recommendations To the Government.  
N
at
io
n
al
 A
u
d
it
 O
ff
ic
e
 
NAO 2002 NHS Direct In England 
NAO 2005 
Achieving Improvements Through Clinical Governance: A Progress Report 
On Implementation By NHS Trusts 
NAO 2005 Patient Choice at the point of GP referral.  
NAO 2005 Financial Management in the NHS. NHS summarised accounts 2003-2004 
NAO 2005 A safer place for patients: Learning to improve patient safety. 
NAO 2006 NHS Direct 2004-2005: Qualification of Audit Opinion 
NAO 2006 The National Programme for IT in the NHS 
NAO 2005 
NHS Connecting for Health Process Capability Appraisal prepared for the 
National Audit Office by Qinetiq. (Supporting data for NAO 2006 NPFIT 
report) 
NAO 2007 Prescribing Costs in primary care.  
NAO 2010 Management of NHS hospital Productivity.  
NAO 2010 Short Guide to the NAO’s work on the Department of Health 
NAO 2011 
The National Programme For IT in the NHS: An update on the delivery of 
detailed care record systems 
NAO 2011 Managing High Value Capital Equipment 
NAO 2011 Procurement of consumables by NHS acute and foundation trusts. 
NAO 2011 NHS Landscape Review.  
NAO 2013 
Review of the final benefits statement for programmes previously managed 
under the National Programme for IT in the NHS. Memorandum for the 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts. 
P
u
b
lic
 
A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 
C
o
m
m
it
te
e 
PAC 2007 
Department of Health: The National Programme for IT in the NHS. Twentieth 
Report of Session 2006-07 
PAC 2011 
The National Programme for IT in the NHS: An Update on the delivery of 
detailed care record systems 
O
th
er
  m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g 
b
o
d
ie
s 
House of 
Commons 
Health 
Committee 2007 The Electronic Patient Record. Sixth report of Session 2006-07.  
Major 
Projects 
Authority 2011 
Major Projects Authority Programme Assessment Review of the National 
Programme for IT 
Appendices 
331 
 
B
C
S BCS 2005 BCS Response to NAO Investigation of NPfIT 
BCS 2011 
Preparing the NHS for an information revolution. BCS report on the NHS 
Information Revolution consultation on proposals 
B
M
A
 
BMA 2009 
NHS 2010-2015 From Good to Great. Preventative People-centred, 
productive BMA summary 
BMA 2010 BMA. 2010 Oct. Response to Equity and Excellence: Liberating The NHS.  
BMA 2010 Briefing. Equity and Excellence: Liberating The NHS 
BMA 2010 March. Briefing Note: NHS Choices.  
BMA 2010 June. An NHS Beyond The Market 
BMA 2010 NHS Operating Framework 2011-2012. (December 2010) 
BMA 2011 BMA Response to NHS Future Forum consultation.  
BMA 2011 
BMA Response to Liberating the NHS – Developing th healthcare workforce. 
March 2011.  
BMA 2011 
BMA 2011 January. Survey results by Ipsos MORI for response to Equity and 
Excellence – liberating the NHS 
BMA 2011 Briefing. Social Enterprise Briefing Note.  
BMA 2011 NHS Outcomes Framework 2011-2012. 
R
C
P
 
RCP 2009 
Improving clinical records and clinical coding together – a project with the 
Audit Commission. 
RCP 2010 The case and vision for patient-focused records.  
RCP 2010 Response to Equity and Excellence – regulating healthcare providers.  
RCP 2010 
Response to Equity and Excellence – Local democratic legitimacy in 
healthcare.  
RCP 2010 Response to Equity and Excellence – Commissioning for Patients.  
RCP 2010 Response to Equity and Excellence – Liberating the NHS 
RCP 2010 Oct 2010. RCP response to Liberating the NHS: Transparency In Outcomes 
RCP 
2011
? RCP Response to Liberating the NHS 
RCP 2011 
Response to Liberating the NHS – greater choice and control (Patient Choice 
consultation response) 
RCP 2011 Response to NHS Constitution and Whistleblowing Consultation 
RCP 2011 March 2011. Health and Social Care Bill Committee. RCP Written Evidence.  
RCP 2011 
Feb 2011. Health select committee: commissioning follow-up inquiry. RCP 
response.  
RCP 2011 May 2011. NHS Listening Exercise. RCP Response 
RCP 2011 
Response to Healthy Lives Healthy People. ‘Health Select Committee: 
Inquiry on public health’.  
RCP 2011 June 2011. RCP Summary of Government’s response to Future Forum 
RCP 2011 RCP Response to Future Forum Report. June 2011.  
RCP 2011 Summary of government’s response to future forum 
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RCP 2011 Leading for quality.  
R
C
G
P
 
RCGP 2001 
Valuing General Practice (Joint paper with BMA, Response to NHS Plan, and 
also couple with the Response to the Wanless consultation) 
RCGP 2001 
Securing our future health: Taking a long term view-The Wanless (Interim) 
report (Response to Consultation) 
RCGP 2010 Response to  Equity and Excellence Liberating the NHS 
RCGP 2011 The Health and Social Care Bill - Second Reading brief. Briefing paper. 
RCGP 2010 Health and social care bill committee - transcript 
RCGP 2011 Letter to Cameron regarding Health and Social Care Bill from Clare Gerada 
RCGP 2011 
2011 May. Analysis paper on health reforms. "The Government's Health 
Reforms: An analysis of the need for clarification and change by the RCGP" 
RCGP 2011 Response to future forum listening exercise.  
RCGP 2011 Response to healthy lives healthy people consultation.  
RCGP 2011 
Response to Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Our Strategy for Public Health in 
England 
RCGP 2011 
Response to healthy lives healthy people consultation – transparency in 
outcomes. 
RCGP 2011 Response to Liberating the NHS - An Informatoin Revolution 
RCGP 2011 
Response to healthy lives healthy people consultation – funding and 
commissioning routes for public health. 
R
C
N
 
RCN 2004 Speaking Up: Nurses and NHS IT Developments 
RCN 2007 
Electronic Personal Health Records – Emergence and Implications For The 
UK. (Note: not an RCN Publication) 
RCN 2011 Response to NHS White paper Equity and Excellence: Liberating The NHS 
RCN 2011 Response to Liberating The NHS: Transparency In Outcomes 
RCN 2011 Response To Liberating the NHS: Commissioning For Patients 
RCN 2011 Response to Liberating The NHS: Local Democratic Legitimacy in health 
RCN 2011 Response to Liberating the NHS – Regulating Healthcare providers 
RCN 2011 
RCN Response to Liberating the NHS: Achieving Equity and Excellence for 
Children 
RCN 2011 Response to Liberating The NHS: Greater Choice And Control 
RCN 2011 Response to Liberating The NHS – an Information Revolution 
RCN 2011 Response to Liberating the NHS – Liberating the healthcare workforce 
RCN 2011 Response to NHS Future Forum Listening Exercise 
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APPENDIX C: Interview Agenda 
Themes Points to be covered as time permits 
Personal opinion/experience 
of EHRs 
- Efficiency/benefits at workplace as a result of EHR 
use? 
- Ease of use? 
- Patient-doctor interaction;  Doctor-nurse 
interaction/boundaries 
The need for a national care 
record service 
 
- Views on the felt need for a national care record 
service when the NPfIT began 
 
Feasibility 
 
- Views at the start of the project, vs. current views 
- What was done right/wrong? 
- Opinions on procurement strategy, and the quality of 
systems to be made available to clinicians 
 
Expectations - Discuss their expectations from the NHS Care Record 
Service at the start of the programme, and to what 
extent these were met 
 
Discussion on Summary Care 
Records (SCR)/Detailed Care 
records (DCR) 
- Patient access and 
empowerment 
regarding the same 
 
- Usability & Ease of access to one’s own SCR: ask them 
their own experience 
- SCR/DCR contents – what details they think it should 
contain 
- Patient ‘ownership’ of own records/data, and 
potential consequences of this on safety and 
healthcare delivery 
 
User/public engagement and 
communication 
- Discuss respondent’s views on how DOH engaged 
with his/her professional group, and whether their 
views were considered in later 
developments/decisions in the project 
- General views on how DOH engaged with other 
stakeholder groups 
 
Retrospective thoughts on the 
project – past successes (?) 
and future progress 
- NPfIT as a failure vs. (partial) success – thoughts on 
this?  
- DOH’s positive updates on the electronic record 
component vs. conflicting evidence provided by other 
stakeholders: possible explanations? 
- Thoughts on whether/how the programme and its 
NCRS component shifted focus/priorities during its 
journey 
- Extent to which the original vision of ‘transforming 
the way healthcare is delivered’ was achieved 
- Priorities going forward? (Standardisation; 
Interoperability; Patient engagement; Clinician 
engagement; ) 
  
3
3
4
 
APPENDIX D: Overview of selected key events in the NPfIT. 
 Evolution of the 
NCRS 
Government/ 
DH/CFH 
Accountability bodies 
(NAO/PAC/Health 
Select Committee) 
Engagement 
mechanisms/disruptions/ 
restructuring 
Leadership Suppliers and procurement  
2002  Feb: Meeting at 10 
Downing street sees 
conception of NPFIT; 
June: “Delivering 21
st
 
century IT support for the 
NHS” report: integrated 
record; no mention of 
Spine 
 
  October: Richard Granger 
appointed NPFIT Director 
General 
 
2003 Concept of  the ‘spine 
health record’ put 
forward by clinician-
led groups 
    April: GP contracts signed off 
for GP choice, QMAS systems 
(independent of NPFIT); 
December: LSP contracts signed 
with CSC,  BT, Accenture 
2004    April: Head of National 
Clinical Advisory Board steps 
down; 
National Clinical Leads 
appointed; 
RCN – Oct 2004 document: 
Speaking Up; Nurses and NHS 
IT developments 
 
Sept: Joint Senior 
Responsible Owner of the 
NPFIT (A.Halligan) leaves 
January: LSP contract signed 
with Fujitsu 
2005  Care Records Guarantee 
published 
 Jan: Porter Novelli PR 
company appointed to 
manage public relations for 
NPFIT 
April:NPfIT renamed 
Connecting for Health (CFH) 
and established as new 
agency replacing NHS IA 
 Fujitsu switches from IDX 
systems to Cerner Millenium 
2006 March: GP Systems of 
Choice established 
 April: A dossier of 
concerns drafted by 23 
  July: BT switches from IDX 
systems to Cerner Millenium; 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
  
3
3
5
 
academics  
June: NAO Report 
highlights delays 
Sept: Accenture withdraws; CSC 
takes over 
2007 Spring: Piloting of 
SCRs triggers privacy 
concerns; 
June: SCR consent 
mechanism to be 
made hybrid between 
opt-in/opt-out 
 March: PAC Report 
highlights delays, 
incapabilities of suppliers, 
lack of clinical 
engagement; 
June: Electronic Patient 
Record inquiry by Health 
Select Committee 
April: National Local 
Ownership Programme 
(NLOP) introduced  
Sept: Care Records 
Development Board closed 
June: Richard Granger 
resigns 
 
2008 Increased efforts by 
RCP, AOMRC to 
define professional 
record keeping 
standards 
   Jan-April: Gordon Hextall 
takes over from Granger; 
September: Christine 
Connelly and Martin 
Bellamy jointly take over 
NHS CFH 
May: Fujitsu contract 
terminated, with BT to take 
over some of Fujitsu’s work 
2009   PAC Report on NPFIT 
(Progress since 2006) 
 Martin Bellammy resigns  
2010 March: BMA call for 
suspension of 
Summary Care Record 
rollout  
New Labour gov replaced 
by Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition 
government; 
Central approach 
declared unnecessary 
    
2011 Good practice 
guidelines for GP EPR, 
version 4 – (RCGP, 
BMA and DH) 
September: NPFIT 
dismantled 
May: NAO Report 
(Update on detailed care 
record systems) 
June: MPA Review of the 
NPfIT 
 
   
 
A
p
p
en
d
ices 
